Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

One of the most important lessons learned by Army special operations forces in Afghanistan was the need to integrate joint fires at all levels of operations. The lessons were learned quickly and, in some cases, painfully. The employment of joint fires elements, or JFEs, and the changes in the priorities of the special operations liaison elements are two examples of immediate changes made in theater. Currently, the Army Special Forces Command, in coordination with the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, is testing the concept of assigning a JFE to each Special Forces group.

We also realized the need for additional training, and during the fall of 2002, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, conducted the pilot course of the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course, or SOTACC, less than a year from the time SOF entered Afghanistan. The SOTACC continues to train SOF personnel using state-of-the-art computer simulations and live aircraft controls in training. Students learn to control aircraft bombing runs and to employ lasers and other devices for terminal guidance. Fire-support training has also been added to other SWCS courses: the SF Officer Course, the SF Weapons Sergeant Course and the SF Advanced NCO Course. Joint fires support will also be included in the upcoming revision of FM 3-05, *Doctrine for ARSOF*.

The inclusion of joint fires support in our training is only one part of our initiative to ensure that our doctrine and training are linked to the battlefield.

The first step in the Special Forces training pipeline is selecting Soldiers with the right attributes to train. Current operations have illuminated some important traits of the Special Forces Soldier that makes him so valuable on today's battlefield. Key attributes are his ability to think and adapt quickly to a changing environment, his understanding and acceptance of different cultures and languages and the corresponding ability to work by, with and through indigenous forces. Lastly is the motivation and warrior mindset that every Special Forces Soldier brings to the battlefield. In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Major Will Cotty's article addresses how we are seeking to focus our Special Forces Assessment and Selection process on six core attributes that are requisite for success in Special Forces: intelligence, trainability, judgment, influence, physical fitness and motivation. By applying a "whole man" approach to our evaluation of candidates, we can adapt our assessment to give equal weight to all aspects of a candidate's character and make better-informed decisions about which candidates are suited to perform missions in the Special Forces environment.

As mentioned above, the ability to adapt to a changing environment is something we stress with our students, but it is also important to us in the Special Warfare Center and School staff and faculty. We are adapting training methods to the skills and needs of the candidates, and we are adapting our training content to meet emerging needs and lessons learned, without sacrificing our high standards.

Major General James W. Parker

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Features

Departments

The Evolution of Special Operations Joint Fires

by Major Eric Braganca, U.S. Air Force

Conventional forces frequently suspect that special-operations forces, or SOF, consider themselves to be strategic assets that do not need to be integrated with conventional forces. SOF leaders, however, recognize that they support other forces — land, sea, air and space — just as those forces support special operations and one another. This realization and SOF experiences in Afghanistan led to the improvement of special-operations joint fires integration in Iraq.

SOF made great progress in integrating joint fires in three distinct battlespaces during Operation Iraqi Freedom, or OIF. The use of joint-fires elements and air-coordination elements in OIF should provide a model for the future.

Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, in Afghanistan, SOF understood the need to integrate joint fires. Doctrine indicates that SOF headquarters should include joint-fires expertise in mission planning and execution. But even after Sept. 11, those headquarters, seeking to keep operations small, light and quiet, were reluctant to seek the support of outside joint fires, and they did not fully understand what they were missing. Initially, they resisted joint-fires assistance at the tactical and operational levels, either planning operations without qualified operational planners on their staffs or deploying teams without terminal attack controllers.

However, based on a battlefield assessment in Afghanistan, SOF realized their errors and took corrective action: They organized a small but effective team to integrate operations with the air component. That cooperation became the model for OIF.

But OIF was much more complicated than OEF because SOF assets operated in three environments, each with unique integration issues. The various supported and supporting relationships required unique solutions to joint integration, and each can serve as a model for future joint-fires integration.

Although SOF were successful in meeting the challenges of joint-fires integration in OEF and OIF, the challenge now is to institutionalize that success. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were fought with the same land, sea, air and special-operations components. While forces in other theaters are aware of the successes in OEF and OIF, they require details on SOF joint-fires advances if they are to adapt the lessons.

SOF play an important role in the Global War on Terrorism that transcends conventional boundaries and that will require increased personnel, some of whom should be used to reinforce the joint-fires capability. One aspect of that capability is the link between SOF and conventional forces. The

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This article was adapted from Major Braganca's article that appeared in Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 35. — Editor*

Photo by Kristopher Wilson

An F/A-18C Hornet launches from a U.S. Navy carrier to fly a close-air-support mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq have been a driving force behind changes to special-operations joint-fires training. The creation of a joint fires element will help successfully use close air support in future campaigns.

United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and the Air Force should institutionalize the relationships formed among their subordinate commands during OEF and OIF in order to better respond to the next crisis.

Planning and coordination

The Army has an extensive approach to linking its organic fires (artillery, missiles and helicopters) with Air Force close air support and interdiction, using tactical-air-control parties attached to units down to the battalion level. The Marine Corps has a similar arrangement for connecting its air and ground fires. The Navy links its strike aviation and missiles with the other services. Each service's path goes through a joint air-operations center to ensure that campaigns are synchronized.

But for years, joint doctrine did not list the duties or responsibilities for the fire-support element of a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF. SOF were doctrinally connected only to each other, reinforcing a perception that they are fighting their own war.

Between 1998 and 2001, that began to change. Joint Publication 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, published in May 1998, integrated SOF into joint fires in the theater air-ground system. Prior to the war in Afghanistan, during joint exercises, some headquarters realized the shortfall in operational fires expertise and tried to address it, but their efforts proved to be insufficient. Joint Publication 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, was being revised as the conflict in Afghanistan began. Revisions included details on the fire-support element, including coordinating boundaries, representing special operations to agencies such as the joint targeting and coordination board, and preventing fratricide. JP 3-05.1 also recommended the addition of a fire-support annex to the task-force operations order and the establishment of fire-support standard operating procedures. However, none of the doctrinal revisions were in place when operations began in Afghanistan, and service members were forced to learn the lessons through experience.

