Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

As we prepare for a future characterized by increasing missions and diminishing resources, the American military is seeking ways of doing more with less. One way will be to rely on sophisticated technology to compensate for smaller forces.

One might expect that SOF, a relatively low-tech force, would receive less emphasis in such a situation, but in fact, the missions that will probably dominate the future — peace-enforcement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief — require human skills, which have always been a SOF specialty.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Colonel Ed Phillips examines the difficulty of providing forces for operations other than war without diminishing the readiness of those units. He compares the U.S. attempt to confront OOTW to C.S. Forester's analogy of savages attempting unsuccessfully to pull a screw from a piece of wood by applying more and more force. In an effort to find the most cost-effective force for employment in OOTW, Phillips compares the advantages and disadvantages of SOF with those of conventional forces.

Colonel William Flavin writes that one of the greatest problems in Europe's future will be the need for peace-building. Because they already have the skills and experience needed, SOF can provide a wide range of peace-building capabilities. Flavin also suggests that the concept of special-action forces, used during the 1960s, might be applicable in Europe in the future.

Dr. Thomas Marks discusses trends and problems in Asia and suggests that multinational action, in various forms, may be the preferred choice for dealing with many of Asia's difficulties. Whatever form the multinational actions take, Marks expects SOF to be a key component.

Captain Paul Allswede's article shows how a three-man Civil Affairs team contributed to the CINCPAC's peacetime-engagement program by assisting the Cambodian government in caring for Khmer Rouge defectors

and their families. The team's actions assisted Cambodia's efforts to end the Khmer Rouge insurgency and demonstrated the way in which a small SOF contingent can sometimes help to bring about dramatic results.

Finally, Dr. Carnes Lord examines the role of PSYOP in the RMA and finds that although the RMA is largely a technical and information revolution, PSYOP has not assumed a greater importance in our warfare strategies. Looking back at recent operations, Lord cites lessons learned and suggests ways of achieving the possibilities that PSYOP offers.

As the U.S. military plans for the future and prepares to operate more efficiently, we should remember that efficiency lies not only in achieving a greater return but also in expending less effort. As in Forester's analogy, the answer is not to apply *more* force but rather to apply a different *kind* of force — one more suited to the task. In many of the missions we will face, that force will be SOF.

William P. Tangney

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Army SOF: Right Tool for OOTW

by Colonel Ed Phillips

How can the United States Army maintain its combat edge and carry out the shadowy missions that are not war but are certainly not peace? Must the Army do more with less, or is there a solution already at hand to the challenge of operations other than war? Perhaps the answer lies in using the right tool for the right job, especially when the tool, Army special-operations forces, is available now.

President Clinton's national-security strategy of engagement and enlargement signals that operations other than war, or OOTW (humanitarian and disaster relief, peace operations, counternarcotics, and the like), will be *the* "growth industry" in U.S. foreign policy.[1] Engagement is inevitable and apolitical. The incidence of combat and of OOTW has increased through two successive administrations, one Republican and one Democratic.[2]

Engagement also means crusading, but American crusading is nothing new. The U.S. committed to an "active internationalist agenda" with the National Security Council Directive (NSC 68) of 1950. This agenda had less to do with the rise of a Soviet peer competitor than it did, as NSC 68 proclaimed, with "fostering a world in which the American system can survive and flourish."[3] Stability is key to that kind of world. Stability means American engagement in some form. (Thus, NSC 68 preceded the core of President Clinton's 1996 National Security Strategy by 46 years and, in effect, established our policy from 1950 to the present.)

What has changed with the end of the Cold War then is not the agenda of American foreign policy, but rather the way by which American foreign policy must pursue that agenda. The Cold War's bipolar nature usually cast engagement at the high end of the conflict spectrum (Korea, Vietnam, and European Iron Curtain containment). The post-Cold War's multipolar nature will usually cast engagement at the low end (Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia involvement). The Cold War's defined global threat enabled superpowers to engage by proxy. The post-Cold War's uncertain regional threat requires superpower leadership by example. The messages for the U.S. military are: (1) engagement has been and will remain essential to our foreign policy agenda; (2) the nature of engagement has expanded; and (3) the expanded engagement role requires a resolution of strategy and force planning between war-fighting and OOTW.

The U.S. military won the Cold War, demonstrating its skill at the high end of the spectrum in the Persian Gulf. It now must succeed in the post-Cold War's low-end competition without trading off war-fighting capability.

This article examines the ways by which the U.S. military proposes to confront its expanded engagement role, and it offers an alternative to Joint Vision 2010/Army Force XXI thinking. The discussion will review the advantages and disadvantages of both alternatives. It will then compare the impact of OOTW on each alternative's efficiency and assess each alternative's effectiveness in addressing OOTW. By identifying the most effective tools available and by finding the most efficient use of resources, we may be able to resolve the dilemma of whether to prepare

for what will be most in demand (OOTW) or what will be most demanding (war fighting).

In *The General*, C.S. Forester writes: "In some ways, it was like a debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of wood. Accustomed only to nails, they made one effort to pull out the screw by main force, and now that it had failed they were devising methods of applying more force still. … They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come out after the exertion of far less effort."[4]

Is Forester's analogy appropriate to our attempts at dealing with OOTW? What options already exist in the force structure for creativity in tool selection, for innovation in economy-of-force application and for a logical division of labor? Force planners must identify and exploit these options if they are to confront OOTW efficiently and effectively.

OOTW challenge

The U.S. military won the Cold War, demonstrating its skill at the high end of the spectrum in the Persian Gulf. It now must succeed in the post-Cold War's low-end competition without trading off war-fighting capability. And it must do so with significantly fewer resources than it enjoyed during the Cold War. This phenomenon is the fundamental problem confronting the U.S. military today — so much so that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John M. Shalikashvili has identified the need to balance advancing national interests in peacetime with maintaining readiness for war as the "challenge of the new strategic era."[5]

The challenge is fundamental to U.S. military strategies for the post-Cold War environment and to attempts to plan the force structure for the early 21st century. Robert Hoffa suggests that "the single most contentious policy related to general-purpose force planning is the dedication of forces to peacekeeping chores at the expense of the conventional mission. … Resolution of the focus debate will have considerable implications for the shape and structure of U.S. forces."[6]



Photo by Michael J. Halgren

Operations other than war, such as Somalia, may require U.S. conventional military forces to perform missions outside the realm of their military training and experience.

Efficiency paradox

The armed forces face an apparent "zero-sum" game with expanding OOTW commitments. Defense budgets and force structure are going down. At best, DoD budgets will probably hover around 2.9-3.0 percent of the gross domestic product for the foreseeable future.[7] The threshold for U.S. commitment is low. According to National Security Adviser Tony Lake, military forces can be used for almost any purpose.[8] The fiscal and temporal implication is that DoD must conduct more operations (most of which are OOTW) without destroying readiness for the overarching first priority — fighting the nation's wars.[9]

Fighting and winning the nation's wars, as then-CJCS General Colin Powell declared, remains "job one" for the military.[10] But focusing in two directions at the same time holds serious consequences for any organization, civilian or military. Dilution of cognitive effort normally results in erosion of the skills necessary to excel at the main effort. James Wilson and Carnes Lord note that high-performance organizations are in agreement on the way critical tasks are defined.[11] Agreement enhances organizational cohesion, sense of purpose and member-comfort levels. Humans avoid uncertainty. According to Lord, "Expansion into areas only peripherally related to the 'organizational essence' dilute or blur the central function."[12]

Stephen Cimbala captures the cognitive organizational problem succinctly: "Forces optimized for high intensity combat simply cannot be reduced in size and reassigned to OOTW. U.S. forces' sense of military professionalism may be compromised outside the competency of military training and

OOTW War-Fighting Paradox
IMPACT ON EFFICIENCY

INPUT	DESIRED OUTPUT	OOTW IMPACT
Fiscal	Materiel/personnel readiness	Diversion of O&M funds Training events Maintenance R&D Monetary flexibility QOL funding
Temporal	Skills/morale	Dissipation of time available Training opportunities Family time
Cognitive	War-fighter mentality	Dilution of focus Organizational purpose Skills concentration Organizational essence Diffuse doctrine
Potential Cumulative Costs	→	Reduced combat skills Outdated hardware Reduced unit cohesion Lower morale Lower retention "Hollow force"

experience. Assigning military forces to nation-building invites possible confusion between a military mission and a broader political one, to the detriment of military and political objectives."[13]

There is an inverse relationship between executing OOTW and maintaining fiscal, temporal and cognitive readiness for war-fighting. Military organizational efficiency is the ratio of inputs (dollars and time) to outputs (war-fighting prowess).[14] Therefore, the possibility that involvement in OOTW will degrade efficiency is real.

The combination of fiscal, temporal and cognitive factors is shown in the chart above. The chart summarizes OOTW's impact on efficiency — the first criterion that will be used later to evaluate the alternatives.

Effectiveness challenge

OOTW requirements are profoundly different from those of traditional war fighting. Authorities point to a defining separation between the two: OOTW is, at the core, long-term and preventive in nature, while war fighting is short-term and reactive.[15] Dr. Larry Cable describes the difference as "patience, persistence, and presence versus find, fix, and destroy."[16] OOTW requirements are interdependent, dynamic and repetitive. The ultimate measure of OOTW success is not steel on target, but rather no target for the steel.

OOTW is also an inherently "human" enterprise. Stephen Metz of the Army War College postulates that "while machines may dominate land combat in the future, they will not be capable of the complex and subtle interface with humans. Only highly trained officers and soldiers can cultivate the sophistication to succeed in peace operations. This requires 'script adaptability.' "[17] Metz contends that interagency cooperation, more than service jointness, will be an OOTW unity-of-effort prerequisite.

Across the board, the recurrent themes in OOTW are patience, extended physical presence, cultural sensitivity, language skill, interagency coordination and the need for an innovative approach. Recurrent concerns include a high potential for the "cure being worse than the disease," and the questionable applicability of traditional military power.[18]

Some authorities advocate a modest disposition of forces in order to maintain a low profile.[19] Still others express concern over the unintended consequences of military intervention. Even humanitarian operations raise questions of sovereignty that can link benign intervention to imperial colonialism. By comparison, oppressive local thugs can take on the mantle of a Robin Hood.[20] Protracted employment of U.S. combat forces in OOTW may also jeopardize the ultimate American center of gravity: public support.

There is a direct relationship between effectiveness in OOTW

and possession of the correct repertoire of organizational skills. A military organization's effectiveness is the ratio of its outputs to its objectives.[21] Therefore, the repertoire of skills possessed by an organization will largely dictate the organization's effectiveness in accomplishing its objectives. The skills needed in OOTW are shown in the chart below. This chart reflects the skills that organizations must develop if they are to successfully contend with OOTW. Effectiveness is the second criterion that will be used later to evaluate the alternatives.

OOTW strategies

In the 1995 *National Military Strategy* and in *Joint Vision 2010*, General Shalikashvili describes the military's macro plan for dealing with OOTW. The *JV 2010* descriptor is "full spectrum dominance," a concept that uses existing forces to accomplish a broader variety of missions — doing more with less, but with more capable technologies. The defining characteristic of the concept is the perennial use of a war-fighter unit serving as the OOTW lead agency. Excerpts from *JV 2010* and the *NMS* illuminate the concept: "We recognize that peace operations are different from traditional military operations in the tasks and capabilities they require. We are developing doctrine and training for these operations. Our guidelines continue to be to commit sufficient forces to achieve objectives decisively and to reassess the size, composition, and disposition of forces to achieve our objectives."[22]

Shalikashvili also states: "Other operations, from humanitarian assistance in peacetime through peace operations in a near hostile environment, have proved to be possible using forces optimized for wartime effectiveness. For non-combat operations, physical presence will likely be even more important. Simply to retain our effectiveness with less redundancy, we will need to wring every ounce of capability from every source."[23] Curiously, there is no mention of special-operations forces, or SOF, in *JV 2010*.

Shalikashvili acknowledges that a different skills repertoire is necessary for realizing OOTW objectives. Because OOTW skills are long-term in acquisition, war-fighter units will incorporate some of them, but only the modest, combat-related ones. Combat units will do double duty, taking on OOTW as an implied mission. OOTW must be as decisive and as limited in scope as practicable. The OOTW "rose" must be handed off as soon as possible. Why? The overarching theme is damage control. The chairman recognizes that the costs in war-fighting efficiency are not worth the effectiveness gains from OOTW execution. War fighting is, after all, job one.

Some observers disagree with the chairman's notion that stopgap measures will succeed. Cole

OOTW Repertoire Requirements
IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS

AREA	SKILLS/OUTPUT	OBJECTIVES
Fiscal	Economy of effort	Overhead costs More bang for the buck U.S. presence/threat image Home-grown solutions U.S. target signature
Environment	Set conditions	Create permissive setting
Temporal	Stay for the long haul	Systemic focus Preventive diplomacy Violence Stability
Interpersonal	Cultural awareness Language Multidisciplined Interagency	Host acceptance Leverage, dialogue Address holistic problem Team effort
Potential Cumulative Impact	→	Reduce incidence of crisis Long-term stability Exploit host capabilities Passive intel collection Reduce geopolitical surprise

Kingseed specifically cautions that military planners must "attend to promoting long term stability and sustained host nation development. Planners should emphasize 'nation assistance' as a specified mission and maintain forward presence in areas critical to U.S. interests."[24] Floyd Spence's criticism is more direct: "Doing more with less is an accurate description of the U.S. military, but it is a slogan, not a plan, and a recipe for eventual failure."[25]

Army officers Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest and Captain Robert Bateman question the efficacy of the stopgap training mentioned by the chairman: "Untrained force is not what we should commit (to OOTW), but what we must do when institutional personnel policy and training priorities combine to prevent any one unit from becoming proficient over time."[26] "The weight of Air-Land Battle promises to keep the Army's training and education system from mastering concepts needed to respond to problems at the low end of the conflict spectrum."[27]

Full-spectrum dominance might be described then as "warfare dominance with economy in OOTW." Criticism aside, Shalikashvili, faced with diminished resources and a national constituency averse to casualties, takes a hedge approach to OOTW strategy: overwhelm with force, avoid decisive engagement, clear out fast, get on with what is important. The conventional military cannot afford to field a force structure with a skill repertoire focused on OOTW.

