Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



PB 80–95–4 October 1995 Vol. 8, No. 4

From the Commandant

Special Warfare

As we consider today's world political situation, we survey a landscape whose continuing upheavals promise an unstable and uncertain future. In this issue of *Special Warfare*, our focus is on the future and the steps we should take to prepare for it in terms of doctrine, force structure and theory. I fully expect this issue to engender comments and debate, and I encourage readers to use *Special Warfare* as a forum for expressing their views.

Robert Pfaltzgraff points out that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have seen armed conflict on a scale unprecedented since World War II. The numerous conflicts, political fragmentations and possible hostile alliances pose challenges for the United States security strategy. These instabilities may lead to a variety of military actions, at all levels of the conflict spectrum. Special-operations forces will have roles at each conflict level.

In preparing for the future, we must ensure that our doctrine is up-to-date and that our training and force structure will support the changing requirements. Colonel Mark Boyatt wrote in the October 1994 issue of *Special Warfare* about possible changes to doctrine and organization that might better enable SF to meet current and future mission demands. In this issue, Colonel Glenn Harned continues the discussion with alternative recommendations.

As Harned points out, our doctrine may already be sufficient to the task, with some relevant changes in the unit mission-essential task lists and in the reordering of our unit training priorities. Both Harned and retired Major General Sidney Shachnow discuss possible changes in force structure to meet the changing mission demands. But in making these changes, we face not only the problem of determining the best solutions but also the problem of overcoming reluctance to change when the solutions involve the shifting of personnel and resources into unfamiliar combinations.

As the world political situation is changing, so is the way that some thinkers perceive warfare and military forces. Steven Metz's review essay compares the thinking of three prominent modern theorists to the strategic thinking of Karl von Clausewitz. Although none of the three modern theorists may be correct, the discussion and evaluation of their concepts are important to improve our understanding of the philosophy of warfare, and we must be willing to change our way of thinking if necessary.

Changes to doctrine and force structure have long-reaching effects and should be made judiciously. But we should not allow our reluctance to change to interfere with the need to adapt to changes in our operational environment and in the nature of warfare. As Sidney Shachnow says in his article, "Of all our human resources, the most precious is the desire to improve."

Major General William F. Garrison

PB 80–95–4

Contents

October 1995 | Special Warfare | Vol. 8, No. 4

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -5341. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Dennis J. Reimer
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
Joel B. Hudson
Acting Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

00686

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Features

Departments

Sources of Instability: Implications for Special Operations Forces

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.

The post-Cold War world contains numerous sources of instability that shape the roles and missions for which U.S. military capabilities, particularly those of special-operations forces, or SOF, must be configured in order to support American interests. In the planning processes within each of the services and in broader public discussion, much emphasis has been placed on the dramatic changes in the global system of the 1990s.

There are, however, important elements of continuity between the Cold War era and the present period. They include the large number of intrastate conflicts that followed or coincided with the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa from the early post-World War II period into the 1960s, and the growing numbers of terrorist activities, especially during the 1980s. Meanwhile, it is widely recognized that we are in the midst of a political fragmentation that has already reshaped the map of Europe and that has yet to run its course. If intrastate conflict has not replaced interstate wars, the emerging paradigm nevertheless contains numerous examples of conflicts between groups other than states. We are confronted by a spectrum of conflict that includes regional powers as well as increasing numbers of nonstate actors.

In the Cold War era, superpower relations shaped the interests of the U.S. in regions from Europe to east Asia and from the Caribbean to southwest Asia. With the end of the Cold War, regions whose importance was once measured by our interest in preventing Soviet domination remain the object of U.S. policy because of their enduring geostrategic significance to the U.S.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union coincided with a regionalization of U.S. security policy framed by vital interests that transcend the Cold War superpower relationship, especially in southwest and northeast Asia. The rise of destabilizing regional powers, e.g., Iraq and North Korea, and the potential for transregional relationships among actors hostile to the West, especially in regional settings of vital geostrategic importance, pose new threats to U.S. security. The extent to which geographically separate states forge closer interregional links with each other or become part of a broader anti-Western coalition remains to be seen. To the extent that geographically separated states, such as Iran and North Korea, develop alignments with each other, the

---

This article was originally presented at a 1994 conference hosted by Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Roles and Missions of Special Operations Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War.

Photo by Kit Thompson

A U.S. tank crosses the Kuwaiti desert during Operation Desert Storm. The rise of destabilizing powers like Iraq in areas of strategic importance to the U.S. poses new security threats.

security threat to the U.S. and its allies will increase.

The growing importance of would-be regional hegemonic powers coincides with the emergence of other conflicts that did not surface as long as the Soviet Union existed as part of a bipolar global structure. In contrast to the Cold War era, which constituted Europe's longest period of peace in modern times, the collapse of the Soviet Union has been followed by a fragmenting Europe and armed conflict on a scale unprecedented since World War II. Simultaneously we confront the specter of a post-Soviet Russia that remains in possession of thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Its society is one in which criminal groups and hard-line elements have gained increasing power in recent months, with reported incidents of the theft of nuclear materials and technology, some of which have flowed into Iran, North Korea and other states in regions of importance to the U.S. and its allies.

Sources

Theories abound about the sources of instability in the post-Cold War world. For example, a radicalized bloc of Islamic-fundamentalist states led by Iran would give operational meaning to Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis: "The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations." Huntington suggests that "Intercivilizational issues are increasingly replacing intersuperpower issues as the top items on the international agenda. These issues include arms proliferation, human rights, and immigration. On these three issues, the West is on one side and most of the other major civilizations are on the other." States linked ideologically by Islamic fundamentalism and armed with weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, would have derived their advanced technologies from outside sources (including North Korea, China and Russia) and from the West as well.

A closely related explanation of the sources of conflict can be found in the "waves of history" thesis set forth more than a generation ago by Alvin Toffler: "When waves of history collide, whole civilizations clash." In this perspective, "The deepest economic and strategic change of all is the coming division of the world into three distinct, differing, and potentially clashing civilizations."[1] Toffler suggests three waves: the first is based on an agrarian society, with wealth generated from land; the second is based on the Industrial Revolution, with wealth generated from industry; and the third is based on new ways of creating and exploiting knowledge, with an accelerating pace of technological change, transactions and daily life. In the post-Cold War era are political units patterned after each of the three waves. The types of con-

flict in the future, and the means by which to wage them, will be highly variegated and complex. Third-wave societies, in possession of highly advanced technologies, will contend with entities whose capabilities are derived from first- or second-wave societies.

The implications of this diverse conflict spectrum are important. High-tech capabilities well-suited to conducting military operations like Operation Desert Storm have not been readily applicable to situations such as the ethnic warfare in the Balkans. Military capabilities designed primarily for interstate conventional warfare, such as that of World War II, the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and Desert Storm, appear to be largely inapplicable to the intrastate conflicts waged by insurgency forces. In the Cold War era and after, states accustomed to fighting conventional wars against other states have found it virtually impossible to formulate effective strategies and to create military capabilities that would prove successful in unconventional warfare. The emerging conflict map is likely to contain numerous flashpoints in which armed conflicts based on insurgency strategies and tactics will be waged by military units, with one or both sides being nonstate actors. What marks special-operations forces is their apparent suitability or adaptability to each of the three types of political-military environment suggested by the Toffler thesis.

Actors

The present global conflict setting contains an unprecedented diversity of actors, a large number of which are either nonstates or "failed states." The present setting is also characterized by elements of integration coinciding with forces of disintegration. The former includes transnational actors; alliances; economic activity leading to unprecedented flows of people, ideas, goods, services and information; and the permeability of state borders. The fragmenting forces include the breakup of empires and states and the emergence of additional power centers whose international status will be measured to a large extent by the levels of technology and the types of weapons systems in their possession. Rapid increases in technology and the dissemination of that technology to greater numbers of actors are transforming the global security setting in ways not easily or readily understood.

In a future global structure characterized by post-Cold War political fragmentation, the armed conflicts and the wars between legally sovereign states will include confrontations at the subnational level. As a consequence, there will be a growing indistinguishability between crime and war. "National defense" will become a local concept and will include the control of conflict in urban and other areas. The profile of emerging conflicts is said to have such defining characteristics as ungovernability, the withering of central governments, anarchy, and private armies in regions extending across, but not necessarily confined to, Africa, southwest and central Asia and parts of Europe, especially the Balkans.[2] Such a security setting is based on the view of a world divided into "islands" of affluence — North America, Western Europe and much of the Pacific Rim — linked by a global network of trade, investment, technology transfer and instantaneous communications; and by the mobility of their citizens, capital and ideas.

These islands are surrounded by poverty, surging populations, declining literacy and a growing political fanaticism and fundamentalism. Such is the operational setting for the clash of civilizations and the collision of the three waves of history. The potential for cleavages, even within advanced third-wave societies, is heightened by pressures resulting from refugee flows; the spillover of conflicts from adjacent regions; a tendency toward polarization within states as immigration surges; challenges to domestic cohesiveness, especially in the U.S. and Western Europe, resulting from an increasingly multiethnic, multicultural society and a

Photo by Hans Deffner

High-tech capabilities well-suited to operations like Desert Storm may not be readily applicable to ethnic warfare and regional conflicts.

greater polarity among contending political, social, racial and ethnic groups.

Technologies

Among the major trends shaping our global security environment is the widening availability of technologies for the conduct of warfare. The emergence of a "multipolar" system may be measured and assessed by the extent to which military technology and other capabilities are diffused or proliferated.

The deployment of missiles armed with nuclear and other types of warheads may pose a threat to states distant from an immediate theater of operations. Although Brazil, Argentina and South Africa have pulled away from the nuclear threshold, an estimated 25 other countries are reported to be developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the means of delivering them. As we move toward and into the 21st century, as many as 40 states will have the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons. A substantial number of such states may be aligned with each other or at the very least in pursuit of policies that clash with U.S. interests.

An additional proliferation issue will gain greater prominence as a result of the revolutions in bioengineering, which in turn will bring about larger numbers and a wider availability of novel, highly virulent biological agents. Such capabilities, to the extent that they are present in regions of importance, will place new requirements and burdens on the U.S. and its coalition partners in future operations.

Military technologies that will be more widely available encompass submarines, surface ships, tanks and artillery, as well as increasingly accurate cruise and ballistic missiles equipped with conventional or mass-destruction warheads.

Because of their widespread use in low-intensity conflicts, such as those in Bosnia and Somalia, less sophisticated technologies have accounted for more casualties and devastation than have highly advanced systems since the end of World War II. In a conflict setting where there are likely to be substantial numbers of ethnic and regional disputes, military power ranging from low intensity to potentially higher intensity may be employed. A description of capabilities available to the respective actors would emphasize relatively low-tech systems that may be acces-

sible in large quantities. What have been termed "non-apocalyptic" weapons include aircraft, artillery and armored vehicles such as those used in Bosnia; and a range of smaller arms such as those used in Somalia and Haiti. Conflicts and ethnic wars within failed states will provide ample scope for the employment of military power that does not include WMD.

Geopolitics

Although we have a brief description of the basic elements of the emerging post-Cold War world, for purposes of U.S. strategy we must seek a geopolitical construct to replace that of the Cold War period. We may begin with the basic proposition that in this century the U.S. has had an enduring interest in assuring the independence of as many states as possible on the rimlands of Eurasia. Some states in regions extending from Europe to east Asia have been deemed inimical to U.S. vital interests because of their transatlantic or transpacific threat to North America. In the Cold War era we forged transatlantic and transpacific alliances and other security commitments with states on the Eurasian rimland extending from Japan and the Republic of Korea to the Atlantic Alliance. U.S. forward-deployed forces were designed to deter armed conflict in Europe and the Pacific Rim.

In this complex global setting, it is essential to rethink the types of capabilities, including those of special-operations forces, that will be needed by the U.S. and its coalition partners to halt or otherwise shape the outcome of crises and conflicts in various regions.

Even before Desert Storm, the U.S. had fought two major regional conflicts, in Korea and in southeast Asia, under the premise that hostile control of the Asian mainland would pose danger to the U.S. By the same token, the U.S. is confronting an emerging post-Cold War geopolitical map in which the principal contenders for power capable of threatening U.S. interests lie in the vast regions extending from northeast to southwest Asia and to Russia. Russia's strategic threat remains the potentially lethal combination of political instability and a huge nuclear arsenal.

Many building blocks are in place for an alignment of radical states stretching from north Africa to northeast Asia. Key actors in such a configuration might include Iran and North Korea, as well as central-Asian and north-African states. Greatly influenced by Islamic fundamentalism and by anti-U.S./Western policies, such states would have acquired or would be in the process of acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Located in many cases in the coastal regions of Asia and north Africa, these radical states would pose a danger to U.S. interests. How closely in concert they would be prepared to act in order to oppose the U.S. and other third-wave societies remains to be seen. What is evident, nevertheless, is the potential for the emergence of a significant number of states in possession of a broad spectrum of military capabilities targetable against vital interests of the United States and its allies.

Regions such as northeast Asia and southwest Asia, which are geographically separated, could become linked in a geopolitical setting of vital significance to the U.S. and its allies. For example, North Korea and Iran could coordinate their military operations and confront the U.S. simultaneously with two major regional conflicts or they could simply pose a threat to the territory of the U.S. and its allies by means of WMD. This alliance would vastly complicate the already formidable task of safeguarding U.S. interests. North Korea's growing missile industry appears to be heavily dependent on Iran for financial assistance and on Russia for technological assistance.[3] There have been reports that North Korea and Iran have agreed to establish a plant in Iran to produce

missiles.[4] A radicalized grouping including Iran, China, North Korea, and Islamic fundamentalist Algeria and Egypt would span at least three regions of great importance to the U.S. and its allies.