Task Force Dagger, the initial JSOTF for

Afghanistan, was built around a Special Forces group headquarters. It faced problems using joint fires on the tactical and operational levels. Teams deployed without terminal attack controllers — Air Force troops trained and certified to control close air support. Unsuccessful close air support during the first few days of combat indicated the need for greater expertise, leading the task force commander to request trained ground controllers. Within days, the SF team had qualified terminal attack controllers, and they had an immediate positive effect on the campaign.

At the operational level, problems occurred when the air-savvy ground controllers sent air-support requests to the task force. No one in the headquarters could handle the tasks of integration: incorporating joint fires in campaign planning, collating or submitting requests for subordinate fires, and deconflicting operations. There was a special-operations liaison element at the air-component level, and the task force relied almost exclusively on the liaison element for deconfliction and integration. The liaison element had limited success, but it was not the complete solution. Because the liaison element was located with the air component in Saudi Arabia, the task force had no resident expertise for incorporating fires in the campaign planning.

Fortunately, the air-component commander deployed a small Air Force element of the same type used to support maneuvers of conventional Army forces. This element, known as the joint air-component element, provided what SOF lacked — the ability to plan and coordinate joint air fires. This initiative dramatically enhanced coordination and integration with the air component. Teams on the ground noticed a great improvement in their missions when close air support became readily available.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

As operations continued in Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command, or USCENTCOM, focused on planning for Iraq. USCENTCOM's land, air and special-operations components — Third Army, Ninth Air Force and Special Operations Command Central, or SOCCENT — created a joint-fires architecture.

In Iraq, SOF units fought in the north, west and south. They stopped the enemy in the north, which had fortified the unofficial boundary with the Kurds, from reinforcing Baghdad. To the west, they assisted the air component in preventing the launch of SCUDs and other theater ballistic missiles. In the south, they supported the campaign of the land component to take Baghdad and eliminate elite forces, such as the Republican Guard.

Because the three fronts required unique approaches to the integration of

Photo by James L. Yarboro

By organizing standing joint-fires elements, SOF can ensure resident expertise in four areas — Army fire support, Navy and Air Force close air support/interdiction and Marine Corps artillery. In this photo, Soldiers of Fox Battery, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, fire a 198 mm howitzer during a training exercise in Afghanistan.

joint fires, Third Army, Ninth Air Force and SOCCENT developed a tailored package for each front. In the north, where the SOF commander was supported, the air component deployed a joint air-component element to the JSOTF (subordinate to SOCCENT), which developed its own joint-fires element. While the joint air-component element and the joint-fires element worked together closely, they had separate identities. The joint air-component element focused exclusively on air operations, and the joint-fires element focused on lethal and nonlethal effects.

In the west, where SOF supported the air component in the counter-SCUD mission, the joint air-component and joint-fires elements were fused into a single body. This worked because operations in the west focused on one mission, and there was no need to distinguish between them.

In the south, integration in the land battle presented unique challenges. First, the two units subordinate to Third Army were organized differently for fires. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and V Corps had distinct processes for deep operations in which SOF would be supporting them. Rather than seeking a one-size-fits-all solution, SOCCENT and its subordinate commands organized a flexible system of command and control, as well as liaison elements, to ensure that SOF capabilities supported Third Army and its subordinate commands.

SOCCENT and Third Army exchanged liaison officers to ensure that there would be conduits for information. By mutual agreement, special-operations command-and-control elements, or SOCCEs, were attached to V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. The SOCCEs took tactical control of teams operating with ground forces to ensure that SOF operations were fully integrated. The SOCCE at V Corps also recognized the need for a presence in subordinate divisions to keep supported commanders informed by deployed liaison elements. This integration was effective as SOF assets supported Third Army in front of and behind a nonlinear operation. Using this scheme, SOF reconnoitered lines of communication in advance of the 3rd Infantry Division en route to Baghdad and supported the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force with AC-130 gunships in rear areas, targeting the *fedayeen* fighters.

Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was a unified effort, SOF's role was far from unified. Fighting on three fronts, SOF units captured the northern oil fields, which contain one-third of the Iraqi oil reserves; helped prevent the launching of theater ballistic missiles; and captured the southern oil-distribution point so that it could be turned over to custody of conventional forces. In all, SOF units nominated more than 5,200 targets. Their success was largely the result of innovative thinking by the joint-fires architects from Third Army, Ninth Air Force and SOCCENT, whose integration methods were tailored to the battlespace.

SOCCENT learned painful joint-fires lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenge now is to institutionalize them. By improving joint-fires expertise in SOF headquarters, by formalizing the link between SOF and the Air Force, and by updating doctrine, SOF can see to it that those lessons will endure.

The Future

SOCCENT learned painful joint-fires lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenge now is to institutionalize them. By improving joint-fires expertise in SOF headquarters, by formalizing the link between SOF and the Air Force, and by updating doctrine, SOF can see to it that those lessons will endure. The lessons should be folded into training so that successive generations of special-operations warriors will understand joint fires without learning the hard way.

No theater special-operations commands have standing joint-fires elements that would better prepare them to make the leap in ability. Theater headquarters are small and lightly staffed, and they have little joint-fires expertise. Moreover, that is also true of the SOF headquarters that

formed many of the recent JSOTFs. By organizing standing special-operations joint-fires elements in each theater, we can ensure that there will be resident experts during planning and during exercise development. Such an asset would ensure that each theater special-operations command establishes and maintains links between sister components and rehearses integration processes during operational battle-staff exercises and field-training exercises.