The Army's Force XXI vision provides a micro view of the chairman's concept.[28] The focus of Force XXI is "information dominance"; that is, the ability to see the battlefield in near-real time and to make operational-level decisions in minutes rather than in days. Technology is the centerpiece of this concept. Force XXI (a system) marks its forward momentum by tracking the progress of subsystems (the Comanche helicopter, automated C4I systems, the Crusader 155 mm howitzer, and logistics automation, to name a few).

Photo by Ken Bergmann

Major General William Nash, commander of the 1st Armored Division, talks with a Russian soldier. Nash's division's superb performance in Bosnia may have high costs in terms of readiness.

According to General Dennis Reimer, Army chief of staff, full-spectrum dominance means dominant maneuver, precision strike, force protection and focused logistics[29] through exploitation of enhanced technology. OOTW is a secondary concern, but "real" units will always be in charge of OOTW.

Many agree with such an orientation, and with good historical precedence. In testimony before Congress, columnist Harry Summers claimed that the proper military "value system" is firmly rooted in war fighting. He made a compelling point about the importance of war-fighting focus by reviewing the capstone doctrine in FM 100-5 from each of three eras: World War II, Vietnam and the Gulf War. In 1941, FM 100-5 said the Army should "destroy the enemy's armed forces in battle." In 1968, FM 100-5 said the Army should "provide a presence to create, preserve, and maintain an environment of order and stability." In 1986, FM 100-5 said the Army should "destroy the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield." Summers then allowed congressmen to draw their own conclusions.[30]

Other sources cite temporal trade-off pitfalls associated with OOTW. The General Accounting Office concludes that "while participation in peace operations enhances the capabilities of some formations (aviation, signal, and special operations), combat skills are at the greatest risk of atrophy. … The greatest impact is in removing a unit from its normal training cycle and equipment. … Army commanders estimate a required range of three to six months to restore OOTW participant units to full combat capability."[31] (A dismounted infantry battalion is responsible

JV 2010/Force XXI OOTW
Advantages–Disadvantages

ADVANTAGES	TRADE-OFFS	DISADVANTAGES
Provides security/overwhelming force		High fiscal and temporal expense Cascading effect on other units Makes large target Sends aggressive signals High media visibility Difficult to disengage
Uses/justifies existing force structure (Defense appropriations)		Inappropriate skills False expectations May set up for failure
Avoids fund diversions to "non-war-fighter" force structure		Limits outcome of effectiveness Dilutes war-fighter training focus "Ad hoc vs. systemic" approach
Does more with less		Jeopardizes core competency Jeopardizes organizational ethos
Critical tension point	→	Core competency

for maintaining proficiency in 60 collective tasks.)[32]

Cimbala references testimony before Congress by General Carl Vouno, former CSA, as evidence of the fiscal impact on Army efficiency of conducting OOTW. Vouno testified that "commitment of combat forces (hence O&M dollars) to peacekeeping missions de facto dilutes readiness to meet two Major Regional Crises (MRCs)." In 1993 alone, Congress allocated $1.1 billion to supplement expenditures from unforeseen OOTW.[33] The figure for FY 1995 was $2.5 billion, according to Defense Secretary Perry.[34]

The Army's approach to OOTW — attempting to minimize OOTW impact on core competency — makes sense if one assumes that the only rational base line for OOTW is the combat division, augmented with other combat service and SOF. Events in Somalia, Haiti (involving the 10th and 25th Infantry Divisions), and Bosnia (involving the 1st Armored Division) make it clear that this is the Army's frame of reference. As the chairman stated, this pattern will work, and under many conditions it will work well. (Major General William Nash's 1st Armored Division has set the standard with its superb performance in Bosnia.)

But the cost of success in war-fighting readiness (and thus efficiency) is astronomical. Consider the Bosnia example. The 1st Armored Division stripped the remaining U.S. division in Europe (1st Infantry) as well as units from U.S. V Corps to fill its ranks. The same occurred with logistics resources. Then the division trained exclusively, seven days a week, from September 1995 through its deployment in December. Priority for key training facilities in eastern Germany went to the 1st Armored, affecting the training readiness of other formations. Because mission exigencies curtailed normal personnel rotations, every Army unit in Europe will experience a disproportionate, immediate turnover when the 1st Armored returns.

Had the Soviet Union still been a viable threat, the Army in Europe could not have conducted the mission.[35] As it stands, the cost in readiness is staggering — dollar figures excluded. The effects on war-fighting efficiency cascade and reverberate throughout the Army, affecting national-security interests. The stakes in Bosnia (NATO's perceived viability and the legitimacy of U.S. leadership) justify the cost, but most OOTW will not. The chart above shows the advantage/disadvantage trade-offs associated with the U.S. military's present and future OOTW strategy and force structuring. Not depicted, but perhaps more insidious, is the risk that the conventional-force option places on U.S. grand strategy. Casualties or some type of "debacle" (so-called or real) can

derail national policy, as Somalia demonstrated.

The SOF alternative

SOF (primarily Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs) can provide an existing economy-of-force solution to take the "OOTW monkey" off the back of combat formations.[36] When the presence of combat forces is unnecessary, SOF can, in concert with civilian international organizations, nongovernment organizations, private volunteer organizations, Department of State, and the local population, conduct OOTW almost indefinitely. When the presence of combat forces is essential for combat-related forced entry, SOF can relieve the combat forces early and allow them to retain their war-fighter focus. When military objectives are subordinate to psychological, economic or political ones, SOF can be the tool of choice by virtue of their core competencies in language and intercultural relations.

SOF efficiencies are the mirror image of combat-unit efficiencies. The attributes that make combat formations *less* OOTW-effective are the attributes that make SOF *more* OOTW-effective. SOF has more limited application in full-blown combat, but they are tailor-made for OOTW.

This alternative envisions "man-on-man" coverage of U.S. areas of interest, 365 days per year, as the first line of stability. The desired outcome is crisis avoidance. This concept is already a reality (in FY 1995, SOF conducted 2,765 deployments to 137 countries, using only 3,650 personnel).[37] And the price is right. FY 1995 SOF expenses (adjusting for personnel costs, which the services paid) represented about 1 percent of all DoD outlays, and slightly more than 5 percent of Army expenditures.[38]

Photo by T.K. Ritchie

General Maxwell Thurman (second from right), the CINCSOUTH during Operation Just Cause, later marveled that SOF had accomplished so much in Panama with so few soldiers.

In most of these cases, SOF personnel worked for the interagency country team and the theater commander in chief. (Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru is a good example. U.S. observer-communicators are from the Army's 7th Special Forces Group and work for the CINC through the MOMEP chain of command. About 30 SF troops control what could have evolved into a major force deployment.)[39] Ensuring consistency and "right country selection" is problematic in OOTW because of difficulties in developing stability-campaign plans between DoD and DoS authority lines. SOF can serve as the interagency "go-between" that is essential to OOTW.

When crises occur, SOF can generate creative, non-standard task organizations and command relationships. SOF might fall under a conventional-force JTF for initial entry, then assume command of all residual forces as soon as extensive combat power is no longer necessary. The joint SOF task force, or JSOTF, could work for U.S. political authorities and incorporate civilian organizations as components. The JSOTF could assume responsibility for operations at the outset by taking operational control of tailored combat units. This arrangement would free war-fighting headquarters to concentrate on other issues and would put the element with the appropriate skill repertoire in charge.

This idea, ignored so far by the military hierarchy, found an indirect supporter in the late General Maxwell Thurman. Commenting in an interview after Operation Just Cause, then-CINCSOUTH Thurman conceded that he had "underestimated SOF potential for getting results in the twilight between all-out war and all-out peace." He marveled at how SOF had accomplished so much in Panama with so few men.[40]

The use of the SOF alternative puts U.S. policy at less risk, through reduced target signature and local acceptance. It is more difficult to target SOF elements because they "hug" the local population.

The fundamental weakness of

the SOF option is that without combat-force augmentation, SOF cannot generate the security necessary to set conditions for initial conflict resolution. SOF cannot "stand in the line of battle" like the combat division. The amount of day-to-day coverage that SOF can generate in a theater is about 21 Army teams (the addition of SEALs increases the coverage). Beyond this number, SOF suffers the same temporal efficiency costs as the war-fighting forces.

The advantages and disadvantages of OOTW trade-offs for the SOF alternative are shown in the chart below. The charts on pages 7 and 9 are veritable mirror images. The split in alternatives is at the critical tension point for each — infrastructure efficiency for SOF and OOTW effectiveness (defined by core competency) for war-fighters. The question is, Which of the alternatives appears to maximize its strengths and minimize its weaknesses under all conceivable approaches to strategy and force-planning? Three criteria — efficiency, effectiveness and planning methodology — form the axes of evaluation.

Evaluating alternatives

The chart on page 10 compares the *JV 2010* and SOF OOTW alternatives against the backdrop of the standard force-planning alternatives described by Naval War College professors Bartlett, Holman and Somes.[41] The force-planning alternatives represent all rationale for development of a force structure. The chart builds on the efficiencies-effectiveness models already discussed by comparing them against all conceivable force-planning approaches.

The *top-down planning approach* emphasizes national objectives, ends and systemics. The SOF option supports this concept by offering efficiency — low diversion of O&M or R&D funds (fiscal), low or no cost in combat-unit readiness or morale (temporal), no cost in war-fighter focus (psychological) — and effectiveness — cheapest option (fiscal), systemic solution over the long haul (temporal), best-available core competency (interpersonal). As in all cases, setting the conditions or environment is an effectiveness measure that SOF cannot perform alone.

The *bottom-up approach* focuses on the use of existing military capabilities at the expense of creativity. This approach is the basis of the *JV 2010* OOTW plan: Efficiency equates to justifying the existing force structure (fiscal); and effectiveness equates to using overwhelming force to set the environment for conflict resolution. Although *JV 2010*'s OOTW plan comes from a bottom-up start point, the matrix makes it clear that the SOF alternative is the better option under bottom-up planning.

SOF OOTW
Advantages–Disadvantages

ADVANTAGES	TRADE-OFFS	DISADVANTAGES
Low fiscal and temporal expense Limited effect on other units Makes small target Sends benign signals Low media visibility Easy to disengage		Insufficient combat power Lack of sustainment/logistics Limited forces available for 365-day operations
Appropriate skills repertoire Less risk of failure Small terrorist/scrutiny target		Does not justify service force structure or big-ticket R&D appropriations
Increases chance of positive outcome Protects war-fighter training focus Promotes systemic approach		
Does more with less Capitalizes on core competency		
Critical tension point	→	Infrastructure efficiency

Alternative Comparison Matrix

	EFFICIENCIES			EFFECTIVENESS			
	Fiscal	Temporal	Psychological	Fiscal	Environmental	Temporal	Interpersonal
Top-down	S	S	S	S	W	S	S
Bottom-up	W	S	S	S	W	S	S
Scenario	W	W	S	W	W	W	S
Threat	W	W	S	W	N	S	S
Mission	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Hedging	S	W	S	W	W	W	S
Technology	W	W	N	S	W	S	S
Fiscal	S	S	S	S	N	S	S

Legend: S = favors SOF W = favors war-fighter units N = neutral

The *scenario and threat approaches* focus on potential adversaries, and when they are combined with bottom-up planning, explain the logic behind *JV 2010* — worst-case planning. The *hedging approach* is closely related and follows from the war-fighter focus on being able to handle worst-case threats in an era of limited resources. The war-fighter alternative competes most favorably under these planning approaches.

The *mission-planning approach* zeroes in on functional-area-friendly capabilities. Under this and every other planning approach, interpersonal effectiveness is a SOF strength. Despite the logic of the SOF alternative under the mission-planning approach, senior planners have chosen predictable OOTW solutions based on combat-division building blocks.

The *technology approach* is central to the way *JV 2010* will do more with less: efficiency is defined as doing more with the same or reduced force structure (fiscal), at higher speed to limit readiness and morale costs (temporal). Effectiveness is defined as using overwhelming force (actually overwhelming fires) in the shortest time. As in the bottom-up approach, the SOF alternative appears to be more attractive. Providing more high technology to SOF might skew the alternative comparison matrix even more. The *fiscal approach* favors the SOF alternative hands down: The logic behind a force accomplishing the OOTW requirement at 1 percent of the DoD budget requires no amplification.

Comparison of the alternatives favors the SOF OOTW option over the *JV 2010* option by a score of 35 to 18. Assigning combat forces to a JSOTF (and thereby obviating the environment-setting factor) would raise the score in the SOF alternative's favor to 40-13. However, the alternative comparison matrix is rather simplistic and broad-based. Is there a way to measure the validity of its findings based on empirical evidence?

Uphold Democracy

The record of SOF operations in Haiti bears out the validity of the alternative comparison matrix in a convincing way. A comparison of costs (efficiency-fiscal) versus readiness impact (efficiency-temporal) versus the amount of territory controlled (effectiveness-interpersonal) is insightful.

ARSOF total expenditures for the period August 1994 through February 1996 were $16.83 million.[42] According to the Congressional Research Service, total U.S. troop costs in Haiti for the period September 1994 through January 1995 were $200.9 million.[43] That means non-SOF costs were approximately $182.158 million. This represents a SOF cost share of about 9.2 percent.