Pakistan might be drawn into such an alignment as a counter to India, which is said to have major power aspirations in south Asia and with which Pakistan is locked into a long-term struggle over Kashmir. Pakistan views China as part of an alignment against India. For China, Pakistan represents a geographical link across south Asia to Iran. A modernizing China, with increasing technological and military capabilities, would forge alignments with such states as part of a foreign-policy strategy.

According to this strategic logic, China would become the leader of an Asian bloc, with Iran playing a comparable role within an Islamic bloc. To the extent that China and Iran forge links with each other, the basis exists for a combination of states extending across much of the Asian Pacific Rim.

The pattern could be extended into central Asia by the emerging relationships with former republics of the Soviet Union, including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgistan and Kazakhstan, all of which are seeking to balance a renewal of Russian expansion into central Asia. In this geopolitical setting, Russia, which is itself seeking a political accommodation with China, would possibly be prepared to accept joint leadership of the Asian bloc with Beijing. In turn, the United States could face an increasingly hostile band of states and a post-Yeltsin Russian leadership more fully committed to the gradual restoration of Russian hegemony than any other leadership since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Radicalized states, including North Korea and Iran, already the perpetrators of state-sponsored terrorism, will soon be in possession of WMD systems. This combination of capabilities for low- and high-intensity conflict will confer unprecedented political-military leverage on radicalized states, especially if they are able to coordinate their actions into a strategy against the United States and its allies.

Crisis response

In this complex global setting, it is essential to rethink the types of capabilities, including those of special-operations forces, that will be needed by the U.S. and its coalition partners to halt or otherwise shape the outcome of crises and conflicts in various regions. We will need appropriate strategies of deterrence for conflicts involving what may inevitably be culturally and politically diverse entities whose value structures and security objectives will not be easily discernible. Strategic thought will be prerequisite to developing necessary capabilities, including forward presence, power projection and flexible forces, that will provide options that extend beyond a diplomatic response but fall short of a major commitment of military forces.

United Nations photo

These U.S. Marines were part of a U.S.-led coalition force sent to Somalia in December 1992 to safeguard the delivery of food supplies.

Thus far, our thinking about post-Cold War crisis response has concentrated on options designed to contain, control and de-escalate situations. We are in the midst of developing a concept in which the use of military power is described as “peace support operations,” which are divided into essentially four categories: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping

and peace-building. Each category contains requirements for the potential use of special-operations forces.

With regard to preventive diplomacy, for example, if disputes cannot be deterred or prevented, our goal should be to control their escalation and to limit their spread. Preventive diplomacy also includes timely diplomatic action to resolve disputes before violence erupts. Peacemaking, which is designed to halt conflict, is also likely to require the use of military power including special-operations forces. Peacemaking efforts involve the use of diplomacy to end disputes and to remove their underlying causes. The function of peacekeeping is usually carried out at the request of, or with the approval of, the parties to a dispute.

Peacekeeping typically calls for the employment of an international presence that includes military and civilian personnel who are deployed to an area for the purpose of supervising a cease-fire or separating the hostile parties. Peace-building is the diplomatic and military action that occurs after the conflict for the purpose of developing structures designed to strengthen the prospects for peace and thereby lessen the probability of a recurrence of conflict. Peace-building cannot be accomplished without military capabilities that include SOF.

If we project a global security setting in which many existing political units are in the process of political fragmentation and outside military forces are called upon to intervene in ways other than war, it follows that operations other than war will be undertaken with increasing frequency. They may precede, accompany or follow war. The military occupation of the defeated World War II powers, as well as the use of Civil Affairs military units to assist local authorities in re-establishing structures for law and order, come to mind. The types of operations that military forces, especially those of the U.S., are called upon to perform include disaster relief, drug interdiction, training and noncombatant assistance to other militaries, aid to local or state authorities in maintaining order, and noncombatant evacuation.

In the emerging security setting, military power is likely to be used in essentially two categories of operations other than war: first, situations arising from human conflict such as the post-war activities described above; and second, situations resulting from natural disasters such as tornadoes and hurricanes. When natural disasters occur, military units, including SOF, may be called upon to provide emergency relief.

Across this broad spectrum of existing and potential conflicts, SOF have been used with increasing frequency since the end of the Cold War. Each of the conflict categories, extending from mid-high intensity to low intensity, contains a place for SOF. Without enumerating SOF-specific roles and missions, an obvious match exists between the emerging security setting and the overall characteristics and capabilities of SOF. One of the distinguishing characteristics of SOF is their inherent ability to perform numerous functions with relatively few personnel in low-profile situations, with minimal logistics support and with little publicity.

Special Forces soldiers assess damage from Hurricane Andrew as part of disaster-relief operations in southern Florida.

Photo by Keith Butler

Implications

From this survey of the evolving security setting, including major sources of instability, a number of implications for special-operations forces are evident. A global political setting characterized by political fragmentation, in which enemies

and friends may be difficult to identify, is likely to be ideally suited for the use of SOF. SOF may be called upon to undertake high-stakes and high-risk activities such as sabotaging an enemy's nuclear-weapons program or locating an enemy's command-and-control systems so that these systems can be destroyed in air strikes or by other military operations.

In retrospect, it appears fortuitous that the U.S. Special Operations Command was established in 1987. USSOCOM is a unified command with two basic missions: to furnish special-operations forces to regional commanders in chief, or CINCs; and, as a supported command, to plan and undertake special operations as directed by the national command authorities. The two basic roles assigned to USSOCOM in support of national security strategy are to deter and counter violence as part of a crisis-response capability; and to provide national assistance to states faced with the need to counter insurgencies, and to address problems whose solutions might help prevent sources of instability from becoming crises.

In the post-Cold War security setting, the importance of special-operations forces has been enhanced by their contribution of a "crisis-response capability, falling between diplomatic initiatives and the committing of conventional forces."[5]

As we move toward the end of this decade and into a new century, the U.S. inevitably will face new competitors for military power. The competition may extend across regions in which the U.S. has held important interests and in which we have fought major regional conflicts, such as northeast and southwest Asia. Our ability to maintain a forward presence in or near such areas will be further diminished at a time when additional actors will have access to advanced technologies, including WMD, and in an era in which the U.S. will confront the prospect of radicalized states posing a challenge to its interests.

We will need special-operations forces, as we did in Operation Desert Storm, to operate behind an enemy's front lines, to attack targets of major importance, to integrate reconnaissance and intelligence efforts, to establish clandestine and unconventional operations, to work with coalition forces, and to develop a strategy for psychological operations. During the war phase itself, special-operations forces will be needed to provide intelligence and to delay, disrupt, divert and deceive enemy military units. After the armed conflict has ended, special-operations forces will be needed to assist in nation-building, peacekeeping and humanitarian support, and to help in the restoration of essential services and political structures.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. is president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis professor of international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Cambridge, Mass. Dr. Pfaltzgraff is an authority on issues of U.S. national-security policy, including relations between the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union, alliance relationships with a focus on Europe and the Asian-Pacific area, regional-security issues, crisis management, force planning and arms control. He writes and lectures in the U.S. and abroad. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. The recipient of Penfield and Guggenheim fellowships, Dr. Pfaltzgraff has held visiting professorships at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium; and at the National Defense College, Tokyo.

Notes:

[1] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), p. 18.

[2] For an extended discussion of such a conflict setting, see Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1994.

[3] Greg J. Garardi and James A. Plotts, *An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments* (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 11 August 1994), pp. 3-4.

[4] See *Proliferation Issues* (5 May 1994), p. 47.

[5] General Carl W. Stiner, "USSOCOM'S Wide Ranging Area of Operations: Large-Scale War to Forward Presence," *Army Magazine*, April 1993, p. 30.

Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?

by Colonel Glenn M. Harned

In the October 1994 issue of *Special Warfare*, Colonel Mark Boyatt proposed a change in Special Forces doctrine that would replace the five current SF missions — unconventional warfare, or UW; foreign internal defense, or FID; direct action, or DA; special reconnaissance, or SR; and counterterrorism, or CT — with one primary mission termed unconventional operations, or UO.

The new mission would encompass UW, FID and multinational DA/SR. Boyatt's proposal would eliminate the CT mission of selected units within the SF groups, and it would downgrade unilateral DA and SR missions to collateral activities. He believes that CT, DA and SR currently consume a disproportionate share of training time and other resources that the SF groups should be devoting to UO.

Boyatt's thought-provoking article contains implicit assumptions that SF survival is no longer in jeopardy and that SF relevance to wartime AirLand operations is no longer central to the acceptance of SF by the rest of the Army. The Army's Special Forces have truly come a long way in a short time if SF senior leaders are beginning to make these assumptions.

Nevertheless, one might disagree with Boyatt's proposed doctrinal mission change. To explain, we will begin with a history of the development of SF doctrinal missions.

Past

When the 10th SF Group was activated in 1952, its sole mission was UW, *which at the time included DA and SR*.[1] The Army envisioned SF performing UW at the theater-strategic level in occupied Europe (and later in Asia) within the context of a global war with the Soviet Union. SF thus inherited the World War II mission of the Office of Strategic Services' operational groups and special-operations detachments. Only in the relatively brief period between pre-linkup and demobilization did SF plan to operate in direct support of, or in close coordination with, tactical ground forces. As was mentioned previously, DA and SR were considered subsets of UW, collateral activities to be performed using UW capabilities inherent in the SF group — as Boyatt argues they should be today.

During the Kennedy administration, when communist insurgencies in the Third World were perceived as threats to vital U.S. national interests, counterinsurgency gained new importance within the Department of Defense. SF acquired its FID mission through the belief that "The best way to fight a guerrilla is with another guerrilla." For more than a decade, SF fought insurgents in Southeast Asia, Latin

America and elsewhere in the Third World. Over the past 20 years, the de facto definition of the SF FID mission has expanded to include all forms of foreign military assistance in a permissive environment, even when that assistance is directed against an external threat.

At the end of the Indochina War, the Army refocused on its NATO mission and conventional warfighting. It became obsessed with winning the first defensive battle; the Army had little interest in joint operations, echelons above corps or the operational level of war. UW, regarded as a long-term effort without immediate impact on the close battle, was discredited because of the perceived lack of resistance potential within the Warsaw Pact countries. Before the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, theater commanders in chief, or CINCs, had relatively little political clout within the DoD. The senior SF leadership found itself in a struggle for survival that could be won only by demonstrating the relevance of SF to the conventional warfighter, which in the 1970s meant the Army corps.

To secure the survival of SF in this hostile strategic, doctrinal and fiscal environment, the senior SF leadership separated DA and SR into two separate and distinct SF missions and linked them doctrinally to the warfighting requirements of Army corps commanders. The theater joint unconventional warfare task forces, or JUWTFs — forerunners of today's theater special-operations commands, or SOCs — continued to plan for SF employment at the theater-strategic level, but one SF battalion was actually tasked to deploy as an element of the XVIII Airborne Corps during contingency operations. Because of the creation of this doctrinal/planning mismatch, the 5th, 7th, and 10th SF groups survived the post-Vietnam doldrums.

The advent of AirLand Battle doctrine, with its emphasis on deep battle and the operational level of war, greatly facilitated the strategy of SF integration into the Army mainstream. So did the Goldwater-Nichols legislation; the establishment of the SF Branch, U.S. Special Operations Command and the theater SOCs, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command; and a string of SF operational successes in El Salvador, Lebanon, Panama (Just Cause/Promote Liberty), the Arabian Gulf (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), Iraq (Provide Comfort) and elsewhere. With the revitalization of the SOF community and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the future of SF in a post-Cold War world has been assured. Moreover, SF capabilities have become more relevant than ever before because of regional instabilities and ethno-religious conflicts.

In January 1989 General James J. Lindsay (then commander in chief of USSOCOM) hosted a one-day conference for SOF general and flag officers in an effort to reach a consensus within the community on SOF doctrinal missions and their definitions. The five current SF missions emerged from that conference. (CT, having ceased to be a collateral activity for more than a decade, was added as the fifth mission.) Army units are organized, trained and equipped to perform their primary missions, not collateral activities. No one at the conference could refute the argument that selected SF units, with capabili-

Photo by Joel Herard

A Special Forces soldier talks with a Haitian detainee during Operation Uphold Democracy. Persistent contingency operations and frequent crises place increased demands on SF units.

ties far beyond those required by other SF units to execute "normal" DA and SR missions, were being organized, trained and equipped to perform CT missions.

Present

Today the U.S. Army Special Forces Command controls five active-duty and two National Guard SF groups in CONUS. Other SF units are forward-based in Germany, Japan, Panama and Korea. The current operations tempo of some SF units is unprecedented. Overseas presence missions and ongoing contingency operations challenge the ability of these units to train to standard in their primary missions. The strategic reality is that frequent crises and persistent contingency operations are not aberrations; they have become the new status quo. The fiscal reality is that the SF force structure cannot be increased to provide long-term relief in the face of these new operational demands. Boyatt's article reflects the frustration of SF commanders who are finding it difficult to keep all the balls in the air at the same time.

One could argue, however, that the solution to this dilemma does not lie in doctrinal changes that treat the symptoms rather than the causes. The dilemma is rooted in policy, force structure, and resource limitations. Embedding DA and SR capabilities into a new UO mission will not eliminate the need to train for DA and SR missions if they are to remain mission-essential tasks in the minds (and plans) of the theater CINCs.