Standing joint-fires elements need not be as large as those deployed in Iraq — with as many as 21 personnel in one command. With resident expertise in four areas — Army fire support, Navy and Air Force close air support/interdiction, and Marine Corps artillery — each SOF command could develop standard operating procedures, incorporate joint fires into operational and concept plans, and include joint-fires concepts in routine exercises.

USSOCOM is preparing to absorb a large number of new positions for fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Moving some assets to theater special-operations commands as joint-fires elements would improve joint-fires integration and significantly help combat terrorism. The Marine Corps is also working with USSOCOM to integrate some of its forces, providing an opportunity for them to lend their joint-fires expertise to SOF headquarters. With a three-legged joint-fires effort, SOF can ensure the long-term survival of the process that brought success in Iraq without the lengthy learning process that preceded it.

The other joint-fires success story from recent operations is the Air Force tactical air control party — particularly the joint air-component elements. For years, SOF have been augmented by Air Force enlisted terminal attack controllers, including some who have been permanently attached. But a direct-support relationship by these elements to a JSOTF headquarters, as in Afghanistan, was new. USSOCOM and the Air Force should formalize this arrangement for tactical and operational training purposes as well as for contingencies. Linking specific headquarters with tactical air control, perhaps geographically, would create a standing relationship with common tactics, techniques and procedures before contingencies erupt. Without a formal agreement, these recent successes will fade from memory and need to be revived during future operations, with the same risks as those experienced by the U.S. Central Command.

Lessons learned must also be incorporated into doctrine as proven methods for integration. Joint special-operations doctrine is being revised, and joint-fires support is scheduled to be included. Related joint doctrine must eventually be revised as service doctrine is modified in this collaborative effort.

Progress should be institutionalized by extending joint-fires expertise to SOF headquarters, formalizing the links between the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Air Force and updating joint doctrine for the next conflict.

By the end of combat operations in Iraq, SOF had made dramatic progress in the integration of joint fires. Although SOF had lacked adequate joint-fires doctrine only six years earlier, they overcame that challenge through painful mistakes and innovative thinking. No longer seen as fighting their own war, they were fully integrated with other forces as both supported and supporting OEF campaign assets. The challenge now is to preserve those hard-won advances by incorporating them into the training of future special-operations warriors and the doctrine that will guide future operations.

Major Eric Braganca is an Air Force special-operations MH-53 pilot who has experience in various flying and staff positions in PACOM, EUCOM and CENTCOM. He was a staff officer in Special Operations Command-Central during OEF and served during OIF in the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North as a liaison officer with the combined forces air component command. He has also served a joint assignment as a joint-fires trainer with the Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command.

Joint Fires Education and Training for ARSOF

by Lieutenant Colonel Brian R. Vines

Recent experiences during operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, or OEF and OIF, highlight the importance of the planning, coordination, synchronization and execution of joint fires in support of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF. This article will present observations and ideas on ways that ARSOF can best train to maximize the lethal and nonlethal effects of joint fires.

Joint fires element

During OEF and OIF, joint special-operations task forces, or JSOTFs, began employing the newly developed joint-fires elements, or JFEs. According to Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, a JFE is an optional staff element that provides recommendations to the J3 for planning and synchronizing fires. During OEF and OIF, ARSOF learned a very important lesson: Deployment is not the time to begin building and training a JFE.

At the beginning of OEF, the combined forces air-component commander, or CFACC, was responsible for conducting interdiction and strategic attack throughout Afghanistan and viewed SOF as key sensors on the ground supporting CFACC fire. ARSOF, with their Northern Alliance partners, found themselves requiring joint fire support like any other maneuver force operating in Afghanistan.

During OEF and OIF, ARSOF learned a very important lesson: Deployment is not the time to begin building and training a JFE.

The JSOTF's newly formed JFE had to quickly learn and define its role in the theater targeting-and-fires process. The special-operations liaison element, or SOLE, attached to the CFACC had to change its priorities from airspace coordination and deconfliction for special-operations aviation to participation in targeting, apportionment and allocation of close air support, or CAS.[1]

The JFE proved its worth during OEF and provided invaluable lessons learned for implementation during the beginning of OIF. Although the initial OIF JSOTF JFEs were still ad hoc, there was no dispute regarding their importance. In Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West, or CJSOTF-W, the JFE trained with the supporting air wing prior to deploying to Iraq. This training facilitated quicker response times by joint close air support, or JCAS, platforms that were supporting time-sensitive targeting needed for destroying SCUD missiles in western Iraq.[2]

Another newly created joint asset that enhanced the air-support capabilities in Iraq was the joint air-coordination element, or JACE. The JACE was provided to the JSOTF by the CFACC to plan and control JCAS. The addition of the JACE significantly enhanced the ability of the JFE to plan and execute air operations, and it reduced "sensor to shooter" time.

The JFE is the focal point for targeting and planning joint fires within the JSOTF. It produces and maintains the JSOTF's joint

Army News Service

An A-10 Thunderbolt II engages ground targets with a maverick missile. Air strikes were a key to success in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

target list, or JTL, and joint integrated prioritized target list, or JIPTL. It forwards prioritized target nominations to the higher headquarters JFE or directly to the joint air-operations center, or JAOC, for possible inclusion in the consolidated joint-force JIPTL, as approved by the joint-force commander's joint target-coordination board. The JFE should be augmented by liaisons from the various providers of joint fire support (air, ground and maritime).

In addition to planning the effects of lethal and nonlethal fires, the JFE must also maintain an accurate understanding of the air, ground and maritime battlespace. This includes the ability to access and input fire-support coordination measures, or FSCMs.