Extrapolating for time presents a more realistic picture. SOF participated three times as long as the period covered in the CRS

report. Carrying forward the generic mathematics logic, the war fighters' comparable costs would conservatively fall in the $546-million range, bringing the comparison down to 3 percent. SOF occupied 27 of the 30 sites permanently garrisoned by all Uphold Democracy forces, and they were responsible for more than 700 smaller villages. Roughly, SOF performed 90 percent of the work at 3 percent of the cost.[44]

According to the General Accounting Office, the 10th Infantry Division paid an efficiency cost in combat-skills readiness.[45] Brigade commanders did not report full combat readiness until May 1995, five months after redeployment. Still, these commanders expressed concern about their ability to synchronize combat systems for a major training event at the Joint Readiness Training Center in October-November 1995, *some 10 months after redeployment*. The GAO rated Haiti's impact on SOF units as less problematic.

The 10th Division also paid a price in morale. Army psychologists who interviewed 10th Division soldiers found that more than 60 percent of infantry, artillery and air-defense troops reported "they were performing missions for which they were not trained." Junior infantry soldiers reported a higher level of psychological stress than any other respondents. Psychologists concluded that combat-arms soldiers had difficulty understanding their role in Uphold Democracy and that unit cohesion suffered as a consequence.[46] Only 23 percent of SOF soldiers reported concern over mission focus, but all of those respondents were support troops who were not SOF-qualified. Psychologists claimed that operations in Haiti "stood alone as the poorest example of supporting the soldier."

Conclusions

Operations other than war in the era of engagement are inevitable. The case for using SOF as the lead agent in these operations is strong, from the perspectives of efficiency and effectiveness. Recalling C.S. Forester's analogy, SOF are the tool that will allow us to confront OOTW with less effort, and they are a tool that is already purchased.

OOTW is the most likely, but not the most dangerous, event the U.S. military will face. Stephen Metz summarized the state of play this way: "The Army's war fighting component, built on armored and mechanized divisions, will evolve in a different direction from its peace operations conflict resolution based on SF and light units. This separation already exists, but reflects the clear priority of the war fighting function."[47] Organizational inertia and infatuation with warfare specialty traditions, as Bartlett, Holman and Somes relate, may partially explain why SOF is not the "first thought" when OOTW surface. Protection of flags, image baggage from Vietnam, and a sincere desire to retain heavy force structure for the next "big one" may cover the rest of the story.

One thing is clear — SOF is the right lead-agency tool for the OOTW job. The only significant weakness in the SOF OOTW alternative can be obviated by assigning combat forces to a JSOTF *when necessary*. (In many cases, use of combat forces will not *be* necessary or even well-advised.) War-fighter units should work for the JSOTF, not the other way around. The solution may lie, as Metz hints, in the creation of a separate service, or perhaps in a full restructuring of the armed forces as we have known them.

Development of long-range, nation-building campaign plans by combatant commanders working with embassy country teams is a step that should be taken now. DoS

U.S. Army photo

SOF soldiers, such as this PSYOP specialist, performed 90 percent of the work in Operation Uphold Democracy at only 3 percent of the cost.



should position a CINC regional counterpart with the theater CINC to facilitate such planning. True jointness is interagency.

But the broader art of the possible beyond 2010 lies in the eventual restructuring of national-defense forces consisting of many agencies along cross-functional lines. The illustration above offers an example. Organization along cross-functional lines is the essence of effective OOTW. If engagement is inevitable, then the rise of cross-functional national-defense forces may be the "real" Force XXI.

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Notes:

[1] Rick Maze, "Weapons vs. People: The Outlook Is Bleak," *The Army Times*, Vol. 57, No. 7, 9 September 1996, p. 6; Michael O'Hanlon, "How to be a Cheap Hawk," *The Brookings Review*, Summer 1995, Brookings Institution, p. 34. See note nine for the scope of the U.S. Army's optempo since the end of the Cold War.

[2] The U.S. Army is in the process of changing terminologies for these types of operations. The emergent term for OOTW will probably be "stability and support" operations.

[3] Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "American Hegemony — Without an Enemy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 92, Fall 1993, pp. 5-7.

[4] C.S. Forester, *The General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1936).

[5] John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy*, February 1995, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., preface.

[6] Robert P. Hoffa, "A New Look at the Bottom-Up Review, Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces for a New Century," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1996, United States Strategic Institute, p. 25.

[7] Peter T. Tarpgaard, "The Defense Budget: Context and Constraints," January 1996, The Naval War College, Newport, R.I., pp. 5, 8.

[8] John Carrell, "The Lake Doctrine," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 79, No. 5, May 1996, p. 3.

[9] William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996), p. 23; Dennis J. Reimer, "Chief Says Army Is Trained and Ready," *Soldiers' Magazine*, Vol. 51, No. 8, August 1996, p. 8. In this interview, the CSA points out that while Army personnel have declined by 33 percent and resources have declined by 40 percent, the Army has executed 25 major deployments since 1989.

This is in contrast to only 10 major deployments during 40 years of the Cold War. (Author's note: Some of these were not comparable except to the Gulf War [Korea, Vietnam].) The Army's (and DoD's) focus on war fighting as priority number one is clearly and repeatedly articulated in the president's 1996 *National Security Strategy*, the Pentagon's 1995 *National Military Strategy*, in current Army doctrine (FM 100-5, 1993), and in SECDEF 1996 Annual Report to the President and the Congress. CJCS' *Joint Vision 2010* echoes the same priority; Stephen J. Cimbala, "Military Persuasion and the American Way of War," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1994, United States Strategic Institute, pp. 33-43.

[10] Cimbala, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-43. At a press conference held in September 1993, General Colin Powell expressed his concern about the potential erosion of U.S. military war-fighting skills as a consequence of shifting to OOTW.

[11] James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 26.

[12] Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp. 18-19.

[13] Cimbala, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-43.

[14] William E. Turcotte, "The Use (and Abuse) of Output Measures," 1996, The Naval War College, Newport, R.I., p. 1.

[15] Garth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 11, 15-16.

[16] Larry Cable, Lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, 2 February 1995.

[17] Steven Metz, W.T. Johnson, D.V. Johnson, J.O Krevitt, and D.C. Lovelace, *The Future of American Landpower: Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,March 1996), pp. 10-23.

[18] Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability," *Parameters*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 17-29; Evans, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

[19] Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995.

[20] Kimberly Stanton, "Pitfalls of Intervention: Sovereignty as a Foundation for Human Rights," *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1993, pp. 14-16.

[21] Turcotte, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[22] Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy,* pp. 9, 15.

[23] *Idem*, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 2-4, 8-9, 17, 27-33.

[24] Cole C. Kingseed, "Peacetime Engagement: Devising the Army's Role," *Parameters*, Autumn 1993, pp. 96-102.

[25] Floyd D. Spence, "What to Fight For? American Interests and the Use of Force in the Post Cold War World," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. III, Issue 1, Winter/Spring 1996, pp. 280-83.

[26] Robert L. Bateman, "The Peace Brigade — A Hybrid Unit for Real World Missions," *Army*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 12, December 1995, pp. 8-12.

[27] Geoffrey Demarest, "Beefing Up at the Low End," *Military Review*, June 1993, pp. 50-56.

[28] Author's note: All services contribute to execution of OOTW, but the Army's role (and often that of the USMC) is direct. Skills required to execute OOTW are significantly different from those required in conventional war-fighting. Skills required to support vs. execute OOTW are virtually unchanged from those required in conventional war-fighting, although the ROE may be more restrictive. For this reason, this paper focuses on Army Force XXI concepts to draw comparative analyses. The author also reviewed *Forward from the Sea* (USN), and select *Sea Dragon* (USMC) readings. The USMC appears more interested than either the Army or the Navy in the OOTW implications. In all cases, however, the principal focus of service visions is on more lethal war-fighting through enhanced application of technology.

[29] John G. Roos, "Forging a Full-Spectrum Force," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1996, pp. 30-35.

[30] Kingseed, pp. 96-102.

[31] General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations. Effects of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1995); General Accounting Office, *Military Readiness Data and Trends for January 1990 to March 1995* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1995).

[32] Army Mission Training Plan ARTEP 7-20, *Army Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion* (Fort Benning, Ga.: USAIS, December 1988), pp. 2-1, 2-2.

[33] Cimbala, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-43.

[34] William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1996), p. 149.

[35] The author deployed to Germany in October 1995 to assist the 1st Armored Division in its preparation for Bosnia and witnessed the cascading impact firsthand.

[36] The author's reference to Army SOF vs. SOF across all services is not intended to be exclusionary; however, the focus of USN SEALs and USAF SOS is primarily on direct-action, war-fighting skills. The principal requirements in OOTW center on foreign internal defense, or FID, and nation-building skills.

[37] Perry, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-202.

[38] *Budget of the United States Government, 1997* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). See military authorizations section; A.H. Holmes and W.A. Downing, *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1994* (MacDill AFB, Fla.: USSOCOM).

[39] Glenn R. Weidner, "Operation Safe Border: The Ecuador-Peru Crisis," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1996, No. 11, pp. 52-58.

[40] George Wilson, "Jumping the Fence in Bosnia," *Army Times*, Vol. 56, No. 51, July 15, 1996, p. 62. A former national-defense correspondent for the *Washington Post*, Wilson has traveled with Special Forces units in Bosnia and Latin America. In this article, he advocates for the Bosnian mission a "pull out quick and turn over to SOF" option.

[41] H.C. Bartlett, G.P. Holman, and T.E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1995, pp. 114-26.

[42] Information on ARSOF funding came from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Comptroller Office. (Phone interviews, September-October 1996.)

[43] Steven R. Bowman, *Congressional Research Service Report 94-735-Fa*, 1 January 1995.

[44] The author concedes that the reliability of dollars-spent figures for non-SOF units is subject to debate. Regardless, the disparity between war-fighter units (10th and 25th Infantry divisions) and SOF is obvious.

[45] General Accounting Office, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-36.

[46] R.R. Halverson, P.D. Bliese, R.E. Moore, and C.A. Castro, *Psychological Well-Being and Physical Health Symptoms of Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: A Summary of Human Dimensions Research in Haiti* (Washington, D.C.: Walter Reed Institute of Research, Division of Neuropsychiatry, Department of Military Psychology, 17 May 1995), pp. ii, iii, 8, 22, 23. Author's note: The results of the psychological survey referenced here are sensitive, according to Walter Reed authorities. The author obtained a copy of the basic report, but Walter Reed refused to release the results by unit. Some unit statistics (as cited) appear in the basic report referenced.

[47] Metz, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-23.

Special Operations Forces and Peace Operations in Greater Europe

by Colonel William Flavin

The annual message from the President of the USA to the Congress:

For us peace reigns everywhere. We desire to perpetuate it always by granting full justice to others and requiring of others full justice to ourselves ... We attend to our own affairs, conserve our own strength, and protect the interests of our own citizens; but we recognize thoroughly our obligation to help others, reserving to the decision of our own judgment the time, the place, and the method. We realize the common bond of humanity. We know the inescapable law of service ... Russia presents notable difficulties. We have every desire to see that great people, who are our traditional friends, restored to their position among the nations of the earth. We have relieved their pitiable destitution with an enormous charity. Our government offers no objection to the carrying on of commerce by our citizens with the people of Russia ... [O]ur country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure ... [However] our main problems are domestic problems. Financial stability is the first requisite of sound government. We cannot escape the effect of world conditions. We cannot avoid the inevitable results of the economic disorders which have reached all nations. But we shall diminish their harm to us in proportion as we continue to restore our governmental finances to a secure and endurable position.[1]

This was President Calvin Coolidge's address to Congress in December 1923, five years after the end of World War I. It was a world not unlike the one we face today. In 1923, no one could have foreseen what the world would look like 15 years in the future (1938). Germany and Austria-Hungary had been soundly defeated and the Soviet Union had just been torn apart by an internal civil war caused by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. We are in the eighth year after the fall of the "Wall," and no one can foresee what the world will look like in 2012. Maybe with the judicious use of special-operations forces, or SOF, we can influence its shape or distinguish its features.

SOF's greatest contribution toward influencing the future of Europe lies in supporting preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-building as part of a coordinated, peace-building organization that can focus the various agencies' resources toward stability and progress. U.S. Army doctrine describes peace operations as:

conducted to create and sustain the con-

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Photo by Michael J. Nelson

A U.S. soldier from the 9th PSYOP Battalion distributes documents to Bosnian citizens explaining U.S. involvement in Operation Joint Endeavor.

ditions necessary for peace to flourish, [it] is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities. The doctrine divides these activities into three principal areas: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace-building and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping operations as well as more forceful activities, such as the protection of humanitarian assistance, the establishment of order and stability, the enforcement of sanctions, the guarantee and denial of movement, the establishment of protected zones, and the forcible separation of belligerents.[2]

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the U.N., defined peacebuilding as "actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out. ... Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter IV of the Charter of the U.N."[3]

Peace operations in general and support to democracy in particular address the central problem facing the world today, the search for legitimacy. The source of most of the current instability is the struggle among various groups and factions for legitimacy. Legitimacy means that one group will be "perceived to have the ability to provide an acceptable balance between equity, freedom, development, and security for a given populace."[4] In other words, who will have the power to provide and coerce? Will it be a certain ethnic group such as the Serbs; previous members of the Communist party as in Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland; or criminal protection organizations that have sprung up in Russia?