Current SF doctrine provides joint and service-force commanders with a menu of SF operational capabilities and employment options. From this menu, supported commanders can select the capabilities most relevant to their requirements. Theater SOCs translate these requirements into mission taskings to be used by supporting SF commanders in developing their units' mission-essential task lists, or METLs, and training programs. When time constraints and other resource limitations prevent SF commanders from being prepared to perform all their missions to standard, commanders are obligated to inform their chain of command and to seek relief from nonmission taskings or from low-priority mission taskings. *If this relief proves impossible, either the SF commander or his superiors will have to establish training priorities and accept the operational risk that the SF units may not be adequately prepared to perform low-priority or less likely missions.*

No SF operational detachment should be expected to maintain readiness in all five SF missions. The 1990 edition of FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations,* clearly states:

An SF group can conduct all five SF missions simultaneously, but an SFOD must focus its training on no more than two SF missions at the same time. SF commanders must prioritize mission requirements and developments (METLs) that translate into realistic mission letters for their SFODs.[2]

If some SF units "seem fixated on CT, DA and SR missions," as Boyatt contends, one would hope that these units have been so tasked by their theater SOC commander. If that is not the case, Special Forces has a problem that transcends doctrine. Using their own strategic assessments, some theater CINCs place their priority for SF employment on FID/UW, while others emphasize DA/SR. Some theater CINCs task an assigned SF unit to perform CT missions; others do not. SF doctrine should not be changed for the purpose of making FID/UW (Boyatt's "UO") "the primary mission for (all) active-component Army Special Forces groups." The last thing SF should do is reduce the menu of doctrinal capabilities provided to the CINCs, which in turn would reduce the number of employment options available to the CINCs.

There are valid reasons why a CINC may prefer that some of his assigned or apportioned SF focus on DA, SR and CT missions. As Boyatt notes, these missions — like UW and FID — are "complicated missions requiring intensive training." While it is true that certain national-level, special-mission units, or SMUs, have extraordinary DA and SR capabilities,

Photo by Keith Butler

Special Forces soldiers perform a parachute inspection on a Thai soldier during a foreign military training exercise. Making FID/UW the primary SF mission would reduce the menu of doctrinal capabilities available to regional commanders.

these SMUs are neither assigned nor apportioned to the theater CINCs. Furthermore, the SMUs lack sufficient size to perform multiple concurrent missions of operational significance to a theater CINC during a major regional contingency. The National Command Authorities necessarily reserve SMU employment for missions of national- or theater-strategic significance. Finally, there have been recent instances of SFODs being committed to FID missions and then being tasked to perform short-notice DA/SR missions in response to unanticipated crises. For all these reasons, SF must retain DA, SR and CT as doctrinal primary missions.

Future

Although one may disagree with Boyatt's proposed doctrinal mission changes, one might support his proposed organizational changes. Those of us who were involved in the conversion of the 1989 L-series table of organization and equipment, or LTOE, did not fully understand the operational implications of that conversion until it was too late to "stop the train" and further revise FM 31-20 and the LTOE. Major General James Guest (then commander of the 1st Special Operations Command) was among the first to recognize the mistake. He took action to make the SF battalion the sole focus of SF operations and even prohibited his SF group commanders from directly isolating and controlling deployed SF teams. Now is a good time to update the LTOE and the organizational doctrine in FM 31-20 to bring them in line with ground truth.

As Boyatt recommends, USASOC should make the SF battalions more organizationally independent, at the expense of the SF group support structure. The group-level capability to isolate and control SFODs (e.g., the fourth radio base station) should be used to provide SF battalions with the capability to establish and operate independent forward operating bases, or FOBs, *without using uncommitted SFODs as FOB staff augmentation*. My experience in SF battalion command indicates that this capability requires an SF battalion of approximately 550-575 personnel.

As Boyatt argues, now is also the time to break away from the "cookie cutter" approach to force structure. The Army is moving toward "modularization" (which appears to resemble the cellular TOE structure that was eliminated to pay the

bills for the Army of Excellence) in an effort to enhance its force-projection capabilities. It may also be appropriate to reconsider the issue of having SF groups and battalions that are not all alike. Boyatt is correct in suggesting that "world dynamics" should determine the allocation of SF battalions among SF group headquarters. The reorganization of fixed SF groups into modular SF brigades is an idea whose time may have come.

Operational and organizational doctrine are powerful forces within the Army. Doctrinal changes should reflect fundamental changes in the functions of SF groups. Any implications should be thoroughly debated and field-tested before changes are implemented. The 1990 edition of FM 31-20 culminated years of intense debate within the SF community. Although FM 31-20 is a useful 80-percent solution, it should be updated to incorporate the myriad lessons learned during the past five years. Nevertheless, the fundamental doctrinal thrust of FM 31-20 remains sound.

Doctrinal changes are not panaceas; they cannot solve problems in training, in force structure, or in operational overcommitment. Doctrine cannot force commanders to make tough decisions, nor can it substitute for those decisions. Given the profound implications involved with the doctrinal changes proposed by Boyatt, the revision of FM 31-20 should not be implemented without considerable discussion within the SF community and among the communities supported by SF.

Colonel Glenn M. Harned is the commander of Special Operations Command-Korea. Commissioned in 1972 after graduation from the University of Pennsylvania, Harned has served in various Infantry and Special Forces command and staff assignments. While assigned to the Special Warfare Center and School as Chief of Doctrine Development, he authored the 1990 edition of FM 31-20. He subsequently commanded the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, and served as SOF branch chief in the J-3 Special Operations Division of the Joint Staff. Harned is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the Marine Corps War College.

Notes:

[1]The pre-1992 JCS definition of UW included "the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, *and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature*." This author added italics to highlight that portion of the definition originally designed to encompass DA and SR missions.

[2]FM 31-20, pg. 7-11.

As I Remember It: Notional 'X' Command

by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

When General Wayne A. Downing was commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, he periodically assembled his subordinate commanders to examine issues confronting the command. In March 1992, I was invited to brief an alternative to the existing SOF operational structure. Having recently undergone heart surgery, however, I was not sure whether my doctors would allow me to attend. On the day of the conference, I was given the green light. When I arrived at the meeting site, my colleagues seemed genuinely pleased to see me and acted as if I had been resurrected.

That afternoon I briefed the concept of the Notional "X" Command. After a short recap of how the world had changed, I showed the block diagram of the command (below). The "X" command was to be built on the foundation of a Special Forces

Notional 'X' Command



Notional 'X' Command

PROS

- FLEXIBLE/ADAPTABLE
- UNITY OF EFFORT
- INTEROPERABILITY
- TRAINING & OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
- TAILORED & THEATER SPECIFIC
- FACILITATES BUILDUP OF JTF
- SENIOR ARSOF CDR TO THEATER
- ECONOMY OF STRUCTURE
- ELIMINATE HQ & CONSIDERABLE TDA STRUCTURE WHILE MAXIMIZING OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

CONS

- PROPONENCY ISSUES
- POTENTIAL CINC 'STOVEPIPE' ISSUE

BILL PAYERS

- SF CMD
- CA PSYOP CMD
- SOIC
- 4th POG HQ
- 96th CA BN
- SIG BN
- SPT BN
- TF 160
- RANGER RGT HQ
- NG SF GP HQ
- ONE AC GP

group. We could test the concept over several years with one Special Forces group before deciding on the final structure.

The next slide (above) addressed the pros and cons of the concept. Initially there was active discussion among the participants, but when the issue of potential bill payers came up, one could sense that vested interests were coming to the surface. The discussion became guarded. Although the participants had expressed sincere interest in the concept and thought it was a good one, the expense involved was another issue. I pointed out the linkages and responsibilities (p. 17), but the group did not appear to have the appetite for the wrenching shift — the internal and external conflicts and the soul-searching that go hand in hand with such a significant break from the accustomed way of thinking and operating.

The briefing concluded with my plea for testing this bold alternative, a design that would allow SOF to meet the demands of the volatile, uncertain, chaotic and ambiguous world in which we live. The group, fearing that an outright rejection of the concept would be detrimental to my health, complimented my effort, and General Downing awarded me a rare bottle of wine. (It must have been very rare — it did not even have a label.) He subsequently directed his staff to examine the concept as a possible organizational alternative.

Shortly afterward, General Downing was reassigned, as were many of the other participants. Notional "X" Command was filed in the too-hard-to-do box and is probably marinating there today.

Some of the old-timers can recall the early 1980s, when SOF's concentration was on a bold vision. Our efforts were focused. Our progress was visible and measurable. By the early 1990s, we had achieved most of our goals. But what happened when SOF reached the future? Where did we go from there? An interesting thing began to happen. Once we had achieved our goals, bureaucracy took over. We became top-heavy, and as an institution we forgot how to test, experiment and learn new ideas. We began to prefer analysis and debate to experimentation.

It is time to remind ourselves that today's "profits" are traceable to wise and bold decisions made many years ago. If we are to profit in the future, we must continue to focus on what is to be rather than on

Linkages



what has been. Today, as the Army attempts to leverage technology to develop Force XXI, there is a great opportunity to build the Army of tomorrow. We should join in that effort, and with the Army's concurrence and support, test Notional "X" Command.

Because of our regional orientation, we would need to gain the approval of the regional theater commander in chief. The 7th SF Group is an excellent candidate for the test, and the U.S. Southern Command's region is an ideal location in which to examine the relevance of the concept.

Undoubtedly, some people will point to the magnificent manner in which SOF have succeeded in meeting all challenges to date. These same people will remind us not to fix something that is not broken. My response is, show me a thoroughly satisfied man, and I will show you a failure. Of all our human resources, the most precious is the desire to improve.

Major General Sidney Shachnow's commissioned service spanned more than 30 years, during which he served as either a commander or a staff officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airmobile, airborne, and Special Forces units. He served as commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, of the Army Special Forces Command and of U.S. Army-Berlin. Shachnow holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska and a master's degree from Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from the Army in August 1994.

Special Operations Aviation Support to Special Forces

by Major Andy Milani

Soldiers on a Special Forces operational detachment often spend many hours in isolation preparing for a training mission, only to find themselves on a five-ton truck headed to the infil site. They failed to plan for special-operations aviation support. The lack of aviation support not only detracts from the training experience but also results in a missed opportunity for soldiers to train with the aircrews that will accompany them to combat.

Photo by Paul Caron

The aviation force most likely to transport SF teams into combat is the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. As the premier aviation unit in the military, the 160th is often viewed as an inaccessible resource. The 160th is significantly committed to the exercise priorities of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, but it rounds out its calendar with bilateral training events supporting SF teams.

The purpose of this article is twofold: To dispel some of the myths concerning 160th support to the SF groups; and to outline the process for requesting and receiving SOF aviation support for bilateral training.

Myths

Myth: "*The 160th won't support us because specialized units and the Rangers have a higher priority*."

While a significant number of 160th aircraft routinely train with other units, the 160th SOAR also has a battalion-plus whose principal mission is to support the Special Forces groups. The 160th's support to SF includes two companies of MH-47s (20 aircraft), an MH-60L company (10 aircraft), and a forward-deployed MH-60L detachment (five aircraft) in Panama. These "white SOF" aircraft support rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center involving Special Forces play, including SF National Guard rotations. They also provide aviation support to numerous CONUS and OCONUS JCS and theater CINC exercises involving Special Forces. The 160th regimental commander, with the concurrence of USASOC, has pledged these aircraft primarily to the Special Forces groups. Only on a strict noninterference basis with SF group requirements will Ranger units and other units receive support.

Myth: "*There was better SOF aviation tactical-mission support when each group had its own flight platoon*."

The purpose of the SF flight platoons was to provide administrative and logistics aviation support to their groups. It is true that with the deactivation of these platoons, the bill payers for a larger 160th, the level of administrative and logistics aviation support for the groups has diminished. However, the quality and the availability of SOA tactical-mission support have increased markedly. This may be of little solace to the SF groups that are not in proximity to the 160th. For now, the 160th will continue to support these "outlying" groups during JCS exercises and CTC rotations. Opportunity training is conducted when strategic airlift is available or when aircraft are deployed in an SF group's area.

Myth: "*USASOC receives a fixed number of the 160th's flight hours to parcel out to the Special Forces groups.*"

There is no definitive number of flight hours allocated for support to any unit or headquarters. The USASOC deputy chief of staff for special-operations aviation oversees 100 percent of the 160th's flying hours but delegates day-to-day management to the commander, 160th SOAR, who is responsible for aircrew training and maintenance requirements. Once aircrew training and maintenance needs have been met, every residual flight hour is used to support SOF missions. The number of hours available for mission support varies, depending on the level of taskings from the SOF community. To illustrate, approximately 60 percent of the 3-160th's FY94 flying hours went to SOF mission support. Aircrew training constituted 32 percent; aircraft maintenance, 8 percent.

Myth: "*The 160th determines mission-support priorities.*"

USASOC directs and establishes the 160th's mission-support priorities. These priorities include JRTC/NTC, JCS exercises, and bilateral training events brokered at the USSOCOM Air Asset Allocation conferences, or AAACs. The 160th provides support to all JRTC and NTC rotations involving SOF play. During these 10 annual rotations, at least one battalion from each Special Forces group (active-duty and National Guard) isolates, plans, rehearses and executes missions with the 160th.

Myth: "*The 160th routinely conducts non-METL-specific missions for the SOF community.*"

General Wayne A. Downing's guidance to the SOF community is clear: "If it (training) doesn't meet your wartime METL requirements, don't do it." Therefore, for bilateral training support, USSOCOM approves only those requests that meet the legitimate METL requirements of the supported unit — and of the 160th. The very nature of SOA support to SF groups ensures complementary training events. If carefully planned, METL training can provide maximum benefit for all participants.

General Wayne A. Downing's guidance to the SOF community is clear: "If it (training) doesn't meet your wartime METL requirements, don't do it." ... USSOCOM approves only those requests that meet the legitimate METL requirements of the supported unit and of the 160th. ... If carefully planned, METL training can provide maximum benefit for all participants.

Requesting aviation support

To achieve success in your request for aviation support, you must understand the process. As is most often the case, the process begins with the user. Special Forces units begin with their battalion S-3s.