FSCMs are important to mission planning and the prevention of fratricide. Techniques, such as the common geographic reference system, or CGRS, allow ARSOF units to "open" and "close" designated keypads to facilitate the timely movement of the boundaries of a joint special-operations area, or JSOA. This is particularly important to the survival of ARSOF units involved in deep time-sensitive target, or TST, missions and special reconnaissance.[3]

SOF joint-fires element

In a JFE, there must be a core of assigned personnel who are school-trained and experienced in the planning, coordination, synchronization and execution of joint fires. ARSOF's solution is the creation of the special-operations forces joint-fires element, or SOFJFE. Although 7th SF Group is implementing the initial "proof of concept," in the future, all SF groups will have SOFJFEs permanently manned by Field Artillery personnel. The 7th SF Group's SOFJFE is manned as follows:[4]

SF group:

- One 13A (Field Artillery) major.
- One 130A (Field Artillery) targeting warrant officer.
- One 13F (Field Artillery) fire-support NCO.

SF battalion:

- One 13A (Field Artillery) captain.
- One 13F (Field Artillery) fire-support NCO.

Core competencies

In order to maximize the lethal and nonlethal effects of joint fires, the SOFJFE will need to maintain some core competencies associated with the planning and execution of joint fire support. These include:

- Joint fire-support doctrine.
- Service doctrine on fire support.
- Joint SOF and ARSOF doctrine.
- Information operations.
- Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace.
- Joint targeting-cycle process.
- Target development.
- Surface-to-surface fires.
- Air-to-surface fires.
- Integration of land-component fires.
- Joint air-tasking-order cycle.
- Time-sensitive targeting.
- Combat assessment.
- Joint close air support.
- Laser-designation operations.

The SOFJFE's connectivity to planning, fire support, FSCMs, ATO and the common operational picture is achieved through a myriad of joint and Army battle-command systems, or ABCSs. These include command-and-control personal computer, or C²PC; advanced deep-operations coordination system, known as ADOCS; air and missile defense work station, known as AMDWS; and advanced field-artillery tactical data system, known as AFATDS.

These systems require trained and experienced operators who are integrated into ARSOF training. Field Artillery personnel assigned to SOFJFEs understand the applicability and operation of ABCSs; however, most

ARSOF personnel are not familiar with the capabilities and importance of these systems.

Joint-fires training

There are many courses available on the Army Training Requirements and Resources System that can train ARSOF personnel who may be either assigned to SOFJFEs or responsible for integrating joint fires into operations. Some of these schools include:

• *Joint Fires and Effects Course, or JFEC*. A two-week school conducted at Fort Sill, Okla., that trains personnel at the joint task force, or JTF, level to plan, coordinate, synchronize and execute lethal and nonlethal joint fires to achieve desired effects. JFEC provides instruction on all of the recommended SOFJFE core competencies listed in this article and familiarizes students with the different joint and ABCS systems required to plan and execute joint fires. This course is recommended to every SOFJFE member, SF company commander and sergeant major, SF battalion commander and command sergeant major, and SF battalion or group operations officer and senior operations NCO.

• *Joint Targeting Staff Course, or JTSC*. A three-week joint school conducted at Dam Neck, Va. It trains personnel at the JTF and component level on the application of the six-step joint targeting cycle. (The six steps are: determine objectives and guidance; develop targets; conduct capability analysis; conduct joint capabilities integration and taskings; synchronize and execute targeting plans at the operational level; and assess the overall effectiveness toward achieving campaign goals.)

The course is particularly valuable to the members of the SOFJFEs who lead the targeting, operations and plans cells, as well as to intelligence personnel who have responsibilities for intelligence support to targeting and collection management. The course is also valuable to ARSOF personnel who are attached to the SOLE at the CFACC.

• *Joint Firepower Course*. A three-week interservice training course conducted at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., that teaches jointly approved concepts, procedures and techniques involved in the execution of air power in support of ground maneuver. The course provides an overview of the theater air-control system and Army air-ground system, or TACS/AAGS. Instruction emphasizes operations at the Army division level and below, concentrating on planning and coordination within the TACS/AAGS at brigade and battalion levels. Army students are integrated into only the first two weeks of the course: The third week trains Air Force personnel who are assigned to tactical air-control parties, or TACPs. Air-to-surface fires contribute a large portion of the instruction on ARSOF joint-fires support. This is a good course for ARSOF personnel who will plan and integrate air-to-surface fires in support of special operations, particularly at the ≈ JSOTF level.

Continuous training of the SOFJFE is important to ensure that it can accomplish joint-fires planning and synchronization. Training should focus on individual tasks, collective core competencies and integration into SF group operations.

• *Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course, or SOTACC*. A three-week course conducted at Yuma Proving Grounds, Ariz., that trains SOF personnel in basic terminal-attack-control procedures using Type I, laser and infrared employment techniques, in accordance with the memorandum of agreement, or MOA, concerning joint terminal attack controllers, or JTACs.[5] The course introduces students to the planning, integration and execution of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface fires. Its primary purpose is to produce JTACs.[6] The SOFJFE should be augmented with JTACs to enable JCAS planning in support of SOF missions.

Once students graduate from SOTACC, they must conduct a minimum of 12 controls per year to maintain their JTAC qualification. This requirement will become resource-intensive upon CAS platforms as more JTACs are trained. Close coordination will be required between the 18th Air Support Operations Group, or ASOG; the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC; the U.S. Army Special Forces Command; and SF groups to ensure that Air Force JTACs (formerly referred to as special operations terminal attack controllers),[7] and SF JTACs maintain their currency. A close training partnership between JTACs in each ARSOF unit will be necessary to ensure that training is resourced and accomplished to the standards of the JTAC MOA.