This struggle for legitimacy manifests itself not so much as a struggle among competitive political ideologies, although ideology is not dead, as among competitive economic and cultural imperatives. Robert Kaplan in his article in *Atlantic*, "The Coming Anarchy," and Samuel Huntington in his article in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Clash of Civilizations," have attempted to describe this crisis for the public.[5]

This struggle for legitimacy is nowhere more apparent than in the realignment of power among the states and substate elements of Central and Eastern Europe as they emerge from the wake of a fallen "Soviet Empire." Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have ethnocentric and nationalistic disputes that go back centuries. Zbigniew Brzezinski writes that nationalism is the "central reality of the

once seemingly homogeneous Soviet world."[6] Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute characterizes it in the following way:

Events in 1993, such as Yugoslavia's unrelenting war, ethnic conflicts all along Russia's southern periphery, coups and counter-coups in Russia, the Ukraine's political and economic paralysis, the lack of a political resolution of the Baltic issue, Russia's effort to reintegrate its former empire even though it is beset with serious political, constitutional and economic problems at home all point to one conclusion: the state system from Germany's western border to the Pacific Ocean is unstable and profoundly insecure. No viable security architecture of functioning institution has arisen that can provide legitimacy and security throughout this expanse of territory.[7]

SOF, throughout their existence, have been helping people deal with this legitimacy crisis. SOF were established to support insurgencies and wrest power from oppressive, illegitimate governments, notably those of Central and Eastern Europe. Later, SOF became counterinsurgency fighters, shoring up failing governments. Thus, the concern about legitimacy is central to most of the SOF doctrinal imperatives as well as their primary and collateral mission areas: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, counternarcotics and anti-terrorism.

The SOF doctrinal imperatives stress that SOF is a political tool supporting a larger interagency and multinational effort. SOF elements are comfortable dealing in the ambiguity that lies on the border between the civil and military worlds. They can provide a bridge between the two worlds with the experience they have gained from their insurgency and counterinsurgency backgrounds as well as the recent counterdrug and humanitarian-assistance efforts. Operations Provide Comfort in Iraq, Restore Hope in Somalia, and Uphold Democracy in Haiti have shown SOF's ability to work not only with private volunteer organizations, or PVO, but also with nongovernmental organizations, or NGO. In fact, SOF have also worked closely with contractors and entrepreneurs who are now a part of the scene in Eastern Europe and the states of the former USSR. Thus they can deal with the realities of national power that is relative, situational, dynamic and subjective.[8]

The SOF imperatives stress the protracted nature of these conflicts and their psychological dimensions. Indeed, as we have discovered in both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the informational aspect of national power can be decisive in peace operations. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, former Canadian commander of U.N. peace operations in Sarajevo, stated before Congress, "I would add that my comments will be somewhat guarded. … They watch C-SPAN every night in Bosnia-

Photo by Blaze E. Lipowski

Bosnian children from the village of Hadzici receive toys donated by Samaritan's Purse, a civilian relief group that worked with military forces to distribute the toys.

Herzegovina, they watch CNN and all other major networks. … I think what's happened is that there have been atrocities, and those atrocities have been sophisticatedly exaggerated — don't forget that the international media is there in big numbers in Sarajevo — and the propaganda that has been perpetuated has now entered into the minds of the people and they do not trust and will never trust, in my estimation, the other side."[9] In Rwanda, the RTLM radio station, owned by the Hutus, conducted an Anti-Tutsi campaign before the 6 April 1994 plane crash to prepare their people for the planned uprisings.[10]

In addition to these imperatives, SOF possess a wide range of capabilities that can be used to support peace-building. Some of these forces are linguistically and culturally oriented to certain geographic areas and consist of individuals proficient in cross-cultural communications and negotiations. Trained to operate in small groups or independently, skilled in unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, psychological operations, nation-assistance techniques, and equally conversant with both the most sophisticated technology and the most primitive methods of field operations, they are a useful "tool" to advance U.S. national objectives.[11]

Because of these capabilities, SOF have developed special relationships with special-operations forces of other nations and thus can gain access and be employed where the use of conventional forces would be expensive, premature, inappropriate or not feasible. Additionally, SOF provide the U.S. with a military option that "does not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation associated with employment of necessarily larger, more visible, conventional forces."[12]

SOF are most useful when employed before hostilities commence. Then they can use their capabilities to prevent the situation from escalating to such a level that military force must be used in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission. Therefore, SOF must be engaged today in concert with other elements of national power to gain the initiative. SOF must be working in or near those countries identified by the national command authority that have the potential, in four years, to become destabilized. There they should study and understand the local situation and how it relates to U.S. national objectives while providing intelligence and advice through appropriate channels to policy-makers.

SOF provide a "grassroots" assessment that is not always available to the policy-maker and cannot readily be otherwise obtained. Like T. E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate before the two world wars, SOF can walk the ground, live with the people, and develop a deep understanding of all aspects of the "environment, the political, economic, sociological [cultural, religious], psychological, geographic, and military [situation]. … They (can) identify the friendly and hostile decision makers and … their objectives and strategies."[13] This assessment should form the basis for further policy decisions that could range from disengagement from a failing country to increasing foreign assistance or employing conventional military in a preventive deployment or a peace-enforcement operation.

The SOF doctrinal imperatives stress that SOF is a political tool supporting a larger interagency and multinational effort. SOF elements are comfortable dealing in the ambiguity that lies on the border between the civil and military worlds.

Besides assessing the situation, SOF can "influence human behavior in a way favorable to our objectives" by:

- *aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nation to develop and mature along the lines such that those conditions normally associated with the causes of insurgency can be prevented or diminished.*
- *aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nation which has thrown the yoke of communism off its shoulders and is now attempting to grow along the road of democracy and self-determination.*
- *aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nation to recover from those conditions which exist as a result of an armed conflict or natur-*

al/manmade/technological disaster.[14]

If the peace-building mission deteriorates, SOF are in an excellent position to be a policy tool to control or contain the crisis. Because of their low visibility, SOF can stay or be withdrawn quietly at any time. SOF can support the escalation of the involvement of conventional military forces by preparing the operational area and supporting their introduction and employment. Upon the termination of the peace-enforcement mission, SOF can support peace-building as they did in Operation Promote Liberty in Panama. Major General Joseph Lutz, when commander of Special Forces in 1982, summed it up this way:

In the special operations forces we have the capability of being introduced into a given country, being established on the ground with contacts, maybe even with our own intelligence networks. If war ultimately breaks out within that region, there are people on hand who understand the region and are available to go there. That is the secret of the peacetime to wartime transition.[15]

SOF have established long-standing relationships with conventional and special forces of Western Europe. Even during the Cold War, SOF maintained relations with special forces of the East by participating in parachute, rifle and ski competitions.

In 1962 SOF conducted what could be called peace-building operations as part of an integrated organization established by the Department of the Army called a Special Action Force, or SAF. It was formed around the core of a Special Forces group and consisted of the following units: Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, medical, military police, signal, electronic warfare, intelligence, counterintelligence, and engineers, and other augmented units as needed, such as aviation maintenance, to complement the U.S. government's developmental programs.[16]

... to cure the substantial ills of ad hoc organization of mobile training teams. It provided by unity of command a method to ensure standardization and interoperability of our training efforts throughout the particular region; quick access to skilled, multi-disciplinary personnel in an environment that demands the ability to operate quickly; enhanced continuity of effort; personal and unit identification with the success of the mission at hand; and increased opportunities to develop rapport and personal relationships with host nation counterparts through recurrent contact with SAF personnel.[17]

SAFs, in some form or other, operated successfully in South America, Africa, the Pacific region and the Middle East until the 1970s, when the Nixon and the Carter administrations dissolved them.

SOF were selected to form the core of the SAF, because of their area orientation, organizational flexibility, instructional skills, extensive experience with and knowledge of instability (i.e., terrorism, insurgency and drug trafficking), prior connections with the host nation, and proven capability to work with host nations, conventional and elite militaries.

In Europe, the SAF concept should be considered as a method for conducting peace-building operations. SOF can best accomplish their peace-building mission as part of an international and interagency "SAF" whose purpose is peace-building. The U.N. should empower the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, to establish such a multinational peace-building organization to employ preventative measures in selected countries to shape the new face of Europe. This organization should not replace any individual nation's foreign-assistance programs; rather it should focus on coordinating a development program for specific countries who have not fallen into chaotic instability.

This organization should be built around a coordinating committee similar to the Standing Liaison Committee of the Civil Military Operations Command used by UNOSOM II in Somalia. The committee was chaired by Phil Johnston of CARE and coordinated the activities of governmental organizations, NGOs and PVOs. It would link into the Supreme Allied Commander-

U.S. PSYOP soldiers distribute copies of the Rajo *newspaper to children in Somalia.*

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

Europe through a humanitarian-assistance coordination center like Central Command used for Somalia.[18] The military portion of this organization should be organized similar to the old security-assistance force, also called a SAF.

This multinational peace-building organization should be oriented on providing a coherent approach toward integrating military and non-military development and coordinating that effort with PVOs, NGOs, and the contractors and entrepreneurs that currently are working in Central and East Europe. The integration of all aspects of the peace-building program is essential. For example, a sound program could fail if psychological dimensions are neglected. In Latin America there are any number of stories about engineer projects to build bridges or schools that failed because the lack of an integrated PSYOP program allowed the drug organizations to discredit the project.[19]

The military portion of this organization should assist the military, paramilitary and security forces in selected counties to develop into organizations that can support legitimate popular governments and multipolar political systems, while teaching them ways to deal with the instability of drug trafficking, criminal organizations, terrorism and insurgency. SOF would play a key part of this task force by providing the Civil Affairs and PSYOP expertise as well as Special Forces, SEALs, and special-operations aviation of both the Army and the Air Force to work with the foreign military and their special forces.

Militaries and paramilitary forces will play a decisive role in Central and East Europe to help nurture the institutional basis on which the new democratic governments will exist.[20] These militaries must use their "energy, discipline, training and technical capability … for purposes other than illegal intervention in politics."[21]

SOF have established long-standing relationships with conventional and special forces of Western Europe. Even during the Cold War, SOF maintained relations with special forces of the East by participating in parachute, rifle and ski competitions. Today, Central and East European countries have invited SOF to assist them in combating drugs, terrorism and insurgency. SOF, therefore, have access.

This peace-building organization can solve the complaints of the NGO and PVO communities that the time to begin working together is not on a departure airfield in the middle of a crisis but through pre-crisis planning and exercises. It will also engage the West in a positive project that can lead to the development of a new international order. It will expose the East to the ideas and examples of democracy and free government. And finally it will allow the West to understand close-up the plight of the East. The knowledge gained by such a venture can forge politi-

cal, social, cultural and economic bonds.

However, there are three major issues which can limit the use of SOF in support of a peace-building organization. These are lack of political direction, inadequate interagency and multinational synchronization, and incorrect appreciation of the magnitude of the problem.

SOF, as a political instrument, has to be calibrated by clear political guidance to be effective. Without such clear and consistent guidance SOF may be ineffective or, worse, counterproductive. The employment of SOF is not a neutral act. Local ethnic groups will interpret all of the words and actions of Special Forces teams as U.S. or U.N. policy.[22] This is especially critical in the information war. A peace-building mission can be easily discredited by the type of sophisticated psychological war that has been witnessed in the former Yugoslavia. Without a policy to synchronize efforts, any peace operation can dissolve.

There are three major issues which can limit the use of SOF in support of a peace-building organization. These are lack of political direction, inadequate interagency and multinational synchronization, and incorrect appreciation of the magnitude of the problem.

All of the elements of national power must be balanced to employ SOF successfully as part of the peace-building organization. When one element, like the military, takes primacy, then the operation becomes unbalanced. This will lead to imposing military solutions on what is a political problem. Somalia was an example of trying to force a solution through military means without an accompanying comprehensive and robust political program.[23] Other nations and international organizations exacerbate the problem. PSYOP in Somalia can provide an example. In Somalia, the U.S. PSYOP elements published a popular and credible newspaper called *Rajo*. This paper printed the facts and encouraged settlement rather than violence. When UNOSOM II was established, the PSYOP elements departed with the joint task force, UNITAF, leaving the publication of the newspaper to the U.N. After the October 1993 killing of the U.S. Rangers, the PSYOP elements returned to discover that the editor was running advertisements for weapons, such as mortars, in the paper. The U.N. officially stated that they were just trying to be neutral and support individual enterprise.[24]

The third issue is the propensity for the U.S. and the U.N. to underestimate the magnitude of the problem. Some states in Central and Eastern Europe may need years of assistance and dramatic measures such as military occupation to begin to solve their problems. However, the U.S. and other Western nations, driven by domestic and international agenda influenced by the popular media, can underestimate the complexity and the amount of time it would take to solve some of these problems. Peace operations may be launched to "do something humane." If peace operations are based on best-case scenarios and assumptions, then the potential for failure is great. This was the case in Somalia. The assumption was that UNOSOM II was an organization capable of returning governance to Somalia, and therefore most of the U.S. military support could withdraw. When the assumptions proved false, the resources too many, the risks too many, then the support for the venture collapsed.[25]

The European Union cannot wait and see if "Greater Europe" moves on its own toward peace and stability. The Balkans are an example of the EU not engaging early on with positive measures. Europe has an opportunity to provide insurance against the unknown and shape the future the way it would like to see it by establishing a peace-building organization which can engage early on with positive measures. SOF, employed in support of this peace-building effort, can promote and support democratic ideals within other armed forces, stabilize situations so that support for pluralistic political institutions and free-market economies can grow, provide early indica-

tions of instability, and influence other governments in ways which would be mutually advantageous.

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[16] Charles M. Simpson, III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years: A History of the US Army Special Forces* (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 82, and Yarborough (note 12), p. 57, state that the SAF for Africa and Latin America were very successful. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DCSOPS, "Implementation of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Program" (unpublished memo) (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1962), pp. 3, 4, 6. A full SAF, in addition to an SF group, consisted of the following: PSYOP - 72; Civil Affairs - 86; Engineers - 60; Military Intelligence - 47; ASA - 44; Medical - 66; Military Police - 57; Signal - 40.