Once the SF battalions have forecast their aviation requirements for green-cycle training, they forward the aviation requests to their group S-3s. Next, the requests are forwarded to the air office of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC. The USASFC air officer scrutinizes the requests and consolidates

complementary missions by moving mission dates, if the units requesting the support are flexible. This process maximizes the use of aviation assets that have been requested for the same location. The USASFC air officer also eliminates missions that misuse the tactical capabilities of the aircraft (e.g., administrative movements).

The USASFC presents the aviation-support requests at the monthly USSOCOM AAAC. This is where the SOF community competes for special-operations aviation support from both the 160th and the Air Force Special Operations Command, or AFSOC. Previously, USASFC had only to compete with other Army units at a bimonthly USASOC-sponsored AAAC, but in a recent change the bimonthly conference was replaced by the USSOCOM meeting.

As the single air manager for special-operations aviation, USSOCOM oversees a process in which the 160th opens its calendar to accept air-mission requests. Bilateral training requests are entertained up to 12 months in advance and are locked in two months out. All major subordinate USSOCOM commands may attend the AAAC and vie for aviation support alongside the USASFC representative. USSOCOM prepares a recapitulation document outlining the requesting unit, the supporting unit, the dates, the points of contact, the number and the types of aircraft, and a brief description of the mission.

Suggestions

Conduct forward and meticulous planning. The 160th maintains the highest operational tempo of any regimental-sized unit in Army aviation. As might be expected, the 160th's calendar is usually filled two to three months out. With advanced planning, you may be able to reduce the number of conflicting requests from other units and also increase the chance that your mission will be scheduled on the 160th's calendar.

Combine requests with other units' training. To maximize the valuable flying hours of the 160th's aircraft during deployments to training locations, plan concurrent or sequential missions with other SOF units. Also pursue opportunity training events with adjacent units if

Consolidated Requests



aircraft will be available during a support cycle.

Exercise flexibility. In planning for training missions, develop primary and alternate block periods. Allow sufficient flexibility so that training can be shifted a few days on either side of the planned event. In turn, the training schedulers will have considerable latitude in "fitting" a mission into the calendar.

Advocate modularity. Modular-type training capitalizes on ODA similarities in infiltration/exfiltration mission profiles. Generically planned modules provide the flexibility of "plugging in" a different team should the originally planned team fall out. Modular-type training also helps ensure utilization of the scheduled aviation unit. Once a mission has been programmed into the supporting unit's calendar, competing requests are denied and individual aviator training is foregone. If a supported unit cancels a mission, the scheduled training is lost, the opportunity for other units to train is lost, and the opportunity for aircrews to train is lost.

Support bilateral design. The objective of bilateral training is that each participating unit obtain a positive training value from the experience. This holds true with special-operations aviation support to SOF. In fact, SOA receives some of its most productive during bilateral support to SOF. By stressing METL tasks and flying actual mission profiles, aircrews and teams gain a familiarity that serve both of them well. Develop a crawl-walk-run process that builds confidence in the various aircraft profiles. When possible, design training so that the 160th aircrews can integrate specialized mission equipment — equipment that enables these aircrews to fly mission profiles that no conventional military aircraft can perform.

Practice cost control. Wherever possible, limit the costs associated with bilateral training support. Aviation liaison officers should conduct preliminary mission coordination so that aircraft arrive at training locations only when actually needed. To minimize aircrew logistics needs, supported units should provide billeting space and motor-pool vehicles whenever possible.

Conclusion

The 160th considers itself responsible for providing tactical special-operations aviation support to Special Forces soldiers. Limited assets, long deployment distances, and commitments to numerous CTC and JCS exercises leave precious little residual capability for bilateral training events. Merging the AAAC system with coherent, mutually supportive, bilateral training will facilitate the aviation needs of the SOF community.

Major Andy Milani is the battalion operations officer for the 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. He was formerly the S-3 for the 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR, and has held various command and staff positions within special-operations aviation since 1986.



Review Essay

A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare

by Steven Metz

The veneration that has been heaped upon Clausewitz seems to grow even as his power to explain the world declines. He remains an icon throughout all U.S. war colleges (figuratively and literally), although his writings are bent, twisted and stretched to explain everything from guerrilla insurgency (Summers)[1] through nuclear strategy (Cimbala)[2] to counternarcotrafficking (Sharpe).[3] *On War* is treated like holy script, from which quotations are plucked to legitimize all sorts of policies and programs. But enough! It is time to hold a wake so that strategists can pay their respects to Clausewitz and then move on, leaving him to rest among the historians.

Who to invite to the final vigil? Who can possibly provide future-looking considerations of armed conflict that even approach the power and depth of *On War*? Though the literature on warfare and military matters is vast, few writers have grappled with the sort of fundamental issues so astutely dissected by the great Prussian. Alvin and Heidi Toffler's *War and Anti-War*, John Keegan's *A History of Warfare*, and Martin van Creveld's *The Transformation of War* have been the most important recent works from the small group searching for a new philosophy of war.

At first glance, these renowned authors are a polyglot group. The Tofflers are Americans, probably the world's best-known futurists, and wildly successful mass-market authors. The other two are military historians and trained scholars. Keegan is British; Van Creveld, Israeli. In this case, heritage plays a major role in the tone and tenor of analysis. The three books also differ in methodology, with distinct notions of why and how future wars will be fought. The Tofflers are economic determinists — Marxist in analytical style, though not in prescription. "The way we make war," they argue, "reflects the way we make wealth." Keegan, while sensitive enough to the complexities of war to eschew monocausal explanations, uses *A History of Warfare* to argue that the importance of culture with regard to how and why people fight is often underestimated. Van Creveld turns the causal relationship around and contends that how

---

This essay originally appeared in the Winter 1994-95 issue of Parameters. *The Clausewitzian doctrine of interstate warfare seeks to destroy the enemy; it was applicable during the Cold War and led to the success of Desert Storm. But some modern theorists feel that in situations such as Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, which are examples of intrastate war, the circumstances are dramatically different. In these situations, political factors are more important than military ones, and Clausewitz no longer applies. Metz's essay points the way toward a new basis for doctrine. — Editor.*

and why people fight help determine their political, economic and even social organization. War for him is as much an independent variable as a dependent one.

Despite such differences, all three books do belong together. They share, for instance, a degree of influence. All three have helped shape contemporary thinking on the future of armed conflict. At an even deeper level, all three books agree that the world is in the midst of a historical transformation. They predict the future of organized violence to be fundamentally different from its past. And as they peer into the future, all three reject what they see as the conceptual limitations of Clausewitz. From this common starting point, they move in dramatically different directions.

First to *War and Anti-War*, by the Tofflers. Written for a general audience, this book is certainly the easiest of the three to read. It also represents the Tofflers' first extended foray into military matters. Since they are little concerned with staking a claim in the literature of strategic studies, their rejection of Clausewitz is indirect. For Keegan and Van Creveld, Clausewitz's notoriety demands that he be executed in public; the Tofflers are willing to let him die quietly in a closed room. As newcomers to the field, the Tofflers built *War and Anti-War* from their past writing on economic trends rather than from an existing body of work on military matters. The core argument of the book is that a third historic economic transformation is under way (the first was the invention of agriculture; the second, the industrial revolution). The emergence of third-wave economics, "based on knowledge rather than on conventional raw materials and physical labor," will affect all aspects of human life, including warfare. But first-wave states or regions (premodern, agrarian) and second-wave ones (industrial) will persist even as third-wave states or regions explore new techniques of economic production and social organization. This heterogeneity will have an immense effect on global security. According to the Tofflers, "The historic change from a bisected to a trisected world could well trigger the deepest power struggles on the planet as each country tries to position itself in the emerging three-tiered power structure."[4] The Tofflers thus accept the long-standing notion that deep and fundamental change — whether in the global system or within a developing country — sparks instability and often violent conflict.

The changing nature of production and the emergence of third-wave states and regions are already shaping military forces. "Knowledge," the Tofflers write, "is now the central resource of destructivity just as it is the central resource of productivity," an idea that has captured the attention of U.S. Army leadership.[5] In *War and Anti-War*, the Tofflers briefly survey the military implications of "demassification," which point to highly specialized "niche wars," the military use of space, robotic combat, nano-technology, non-lethal weapons and cyberwar. Throughout, the Tofflers' fascination with technology is evident. Quintessentially American, they concentrate on the feasibility of technology, with little concern for the strategic, political, social, psychological or ethical implications of changing military technology. They describe *how* men might fight in the future, but not why.



Even while speculating on the future of war, the Tofflers seek ways by which anti-war — strategic applications of military, economic, and informational power to reduce the violence so often associated with change on the world stage — can match evolving military technology. Their analysis of this topic is halfhearted compared to their description of the changing nature of organized conflict. Even here, they follow the long American tradition of searching for technological panaceas. As in all of their other works, the Tofflers see technology driving and shaping history rather than reflecting human values and systems of social organization.

John Keegan's *A History of Warfare* takes a diametrically different approach. Technology is barely mentioned. Instead, Keegan seeks the keys to warfare within the human mind. In the opening sentence of the book, he announces his location within the wider currents of military and strategic thinking. "War," he writes, "is not the continuation of policy by other means."[6] The book thus explicitly rejects, or at least attempts to transcend, Clausewitz. Keegan is driven to explain the powerful role that culture plays in determining how we understand most social phenomena, war included. "We all find it difficult," Keegan writes, "to stand far enough outside our own culture to perceive how it makes us, as individuals, what we are."[7] According to Keegan, this constraint applies equally to Clausewitz:

Good historian though he was, Clausewitz allowed the two institutions — state and regiment — that circumscribed his own perception of the world to dominate his thinking so narrowly that he denied himself the room to observe how different war might be in societies where both state and regiment were alien concepts.[8]

By relying solely on European evidence, Clausewitz constructed a culture-specific philosophy of war. In *A History of Warfare,* Keegan attempts to overcome this limitation by examining non-European warfare from the Mamelukes and samurai through Eastern Islanders and the Yanomamo tribe of South America. The notion that war was an extension of policy and that soldiers and sailors fought and died for national interests, Keegan contends, may have been what Clausewitz preferred, but it is not a universal and immutable principle. Even Clausewitz was unable to explain the type of war waged by Cossacks and other irregular forces. Despite the efforts of brilliant minds to adapt and update his theory, Clausewitz does not adequately account for much of the real or threatened armed violence of the late 20th century, whether revolutionary insurgency, nuclear deterrence or counternarcotrafficking.

Like the Tofflers, Keegan is concerned with the control of war. He believes that



much of recorded history has been shaped by the tension between mankind's drive for violence and the need to constrain it. Keegan's proposals for limiting violence, like those of the Tofflers, do not satisfy. The controls on war that have developed in the Western World — whether legal proscriptions, deterrence, arms control, or the fog, friction, and rationality that Clausewitz discussed — have, as the history of the 20th century shows, proven inadequate. Thus Keegan feels that "future peacekeepers and peacemakers have much to learn from alternative military cultures."[9] Unfortunately, the only answers he finds are "the principles of intellectual restraint" and "symbolic ritual." Mankind may deliberately choose to abandon war as its human and material costs increase. "Despite confusion and uncertainty," Keegan writes, "it seems just possible to glimpse the emerging outline of a world without war."[10] This is an alluring idea, but writers since Plato have glimpsed societies without war, yet none have been able to guide us to them. Unlike his analysis of why and how men fight, Keegan offers little that is new or profound regarding why men might choose *not* to fight.

Writing from Israel, where the crack of gunfire more often forms the soundtrack of daily life than it does in the English countryside, Martin van Creveld is less sanguine about the future. *The Transformation of War is* an explicit attempt to explain why and how men fight. In contrast to the Tofflers, Van Creveld has thought deeply about why organized violence occurs. He writes, "War, far from being merely a means, has very often been considered an end — a highly attractive activity for which no other can provide an adequate substitute."[11] Like Keegan, Van Creveld begins by arguing that most contemporary strategic thought reflects the obsolete Clausewitzian "trinity" of the state, the army, and the people. Specifically, *On War* was based on three core ideas. First, war is waged by the state. Second, war tends toward unrestrained force. And, third, war is a means to an end — it should further state interests and policy. But, Van Creveld argues, "trinitarian war is not War with a capital W but merely one of the many forms that war has assumed."[12] His ambitious goal, then, is to provide a new, non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about war.

He begins with the state. Modern states emerged in part because of their proficiency at war. Because they were able to protect their subjects from bandits and external enemies, states gained a degree of pragmatic support which eventually matured into legitimacy — the moral obligation to obey. But, Van Creveld argues, modern states are not very good at protecting their citizens from low-intensity conflict, the dominant security threat of the late 20th century. Not only have the majority of armed struggles since World War II been low-intensity conflicts of one form or the other, but, according to Van Creveld, they have also been the bloodiest and most strategically significant. History bears this out: with the exception of the Six Days War, most of the major conventional wars over the past few decades have ended in stalemate or in the *status quo antebellum* — Korea, Iran-lraq, 1973 Arab-lsraeli, Desert Storm. On the other hand, many low-intensity conflicts have led to major changes in the internal or international distribution of power, whether in China, Vietnam, Algeria or throughout southern Africa.