Continuous training of the

SOFJFE is important to ensure that it can accomplish joint-fires planning and synchronization. Training should focus on individual tasks, collective core competencies and integration into SF group operations. The SOFJFE should be integrated into the training of the JTACs. This includes the Air Force JTACs provided to the SF groups by the 18th ASOG and the JTACs trained by SOTACC. All these joint-fires facilitators should be familiar with the TACS, AAGS, CGRS and other tactics, techniques and procedures related to joint fires.

Training vision

The vision for the future training and integration of JTACs and SOFJFEs is that it will be integrated with 18th ASOG JTAC training and will use the expanded joint-fire training capabilities of SOTACC facilities and training ranges. The SOTACC live-fire area allows students to practice indirect fire support and CAS using rotary-wing assets, B-1s, B-52s, AC-130s, and other fixed-wing CAS platforms. Another training opportunity at Yuma is a training area for military operations in urban terrain that can accommodate urban CAS. The SOTACC training facility has a T1 digital connection to the National Training Center for JFE integration and incorporation into NTC rotations and mission-readiness exercises.

The SOTACC incorporates the Enhanced Guard Fist II JCAS simulation program with a work station that replicates a JFE, SOCCE or FSE. The simulation program uses the same terrain as the SOTACC CAS live-fire area to allow students and JTACs to conduct training and rehearsals on the same terrain. The SOTACC simulation center integrates a pilot simulator that allows a pilot to fly the mission under the control of a student or JTAC. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, Futures Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., also has the Enhanced Guard Fist II JCAS simulation program. Both simulators support JCAS and laser-designation operations.

U.S. Army photo

A student in the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course, or SOTACC, learns basic terminal-attack-control procedures to sight targets for attack during the three-week training course at Yuma, Ariz.

Joint fire-support concepts and doctrine, including the employment of a SOFJFE, must be integrated into ARSOF basic- and advanced-skills training for officers, warrant officers and NCOs. Currently, fire-support training is part of the following courses taught by the 1st Special Warfare Training Group at Fort Bragg:

- 18A Special Forces Officer Course: 2.5 hours of CAS planning.
- 18B Special Forces Weapons Sergeant Course: 90.6 hours of indirect fire support.
- 18-series Advanced NCO Course: eight hours of CAS and two hours of indirect fire support.

Joint fire support should also be included in ARSOF and joint SOF doctrine. Field Manual 3-05 (formally known as FM 100-25), *Doctrine for ARSOF*, is being revised and will include information about joint-fires support and the SOFJFE. It is scheduled to be completed by October 2005.

Joint Publication 3-05.1, *JTTP for JSOTF Operations*, and JP 3-05.2, *JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*, are being combined into JP 3-05.1. The revised JP 3-05.1 will include language about joint fire support at the JSOTF level. The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is working to update and enhance doctrine using joint-fires lessons learned from OEF and OIF. An excellent source for articles on joint fire support in support of OEF and OIF is at the *Field Artillery Magazine* Web site: http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/Go_to_War_Primer/.

Future force structure must also incorporate the SOFJFE. In the Enhanced Special Forces Group Band III, Force Design Update, or FDU, a joint-fires element is identified at the SF-group and SF-battalion levels. Although the soonest that the FDU can be implemented is fiscal year 2008, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, are drafting an MOA with U.S. Army Forces Command to provide personnel for the SOFJFEs during the interim.

Conclusion

During OEF and OIF, SOF learned many valuable lessons regarding joint fires that must be institutionalized in SOF doctrine, training and force structure. Although the solution will not be immediate, USASOC is taking the steps necessary to place a SOFJFE in each ARSOF combat-unit headquarters, and SWCS is expanding SOTACC to meet the training requirements for ARSOF JTACs and SOFJFEs. On the current and future joint and interagency battlefield, it is imperative that ARSOF leaders, planners and operators understand the planning and execution of lethal and nonlethal joint fires in support of ARSOF operations.

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U.S. Army photo

Students in SOTACC conduct JCAS and laser target designation utilizing the Enhanced Guard Fist II simulation workstations.

Notes:

1 Colonel Mike Findlay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Green and Major Eric Braganca, "SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield," *Military Review*, May-June 2003, 11.

2 Robert Green, "Utilization of a Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS) by Coalition Special Operations Forces During OIF," *The Air Land Sea Bulletin*, September 2004, 12.

3 Green, "Utilization."

4 The SOFJFE initiative was born out of discussions between the commanding generals of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, based on lessons learned from OEF and OIF. On Oct. 4, 2004, the U.S. Army Human Resources Command approved a directed military overstrength to assign four Field Artillery officers to the 7th SF Group and two to the 75th Ranger Regiment as a "proof of concept." The targeting warrant officer and the 13F NCOs were provided from XVIIIth Airborne Corps assets.

5 The JTAC MOA was signed by the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the director of the Joint Staff, and all of the services. It standardizes the JTAC certification-and-qualification process and provides a JTAC joint mission task list.

6 Joint Publication 3-09.3, *JTTP for Joint Close Air Support*, defines JTAC as "A qualified (certified) service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current JTAC will be recognized across DoD as capable and authorized to perform terminal attack control."

7 The Air Force Air Combat Command currently provides eight enlisted JTACs to each SF group. They are commonly referred to as SOTACs (special-operations terminal attack controllers).

Joint Fires Support, the Joint Fires Element and the CGRS: Keys to Success for CJSOTF-West

by Colonel Robert B. Green

During the early, pre-deployment planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the combined-force commander gave Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West, or CJSOTF-W, the mission of interdicting ground-based time-sensitive targets, or TSTs, in the western desert of Iraq in support of the combined force air-component commander, or CFACC, and the CFACC's counter-SCUD mission.