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Strategic Trends in Asia

by Dr. Thomas A. Marks

In examining possible areas of Asia where future multinational peace operations might take place, a special-operations component thus following, there are two possible approaches. The first, which I shall decidedly not use, is to comb the region systematically for likely candidates, an inventory of instability if you will. This leads only to argument between self-appointed experts. It is, in any case, rather an exercise in futility, since there is little chance we can raise our intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities to the necessary level of viability. What we can do, though, a second approach, is to sketch out the strategic trends and, in the process, cite some exemplars.

It is the end of the Cold War, of course, which sets the stage for what follows. It is a stage which has seen 50 years of arrangement. World War II's conclusion found the democratic powers, having defeated Fascism, locked in immediate confrontation with their erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, an opponent more powerful in every sense than either the Nazis or Japanese militarists (Italy need not detain our discussion). How subsequent Cold War victory was actually achieved by the Washington-led coalition remains a subject of much debate, the most salient aspect of which is a concerted effort by the academic veterans of the anti-Vietnam War movement to paint the struggle as neither victory nor crusade, but only America forcing conflict upon an unwilling, frightened Moscow (with sundry Third World victims suffering alongside, targets of our institutional and systemic terrorism). Less debatable has been the result: To use World War II imagery, we have not seen peace in our time.

In retrospect, this seems hardly surprising. That we expected victory to bring with it a moment's rest can only call forth analytically a jaded recitation of the truism that hope springs eternal in the breasts of men. What has followed, the veritable explosion of violence, appears with the benefit of hindsight to be all too predictable. That it was not anticipated is a telling commentary upon our complete preoccupation with the trees at the expense of the forest. Likewise, the intense discussion which has greeted efforts at explication often does more to reveal respective ideological positions than it does to provide accurate commentary about either the posited frameworks or the realities the explication seeks to elucidate. Nevertheless, certain impor-

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Photo by Mark Martello

Despite the end of the Cold War, the people of Asia, such as this Cambodian woman and her child, face a number of problems, including violence, overpopulation and resource depletion.

tant works have served as a foundation for the intellectual and strategic debate which has emerged in the so-called "new world order" (which, as any number of wags have had it, has turned out to be neither new nor very ordered). The notes cite them.

What the references attempt to do is to grapple with the underlying strategic dynamic(s) at hand now that the overwhelming dynamic of the Cold War has collapsed. Samuel P. Huntington argues that future conflict is likely to be driven by a "clash of civilizations," as dissimilar worldviews play themselves out in local arenas.[1] Ted Robert Gurr lowers his sights a notch below this and speaks of ethnonationalism erupting in a bewildering array of circumstances and groups.[2]

Fred W. Riggs provides a macro-historical context in analyzing what he calls the "three *tsunamis*" (tidal waves) of recent world history: consolidation (of the globe's peoples into geopolitical units), liberation (as distinct peoples have sought autonomy), and self-determination (as the previous stage moves forward in logical sequence).[3] Thomas E. Homer-Dixon *et al.* examine the seemingly inevitable violent consequences of resource depletion and population growth.[4] Michael Tobias does the same but goes beyond the descriptive to present a journalistic immediacy that includes interviews with key players worldwide.[5]

Robert D. Kaplan takes the lot and describes a world already reduced to near-anarchy in spots and rapidly heading for the same in others.[6] Rudolph J. Rummel, in tabulating the sheer awesome scope of man's inhumanity to man, highlights the political consequences of non-democratic political solutions and the quest for power.[7] Finally, Benedict Anderson has served notice that the communities we take for granted are, in a very real sense, artificial. They have been created and sustained.[8]

These works are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily designed to explain the universe of problems which have surfaced in the post-Cold War political arena. Rather, they offer means to deal analytically with the problem. Using their strategic explanations, we can say that the operational issues which confront us are as follows:

• Systemic Disintegration — the ripping apart of nation-states as nations clash with states, the latter necessarily artificially created, but the former, too, in some cases, artificially created; the point being, howev-

er, that the "fit" between the two has never been perfect, any more so in Asia than in other areas of the globe. In some cases the results are simply annoying (e.g., Is it of more than passing concern that even tiny Bhutan now has active ethnic unrest as Nepali migrants in its south work against the Bhoot majority?), but in numerous other cases the implications are profound. The situations in India and Pakistan come readily to mind, where, amidst the numerous uprisings only just contained through a degree of militarization which is quite astonishing (e.g., India's paramilitary forces), there are some (e.g., Kashmir) which have threatened to embroil rival powers (i.e., already India and Pakistan have narrowly avoided military engagement over Pakistan's alleged assistance to the Muslim insurgents in Kashmir).

File photo

Demonstrators give evidence of the ideological clash in China, the largest of the Asian states.

• Ideological Clash – the march of communist utopianism may have been halted, but in its place we have the "subversion" of other ideologies (e.g., democracy or fundamentalism). This has already led to serious violence in the largest Asian state of all, China, but one should not disregard the lower but equally serious level of disorientation which has emerged in the likes of Japan or Thailand as demands for increased democratic access have shaken the bureaucratic polities so-favored by Asian governments, whether civil or military.

• Ecological Concerns/Population Growth — throughout the region, the growth of population and the depletion of resources are creating scenarios far closer to that outlined years ago by Morris West in his novel, *Shoes of the Fisherman*, than is generally noticed (i.e., populations forced on the move in search of sustenance). India has long been the premier illustration, but in truth there is no Asian country which can be said not to have either present or potential for serious violence in this area. Even giant China, the subject of West's treatise and long thought in the popular mind to have established a base level of subsistence for all, in reality has problems of ecological devastation which rival those which have recently come to light in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Consequently, there are enormous areas (i.e., enormous both actually and comparatively) which are already all but uninhabitable. The chain reaction that will necessarily be set in motion as large population movements begin to occur will become increasingly more evident as the years pass and as population growth, even if checked somewhat, ensures that the carrying capacity of the land will be exceeded.

• Resource Scarcity — it follows from the discussion above that resources not only are strained now but increasingly will become a source of conflict, both internally and in international relations. We see the former in any number of contexts (e.g., Homer-Dixon *et al.* discuss the tragic case of the ongoing clash in the Bangladeshi Chittagong Hills between resisting upland tribesmen and migrating lowlanders). The latter has recently emerged as a serious concern in the South China Sea (Chinese irredentism may be at work, but it seems more likely that Peking's infatuation with the region stems from the possibility that it will contain resources). In either case, the results are likely to be explosive.

• Economic Dislocation/Clash — again, what has just been discussed leads naturally to another concern, one which has both an internal and an external dimension. As presently we understand the realities of life on earth, there is no mechanism, save industrialization, capable of providing work and sustenance for burgeoning populations. Industrialization, though, brings with it a host of conflict-laden problems which are reaching crisis proportions in many areas of Asia. Further, the consequences of alienation, as the recent growth of cults exemplifies (with or without a desire to use poison gas in subways), contains an element of concern

which has been all but ignored by governments. Some decades ago, the consequences of "development" were examined, particularly as they related to the Cold War clash (i.e., the exploitation by one side or the other of "grievances"), but of late our attention has turned elsewhere. Occupying us instead have been the external manifestations of economic growth, the growing clash between systems, of which the U.S.-Japan tiff is only the most obvious and serious.

• Culture Clash — one does not have to agree wholeheartedly with Huntington to accept that he is on to something. The bitterness evident in recent exchanges between the U.S. and Singapore (or even between two Asian states, such as the Philippines and Singapore) highlights the potential here for conflict. How the states of the region deal with the various problems identified above can lead to serious disagreements of style and substance. When the fallout is but bad blood, as in the Michael Faye caning case, it is one thing; when bilateral relations are actually endangered, as is presently the case following the disputed execution of a Filipina maid, it is another matter altogether.

There are, as well, at least four concerns which might be called more traditional:

• Cold War Holdovers — victory may have been achieved, but the war is not over. The West still has enemies who do not wish it well. North Korea is only the most obvious, but China should not be judged a partner and may yet precipitate conflict in the region. Of most concern are Peking's current aggressive moves in the South China Sea and its continuing efforts to isolate Taiwan.

• Weapons Proliferation — Not only do at least three Asian states possess weapons of mass destruction (i.e., China, India and Pakistan), there also continue to be efforts by others (e.g., North Korea, certainly; Taiwan, by accusation of some) to obtain these. Further, proliferation of weapons of more traditional concern goes on unabated. China, for instance, has emerged as a leading supplier.

• Natural Disasters — disease, movement of refugees, earthquakes and such all remain significant regional phenomena. Of particular concern should be the inevitable consequences of HIV moving into AIDS in certain states, devastating the populations (e.g., in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand).

• Drugs — far from vanishing, this problem has become more serious and widespread than ever, with the added element that the products no longer simply transit the states concerned but have instead contributed to serious domestic problems.

What is difficult, and fortunately the concern, in a sense, of others, is to discern precisely where these trends will achieve substantive form such that we might anticipate multinational action. One thing is clear:

It becomes increasingly obvious that it is special-operations forces that are capable of carrying out those functions peculiar to what we at one time termed, almost prophetically, 'stability operations.' It is also clear that we discard at our peril the possibility of multinational action.

Any such action, in fact, will involve a special-operations component, for it becomes increasingly obvious that it is special-operations forces that are capable of carrying out those functions peculiar to what we at one time termed, almost prophetically, "stability operations." It is also clear that we discard at our peril the possibility of multinational action, since it is obvious that will and funding, both facets which rise and fall with distressing frequency, are the keys, not probability per se.

Ergo, there is just as likely to be multinational effort in support of flood relief in, say, Bangladesh, as there is to be a more traditional deployment, such as that which remains along the demarcation line between Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir. And it is their off-the-mark capabilities, as well as the simple fact that they will go where they are told, do what is ordered, and work long hours at bargain wages, that guarantee special-operations

United Nations photo

Many of the problems in Asia may require multinational action, and multinational operations would almost invariably include special-operations forces.

forces' uses in roles as disparate as civic action, coordination and control, or ready reaction. Gunships or water systems, all are of a special-operations piece — and Asia is as likely to see their employment as areas we think of as perhaps more unstable.

A ready illustration might be the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, where Indian intervention was ultimately carried out in summer 1987 under the guise of providing a peacekeeping force. There were any number of observers who at the time were urging Colombo to invite in a Commonwealth or United Nations presence. This did not happen, and we may consider it unlikely that it would have, but how likely is the present situation, where India has departed, but the U.S. now sends in Special Forces training teams to work with Sri Lankan forces? As has been demonstrated, it has become a logical step that such presence should become part and parcel of a multinational peacekeeping effort should the international community decide that such would facilitate "peace" (whatever that is, the cynic would add).

More to the point of what has been discussed above, the conflict in Sri Lanka, though "ethnic" in its externals, involved deeper considerations of ideology, population pressure impinging upon scarce resources, geopolitics, and a host of other concerns — none of which in isolation could have been judged beforehand likely to turn an island paradise into a protracted battle zone.

Likewise, might we not expect some sort of U.N. involvement in calming the growing tensions in the South China Sea? It is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that a solution, requiring verification and observation, would require specialized work which would consequently be assigned to the only bodies able to carry it through instantly: special-operations forces. Yet what drives Chinese actions? Population pressure combined with resource scarcity? Irredentism?

My point is not that either of these illustrations is imminent, only that, given the trends above, we ignore possibilities at our peril. The use of a massive matrix (driven perhaps by factor analysis?) might be useful; but so, too, would be simple area expertise. To continue the point, it may be hard to envisage another *immediate* multinational deployment on the scale of the Cambodian mission (1992-93), but can we seri-

ously rule out the possibility that a similar action might not surface in Timor or Jaffna or any of several other trouble (and troubled) spots? True, Asia contains economic powerhouses such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan. It is also, however, a host of other worlds, with possible multinational effort as diverse in form as the region. No matter: in any effort, special-operations forces will play a key role. ✂

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PSYOP and the Revolution in Military Affairs

by Dr. Carnes Lord

Psychological operations, or PSYOP, deal largely with information; and information is at the core of the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA. One might reasonably conclude that PSYOP has assumed greater importance in current debates regarding the future of warfare; and one might also conclude that PSYOP as a discipline has profited from these debates, in that PSYOP has initiated its own process of doctrinal and operational renewal. Unfortunately, both conclusions would be very wide of the mark.

Why should this be so? The standard answer might be that the RMA is, above all, a technological phenomenon, reflecting the radical improvements of the last several decades in electronic gathering, manipulation and communication of information for the purposes of enhancing traditional war fighting.

PSYOP, by contrast, remains, to a large extent, a low-tech enterprise, the standard answer would continue. Indeed, its major tools — leaflets, balloons, loudspeakers, radio broadcasting — are almost laughably old-fashioned. Moreover, the impact of military PSYOP is either diffuse and hard to demonstrate or else essentially tactical, while the RMA affects the entire conflict spectrum, with decisive results for strategy and for the overall conduct of war.

The standard answer would conclude that finally, and most fundamentally, the RMA reduces, if not actually eliminates, the need for PSYOP. To the extent that the RMA enables the United States to apply crushing and decisive force against any plausible adversary, thereby avoiding protracted conflict, there would seem little point in worrying about employing techniques of persuasion. To paraphrase the Vietnam-era adage: "If you have them where you want them, their hearts and minds will follow."

While the standard answer is not altogether wrong, it seriously understates the case for PSYOP, or rather a broader function we will refer to as "strategic information." Before examining the recent and future roles of PSYOP and any related activities, some general observations are in order concerning the emerging strategic environment and the nature of the RMA.