Van Creveld's conclusions run counter to much of the thinking within the U.S. Army concerning the military force of the future. And, he feels, it is not simply armed forces that are growing obsolete, but also the world's basic political unit. Since the territorial state with a conventional army has proven itself unable to decisively defeat low-intensity conflict, the state will fade into obsolescence. "The most important single demand that any political community must meet," he writes, "is the demand for protection."[13] If the territorial state cannot protect its citizens, "then clearly it does not have a future in front of it." The first to go will be the weak states of the Third World; the last, Western Europe and Japan. Even the United States may fall victim if proper

preventive measures are not taken. Van Creveld writes:

America's current economic decline must be halted; or else one day the crime that is rampant in the streets of New York and Washington, D.C., may develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social and political lines, and run completely out of control.[14]

This line of thinking leads to a stark picture of a future where *war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by "professionalism" than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties.* [15]

Van Creveld is not arguing that future war will pit conventional, modern forces against guerrillas and terrorists; but rather that as low-intensity conflict becomes the dominant form of armed violence, *all* armed forces will move toward a guerrilla and irregular configuration. This is a profoundly radical idea. Americans are used to thinking that as other nations and groups "progress," they become more like us. But Van Creveld is on solid historical ground when he contends that "we" may become more like "them." Military innovation often has come from states on the periphery of the most civilized parts of the world. The early Romans in the Mediterranean, the Arabs in the Middle East, the Turks in Central Asia and Southeast Europe, the Mongols in China, and the 20th-century Americans in the Atlantic world were peripheral powers able to adopt military innovations from more advanced armies and navies, thus forcing the developed states to change their own organization, strategy, and tactics. Since, as Van Creveld notes, "war represents the most imitative activity known to man,"[16] the military forces of the developed states may be forced to become more like their enemies in order to survive. Early counterinsurgent theorists such as Roger Trinquier, who argued that the West had to "fight fire with fire," may prove prophetic. Sarajevo, Gaza, Belfast, and east Los Angeles, rather than Desert Storm, may be war's future.

As the state and its conventional army become obsolete, so too will classical strategy, defined as the use of battles or linked operations to attain objectives. Armed forces will "move away from today's large, expensive, powerful machines toward small, cheap gadgets capable of being manufactured in large numbers and used almost everywhere."[17] For a hint of this, one only has to consider the strategic effect of AK-47s, shoulder-held anti-air missiles, and land mines. And conventional military forces themselves will "degenerate into police forces or, in case the struggle lasts for very long, mere armed gangs." War will be fought not to pursue national interests, but to kill enemy leaders, to convert opponents to one's religion, to obtain booty, or, sometimes, for simple entertainment. Thus the core of Clausewitz's philosophy of war — that states wage wars using armies in pursuit of political objectives — will disappear.

War and Anti-War, A History of Warfare, and *The Transformation of War* all have major flaws. The Tofflers, for instance, present more of a sketch or a survey than a sustained analysis. Their book is an MTV clip; Keegan's and Van Creveld's are sonatas, perhaps symphonies. The popularity of the Tofflers' book in the U.S. military is understandable, but worrisome. Furthermore, the Tofflers have to bend history to fit their model of economic causality, most blatantly when they attribute the Napoleonic revolution in warfare to the industrial revolution. If anything, the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, by mobilizing mass armies, sparked the industrial revolution, rather than the other way around. Perhaps more important, *War and Anti-War* never constructs a psychologically sophisticated notion of why people fight. With such an omission, any theory of "anti-war" is incomplete.

Van Creveld's book is much deeper, but also contains problems. Although it may seem a minor point, sloppy proofreading — "Carslyle Barracks," "Bohling Air Force

Base" — cause the reader to approach other facts with skepticism. Van Creveld also suffers from bad timing. His publication date of 1991 indicates that the book was written before the end of the Cold War. While the Gulf War probably does not indicate any permanent alteration of the declining utility of conventional war, the negotiated end or petering out of long-standing, low-intensity conflicts in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, the Philippines, Israel, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere suggests that many strategy theorists (including Van Creveld) overestimated the potential decisiveness of insurgency and terrorism. Of course, low-intensity conflict has been and shall continue to be the most *common* type of organized violence simply because it is the cheapest. Its continued strategic *significance,* though, can be questioned. Van Creveld sometimes loses sight of the psychological dimension of strategic significance — what is important is what people believe is significant. In fact, the strategic significance of low-intensity conflict seems to have peaked in the 1960s and to have declined ever since. Van Creveld himself admits, "A degree of violent activity that even as late as the 1960s would have been considered outrageous is now accepted as an inevitable hazard of modern life."[18] People in the midst of low-intensity conflicts, even severe ones like those in Bosnia and Lebanon, quickly come to accept their condition and go on about their lives. It is possible that low-intensity conflict was strategically significant in the decades after World War II simply because it was new. Today, the people of the world have grown accustomed to it. Conventional war, on the other hand, will, by its very expense, remain rare, and thus retain the potential for strategic significance.

The flaws in Keegan's book are more subtle simply because his contentions are well-couched, often implied rather than stated, and always surrounded with what might seem irrelevant historical vignettes. Many military professionals will find this frustrating. In addition, *A History of Warfare* is the most difficult of the three books to use as a basis for actual policies, programs and strategies. One could take the works by the Tofflers or Van Creveld and plan a future force including training, doctrine, and leader development. This is not true of the Keegan volume.

In works as ambitious as these, flaws are to be expected. Cogent philosophies never spring unblemished from one mind (or in the case of the Tofflers, from two). Perhaps the diverse perspectives these three books offer can be synthesized. But whichever of the three proves to be the truest guide to future warfare, one of their shared premises — that we are in, or are on the verge of, a great historic transformation — is probably true. The basic philosophy of war used by the U.S. military remains Clausewitzian. If Keegan and Van Creveld are correct about the obsolescence of the Clausewitzian approach, there could be extraordinarily dangerous times ahead as we prepare for unlikely types of conflict. Our armed forces are not



configured for non-Clausewitzian war wherein the enemy is motivated by hate, rage, boredom, fear, or the need for personal meaning and bonding, rather than by interests and policy. Fundamental concepts of our military strategy, such as deterrence and conflict resolution, are often useless against such opponents. But those who are grappling with such ideas remain at the periphery of U.S. military thinking (e.g., Peters, 1994).[19] To move them to center stage, to debate and assess them, Keegan, Van Creveld, and, to a lesser degree, the Tofflers, should be required reading for national security leaders in and out of uniform. On the vital issue of a 21st-century philosophy of war, it is time to let a hundred schools of thought bloom.

Dr. Steven Metz is associate research professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in international studies from the University of South Carolina and a Ph.D. in political science from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has served on the faculty at the Air War College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He also has been an adviser to political organizations and campaigns. He is the author of Eisenhower as Strategist, The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace, and many articles on national security policy, military strategy and world politics.

Notes:

[1] Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy. A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).

[2] Stephen J. Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspectives on Nuclear Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1991).

[3] Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The Military, the Drug War and Democracy in Latin America: What Would Clausewitz Tell Us?" in *Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Gabriel Marcella (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

[4] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993) p. 25.

[5] Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, *War in the Information Age* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994).

[6] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) p. 3.

[7] Keegan, p. 22.

[8] Keegan, p. 23.

[9] Keegan, p. 392.

[10] Keegan, p. 58.

[11] Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991) p. 218.

[12] Van Creveld, p. 57.

[13] Van Creveld, p. 198.

[14] Van Creveld, p. 196.

[15] Van Creveld, p. 197.

[16] Van Creveld, p. 195.

[17] Van Creveld, p. 210.

[18] Van Creveld, p. 194.

[19] See Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994):16-26.

‘Instant Advisers’: Civil Affairs Team Assists Haitian Ministries

by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Maddox and Gerard Healy

In 1994, 34 Army Reserve Civil Affairs officers were selected as part of a “dream team” to assist the new democratic government in Haiti in establishing the foundations for a free and prosperous future.

The handpicked ministerial advisory team included citizen-soldier experts in health care, the practice of law, community planning, forestry, traffic management, international banking, education, environmental issues, disaster response and travel management. The team’s mission was to assess the needs of 12 Haitian government ministries and to provide assistance and advice to the ministries.

Reporting directly to the Ambassador to Haiti, William L. Swing, the team coordinated its efforts with other U.S. agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency.

Ambassador Swing, who called these Army Reserve experts “instant advisers,” expressed their value: “They gave the Haitian government a sense that the United States really is serious not only about the military part of the operation but of the civilian economic piece as well.”

Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, commander of the 358th CA Brigade and the senior CA officer in Haiti at the time, first saw the term “instant advisers” in mid-October 1994 in a message from Ambassador Swing to the State Department. The message addressed the need for interim advisers to the Haitian government, which was preparing for the return of President Aristide and a democratic form of government. The message immediately captured Bingham’s attention. CA was heavily involved in Haitian operations at that time, but its role had been limited to civil-military operations. CA assistance in civil administration had not been requested.

A few weeks later, Bingham became the director of the 34 Reserve advisers. “We were not there to run the government,” Bingham stressed. “The ministers were always the ones in charge. We were there to advise and support and to provide information and training as necessary.”

U.S. Army photo

Colonel Robert D. Norton Jr. (right) and Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham (second from right) meet with members of the ministerial advisory team in Haiti.

The advisers assisted in the transitionary stage of the government, providing training and assistance to the ministries and finding short-term solutions to problems, Bingham said. Clearly, they were the linkage between the initial investment of 27,000 military personnel in September and October 1994 and the full-time aid programs that began later.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Koon, a forester from Oregon, discusses erosion solutions with Haitian farmers.

U.S. Army photo

CA's civil-administration missions had not been successfully executed on a large scale since World War II, according to the deputy commander of the 358th, Colonel Robert D. Norton Jr.

Lack of experience in civil-administration missions did not hinder the team's activities, Bingham said. The Army Reserve provides approximately 97 percent of the Army's Civil Affairs assets. The unique qualifications of the citizen-soldiers who work full-time in many diverse professions are particularly well-suited to civil-administration missions.

Working with the Ministry of Agriculture, Lieutenant Colonel Virginia W. Jenkins, a veterinarian with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, initiated a national program that provided for the vaccinations of animals, thereby helping prevent the spread of disease. The program, which was funded by private organizations, also purchased 55 solar-powered refrigerators to keep serum chilled. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth B. Koon, a forester from Oregon, also assisted the Ministry of Agriculture in initiating a program to plant one million trees.

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel P. Evans Jr., a high-school teacher and football coach, helped evaluate Haiti's school system and developed ideas and plans for the

Ministry of Education. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Rubini, an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration, was a member of the legal advisory group that assessed the Haitian justice system.

Lieutenant Colonel Phillip O. Cheney, a construction management consultant, led the group that assessed public-works services such as traffic management. Major Saeed A. Khawaja, an electronics engineer, worked closely with the Ministry of Communication and Information in assessing the country's radio and television needs.

A new ministry, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, was created with the assistance of Major Karen McCurdy, who manages her own graphic-design business. Other projects included the creation of a Haitian emergency preparedness plan and the formation of data bases pertaining to prisons and educational facilities.

Other team members included an executive with the Federal Emergency Management Administration, a senior evaluator with the U.S. Government Accounting Office, and the deputy mayor of transportation for the city of Philadelphia. The members of the advisory team coordinated their efforts so that the Haitian ministries could gain an understanding and an awareness of each other's operation. The team contributed significantly in making it possible for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to consolidate a new government and set its course.

Judging from the reaction of the individual ministers and their staffs, the efforts and the contributions of the advisory team were a huge success. One Haitian official called the team of Army Reservists dedicated professionals. "They have helped us see there is a better future. There is hope, and that's something we're all thankful for," he stated.

Pleased with the advisers' performance and successes in Haiti, Bingham was equally impressed with the Haitian people. Prior to his deployment to Haiti, Bingham had been prepared, by press reports, for sullen and distrustful Haitians. "They were just great. They were friendly, industrious and very appreciative. They were wonderful," he stated.

The advisers themselves seemed proud of their activities. Evans expressed pride that he was a part of the historic team. "We attempted to help a country which is one of the poorest in the Western Hemisphere, in terms of education, get jumpstarted into becoming a responsible and responsive member of the world of nations," he said.

Rubini, who also served in Desert Storm as a legal adviser to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice, added, "We have taken the first steps to establish an effective judiciary, one that will live by rule of law rather than live in the shadow of corruption and fear." ✂

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Maddox is the public affairs officer for the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Atlanta, Ga.

Gerard Healy is the public affairs officer for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

SOFTAC: A Proposed Leader-Development Strategy for Army SOF

by Lieutenant Colonel David E. McCracken

As we prepare for the future, we should seriously consider the importance of establishing a leader-development strategy — in other words, a "master plan" for the leader development of special-operations forces. But what is that master plan? Has such a vision been articulated for SOF?

The initial training for all Army SOF soldiers is the best in the world. Most of SOF's advanced training is equally as outstanding, but it focuses solely on the soldier's vertical progression to the next skill level.

Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, outlines the Army's concept for the transition to the 21st century. TRADOC Pam 525-5 contains essential tasks that augur the need to synchronize unconventional and conventional military operations. Developing this kind of synchronization would call for a comprehensive, advanced leader-development strategy encompassing all the skills of ARSOF. This article proposes such a strategy — the Special Operations Forces Training (Advanced) (Comprehensive), or SOFTAC.

While this article expresses the personal viewpoint of the author, it actually ties together several initiatives already being considered or undertaken at the Special Warfare Center and School. Because SWCS is reviewing the training strategy for all SOF officers, warrant officers and NCOs, proposals from the field and discussion of alternative possibilities are appropriate and welcome at this time. The Directorate of Training and Doctrine encourages reader comments either to Special Warfare *or to the DOTD at ASOCNET/Internet address: dtd-swcs@soc.mil. — Editor*

Structure

SOFTAC is a concept to train ARSOF in synthesizing information, synchronizing operations with other agencies, and synergizing the successful execution of any mission envisioned in Force XXI. The implementation of SOFTAC would immeasurably increase our ability to analyze a mission and to effectively plan and conduct special operations, and it would ensure that ARSOF focuses on its most important asset — people.

Currently, the advanced training for ARSOF includes the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, the Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Psychological Operations Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Civil Affairs Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Regional Studies Course, Troy State University's master of arts program, and Central Texas College's associate degree program.