The mission marked two firsts: (1) For the first time, the CFACC had operational control of an extensive piece of ground — the entire western desert of Iraq, which was his assigned area of operations, or AO; (2) CJSOTF-W, a subcomponent of the Combined Force Special Operations Component commander, or CFSOCC, was designated as the supporting commander for the mission — the first instance of a SOF task-force commander serving as a supporting commander to the CFACC.

CJSOTF-W comprised units from the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group and the British and Australian Special Air Service regiments. Its C-SCUD mission would become the largest coalition SOF operation in history. To plan the mission, CJSOTF-W established a coalition working group consisting of planners from the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, or ACC; the U.S. Central Command Air Force, or CENTAF; other government agencies and coalition special-operations planners from CJSOTF-W's U.S., British and Australian contingents.

In addition to traditional staff planning, CJSOTF-W conducted a series of three live-fly exercises at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., to develop and test the mission's tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs; and its concepts of operation, or CONOPS. The live-flys consisted of joint air-ground operations on the Nellis ranges conducted by portions of CJSOTF-W; the Joint Special Operations Aviation Detachment-West, or JSOAD-W; and CENTAF assets who would later deploy together to conduct the mission. Assets in the live-flys included SF operational detachments and patrols; infiltration platforms; bomber and strike platforms; tanker and airborne command-and-control, or C^2, support; and a complete combined air operations center, or CAOC.

The CFACC established a dedicated air wing, the 410th Air Expeditionary Wing, or AEW, which consisted of strike assets from the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve and the British Royal Air Force, to support the C-SCUD mission. The operation became the first instance in which a SOF task force received all of its apportioned close air support, or CAS, as well as much of its support for air-interdiction, or AI, from a single, dedicated air wing.

Dedicated joint-fires support available to CJSOTF-W included CAS from the 410th AEW, AI support from both the 410th AEW and other CENTAF assets, and AC-130 gunship support from JSOAD-W. Additional joint-fires support was available, upon request, from U.S. Army high-mobility artillery rocket systems, with Army tactical-missile-system capability, that were operating within the area. Other potential joint-fires support assets available in theater included Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles and Air Force air-launched cruise missiles.

The joint-fires element

From the beginning, the success of the CJSOTF-W TST mission depended upon CJSOTF-W's ability to plan, request and control joint-fires support. During early operational planning, based on lessons-learned from OEF, planners determined that a joint-fires

U.S. Air Force photo

A U.S. Air Force F-16 Falcon flies overhead a Soviet-made MAZ TEL SCUD Missile Launcher that simulates an enemy threat for U.S. and allied pilots at Tonopah Test Range, Tonopah, Nev.

element, or JFE, would have to be created as a separate entity within the CJSOTF-W operations staff to manage the complex joint-fires environment. Joint Publication 3-9, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*, describes the JFE as a staff element within the joint operations center, or JOC, that provides recommendations to the J3 on fires planning and synchronization.

The responsibilities of the JFE are divided among its plans, targeting and operations sections. The CJSOTF-W JFE was organized as follows: two joint-fires plans officers (Field Artillery fire-support officers) belonging to the JFE were assigned to the current-plans section of the JOC to prepare the fires portion of all CJSOTF-W plans and orders. Targeting support was provided by two qualified Air Force intelligence targeteers attached to the JFE from CENTAF assets. Their primary responsibility was to work inside the sensitive compartmented information facility, developing target folders in the same format as those used within the CENTAF CAOC, thereby speeding up the process of getting CJSOTF-W targets onto the joint integrated prioritized target list, or JIPTL.

The operations section, working front and center on the JOC floor, consisted of the JFE director (U.S. Army SF); the fighter duty officer, or FDO/JFE shift leader (U.S. Air Force); the fighter duty NCO, or FDNCO (USAF); the current targets officer (British Royal Air Force); the air liaison officer, or ALO (USAF); the air liaison officer (Australian Royal Air Force); the 410th AEW liaison officer (USAF); the gunship liaison officer (USAF SOF); and the tactical air control party, or TACP, NCO (USAF). Each of the JFE positions was replicated on the day and night shifts, except for the JFE director.

The duties and responsibilities of each position within the CJSOTF-W JFE operations section are briefly listed below:

• *JFE director/JFE OIC*. Coordinated directly with the CJSOTF commander, J3 and current-ops officers on all fires issues. Approved the joint-fires portion of all CJSOTF plans and orders. Drafted commander's targeting guidance, as required. Chaired the CJSOTF coalition targeting board, as required.

• *FDO/JFE shift leader*. Gave final JFE deconfliction and clearance for all fires mission requests. Prepared fires portion of the commander's update brief and was the primary fires-log recorder.

• *FDNCO*. Served as JFE shift NCOIC. Coordinated directly with the battle captains and the liaison

officers, or LNOs, of the coalition task forces and U.S. forward operating bases to deconflict immediate or in-extremis fires. Responsible for maintaining the fires overlay that illustrated the current locations of all units and showed all airspace control measures, or ACMs, and fire-support coordination measures, or FSCMs. Was the alternate fires-log recorder.

• *Current targets officer*. Maintained a detailed targeting log on all TST and theater-ballistic-missile target-interdiction requests from CJSOTF ground units. Plotted locations of all targets and troops-in-contact for real-time placement on the CJSOTF common operating picture. Monitored the joint TST manager in the advanced deep-operations coordination system, or ADOCS.

• *Air liaison officer*. Monitored the friendly air picture and all current interdiction or CAS sorties supporting the CJSOTF, as shown in the air tasking order, or ATO, and in the airspace control order, known as the ACO, via ADOCS. Maintained constant contact with the CAOC TST cell's representative from the special-operations liaison element, or SOLE, to transmit immediate TST strike requests or immediate and in-extremis requests for CAS. Maintained awareness of the current threat air picture.