RMA's origin

It can be argued that in some respects the RMA belongs to the past rather than the future.[1] It was born in a strategic con-

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Photo by Thomas E. Witham

U.S. Navy jets prepare for takeoff during the Gulf War. Despite our demonstrated ability to apply decisive force, we still require forces capable of applying techniques of persuasion.

text of rigid alliance systems, peer military rivalry, and the prospect of high-intensity general war. From our country's point of view, the RMA was the core of a more or less consciously pursued "competitive strategy" aimed at offsetting Soviet advantages in men and materiel with American strengths in high technology — especially microelectronics technology. As the Gulf War convincingly demonstrated, advanced American military capabilities provide high leverage against conventional armed forces of the Soviet type. Yet the Gulf War also occurred in a strategic context quite different from a U.S.-Soviet test of arms, and it can be argued that during the Gulf War, America's capabilities were only imperfectly harnessed to the strategic purposes and requirements of the conflict.

There is, of course, an important sense in which the RMA remains to be achieved.[2] Analyses of military-technical revolutions that have occurred in the past suggest that technology was only one of the principal components. In addition, these revolutions almost always involved significant changes in military systems, in operational concepts, and in organizational forms.

In all of these areas, the implications of the ongoing revolution in information technologies have yet to make themselves fully felt. Some foresee a battlefield of the future as one that will dispense with large systems and platforms as well as with centralized command-and-control hierarchies. Others argue that the information-dominated battlefield will essentially collapse the traditional distinction between tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.[3]

It is, as yet, far from clear when, how or to what extent such developments will transform current American military practice. What does seem clear is that these developments will unfold in a strategic context that will impose imperatives of its own — ones that may not always be compatible with the technologically driven imperatives of the RMA as generally understood.

Key features

What are the key features of this strategic context? The following are the most obvious and fundamental: absence of a peer competitor, more fluid and weaker alliance relationships, less stability and predictability in domestic and international politics, heightened prospects for both

regional conflict and mid-intensity conventional warfare (with the possibility of unconventional excursions), and the persistence of low-intensity internal warfare and international lawlessness.

Perhaps less obvious, but no less important, are the commercially driven developments in the international communications environment, especially the growing availability of global television with real-time reporting capabilities. There can be little doubt that what is sometimes called "the CNN factor" not only has greatly magnified the political impact of violence, but in complex ways has also affected decision-making processes and diplomacy in times of crisis and war.[4] Coupled with a declining external threat and the uncertainty of the stakes involved in any potential military involvement by the U.S., the CNN factor is a kind of strategic wild card whose potency is still inadequately appreciated. While it clearly creates a source of strategic vulnerability for this country, the CNN factor is a two-edged weapon that also opens up certain strategic opportunities.

To understand the rise of global television, we need to look at the decades-long American commitment to an overseas information effort specifically targeted against the Soviet bloc. The mainstay of this effort, the shortwave radio broadcasts of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, though widely discounted at the time as an element of Western security policy, unquestionably made a major contribution to the political and ideological decay of the foundations of communism — particularly in Eastern Europe — and therewith contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet rule.

In retrospect, given the high credibility and the wide listenership of American radio broadcasts, it seems certain that they could have played a primary role in any war-threatening crisis in Europe, very possibly causing political turmoil that would have complicated any Soviet decision to go to war.[5] The broadcasts were a major factor in the Soviet decision not to intervene militarily to crush the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980. A careful analysis of media coverage (especially CNN) of the continuing civil war in the former Yugoslavia would almost certainly show a persistent story of television's strategic impact on the course of the conflict.

If anything, the importance of what may be called the psychological-political dimension of conflict is greater today than it was in the strategic environment of the Cold War. However critical the "war of ideas" was between East and West, no one doubted that the key security challenge then was to thwart Soviet military power in a high-intensity struggle, thereby approximating Clausewitz' model of pure war. Today, the key security challenge is to be able to wage limited and politically constrained warfare in a glare of publicity in which unaccustomed factors — ethnic and cultural sensitivities, human-rights outrages and environmental concerns — can unexpectedly assume political importance, and in an international environment in which weak leadership and domestic political instability are increasingly the rule rather than the exception.[6]

In the psychological-political dimension of conflict, the U.S. has potential vulnerabilities but also significant advantages. The key vulnerability is our susceptibility to what has been called "political attrition" — that is, a decline in popular support for a military involvement as a result of factors such as unexpected losses (the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut), atrocities (the My Lai massacre), or prolonged military stalemate. The role of the popular press is, of course, important here, though it is sometimes overstated. As we learned from the Gulf War, the military-media relationship, while inevitably a tense one, can nevertheless be managed effectively,

Photo by William E. Lee

U.S. PSYOP soldiers talk with a Bosnian woman. The U.S. has a high potential for effective PSYOP because its PSYOP forces are disciplined and culturally sensitive.

although perhaps not to the satisfaction of all concerned. Perhaps more important and worrisome is the still-unresolved tension between the president and Congress over war powers, as the Gulf War also demonstrated (and as we are now seeing because of Bosnia).

U.S. advantages

But consider the advantages the U.S. enjoys here. Our military forces are disciplined, professional, highly educated, technically competent, and morally and culturally sensitive. Moreover, they enjoy an unparalleled reputation for overall military excellence. This was especially evident following the Gulf War. Thus, while the vulnerability to psychological operations is very low for our military forces, the potential for their conducting effective PSYOP is very high, particularly against our likeliest adversaries — Third World military establishments that lack most of the qualities that are inherent among our forces.

It is also important to bear in mind the vulnerabilities of Third World political leaders. While not generally subject to the kind of political attrition American officials worry about, these leaders — who may be lacking the support of good staff work and good intelligence — are apt to have highly distorted views of the world and to think in conspiratorial terms. Furthermore, these political leaders are frequently suspicious — often with reason — of their own military high command. These are vulnerabilities the U.S. should be prepared to exploit.[7]

How should American PSYOP capabilities be reconfigured in light of the contemporary RMA?

It is impossible to think intelligently about PSYOP without considering it in the context of a much broader category of psychological-political capabilities and activities, a category that cuts across the responsibilities of all the major agencies in the national-security establishment.

Related activities

The first task of any effort to improve the effectiveness of military PSYOP must be to rethink its relationship to four related activities: public diplomacy; public affairs; covert psychological-political warfare; and what has been called "military persuasion" — that is, the deliberate use of military combat capabilities to create psychological-political effects.[8] One can assume that the last category includes the new discipline of command-and-control warfare, or C^2W, which proposes to integrate PSYOP with other capabilities in a comprehensive attack on an adversary's decision-making and military communications.[9]

Thinking about PSYOP in this larger

context is necessary because of the impact of the RMA, with its acceleration of the tempo of military operations, its potential for radical psychological shock, and its tendency to collapse the levels of warfare. No less important is the increasing transparency of the modern battlefield and the near-real-time reporting of military operations by the global media. Both of these developments have increased the strategic salience of psychological operations. But by so doing, these developments have also increased the urgency and the importance of a more careful delineation of the area(s) of responsibility of military PSYOP, and of achieving better coordination with related disciplines.

Anyone familiar with the postwar history of military PSYOP knows that the issues of definition and coordination have long been contentious, reflecting the bureaucratic weakness of PSYOP within the national-security establishment as a whole.[10] Public-affairs personnel within DoD have generally succeeded in their relentless efforts to keep PSYOP out of their business. Relations with the foreign-affairs agencies have been episodic at best. During Operation Desert Shield, PSYOP was essentially derailed by the confusion over the handling of (arguably) covert portions of the PSYOP plan developed within DoD. PSYOP planning and command and control within the uniformed military have often been problematic. During the Gulf War, most of these problems were eventually overcome, and PSYOP proved highly effective when fully engaged. But significant systemic change has yet to occur.

Critical lessons

Although an adequate discussion of these complex organizational issues is not possible here, a few key points should be made. One of the critical lessons of both Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield is that PSYOP planning cannot be effectively conducted in purely military channels. Furthermore, requirements in pre- and post-combat environments must also be considered. In order to position PSYOP to play an effective role in a pre-combat crisis situation, a well-understood and accepted system, established on an interagency basis, is needed for the planning, coordination and management of PSYOP activities in peacetime.

A second key lesson is that PSYOP must be securely coupled with policy at a relatively high level — and not only within the U.S. government. The Gulf War demonstrated beyond question the importance of the coalition dimension of PSYOP and related activities. The strategic salience of PSYOP was much more evident in Riyadh and Cairo than it was in Washington.

The fluidity of alliance relationships

U.S. PSYOP soldiers discuss an upcoming operation during Operation Just Cause in Panama.

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

during the Gulf War is, in fact, a strong argument for an enhanced role for PSYOP-related activities in post-Cold War conflict. Saddam Hussein's efforts to split the allied coalition through propaganda and political warfare enjoyed considerable initial success, and the U.S. and its partners were slow to counter Hussein's efforts. Part of the reason for this was that the task was thought to exceed the scope of PSYOP as a military function, yet other elements of the U.S. government were not prepared to take on the responsibility. The result was the reconstitution of a "public diplomacy" staff within DoD, with the mandate of conducting (in coordination with the U.S. Information Agency) counterpropaganda and counterdisinformation operations throughout the Muslim world. This is one of the unsung success stories of the Gulf War.

What is to be done? If the U.S. is to engage effectively in political-psychological warfare in a post-Cold War context, PSYOP within DoD will have to become better integrated with public diplomacy, public affairs and overall national policy through a "strategic information staff," which would be housed at a high level within the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The staff would be composed of civilian and military personnel representing all of the agencies involved as well as the intelligence community.[11] Staff members would develop and validate plans and programs for military PSYOP and defense-related public diplomacy across the conflict spectrum, and they would coordinate related activities through appropriate public affairs and other operational loops both within DoD and at the national level.

At the same time, a focal point for "strategic information" should be created within the National Security Council to help ensure policy and operational coordination across all relevant agencies. A key priority for such a national-level effort must be to develop agreed policy, doctrine and procedures governing the relationship between overt and non-overt psychological-political warfare and the respective responsibilities associated with psychological-political warfare within DoD and in the Central Intelligence Agency.

PSYOP possibilities

There should also be a stronger focus on the relationship between traditional PSYOP and the use of other combat capabilities in conducting sophisticated command-and-control warfare, as well as for "military persuasion" generally. In a battlefield environment where the U.S. maintains electronic dominance, many possibilities exist for the direct exploitation of electronic systems for psychological purposes. Therefore, possibilities also exist for close cooperation between the disciplines of PSYOP and electronic warfare, or EW. With adequate intelligence, there is no reason why PSYOP could not be more surgically targeted at an enemy's command structure; there are also interesting possibilities for interactive communication with enemy troops and leaders. Also, more systematic efforts could be made to interrupt or degrade an enemy's nonmilitary communications traffic and national broadcast media.

These are some examples of new operational concepts for PSYOP that could profitably be pursued. Other innovative possibilities exist in the more traditional areas of responsibility of military PSYOPers. An argument could be made that given the increasingly compressed time frame of operations and the opportunities afforded by the shock and disorientation of frontline enemy troops (as in the Gulf War), PSYOP personnel should be more fully integrated with combat units and should, at an earlier stage, assume a larger role in certain kinds of ground actions. There is also considerable work to be done in devising PSYOP approaches to the use, or the threatened use, of weapons of mass destruction on the future battlefield.

Finally, there is room for improvement and innovation in PSYOP systems, which have generally received very low priority in defense procurement. During the Gulf War, the greatest technical failure of PSYOP was their inability to transmit an adequate radio signal into Baghdad. That difficulty

reflected, in particular, the limitations (and the vulnerability) of Commando Solo (formerly Volant Solo), an EC-130 aircraft configured for both television and radio broadcasting, principally for PSYOP purposes. Though it has been repeatedly modernized, the Commando Solo will soon have to be supplemented or replaced by a new type of aircraft equipped with a significant self-defense capability and perhaps a powerful shipborne mobile radio.

The use of unmanned aircraft for leaflet dissemination and possibly for broadcasting is beginning to receive attention and should be seriously explored. Consideration should perhaps also be given to the development of a highly agile aircraft for information-gathering and for broadcasting in support of defense public affairs, public diplomacy and PSYOP requirements in low-threat environments and in operations other than war.

The key to future improvement in American performance in psychological warfare remains at the conceptual and organizational levels. Only when we have gained greater clarity as to what PSYOP actually is, determined which objectives PSYOP can reasonably be expected to achieve, and ascertained how PSYOP campaigns are to be planned, organized and implemented, will PSYOP come fully into its own as an integral component of American military power and as an accepted tool of our national-security policy. ✂

Dr. Carnes Lord is a political scientist with interests in international relations, strategic studies and the history of political philosophy. He has served in the U.S. government in a variety of positions, including senior staff member of the National Security Council, assistant to the vice president for national security affairs, and distinguished fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. He is currently the John M. Olin visiting professor of statecraft and civilization at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University. His most recent book is The Presidency and the Management of National Security, *1988.*

Notes:

[1] For a vigorous statement of this case, see Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution," *Parameters* 25 (Summer 1995):7-14.

[2] For what follows, see Jeffrey Cooper, "Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs" (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 15 July 1994).

[3] See Douglas A. MacGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War," *Parameters* 22 (Winter 1992/93):33-47.

[4] For an excellent and well-documented account, see Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars," *Parameters* 24 (Autumn 1994):37-56.

[5] See Henry S. Rowen, "Political Strategies for General War: The Case of Eastern Europe," in Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, eds., *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), pp. 169-97.

[6] Some of these themes are developed in Carnes Lord, "The Role of the United States in Small Wars," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 541 (September 1995):89-100.

[7] See Alvin H. Bernstein, "Political Strategies in Coercive Diplomacy and Limited War," in Lord and Barnett, pp. 145-59.