The advanced training contains only one deficiency — there is no officer transition

course for Special Forces officers moving from company to field grade. Although company- and field-grade officers have much in common, there are distinct differences in their perceptions. For example, a captain may plan a deployment for training as a one-time event, whereas a major may develop a comprehensive program of events to achieve the operational or strategic objectives of a regional combatant commander. An important aspect of SOFTAC would be the addition of a two-week SF officer transition course.

The vertical structure of SOF advanced training should also be cross-sectioned horizontally with seminars that would allow members of all SOF elements to share their ideas, expertise and experience. A series of SOFTAC executive-management seminars in which participants could apply decision-making processes using practical exercises incorporating multiple occupational skills.

In another seminar targeted to the special-operations command-and-control element, or SOCCE, perhaps we could mix ARSOF soldiers of all grades. The purpose of this approach can be illustrated as follows: A Special Forces company is doctrinally expected to function as a SOCCE with a corps or a division, yet there is no institutional training that prepares the company to perform this function as a team. We could develop a training module to meet this requirement, perhaps modeled after Fort Leavenworth's tactical commander's development course. The module could be conducted in one week at Fort Bragg's battle simulation center.

Regional planning seminars could focus on cultural, linguistic and combatant-command areas of responsibility. Other seminars could feature case studies and student discussions of actual events.

These proposed seminars would also provide an excellent opportunity for interaction and communication among combined, joint, interagency and nongovernmental participants. For example, participants could conduct a mission analysis for a theater-specific task from the joint-strategic capabilities plan of a regional combatant commander. We

SOFTAC



could conduct five of these seminars per year (one for each regional combatant commander). Relevant members of organizations affected by the tasks could be invited to participate. These seminars would enable interagency or joint players to develop a clearer understanding of the significant differences between agencies and services. Each combatant commander could provide actual "commander's intent."

The idea of horizontally structured training is not unique to SOFTAC. Each year, the Army selects 10 ARSOF officers (six from Special Forces, two from Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, one Ranger and one special-operations aviator) for enrollment at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. In pursuit of a master's degree in national security affairs, they specialize in the study of special operations and low-intensity conflict. Each year, Functional Area 39 selects 40 officers (PSYOP and CA) for enrollment in Troy State University's master's program in international relations, conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C. Other Special Forces officers attend advanced degree programs in functional areas such as public affairs. However, no similar programs exist for warrant officers and noncommissioned officers.

Eligibility

Those who would be eligible to participate in SOFTAC include Special Forces officers selected for promotion to major; Special Forces warrant officers selected for promotion to CW3; Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs NCOs selected to attend their advanced noncommissioned officer courses; and officers in Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs). Officers and NCOs who have been awarded additional skill identifier K4 (special-operations aviation) would be eligible at parallel selection points. Officers and NCOs with Ranger Regiment experience would also be eligible, although the present series of additional skill identifiers precludes easy identification of these individuals.

Justification

All ARSOF soldiers, whether field-grade officers, senior warrant officers or NCOs, should have a clear vision of the desired end state of their leader development. TRADOC Pam 525-5's extensive discussion of combined and joint operations, coupled with continuous interagency and nongovernmental involvement, opens the door for ideas on leader development that may have previously been unacceptable. The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens, has echoed retired Admiral Hopper's philosophy that the worst phrase in the military is, "We've always done it that way."

If SOFTAC's seminars are added to the existing ARSOF advanced training courses, perhaps the comprehensive training program could be accredited, enabling participants to qualify for academic degrees. Though not the main objective of SOFTAC, these degrees would have the ancillary benefit of putting our ARSOF soldiers ahead of their conventional peers at all NCO, WO and officer levels.

Length of training

Approximately one-half of all ARSOF are reserve-component soldiers who would attend SOFTAC during their annual training. For this reason, most of the SOFTAC seminars would range from 1-3 weeks. This length of training would also accommodate most outside agencies (combined, interagency or joint).

The existing curriculum of basic SOF language courses could serve as a basis for SOFTAC advanced language training. Advanced language training could be conducted in two- to four-week intervals to "step up" selected individuals who have maintained proficiency through self-development.

Depending on how sophisticated the fully developed strategy might become, some participants could attend SOFTAC modules piecemeal and earn their degrees after having completed all the require-

ments. Is ample time available in the individual soldier's professional development to execute this training program? We invest a year in the initial training of a Special Forces soldier. This training is universally applauded as outstanding, but our current advanced training is less effective because of its vertical structure. We must confidently commit to a horizontal cross-section of advanced training, and we must include our associates from the other services, government and nongovernment agencies, and our allies.

Disadvantages

SOFTAC would have some disadvantages. We cannot overlook financial constraints as a major consideration. However, it is clear that the most important entity in SOF is the people, and we must exploit every opportunity to provide our SOF soldiers with specialized training. For the price of annual maintenance on one MH-60G helicopter, we could conduct a pilot seminar — two weeks of case studies, for example. The cost of one complete airframe would likely pay for one year of SOFTAC.

Despite the resource constraints, ARSOF could develop both the strategy and a list of essential elements for the training program. ARSOF soldiers who have already completed the existing advanced training would be considered fully qualified in SOFTAC after they attended the pilot seminars. These "graduates" could then provide a core of future instructors. And, fortunately, we have a veritable phalanx of "beltway bandits" and SOF retirees who might be willing to begin researching and writing the case studies.

Other possible disadvantages of SOFTAC are the burden of maintaining training records and the difficulty in differentiating fully qualified individuals from nonqualified individuals at certain selection or promotion gates.

Summary

An ARSOF soldier would be considered "best-qualified" after he had completed the leader-development segments appropriate to his level of professional development and had demonstrated exemplary performance in every assigned duty. A complete program for a Special Forces officer would include Special Forces branch qualification (1-2 years), the proposed Special Forces Transition Course (two weeks), the Army Command and General Staff College, one regional planning seminar (1-3 weeks), one SOCCE seminar (one week) and a master's degree (if possible) during the SF soldier's life cycle as a major.

What are the advantages of SOFTAC? SOFTAC would provide stimulating and challenging training, coupled with the sharing of expertise among all ranks and among all theaters of operation. The ultimate purpose of the SOFTAC proposal is to bring combined, interagency, joint and Army operators together and to transform elite groups into Force XXI ARSOF leaders — leaders with the clear and open vision necessary to maintain SOF's ability to lead the Army and the nation as we race into the 21st century.

Lieutenant Colonel David E. McCracken is chief of the Special Forces Branch, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. Since graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course in April 1977, he has served in numerous Special Forces assignments, including two assignments in Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group; two assignments in the Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group; and two assignments in the National Capitol Region. He is co-author of a Harvard University national-security-policy analysis paper, Roads to New Strength: Preparing Leaders for Military Operations Other Than War.

Civil Affairs at JRTC: Taking the War to the Enemy

by Major William R. Bishop

During a training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center in September 1994, a reserve-component Civil Affairs detachment demonstrated CA's ability to assist a combat commander by working close to the forward areas.

Elements of the 431st CA Battalion in Little Rock, Ark., formed a CA detachment to support elements of the 101st Airborne Division during JRTC 94-10.

The rotation scenario called for the 101st to deploy to an intermediate staging base, or ISB, located in the "Republic of Cortina." At the ISB, the CA detachment linked up with the 1st Brigade of the 101st. The detachment also began planning for insertion into the JRTC area of operations and task-organizing into separate teams.

After four days, the 101st air-assaulted into the hinterlands of Cortina, beginning the "war." The brigade's first major task was to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation involving approximately 30 American citizens caught in the fighting. The enemy, a well-trained and well-equipped narcoterrorist organization known as the "Cortinian Liberation Front," or CLF, knew that the Americans were planning an evacuation. The CLF was determined to stop the Americans by force or through intimidation of the local population.

Coming in for a night air assault, the CA direct-support team and the lead infantry battalion received a nasty surprise: They were unable to land because the swirling dirt and dust created by the helicopter blades blinded the pilots. The alternate landing site had been taken by another battalion that had faced similar problems while trying to land. After setting down on an unmarked landing zone, the lead battalion conducted a forced march to the village where the evacuees were gathered. The evacuees were processed and put on helicopters bound for the ISB, where they came under the control of the "State Department." There were no victims of friendly fire and no lost evacuees.

Over the next 11 days, the CA teams became heavily involved in the ensuing guerrilla warfare. Team members soon noted that practically all civilian-related problems were beginning at the front lines. Those problems quickly escalated into major issues, which required the brigade staff to expend a massive amount of time seeking solutions. With this in mind, the CA detachment commander decided to move the CA teams closer to the combat areas. Designated teams lived in each village; other teams manned checkpoints, worked closely with counterintelligence assets and ran night combat patrols. Their efforts yielded dramatic results.

Detained CLF members complained to 101st interrogators that CA soldiers were

"everywhere," and that the CA presence was rapidly limiting the CLF's intelligence-gathering and ease of movement. After a week, the CLF began to actively target CA soldiers in an attempt to restrict the gains they were making with the local population. By the end of the second week, all civilian refugees had been relocated, and the villages were under strict surveillance for signs of enemy activity.

With assistance from the 1st Brigade, the CA detachment constructed a displaced-civilian center. Having the center facilitated the efforts of the CA teams in locating, processing and relocating all the civilians on the battlefield who were slowing the forward movement of American soldiers. Brigade support also helped to provide the civilians with housing, food, medical attention and transportation.

Through their work with counterintelligence soldiers, CA soldiers were able to identify civilians on the classified black/gray list and report them to the Cortinian National Police. "Because of the Civil Affairs personnel working so closely with the 101st, more than 70 percent of my intelligence was denied. I finally had to pull back my few available agents before they, too, were caught," stated the opposing-forces senior commander.

The events that occurred while the displaced-civilian center was being shut down illustrate the close relationship between the 1st Brigade and the CA teams: Enemy armor had penetrated American lines and was known to be near the brigade tactical operations center. As CA soldiers were leaving the camp, they spotted an approaching convoy of enemy tanks and personnel carriers. One of the CA NCOs quickly reported the movement across the radio net. Within minutes, the brigade S-3 scrambled a pair of AH-64 Apache helicopters that rapidly destroyed the enemy forces.

At the conclusion of the exercise, the CA elements had achieved impressive results: an almost complete shutdown of enemy human-intelligence gathering and the removal of all refugees from the battlefield.

The aggressive use of CA forces on the battlefield had paid off, and the exercise yielded several important lessons:

- As the S-5, the senior CA officer should ensure that all staff elements of the supported unit know the purpose and the capabilities of the CA elements. CA activities must also be properly coordinated with all necessary elements at the brigade tactical operations center.
- An effective civil-military operations center must be set up and run on a 24-hour basis. Radio skills are imperative for those soldiers manning the center.
- CA soldiers should be placed directly at the battalion level as S-5s. If the battalion commander were to assign one of his officers to work closely with the teams as the S-5, perhaps the system would work even better.
- CA soldiers can be used to take the war to the enemy. When aggressively used as far forward as possible, CA achieves its greatest effect.
- Commanders should maximize the use of CA soldiers who have had previous training as infantrymen, paratroopers, Rangers or Special Forces by moving them forward first.
- There is no textbook solution to every problem encountered — senior leaders should give clear guidance, and soldiers must learn to integrate common sense with the commander's intent.

Major William R. Bishop is a team chief in the 431st Civil Affairs Battalion, Camp Pike, Ark. In previous assignments he was an operations officer with the 82nd Airborne Division during the invasion of Grenada and served at detachment, company and group levels with the 11th Special Forces Group. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the Army Command and General Staff Officer Course, he holds an MBA from Duke University. He is nationally recognized for designing managed-care health-information systems.

Updating Doctrine: It's Everyone's Responsibility

by Captain Robert Kolpien

Military planning and operations are governed by complex theories and strategies referred to as doctrine. Doctrine provides the military with a framework of guidelines and ideas for planning and conducting actions and operations. The U.S. Army's field force receives its doctrine through a series of joint, Army and branch manuals.

All doctrinal literature is updated on a periodic basis. It is revised to keep pace with global trends, threat realities, technical change, evolving concepts and changing missions. Updated manuals assist the user in the planning and conduct of his mission. Without the cooperation of the entire force, doctrinal publications would not be accurate or effective.

As the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School continues to update Special Forces doctrine, it is becoming increasingly important that we receive timely, constructive comments from the operational units (i.e., the users) regarding updates of doctrinal events on the ground. Our updated, published doctrine also permits the rest of the Army and our sister services to see how we operate.

Proper doctrinal updates are the responsibility of everyone within the Special Forces community. SWCS does not create or update doctrine within a vacuum; however, this can be the perception if we do not receive proper input from the field. Because of the personnel drawdown and budget restraints, the doctrinal update system has been reduced from three drafts (preliminary, coordinating and final) to two drafts: initial and final. As a result, the users have one fewer opportunity to review and comment on a manual prior to the final edition. It is more critical than ever to ensure that draft manuals are reviewed by the users and that the users are allowed maximum time to submit valid comments to SWCS.

Individuals who review a document should take their role seriously and provide relevant comments to the doctrine writers. All comments received by the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine are reviewed by the writers. The decisions to include or not to include the changes are explained and defended to the commanding general prior to the publication of the final document. Every person who reviews a document has the power to correct or enhance that manual before it is put "on the street."

A careful review process also facilitates the validation of new ideas for future doctrinal changes. New ideas should be submitted as soon as possible so that they can be considered for inclusion in doctrine.

New doctrinal ideas are also necessary for filling voids where no manuals exist. When it is determined that a void exists, doctrine writers begin the process of collecting information. The first ideas for the doctrine will appear as a series of "White Papers" and will be distributed for review. They can be

used as interim doctrine; however, they should foment professional discussion and debate in order to create the actual drafts of the new FM. In the development of a new manual, this review process is crucial.