• *410th AEW LNO*. Coordinated directly with the supporting air wing. Coordinated directly with the CAOC C-SCUD cell chief and maintained constant awareness of all C-SCUD operations in the AO. Prepared the JFE portion of the daily C-SCUD planning video teleconference with the CAOC. Advised the JFE on air-wing capabilities and status. *It is crucial that LNOs from any unit providing dedicated joint-fires support to a JSOTF be represented within the JSOTF JFE*.

• *Gunship LNO*. Coordinated directly on AC-130 fires issues between the JFE and JSOAD-W. Participated in the CJSOTF J35 planning cell on all future-fires mission planning. Advised the JFE on AC-130 fires capabilities and status.

• *TACP NCO*. Monitored and served as the primary radio operator for the "SCUD-Net." Maintained the JFE radio log. Maintained awareness of the status of the CJSOTF C² net. Coordinated, as required, with communications support elements assigned to the CJSOTF. Served as the JFE communications-security custodian.

The Air Force personnel within the JFE made up the joint air-coordination element, or JACE, which served as the CFACC's liaison element to CJSOTF-W. The JACE chief, who served as the FDO/shift leader for the JFE day shift, was also responsible for administrative control of all Air Force terminal attack controllers attached to SF teams and patrols within CJSOTF-W. The JACE provided the JFE with the capability for a "mini" air-support operations center and managed all immediate and in-extremis CAS requests on the joint air-request net, commonly known as the JARN. In the future, an ALO and senior TACP NCOs should be assigned to each SF group headquarters to form the core of the deployed JACE.

It is crucial that LNOs from any unit providing dedicated joint-fires support to a JSOTF be represented within the JSOTF JFE.

During the live-fly exercises, CJSOTF-W developed and refined specific responsibilities for each duty position within the JFE and formalized joint-fires TTPs for the C-SCUD mission. The TTPs, written into the classified C-SCUD CONOPS, gave the JFE complete control of all joint fires within any CJSOTF-W joint special-operations area, or JSOA. No air-to-ground ordnance could be dropped within a JSOA without clearance by either the JFE director or the FDO/shift leader, as delegated by the CJSOTF-W commander. Specific, detailed and thoroughly rehearsed procedures for deconfliction and clearance of fires allowed rapid approval of immediate and preplanned CAS as well as air-interdiction missions in support of SF teams and patrols within their JSOAs.

These rapid clearance procedures were facilitated by several command and control, communications and collaborative tools that allowed the JFE to maintain constant contact with the CAOC, the CFSOCC, subordinate CJSOTF units and supporting joint-fires providers, as well as to maintain constant situational awareness of the CJSOTF common operating picture. The tools included ADOCS; secure e-mail; secure phones; command-and-control personal computer, or C²PC; Microsoft Internet Relay Chat, or MIRC chat (used for passing critical time-sensitive information by real-time text messaging); and, most importantly, secure SATCOM on the SCUD-Net. The SCUD-Net was a dedicated satellite-communications, or SATCOM, radio channel that linked the teams, advanced operating bases, forward operating bases, JSOTF JFE, CAOC TST cell, airborne C² platforms and certain strike platforms into a real-time communications net.

In addition to its minute-by-minute monitoring and control of joint fires within the JSOAs, the JFE was also responsible for conducting the CJSOTF's daily coalition targeting board, which collected and prioritized air-interdiction target requests and requests for pre-planned CAS submitted by its subordinate units.

The JFE sent prioritized requests for pre-planned CAS to the CFSOCC JFE for further prioritization and submission to the CAOC. The JFE sent prioritized air-interdiction target requests to the CFSOCC J2 targets section for further prioritization and nomination to the JIPTL, produced by the CAOC.

The same procedure was used to nominate any applicable targets within the JSOAs that did not appear on the combined-force commander's approved joint target list, or JTL. Only targets that appeared on the approved JTL could be nominated to the JIPTL. The JFE ALOs would monitor the execution of all CJSOTF-W air-interdiction missions or pre-planned CAS missions that made it into the daily ATO issued by the CAOC.

CGRS

During development of the C-SCUD CONOPS, planners decided to use a CONOPS recently developed by the U.S. Central Command for killbox interdiction/close air support, as the basis for identifying TST locations on the ground. This common geographic reference system, or CGRS, uses lines of latitude and longitude to construct a grid of cells, each measuring 30 minutes by 30 minutes (approximately 30 nautical miles by 30 nautical miles). Those cells are subdivided into nine keypads measuring 10 minutes by 10 minutes (See Figure 1).[1]

During OIF, the 30-minute-by-30-minute cells were mistakenly referred to by all parties as "killboxes." Killbox is actually a functional capability that can be assigned to any particular cell or keypad. The nomenclature was clarified and corrected in Appendix G (CGRS) of the Air Land Sea Application Center 's *Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting Multiservice TTP* (FM 3-60.1), published in April 2004. The appendix was written by a joint working group composed of subject-matter experts in targeting and joint-fires. The group included ARSOF representatives, many of whom had participated in OIF initial combat operations, specifically the C-SCUD TST operations. A more detailed description of killbox techniques can be found in the *ALSA MTTP For Killbox Employment* (FM 3-09.34), which is currently in coordinating-draft form.

During the live-fly exercises, it became apparent that with the large number of SF teams that would be operating in the AO, and with a large number of strike platforms in the air, a more precise, fluid and nontraditional construct would be needed for coordinating and deconflicting all joint fires in the AO and delineating the shifting boundaries of operational areas being used by SF units.