[8] See Stephen J. Cimbala, "Military Persuasion and the American Way of War," *Strategic Review* 22 (Fall 1994):33-43, and *Military Persuasion* (State College, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).

[9] "PSYOP is critical in command-and-control warfare, which is the integrated use of operations security, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to influence, degrade, destroy, or deny information to adversary command-and-control capabilities and to protect friendly command and control against such actions." Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," *Joint Force Quarterly* 8 (Summer 1995):31. This article provides a snapshot of the current state of the discipline.

[10] Fundamental for what follows is *PSYOP at War: Psychological Operations in Recent Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1993), SECRET (with unclassified summary). This study (of which the present writer was director and principal author) was based on interviews with military and civilian participants at all levels from a variety of agencies, and covers Operation Just Cause as well as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. See also Carnes Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," as well as Alfred H. Paddock Jr., "Military Psychological Operations," in Lord and Barnett, pp. 13-37 and 45-65.

[11] Worth particular emphasis here is the intelligence dimension. The timely and effective use of declassified intelligence information in support of policy is currently no one's primary responsibility; yet this is a function that can assume great importance in crises and in wartime.

Civil Military Operations: CA Soldiers Assist in Cambodian Humanitarian Mission

by Captain Paul S. Allswede

Deep in the jungles of southwestern Cambodia, a Cambodian MI-17 helicopter landed. As the rotor blades slowed to a stop, Cambodian and American soldiers stepped off the helicopter and were surrounded by former Khmer Rouge soldiers. But for the first time in 17 years, the Cambodian forces had not come to fight the Khmer Rouge: They had come to feed them.

In February 1997, a three-man Civil Affairs liaison team, or CALT, from Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., assisted United States-trained civil-affairs soldiers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, or RCAF, in delivering and distributing 20 tons of humanitarian daily rations, or HDRs. The rations were intended to feed former Khmer Rouge soldiers, their families, and associated internally displaced persons, or IDPs. The CALT consisted of the author; SFC William Dupré, the team sergeant; and SFC Norm Mastalski, the team medic. HDRs are nutritionally balanced meals, high in protein, low in sodium, and specifically designed for an undernourished and underfed population.

This humanitarian mission was performed in support of the peacetime-engagement program of the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, in coordination with the Cambodian government's Khmer Rouge defector program. The Khmer Rouge defector program has

Photo by Paul Allswede

Photo by Paul Allswede

(Top) All ages of the Khmer Rouge commune help to unload rations at Phum Kon Trom, Cambodia. (Bottom) SFC Norm Mastalski of Company B, 96th CA Battalion, assists Cambodian CA soldiers in loading rations aboard a helicopter in Phnom Penh.

Photo by Paul Allswede

Former Khmer Rouge soldiers and their families gather around the Cambodian MI-17 helicopter to begin unloading the humanitarian daily rations.

become the single most effective method of ending the Khmer Rouge insurgency in Cambodia.

The mission was initiated by the CALT for the purpose of conducting joint civil-military operations with the RCAF, from the planning stage through the execution stage. Mission planning had begun in November 1996, when two divisions of the Khmer Rouge force defected and were officially integrated into the RCAF. The elements consisted of the 405th Division, located in the vicinity of Koah Sla, in the Chhouk district of the Kampot province; and the 305th Division, located near Phum Pring, in the Phnom Sruoch district of the Kampong Speu province.

The divisions were approximately 30 kilometers apart, separated by a large mountain range. The 405th Division was composed of 340 soldiers and 1,448 family members and other IDPs, for a community population of 1,788. The 305th Division was composed of 306 soldiers and 1,400 family members and other IDPs, for a community population of 1,706. With the defection of these two divisions, the Cambodian government considered the entire southwest region of Cambodia to be free of Khmer Rouge insurgents.

Leading the effort for the Khmer Rouge defector program is the RCAF Office of the G5, under the direction of Cambodian Brigadier General Preap Tan. The RCAF, although poorly resourced, is responsible for feeding and caring for all Khmer Rouge defectors once they have been integrated into the Cambodian armed forces.

The U.S. Embassy provided the HDRs for the mission in response to an urgent request from the RCAF general staff. Although the Cambodian government had agreed to provide food for all Khmer Rouge defectors, no arrangements had been made to provide food for their family members and associated IDPs. To further magnify the problem, the Khmer Rouge encampments had been unable to plant sufficient crops of rice and vegetables during the planting season. And because of the intense fighting during the 1996 rainy season, the crops that *had been* planted could not be harvested and had been left in the fields.

The situation presented the opportunity for the CALT to capitalize not only on past U.S. Civil Affairs mobile-training-team training, but also on "partnership" planning

with the RCAF G5, the RCAF Civil Affairs Company, the RCAF G3, the RCAF Air Force, and the U.S. Defense Attaché Office.

The HDR donation evolved into a highly complex operational and logistics effort that required more than four months of planning and coordination by the CALT for projected deliveries into Koah Sla and Phum Pring, two extremely isolated and remote locations. The areas are surrounded by mountains, streams and triple-canopy jungles. Roads to the areas were impassable, and helicopters had to be used for the deliveries. When the CALT and the Cambodian Mine Action Committee identified several minefields near Phum Pring, nearby Phum Kon Trom was chosen as an alternate landing site. Deliveries were made to Koah Sla Feb. 10 and to Phum Kon Trom Feb. 11.

Ambassador Kenneth M. Quinn served as the official U.S. representative for the HDR delivery at Phum Kon Trom.

Presenting the HDRs to the former Khmer Rouge soldiers and their families, Quinn stated that the U.S. was pleased to support the Cambodian government's efforts to achieve reconciliation and peace, and that through the cooperation of the U.S. and Cambodian governments, the RCAF, and former Khmer Rouge peoples, all Cambodians will be able to settle down, raise their children in peace and work toward a better future. Brigadier General Preap Tan, who accompanied Ambassador Quinn, commented on how difficult it had been to provide the support and assistance to the villages. He said that the Cambodian government's goal is to provide homes, land, wells, good roads and schools. He also thanked the U.S. government for its assistance. The former Khmer Rouge 305th Division commander, Van Sorn, thanked the ambassador for the donation to his people. He said that during 17 years of fighting, his people had moved from place to place throughout the jungle, and that all of them would now have a better future through cooperation and trust.

The CALT is continuing its efforts to secure additional HDRs, clothing, shelter material, construction equipment and any other items that will improve the lives of Cambodia's newly integrated soldiers and their families.

Photo by Paul Allswede

Ambassador Kenneth M. Quinn (in baseball cap) talks with the former commander of the Khmer Rouge 305th Division, Van Sorn (in fatigues), following the delivery ceremony at Phum Kon Trom.

Captain Paul S. Allswede is a Civil Affairs Tactical Support team leader assigned to Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C. He previously served as company commander for HHC, 279th Base Support Battalion, and for HHC, 82nd Engineer Battalion, both in Germany. Allswede graduated from Northern Michigan University with a BS in industrial engineering.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Proponent recommends changes to TDA structure of CMFs 18, 37

In response to a Department of the Army initiative to conduct a department-wide review of all CMF NCO grade structures, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has reviewed all CMF 18 and CMF 37 positions and recommended changes to the TDA structure only. The SWCS recommendation affected 68 positions in CMF 18 and 11 in CMF 37. In June, DA completed a review of the proposal and submitted recommendations to the Chief of Staff of the Army for his decision. The recommendations have been accepted.

Army to consider awards for valor in El Salvador

The Chief of Staff of the Army has approved for consideration, on a case-by-case basis, all decorations for valor for actions performed in El Salvador between Jan. 1, 1981, and Feb. 1, 1992. MILPER Message No. 97-123, CDR, PERSCOM, TAPC-PDA, Subject: Consideration of Decorations of Valor — El Salvador, dated June 24, 1997, outlines the criteria and the submission procedures. Contact your unit PAC or PSNCO for additional information and details.

PERSCOM points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

LTC Michael W. Grant	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSG R.B. Gardner	Senior career adviser
SFC Timothy Prescott	USACAPOC; 4th POG; 96th CA; NCOES and schools manager; drill sergeants; recruiters
SFC Tod Young	CMF 18 PDNCO
Mrs. Faye Matheny	Career branch integrator; analyst
Mrs. Rhonda Ruano	1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; JRTC; SFOD-K; ROTC; SOCs; SOTSEs
Ms. Pam Wilson	3rd and 7th SF groups; USASOC; USASFC; JFKSWCS; JOTB; AC/RC advisers
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFAS/SFQC

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to the PDNCO or senior career adviser. SFQC students who have questions about assignments should contact their student PAC, company first sergeant or sergeant major. NCOES questions should be directed to the unit's schools NCO. To make telephone inquiries, call DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. The e-mail address is epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

FA 39 LTC command selectees profiled

The FY 98 lieutenant-colonel command-selection board adjourned Nov. 22, 1996, after considering 2,704 officers for 357 commands. FA 39 had four commands requiring fill, and 33 FA 39 officers were eligible for consideration, resulting in a selection rate of 12.1 percent. The Army selection rate was 13.2 percent. A profile of the FA 39 lieutenant-colonel selectees shows:

- Two were single-track Psychological Operations officers.
- One was a single-track Civil Affairs officer.
- One was a dual-track Civil Affairs officer.
- Three were fully trained, and one was partially trained.
- Two had master's degrees.
- Three had served as battalion S3s.
- Two had served as group S3s.
- One had served as a deputy division G5.
- One had served as an assistant corps G5.
- The selectees' average FA 39 utilization time was 73 months.

LTC command board selects 14 SF officers

The FY 98 lieutenant-colonel command-selection board considered 115 Special Forces officers and selected 14 for battalion command. The board statistics were as follows:

	Eligible	Selected	Selection %
DA	2704	357	13.2
SF	115	14	12.2
Other combat arms	1354	160	11.8

The board selected 11 SF officers for SF branch commands and three SF officers for garrison command. In all but one case, the selectees had served in two or more branch-qualifying positions as majors. A profile of the selected officers shows the following key duty assignments:

- Nine had served as SF company commanders.
- Seven had served as battalion S3s.
- Seven had served as battalion XOs.
- Five had served as group S3s.
- Five had served as group XOs.

Foreign SOF

New Guatemalan National Civilian Police operational

The newly formed Guatemalan National Civilian Police, or PNC, began operations July 15, 1997. The force — formed in the wake of peace accords between the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity guerrillas — is projected to have 20,000 members by the year 2000. The initial contingent will be expanded every three months as new recruits graduate from training. Eventually, the police will replace the security forces and Army units assigned temporarily to law-enforcement duties in the Guatemalan capital. Now that the new force is formally operational, Guatemalan President Arzu has declared war on "lawbreakers, white-collar criminals, drug traffickers, rapists, agitators, members of youth gangs, and other social outcasts." In recent years, organized crime, street crime and associated violence have soared in Guatemala as a consequence of war and weakened institutions. A major mission of the PNC will be to develop strong ties with the population and to win the trust and respect of society at large.

Russians examine future of special-operations forces

A July 1997 military-scientific conference in Moscow addressed the evolving role and structure of Russian "special operations forces" in future conflict. Participants examined special-operations concepts not only from the perspective of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (especially the Airborne Troops) but also from the perspective of the Federal Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Border Service, Civil Defense/Emergency Situations, and other agencies. All of these organizations have their own "special operations" requirements, approaches and definitions. Specialists at the conference noted trends in the development of a "new concept of war involving the use of noncombat systems or limited use of combat equipment and arms"; they characterized SOF as a "modern high-precision weapon, Russian-style"; and they observed that little of the extraordinarily rich base of practical Russian SOF experience had been incorporated into theory. Participants also were warned that the Russian Airborne Troops — so well-suited as candidates for newly formed SOF units — were only one source, and that all ministries and agencies involved need to collaborate on SOF structure and roles.

African militaries to provide environmental security

The 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy includes "protecting the global environment — managing our forests, stopping the spread of toxic chemicals" as one of a number of strategic priorities requiring interagency approaches. Environmental security is also emerging as an important security consideration in other areas of the world. As some militaries around the world examine their future roles in supporting civil authorities, environmental protection and law enforcement are being added to such nontraditional tasks as immigration control and counternarcotics. In this regard, some African militaries have been given the additional role of providing environmental security. Under the DoD Biodiversity Program,

the U.S. has provided materials and training to the military forces of a number of African countries for the protection of wildlife and other natural resources. The Botswana Defense Forces, or BDF, for example, are active in biodiversity missions, especially anti-poaching. At any time, up to 20 percent of the BDF may be involved in these missions, and the BDF have been successful in countering commercial poaching. The Uganda People's Defense Force, or UPDF, has also received an environmental security role. The UPDF is training an anti-poaching squad to fight poaching in Murchison Falls National Park. Some West African navies have also received patrol craft and fisheries-protection training. The overall success rate of such programs in Africa is arguable, in light of reports of the less-than-effective use of U.S.-provided material. Also, there have been reports of some military poaching by less disciplined armies.

Bolivian guerrilla elements still active

Bolivia's Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army, or EGTK, which most specialists believed had disbanded, is evidently still in existence in rural areas of Bolivia and is thought to be in contact with the rebels of the Chilean Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, or FPMR. The EGTK — best known for its bombings of power pylons and oil pipelines in the Bolivian Altiplano in the early 1990s — was badly damaged when its top leaders were arrested in 1992. With the recent arrest of another EGTK member, there have been indications that the EGTK is still active and that its members possess arms and explosives. In addition, EGTK members are apparently developing plans to surface as the Malkus Rojos rebel group. Meanwhile, concerns over possible guerrilla infiltration from Peru and Chile, coupled with rumors that FPMR escapees have entered Bolivia, have resulted in a heightened awareness of Bolivia's potential guerrilla and terrorist problems and in more intensive army patrolling along the Peruvian and Chilean border areas to prevent guerrillas from crossing into Bolivia.