New doctrine is simply a theory of how things should be done. Doctrine is implemented and learned through training. The principles for Army standardized training are found in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. Both publications include guidelines on planning, executing and assessing battle-focused training at all levels. The Army training system consists of individual and collective training. Individual training develops the technical proficiency of the soldier and of the leader. Collective training builds on individual skills and provides the basis for unit proficiency in executing wartime missions.

Critical to the battle-focus concept is the linkage between collective mission-essential tasks and the individual tasks that support them. The Systems Approach to Training directly supports and underlines individual and unit training. It establishes the principles of a systems approach in the evaluation, analysis, design, development and implementation of Army training. We apply these principles when identifying and analyzing missions, collective tasks and individual tasks. Subsequent steps lead to the design, development, implementation and evaluation of supporting training programs and products.

Individual, tactical and technical excellence is the base upon which we build and sustain collective proficiency. This excellence is a result of training to standards those mission-related MOS tasks contained in soldier training publications, or STPs, which are provided as soldier's manuals and as soldier's manuals of common tasks. These manuals standardize soldier training for common tasks and for each MOS within a given enlisted career management field. Because STPs identify and explain the training steps to be accomplished in a task, both the MOS and the common-skills manuals reduce the need for formal lesson plans and make trainer planning easier. These manuals ensure that all soldiers are trained to the same standards for each task, and they may be used as references for planning, preparing and conducting training. It is critical that reviewers contribute valid and acceptable comments that can be incorporated into STPs.

In the preparation, development and publication of collective-training products, a thorough review and relevant comments are just as important as the careful review given to doctrinal and individual training publications. Collective training is guided by the Army Training and Evaluation Program, or ARTEP. ARTEP collective training products are published in the form of mission training plans, or MTPs.

Army MTPs are descriptive training documents that provide units with a clear description of *what* may be trained and suggested methods of *how* to train in order to achieve critical wartime mission proficiency. MTPs identify and explain critical wartime missions in terms of comprehensive training and evaluation outlines that provide observable and measurable training standards. They also provide sample exercises, guidance and other related training-management aids.

Formal and informal feedback is useful in determining whether MTPs are working as designed. Careful review and timely comments from the field help determine the adequacy of the doctrinal literature training products.

The next time a draft manual is placed on your desk for review, keep in mind the doctrinal-development process. With a clear understanding of the part you play in the review process, perhaps you could be a major player in improving the entire force.

Captain Robert Kolpien is chief of the Special Forces Individual Training Branch in the Special Forces Doctrine Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He served four years as detachment commander of ODA-072 (scuba) in the 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group, during which time he also served in Operations Desert Storm, Provide Comfort and Provide Comfort II.

Letters

Civil Affairs receives welcome recognition

I commend you for the publication of "Civil Affairs: A Function of Command" (July 1995) and several of its cogent observations. The most important is simply that "Civil Affairs is an operations function, not a sustainment function." In the same issue, General Yarborough in his article so correctly points out that "Civil Affairs are properly the concern of any combat commander prior to, during or following battle."

This is a very welcome recognition of the proper place of Civil Affairs. The Civil Affairs community itself has, until fairly recently, been partially to blame for the attitude that Civil Affairs is something that happens after the battle. The CA Regiment's distinctive insignia itself contains two elements that, while not truly limiting CA's role to the vestiges of the old Civil Affairs-military government function, tend to portray that thinking. The first is the crest with the scales. The scales, according to the Institute of Heraldry, "represent balance and normality," but are, nevertheless, commonly associated with law or governance. By the same token, the words on the shield, "Secure the Victory," do no necessarily mean after the victory, but there is perhaps that unfortunate connotation.

In any event, it is good to see the proper role of CA now being recognized. On that note, I take this opportunity to express my view that the bulk of CA assets are properly located in the Army Reserve. That's where the expertise is. If there is any one area of the Army where foreign-area expertise should be located, it is in CA. There is quite a bit there now. There should be more. In that connection, I can make a soldier out of a foreign-area expert a lot quicker and cheaper than I can make a foreign-area expert out of a soldier. The expertise to a large extent already exists in the civilian community and the Army Reserve. All we have to do is identify it and channel it into proper utilization

This is not to deny the importance of the proper utilization of the CMO as outlined in the article. Nor is it to deny the increased role CA will have to be utilized by the active component in coming years. Will it ever exist as a branch of the active component? I confess to mixed emotions on that scene. But I can remember when there was no Special Forces branch and no Military Intelligence branch. Things do change and evolve. I think we are seeing that now in CA.

COL H. David O'Malie
U.S. Army (ret.)
Houston, Texas

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but we may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will withhold the author's name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DT-PBM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.*

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Branch reports results of 1995 MSG selection board

The results of the calendar year 1995 master-sergeant selection board show CMF 18 with a master-sergeant selection rate of 19 percent, compared to the Army average of 17.6 percent. Overall, CMF 18 is extremely healthy, with outstanding soldiers competing for a limited number of promotions, according to CPT Adrian A. Erckenbrack, CMF 18 and 37 branch chief at PERSCOM. To help soldiers prepare for future boards, Erckenbrack offers the following analysis of the board's reports.

- The DA photo continues to provide the initial and overwhelming impression between the individual and the selection board. The board noted outdated photos, poor haircuts and/or improperly trimmed mustaches (even properly trimmed mustaches attract closer scrutiny than clean-shaven faces), and awards worn in photos but not documented in the individual's official file. Color photos produce a more favorable impression.
- NCOERs that listed actual APFT scores or specific physical attributes (e.g., "routinely bench-presses 500 pounds") were more helpful than those which simply said "participates in detachment fitness training."
- Language training was considered critical in rating a soldier's file. The level of qualification was not as important as evidence of intensive training (DLI, CLP, FLTC, immersion training, etc.).
- Operations-and-intelligence training was considered very important for a prospective SF master sergeant. Soldiers who had not attended the training were not penalized — O&I was used as a positive discriminator among the highest-quality files.
- Static-line jumpmaster qualification was considered a basic qualification for an SF master sergeant. Other skill-enhancing courses, e.g., MFF, UWO and SOTIC, strengthen the individual's file, but their absence does not reduce soldiers' chances for selection.
- The majority of soldiers had pursued civilian education beyond the high-school level. The board, however, considered overall job performance more important than additional civilian education, and it did not penalize soldiers with a preponderance of ODA time.
- The defining assignment for a CMF 18 SFC was duty as an ODA member.
- Panel members favorably viewed assignments as JRTC observer-controllers, as SWCS instructors and as ROTC instructors, as long as NCOs did not appear to be homesteading.
- "Outstanding" soldiers had performed all jobs well and had served under several raters and senior raters. Consistent excellence was the norm. Rater comments were very important.
- Panel members looked closely at recommendations for future jobs and recommendations for promotions.
- Overall NCO quality is very high in CMF 18. Competition for promotion is keen, and relatively minor discriminators can carry a significant cumulative impact.
- Some files were missing DA Forms 2A and 2-1, leading board members

to conclude that soldiers with incomplete files were not sufficiently motivated to be seriously considered for promotion.

- "Excellent" rating blocks on NCOERs were frequently not supported by raters' comments. Vague or general supporting comments cause board members to devalue or even discount a report. NCOERs must reflect specific accomplishments and results achieved. Comments that include SF-specific terms and acronyms may be meaningless to board members from other CMFs. Terms and acronyms must be written in clear, understandable English.
- At times it was difficult to determine what job an individual held. "Senior sergeant" does not carry the same weight with the panel that "NCOIC" or "team sergeant" does. Raters should avoid using abbreviations in job descriptions and in rater/senior rater comments.
- As a rule, special-mission-unit files were in good shape administratively. However, virtually all NCOERs from SMUs were much the same. All reports were "max," with similar, generic bullets. Lists of these bullets were not considered adequate justification for "excellent." The overall similarity of the files made it difficult to identify the best.

CPT Erckenbrack recommends that each soldier send for his fiche every 1-2 years and check it closely: Many files were found to contain other soldiers' NCOERs or disciplinary actions. Soldiers should also seek a variety of jobs during their careers, with an emphasis on leadership positions in TO&E units. Single or periodic tours as JRTC OCs, SWCS instructors, drill sergeants, and reserve-component advisers are considered beneficial to the soldier and the CMF, but extended or back-to-back tours in TDA positions are not looked upon favorably. The soldiers rated "outstanding" had performed well in these jobs and had subsequently returned to TO&E units.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF officers should consider SFOD-D assignments

Special Forces Operational Detachment-D, although not an SF unit, is a uniquely trained, highly responsive, low-profile special-operations unit with many SF officer authorizations. Chapter 14 of DA Pam 600-3, *Officer Professional Development*, dated June 8, 1995, discusses the integration of SFOD-D service into the SF officer's career life cycle. It may be summarized as follows: A non-SF branch member may be accessed into SF after being accessed into SFOD-D. He must complete the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. If the officer elects to transfer to the SF Branch, SFOD-D troop-commander service will fulfill SF-captain branch qualification. SFAS is waiverable, but the officer must complete SFDOQC to branch-transfer. A qualified SF Branch officer who volunteers for SFOD-D must attend the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. SF branch-qualifying positions in SFOD-D are squadron operations officer (major); SFOD-D deputy commander (lieutenant colonel); and squadron commander (lieutenant colonel — an "additional qualification," per DA Pam 600-3).

SF officers are encouraged to seek SFOD-D assignments but to balance assignments between "black" and "white" SOF. A combination of assignments can enhance an officer's professional qualifications and career opportunities, especially for command selection. Officers who spend most of their careers either in SFOD-D or in SF groups are unlikely to be "best-qualified" for DA selection as a commander in the other type of unit. For more information contact MAJ Dan Adelstein, Branch 18 Manager, SOPO, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

Officers should consult FA requirements data

• DA Pam 600-3, *Officer Professional Development*, provides professional-development requirements and additional qualification data, by grade, for specific officer branches and functional areas. Officers interested in a particular FA should read the applicable chapter(s) before contacting the FA proponent or the assignment officer.

• Correspondence requesting an enhanced FA39 floor for the FY96 lieutenant-colonel promotion selection board has been submitted to the DA DCSPER and accepted. For more information contact Jeanne Schiller, SOPO FA39 Manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

Branch-qualifying assignments important for SF warrant officers

Branch-qualifying assignments for SF warrant officers are based on grade: assistant detachment commander, WO1-CW3; company operations warrant officer, CW3; battalion operations warrant officer, CW4; group operations warrant officer, CW5; and group intelligence warrant officer, CW5. A warrant officer's initial assignment should be for a minimum of five years on an A-detachment. For more information contact CW3 Wayne Searcy, SOPO 180A Manager, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

Foreign SOF

Violence continues in Mexico's troubled Guerrero state

Guerrero was the site of a small, active, and remarkably effective insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s. Guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas and several hundred followers (organized as the Army of the Poor and Peasant's Brigade Against Injustice) operated for some years in the Guerrero mountains. Although a substantial counterinsurgency effort by the Mexican army largely ended their activity in late 1974, lingering political violence, high levels of drug trafficking and criminal violence, and the presence of armed groups with unknown affiliations remained a feature of life there. The 1994 Chiapas uprising also underscored the still-unsolved problems in Guerrero, where several "new" armed groups announced their existence and in some cases their linkages to other insurgent bands and broader agendas. Armed groups are reportedly active in several areas around Guerrero. This summer a series of ambushes and attacks left more than three dozen activists, police and other citizens dead; sparked numerous charges by Mexican human-rights spokesmen of enduring abuses by Mexican police and other authorities; and further highlighted Guerrero's potential as a catalyst for broader instability. The most serious single incident occurred in late June, when state police killed 17 *campesinos* on their way to an anti-government demonstration in a town northwest of Acapulco. Some police officers and officials who were involved were later charged and arrested. The following week, in the municipality of Telolaupan, an ambush by unknown attackers with automatic weapons left five policemen dead, while in central Guerrero, 12 family members were killed in an apparently unrelated roadside attack. Collectively, these acts of political, criminal and random violence — together with Guerrero's troubled past — spotlight the north-central Mexican state as a source of increasing concern to Mexican security specialists.

'Feliks' group increases Russian security problems

High levels of violent crime and other real or perceived threats to regimes and interest groups have spurred the development of extra-legal "death squads" or vigilante organizations in many areas of the world. In Russia, recent media reports charged that the so-called "Feliks" group — reportedly formed in 1991 by former officers of the KGB and General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate — was involved in vigilante activities. According to July 1995 reporting, the Feliks group comprises at least 60 former security-service officers and is planning assassinations of officials judged to be either corrupt or "Western lackeys." Early in 1995, Feliks itself had advanced strong views of Russian and regional corruption, Western connivance with criminal groups in and around the former USSR, and the need for "extreme measures" to deal with the turmoil. The Feliks group's February release of a privately disseminated report, "International Drug Contraband and the Former USSR," painted a picture of an international drug trade involving many of the world's police and security services operating for political or mercenary reasons. Muslim drug trafficking and links to conflict in the former Yugoslavia were specifically discussed, as

were presumed criminal and terrorist links of the "Chechen mafia" and the Chechen political leadership. The report expressed the view that some U.N. peacekeeping contingents were actually serving as drug-trafficking links for leading drug-producing countries. The Feliks report alleges deep corruption in Russian security services and law-enforcement bodies, and it rails against Russian criminal politicians, officials and bankers, as well as the "private armies" some of them have assembled. Whether or not these views have been translated into the "extrajudicial imposition of the death penalty" advocated in the Feliks report, the public surfacing of the shadowy Feliks group adds another organized "nonstate" voice to many other ultranationalist groups advocating extreme, violent remedies to Russia's immediate crime and security problems.