Russian airborne troops downsizing

According to Colonel General Georgiy Shpak, commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, the Russian airborne numerical strength was already down by some 27 percent in 1996. The reduction, which is continuing, was accomplished by reorganizing the combat-support units and by making most of the airborne brigades subordinate to military district commanders. By the end of 1997, the Airborne Troops are to comprise three airborne divisions, one airborne brigade, support units and training facilities (including the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School). The unit's mission focus will be on tactical-level support of ground forces. At the beginning of 1997, the Airborne Troops constituted about 2.5 percent of the total Russian Federation armed forces. In March 1997, in a further effort to cut their staff and administrative overhead, the Airborne Troops became a part of the Main Command of Ground Forces. With the loss of the Airborne Troops' autonomous status, concern has mounted over the potential loss of airborne traditions and esprit.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and LTC Karl E. Prinslow of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

USASOC unveils statue of Dick Meadows

Members of the special-operations community gathered at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command headquarters June 6 to pay tribute to a special-operations soldier.

On what is now the Meadows Memorial Parade Field, a statue of the late Major Richard J. "Dick" Meadows was unveiled. The eight-foot-tall bronze statue, the work of sculptor Lawrence Ludtke, honors "one of America's finest examples of courage, integrity and patriotism," said Lieutenant General Peter Schoomaker, USASOC commanding general.

"Dick Meadows' exploits spanned more than three decades and included the best known and most well-defined missions of U.S. special operations," said General Henry H. Shelton, commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Command. "His biography reads like a movie script, except I would describe it as a documentary, because the words and deeds are true."

Meadows joined the Army in 1947 at the age of 16, served in the Korean War and was promoted to master sergeant when he was 20 years old. He volunteered for Special Forces in 1953, served several tours in Southeast Asia and received a direct commission to the rank of captain in 1967. He was chosen to help plan the 1970 Son Tay raid, and he served as an assault-team leader on that mission.

Meadows retired from the Army in 1977, but he remained active in U.S. operations. As a civilian, he secretly entered Tehran, Iran, in 1980 to assist the Desert One rescue mission of U.S. embassy personnel held hostage by the Iranians. He died from leukemia in 1995 at the age of 64.

Photo by Brian Thomas

Meadows' statue is unveiled at USASOC headquarters.

Meadows' statue is due to the efforts of H. Ross Perot, a long-time supporter of special operations, who paid for the $160,000 monument.

"This memorial will serve to remind us that it's not equipment or technology that wins battles — it's people, it's great soldiers, sailors and airmen of courage and character like Dick Meadows," Shelton said. — *SSG Brian Thomas, USASOC PAO*

7th SF Group receives new commander

The 7th Special Forces Group passed the reins of command to Colonel Edward F. Phillips during a change-of-command ceremony July 3.

Phillips replaced Colonel James W. Parker, who became the deputy commanding officer of the Army Special Operations Command.

Phillips' previous SF assignments include detachment commander and battalion logistics officer in the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG; logistics officer and operations officer, 7th SFG; commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th SFG; and commander, 2nd Battalion, 7th SFG. He also served as the U.S. adviser for the 4th Salvadoran Infantry Brigade, Chalatenango, El Salvador, and as an analyst on the National Security Council.

Phillips is a graduate of both the Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College. He holds master's degrees in management and in national security and strategic studies.

112th Signal Battalion recognized for excellence

The 112th Signal Battalion received the Army Superior Unit Award in a ceremony at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command June 13.

The 112th was credited for its service and support from March 1995 to April 1996. During that time, the battalion supported peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian-assistance and noncombatant-evacuation missions in Turkey, Iraq, Rwanda, Italy, Bosnia, Croatia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ecuador. It also supported joint readiness exercises in Israel, Zimbabwe, Germany, South Korea, Panama, Thailand and the U.S.

"The ability of the 112th's soldiers to stand side by side and operate with Special Forces, Rangers, night-stalkers and other special-operations

forces places you in a class all your own," said Lieutenant General Peter J. Schoomaker, USASOC commanding general.

"The majority of our work is done by small teams over very long distances." said Lieutenant Colonel Howard I. Cohen, commander of the 112th. "Because we're so involved in joint readiness exercises and real-world operations, these soldiers have a sense of purpose and a real sense of mission."

Conference to consider future PSYOP environment

The 1997 Worldwide Psychological Operations Conference will be held Nov. 13-14, 1997. This year's conference theme will be "Psychological Operations in Future Operational and Strategic Environments." The conference is sponsored by OASD-SO/LIC and hosted by the Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Fla. To schedule attendance, call Major Dean Messelheiser at DSN 579-1845 or commercial (904) 884-1845 not later than Oct. 1.

Course teaches role of information warfare

The Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va., conducts the Joint Information Warfare Staff and Operations Course to acquaint students with the emerging role of information operations, or IO, and information warfare, or IW, in joint war-fighting doctrine. Offered eight times a year, the course trains service personnel in grades E7-O6, and civilian equivalents, in the concepts, procedures and applications of IO and IW in a joint, combined or service environment.

The training is available as a two-week resident course or as an on-site orientation course (for unified commands, services or components). The resident course is taught at the TS/SI/TK security level; the orientation course is normally taught at the secret level. For more information, call YN1 (SW) Gerry Banks at DSN 565-6680 or commercial (757) 445-6680.

The AFSC also offers the five-week Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Staff Operations Course. This course teaches the application of command-and-control concepts in the joint environment; the organization of DoD and the way it supports the C^2 process; and the management of joint C^4I systems and related joint procedures of strategic, theater and tactical systems. The course is intended for non-technically oriented military officers and DoD civilians. For more information, call LTC Felix Penn at DSN 564-5142 or commercial (757) 444-5142.

Borchini takes command of 4th PSYOP Group

Colonel Charles P. Borchini assumed command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group from Colonel William C. Hunter June 25.

Borchini comes to the unit from the Pentagon, where he served as the chief of the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Branch in the Special Operations Division of The Joint Staff.

A native of Baltimore, Md., Borchini has served the PSYOP community since 1991 and has deployed in Operations Southern Watch in Southwest Asia and Restore Hope in Somalia. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Towson State University, Towson, Md., and a master's in political science from Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, Ala.

Exercise points out need for CMO manual

A command-post exercise at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has pointed out the need for an additional doctrinal publication on civil-military operations.

During Prairie Warrior 1997, representatives of humanitarian-relief organizations, or HROs, participated in order to make the exercise more realistic. Prairie Warrior, conducted annually as part of the Command and General Staff Operations Course, teaches students how to plan and execute corps and division operations.

The HRO representatives were from CARE, the International Rescue Committee, and Joint Relief International. Following the exercise, the HRO participants and representatives from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School formulated a number of lessons learned to be applied to future operations.

One lesson learned was the need for a publication on the tactics, techniques and procedures used to integrate SOF and HRO operations. The Civil Military Operations Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine is developing the publication's concept.

The CMO Division is also working on other publications:

- FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*. The CMO Division is reviewing comments from field units for inclusion into the manual.
- FM 41-10-1, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*. This how-to CA manual will include checklists and formats for performing assessments, CMO estimates and annexes.
- *Civil Affairs Mission Training Plans*. The CMO Division is developing Army Training and Evaluation Program mission training plans for the tactical-support-team generalist (41-701-10 MTP); HHCs of CA battalions, brigades and commands (41-701-30 MTP); and functional-specialty teams (41-701-60 MTP). These new MTPs will consolidate the current eight MTPs. They will provide clear descriptions of unit training methods for achieving wartime-mission proficiency.

For more information, call the CMO Division at DSN 239-1654/8253 or commercial (910) 432-1654/8253.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. *By John L. Plaster. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. ISBN: 0-684-81105-7. 367 pages. $25.*

The history of Special Forces in the Second Indochina War, also known as the Vietnam War, seems destined to be told in much the same as it was experienced and usually viewed: in discrete parts, never as an integrated whole.

Until now, a large part of the SF Vietnam story has not been revealed. The SF soldiers assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group and detailed to the Military Assistance Command's Studies and Observations Group, usually called "MACV SOG" or simply, "SOG," at times were a third of the 5th Group's strength.

But SF's role in SOG is more than just a matter of numbers assigned. Half of the 5th Group's Medal of Honor recipients were serving in SOG, as were two-thirds of those reported missing in action. Additionally, the statistics for SOG SF killed-in-action or wounded-in-action are comparable to those of some unfortunate Civil War units.

SOG members conducted classified operations for a covert organization. Participants were sworn not to tell where they had been or what they had done. When casualties or heroic actions forced public admissions, the reported locations were often "displaced" to put the soldiers within politically correct areas. Despite the many postwar books, the large number of people who passed through SOG assignments, and the wartime efforts of

politicians and news media to embarrass the country by exposing it, the SOG story has remained largely untold.

The title notwithstanding, this is not an account of SOG per se. The book concentrates on SOG's largest operation: cross-border reconnaissance. Enough is told about other aspects of SOG — a highly compartmented organization — to put these programs in context and to keep the title honest, but the book is overwhelmingly about SOG reconnaissance and the demanding combat missions that came to be associated with it: personnel recovery, trail interdiction, wiretapping, bomb-damage assessment and prisoner snatching.

It is primarily the story of the brave men of the small SOG reconnaissance teams, or RTs (American, Nung and Montagnard), who went deep into heavily occupied hostile territory knowing that there was no possibility of support by friendly ground forces or fires. The teams were equipped with small arms and radios of inadequate range to reach friendly forces. They were dependent on the sporadic overhead presence of U.S. Air Force forward air controllers, or FACs, for communications. Weather and other conditions permitting, these FACs could muster friendly fighters to attack lucrative targets or to support RTs that were in trouble.

Given the prevailing conditions of multilayered jungle, ground mist, and mountainous terrain with monsoonal cloud cover, even this assistance was sometimes unavailable, despite the courage of the FACs and the fighter pilots who repeatedly risked the hazards of flying into massive ground fire and cloud-concealed mountains.

It is hard to read this book without wondering at the courage and tenacity of the RT members. They were no "ignorant army" facing hazards unknowingly. At least as early as 1966, the word was out among Special Forces personnel that the missions of the mysterious SOG were tough and dangerous. A similar knowledge must have existed among the indigenous members.

Although an American's first assignment to SOG was largely a product of selection by reputation (comrades' often fatal compliment), SOG was a volunteer outfit to the extent that a member could be reassigned upon request. The indigenous, because they were mercenaries, could quit when not on missions. Yet very few of the American or indigenous members

of SOG availed themselves of these options. Overwhelmingly, they pulled mission after mission until, for the Americans, their tour was finished or, for both, their luck ran out. Many SF soldiers volunteered for successive tours in SOG, further depleting that precious finite store of luck. (Plaster himself served three tours in SOG RTs).

Because recognition was sparse except among comrades, decorations were limited, and the RT members could talk of their activities only with other SOG RT personnel, it is hard to understand their dedicated endurance save in terms of unit cohesion, loyalty to comrades and personal pride. Plaster has told this story extremely well, and these characteristics shine through without specific statement.

Although this is not a book to give Aunt Minny for Christmas (in a very few places the language is accurately salty), it is a book that any combat soldier would understand and appreciate. Clearly, it should be read by the SOG survivors and particularly by those who patiently waited for them, unable to learn just what they did. It should also be read by anyone with an interest in SF history and by any SF operator with a professional interest in SF's special-reconnaissance mission.

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Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo. *By Major General Lewis MacKenzie. Vancouver, B.C.: Douglas & McIntyre Publishers, 1993. ISBN: 1-55054-098-X. 345 pages. $28.95.*

Retired Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie is one of the world's few genuine experts in the art of peacekeeping.

MacKenzie served eight tours as a peacekeeper in places like Gaza, Cyprus and Central America — finally serving as chief of staff of UNPROFOR and as commanding general of United Nations Forces in Sarajevo during a period of heavy fighting between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. He definitely knows his stuff.

Perhaps just as important, MacKenzie is a good storyteller. He begins his book with a chronology of events that covers all of his peacekeeping tours — beginning with his experiences as a young lieutenant serving in Gaza. He tells his stories with humility and humor, and some of his tales are genuinely funny.

Also — and this is no small point — MacKenzie does not pull any punches: He freely speaks of the mistakes he made. Many books of this type are self-congratulatory, but Mackenzie avoids that autobiographical trap by assiduously telling the truth — no matter how much it hurts or who it offends.

In fact, MacKenzie details the often wasteful, overly bureaucratic and ineffective ways of the various U.N. directorates, and there are those in the U.N. who will take offense. The inefficiencies and ineptitudes include the refusal on the part of U.N. politicos to accept military advice not to use Sarajevo as their headquarters; the continuing refusal of the U.N. to give peacekeeping generals the responsibility for their own budgets; the inability of the U.N. to supply even the simplest administrative materials for UNPROFOR; and the initial unwillingness of the U.N. to give soldiers heavily armed armored vehicles for their own protection. Many U.N. soldiers died as a direct result of that lack of foresight. We could use more of MacKenzie's kind of honesty.



MacKenzie's book will also give the reader a more complete understanding of events in Bosnia and the issues surrounding that country's longstanding conflict. The opportunity to see Sarajevo through MacKenzie's eyes is enlightening.

If you are interested in peacekeeping or in Bosnia, this is a great book to read. Even if you are interested in neither topic, the book is still recommended, and it will appeal to soldiers of all grades. MacKenzie is a good soldier, and he served well and faithfully under the most difficult of circumstances. His story is one that can be appreciated by anyone who has ever worn a uniform.

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Special Warfare

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