Bolivia deploys force of 'Ecological Police'

On July 1, 1995, a three-company Ecological Police organization was officially formed in Bolivia to preserve the ecological balance in designated areas. Elements of the new force began initial deployment and "operational-tactical" training in the Isiboro-Secure National Park of the Chapare region of central Bolivia. Despite the region's prominence as a coca-producing and drug-trafficking area, spokesmen for the Special Antinarcotics Force insisted that the new police units would not have a role in drug interdiction or coca eradication. Rather, the Ecological Police would "preserve the environment; prevent the indiscriminate cutting of trees in the Chapare; and control forestry resources and indiscriminate ecological depredation." Nevertheless, some peasant spokesmen, critical of government interdiction and eradication efforts, viewed the force as an adjunct to other Bolivian-police Mobile Police Units for Rural Areas and Bolivian army counterdrug forces.

Reports suggest increasing criminality among Russian military forces

Allegations of Russian military arms and drug trafficking, as well as charges of traitorous dealings among Russian troops and opposition forces, have intensified in recent months in Tajikistan. Russian military personnel, including senior officers assigned to the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and other Russian military elements in that central Asian nation, have been charged by a variety of regional and Russian reporting with corruption and trading with the "enemy"; i.e., the Tajik opposition forces. In addition to numerous — and sometimes official — allegations of drug and illegal-arms movement via Russian military transportation, corrupt Russian officers have reportedly planned the assassinations of fellow officers and have actively participated in attacks against other Russian (and Tajik government) troops in behalf of criminal or other agendas. While these reports require skeptical consideration, they are analogous to reporting on the growing criminality of the highly stressed Russian military overall, especially among units assigned to peacekeeping duties or otherwise deployed in areas where crime is profitable.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

SOF units receive new commanders

Three Fort Bragg-based special-operations units have recently received new commanders.

On July 27, Colonel Kenneth W. Getty Jr. relinquished command of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group to Colonel Lance E. Booth. Booth was previously commander of the Special Operations Command - Korea.

Major General William F. Garrison, commander of the Special Warfare Center and School, spoke of Booth's qualifications to take the new command. "I am confident that his experiences will benefit the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and that he will continue to lead this diverse, premier unit in the direction that will be necessary for the 21st century."

Since Getty assumed command of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group in February 1993, the organization has trained more than 18,580 U.S. soldiers and 283 soldiers from foreign countries, Garrison said. Getty will remain at Fort Bragg as director of training for the Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, a U.S. Special Operations Command organization.

On July 7, command of the 7th Special Forces Group passed from Colonel Ranger Roach to Colonel James W. Parker. Parker was previously the operations officer and chief of staff for the Army Special Forces Command.

Upon completion of the ceremony, Roach, who had commanded the 7th Group since June 1993, retired with 28 years' active duty in the Army.

Photo by Mike Brantley

Colonel Ranger Roach (second from right) relinquishes the colors of the 7th SF Group.

Colonel William C. Hunter replaced Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones as commander of the 4th PSYOP Group on June 20. Hunter was previously commander of the U.S. Military Group Assistance in Venezuela.

A former commander of the 4th PSYOP Group's 1st PSYOP Battalion, Hunter told spectators assembled for the ceremony, "I am extremely proud to be back. ... This position is not a stepping stone to any other — it is the one job in all the Army that I would rather have."

SWCS to host 1996 SF Branch Conference

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School invites all Special Forces personnel to attend the 1996 Special Forces Branch Conference and Anniversary Ball. The conference will be held at the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg April 17-19, with the ball on April 19. For more information on the branch conference, contact the Special Forces Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS, at DSN 239-5333 or commercial (910) 432-5333.

USASOC names NCO, Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command recently announced the winners in its NCO and Soldier of the Year competitions.

The NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Rolf L. Jensen of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Jensen is a weapons sergeant assigned to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist Nicole V. McGraw of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. McGraw is assigned to Headquarters Support Company, 1st PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group.

Runners-up were Staff Sergeant Violeta Navarro of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, USAJFKSWCS; and Specialist James Durham, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Other competitors were Staff Sergeant Bobby Sattazahn, Headquarters and Headquarters Com-

pany, 4th PSYOP Group; Sergeant Chad McGraw, Company A, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; Sergeant Christopher Richardson, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR; Specialist Michael Batchelor, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; Specialist Del Magana, HHC, 5th SF Group; and Private First Class Michael Kochis, Company B, Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, USAJFKSWCS.

Testing performed on proposed SOF equipment

The New Systems Branch of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine participated in the August testing of a proposed special-operations equipment system.

The New Systems Branch develops initial training required for new SOF equipment systems and provides any required training aids or simulations.

The Penetration Augmented Munition, or PAM, is a multi-stage special-purpose munition designed for precise destruction of reinforced concrete targets such as bridge piers. The 40-pound PAM will produce the effect of 200 pounds of C-4 but will reduce time-on-target from 20 minutes to less than two minutes.

The prime civilian contractor for the PAM brought evaluation models to Fort Bragg for testing. Testing participants included personnel from the 7th SF Group, Army Special Operations Command combat developments and the New Systems Branch. The test evaluated the performance of the 7th Group soldiers on eight different criteria, from portability to ease of fusing/arming. The soldiers provided written comments and critiques on the PAM. The testing also provided an opportunity for the soldiers and the contractor to interact early in the development process.

For more information contact Sergeant First Class Mike Bacon, NCOIC of the New Systems Branch, or Sergeant First Class R.J. Wagner at DSN 239-8853/9959 or commercial (910) 432-8853/9959.

SOF soldiers played major role in El Salvador

During the 12 years in which the U.S. maintained security-assistance trainers in El Salvador to help stop insurgency and civil war, more than half the U.S. soldiers deployed were members of special-operations units.

By the time the last three U.S. trainers left El Salvador in December 1994, approximately 800 soldiers had been deployed, according to the Special Warfare Center and School's Security Assistance Training Management Office. Although the number included soldiers from infantry, medical, aviation and a host of other disciplines and skills, more than 59 percent were drawn from Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

Although some of the soldiers had combat experience from Vietnam and Grenada, the majority had never served in a hostile environment, according to Ralph Corella, a security-assistance manager in SATMO. While the soldiers were mainly involved in the reorganization and improvement of the El Salvadoran armed forces and the development of numerous civic and humanitarian programs, their duties were not without risk: one SF soldier was killed as a result of enemy action, and two others died in helicopter crashes.

"We should be proud of the participation of the United States and of Army special-operations soldiers in assisting a nation in its attempts to end violence and focus its energies toward peace," Corella said. "The contributions made by security-assistance-team members in El Salvador will be an integral part of the texture of that Central American country for many years to come."

Materials needed for history of Civil Affairs

The Army Special Operations Command is seeking photographs, papers, organizational charts, unit after-action reports or any other material from the Civil Affairs community for use in a book on the history of Civil Affairs.

The book will include the operations of military-government detachments in Europe and the Pacific following World War II, establishment of the schools of military government during the war, and the missions and operations of current CA units. The book is scheduled for completion by August 1996.

Contributors may send materials to HQ, USASOC; Attn: AOHS-HS/History of CA Project; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5200. For more information contact Dr. Richard Stewart at DSN 239-9542 or commercial (910) 432-9542.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Beacons in the Night *By Franklin Lindsay. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8047-2123-8. 383 pages. $29.95.*

In May 1944, Major Franklin Lindsay and his OSS team conducted a parachute infiltration into partisan-controlled Slovenia, Yugoslavia. For the next nine months, Lindsay underwent a complete unconventional-warfare experience as part of the OSS mission with Tito's partisans. *Beacons in the Night* is his outstanding memoir of that experience.

Lindsay was a direct participant and observer from the tactical through the strategic levels of unconventional warfare. Throughout the mission, the political imperatives and the agendas of the myriad forces and individuals provided lessons that are as relevant today as they were in 1944.

Three specific thoughts dominate my reflections on this superb book. First, Lindsay's observations and experience with the ethnic situation that has inflamed the Balkans for so long provide an exceptionally clear perspective that spans the years between World War II and the current tragedy in that region. As apparent as the operational lessons that permeate this book are the bitter realities of the vast hatreds, already ancient by the time of Nazi occupation, that afflict the southern Slavs. As Lindsay observed, the wartime ideologies of fascism and communism only provided new frameworks by which to prosecute the pervasive religious and ethnic hatreds that



have ultimately outlived both Nazis and communists.

Second, Lindsay's story provides as accurate and as vivid an illustration of the unconventional-warfare operational environment as any doctrinal manual. From the combined command-and-control arrangements with the British Special Operations Executive, to tactical operations with the partisans, *Beacons in the Night* touches it all.

Throughout the war the author and his men found themselves attempting to reconcile their mission requirements with Tito's political aims. The partisans' enemy, as often as not, was not the German resistance groups but rather other noncommunist resistance groups, especially Draza Mihajlovic's Chetniks. Jockeying to dominate postwar Yugoslavia and posturing to expand communist influence into bordering states increasingly became the partisan agenda — one at odds with U.S./U.K. desires. The lack of appreciation for political intent in American warfighting policy, however, resulted in a lack of preparation for dealing with both Tito and his Soviet counterparts. Lindsay's recollections of his experience with the UW political component is one of the most valuable aspects of this book.

My third reflection is on the criticality of properly selecting and training Special Forces soldiers to successfully conduct UW. Fundamental lessons recur throughout the book, ranging from individual skills to synchronization of assets and the need for a common understanding, at the soldier level, of the desired end state. Lindsay's experience shows an absolute need for mastery of assigned weapons and specialty skills, the maintenance of physical fitness, the maturity required to maintain constant political and situational awareness, and a sound moral and ethical compass.

Beacons in the Night is also a delight because of its superior readability. Well-written and well-edited, the book is every bit as professional as the wartime record it recalls. It should be required reading for all SF personnel and for candidates in the Special Forces Qualification Course. Indeed, this book could serve as a template for UW-scenario development during the SFQC. Planners at regional special-operations commands and in theater headquarters would also do well to read *Beacons in the Night* for a deeper appreciation of the consequences of divergent agendas and of the advantages

that a first-class capability in UW offers our national-defense establishment.

LTC John F. Mulholland
Fort Bragg, N.C.

OSS Weapons. *By John W. Brunner. Williamstown, N.J.: Phillips Publications, 1994. ISBN: 0-932572-20-0. 206 pages. $44.95.*

Within months after the end of World War II, books and films began to tell the tale of the courage and resourcefulness of the agents of the Office of Strategic Services and of the cunning weapons and methods they employed.

The very mention of OSS brings to mind the motion picture of the same name, with Alan Ladd, behind enemy lines, bravely contacting a circling American plane on his Joan-Eleanor radio set as Nazi search parties close in on him. In the film "13 Rue Madeleine," James Cagney plays the part of the intrepid OSS agent. Captured by the Gestapo, he would doubtless have foiled the Nazis' efforts to wrest information from him by torture, if only he had had the deadly OSS L Capsule, a suicide tablet consisting of dry potassium cyanide coated with a heavy rubber sheath. But before any secrets can be divulged, Gestapo headquarters and all in it are annihilated by Army Air Corps pinpoint bombing. In films like these, OSS agents were equipped with everything from invisible ink to guns made to look like tobacco pipes.

The OSS actually did develop the Joan-Eleanor, and it perfected the L Capsule, which OSS chief Brigadier General William Donovan and his agents carried with them to avoid being taken alive. Invisible ink, though included in the OSS inventory, was rarely put to use, and it was our British allies who developed the pipe gun.

Among the many other weapons and devices actually developed, adapted or considered for use by the OSS were the Beano, an impact hand grenade the size and weight of an American baseball; the Tree Spigot Gun, which could pierce 2.5 inches of steel armor plate; pocket incendiary devices; crossbows with enormous penetrating power; a pistol small enough to be concealed in a man's hand; and explosive coal that could be tossed into an enemy's coal bin. The OSS perfected an explosive flour that could be employed to blow up a bridge or baked into pancakes, biscuits, or bread and even eaten. The work of OSS Research and

Development also led to experimentation with ashless paper, dust igniter, hypodermic dart guns, itching towels, stench contaminators, napalm, tire spikes, air rifles, wiretapping and truth drugs.

Many of the special weapons developed by OSS never went operational. Accounts of OSS weapons often became a maze of uncertainty colored by legend. Even the now-declassified OSS Catalog has limitations — it consists partly of unfinished prototypes and does not include all OSS weapons and devices.

John Brunner's *OSS Weapons* does much to dispel uncertainty and to set the record straight. Brunner is admirably qualified to write this book. An OSS veteran, he served as an officer in the OSS Communications Office in Kunming, where he first acquired a lifelong fascination with the OSS's unique weapons and equipment. After the war and the termination of OSS, he continued to serve in the China Theater, along with a select group of OSS veterans, in the Strategic Services Unit. As an SSU officer, he used the OSS Matchbox Camera to photograph, without their knowledge, members of the Maoist delegations at diplomatic parties.

Brunner devoted most of his professional life, until his retirement in 1989, to teaching German literature at Muhlenberg College in Pennsylvania. But he never lost interest in the OSS. Over the course of a lifetime, he acquired a remarkable collection of OSS special weapons and devices.

Not long after the Central Intelligence Agency began releasing its OSS records to the National Archives, Brunner began researching the history and the development of OSS weapons in the records of the Chief of Ordinance (Record Group 156), the Office of Scientific Research and Development (RG 227), and, especially, the Office of Strategic Services (RG 226).

Brunner's *OSS Weapons* is the product of years of service in the OSS and in the SSU, a lifetime of collection and study, and more than a decade of exacting research of original records. It is an excellent book, well-documented, clear and readable. It will do good service for both laymen and specialists.

Dr. Lawrence H. McDonald
National Archives
Washington, D.C.

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ▪ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK – DT – PBM
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

THIRD CLASS
U.S. Postage
PAID
Southern, MD
Permit No. 1968

PIN: 074041–000