The majority of the CFACC's AO became designated as "Special Operations Area-West," or SOA-W. This area established the land boundaries within which CJSOTF-W was allowed to conduct operations. SOA-W was subdivided into several sectors corresponding to the various U.S. and coalition SF tactical headquarters.

Within these sectors, each SF tactical unit was allowed to establish a JSOA. These JSOAs were constructed at the keypad level, the intent being to minimize the area of the JSOA within each sector, in order to give supporting aircraft maximum freedom of strike and maneuver.

Traditional JSOA boundaries are constructed along geographic or political boundaries, which normally give the JSOA an irregular shape on the map. CJSOTF-W delineated the boundaries of its JSOAs using keypads, resulting in various arrangements of contiguous blocks of terrain of no set shape. Using the keypads also allowed CJSOTF-W to make changes in the JSOAs' shape and location as necessary because of operational necessity or speed of maneuver.

The procedure of changing the JSOA boundaries consisted of opening and closing designated keypads. As mounted SF tactical units moved rapidly across the western desert,



Figure 1. CGRS Sample



Figure 2. JSOA Change Request Format

they closed keypads to their front and opened those they had vacated. Boundary changes could occur several times during the ATO day. While units kept the changes to a minimum, it was possible to make them as often as every two hours.

The boundary changes were made by means of thorough, preplanned procedures designated in the C-SCUD CONOPS and the ATO special instructions, commonly known as "SPINs." SF tactical headquarters would transmit their desired JSOA changes to the CJSOTF JFE approximately 36 hours prior to release of the ATO for which the changes would be valid (See Figure 2). However, as mentioned, procedures were in place to make the changes more rapidly. The CJSOTF-W JFE could transmit the requested changes to the CAOC TST cell's representative from the SOLE, with a copy to the CFSOCC JFE and J3. As the supported commander who owned the AO, the CFACC had been delegated approval authority, by the CFC, for these immediate JSOA boundary-change requests.

During OIF, the CGRS boundaries of the JSOAs also delineated the boundaries of all FSCMs, such as no-fire areas, or NFAs; ACMs and maneuver-control measures, or MCMs. JSOA keypads were described by a special color designation of "black," thus indicating their multipurpose function.

Essentially, each JSOA was an NFA with designated altitude restrictions for overflying aircraft. Traditional NFAs were used on only three occasions during the operation — once to protect a friendly asset, once to protect a displaced-persons camp, and once to protect a reconnaissance team surveilling an airfield target. It was undesirable for the SF tactical unit's JSOA to include this target's location, as it would have unnecessarily restricted the freedom of maneuver of strike platforms around the target.[2]

The CGRS construct was found to be adaptable and served a number of other purposes. Planners constructed keypad routes for the initial infiltration of mounted SF tactical units into the western desert of Iraq as they moved toward their respective sectors and initial JSOA locations. CJSOTF-W also used keypad routes and boundaries to control the passage of friendly forces from one sector into or through another sector.

In a unique use of keypads, long-distance infiltration routes were established that facilitated an operation across component boundaries. SF teams were inserted clandestinely into a remote desert airstrip within the CFACC's AO, but they then moved overland along the planned keypad routes into the AO of the combined-force land-component commander, or CFLCC, to conduct strategic reconnaissance missions in support of CFLCC offensive operations. Just as with the "moveable" JSOAs, as these teams moved across the desert, they closed keypads ahead of them and opened keypads to their rear. Only small segments of the infiltration routes were therefore "closed" or placed under restrictive ACMs at any one time.

The use of a CGRS during initial SOF combat operations in OIF reflects the noncontiguous, nonlinear nature of the modern battlefield. SOF ground forces operating in that environment required the ability to move rapidly within their assigned AO in order to identify and prosecute TSTs. Boundaries of JSOAs and the FSCMs and ACMs protecting

the forces within those JSOAs had to be modified quickly and in a manner that could be easily transmitted and coordinated with higher headquarters, the CAOC and any units providing fires support.

The fidelity of the cell/keypad CGRS structure allowed those control measures to be easily modified, particularly during rapid cross-country movement of mounted SF forces. The latitude/longitude structure of the CGRS and the simplicity of the alphanumeric keypad designator allowed the JSOTF, CAOC, airborne C^2 platforms and airborne strike platforms to rapidly communicate boundary changes and easily identify new boundaries from the cockpit. Rapid, decisive operations require speed in ground maneuver, C^2 coordination and deconfliction of joint-fires. CGRS provided that critical solution for CJSOTF-W, facilitating numerous and concurrent successful SF operations within the deep battlespace.

Conclusion

The CGRS techniques used by CJSOTF-W, although they worked well, can certainly be improved upon in the future. The application of these techniques also need not be limited only to SOF operations. There are various opportunities for their use at the operational and tactical levels within any conventional force — be it air, land or sea.

In a memorandum signed Dec. 15, 2004, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to adopt the regional-based CGRS (as used during OIF) as each service's training standard. The applicable reference is Appendix G to the Air, Land, Sea Application Center's *Time Sensitive Targeting Multi-Service TTP*. Further, the Joint Chiefs have recommended that the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency develop a global-based CGRS for use in the future. CGRS will soon become an integral part of operational training for every ARSOF soldier and unit.

It should be noted that the CGRS was designed as an *area reference system*, not a point reference system, and that CGRS is not intended to be a substitute for the Military Grid Reference System. CGRS is simply an improved technique for the delineation of operational boundaries, MCMs, FSCMs, ACMs and area targeting efforts.

JFEs are destined to become a standing capability within every future ARSOTF/JSOTF. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command have worked diligently during the past year to develop a template for the future SOFJFE, which will be embedded in the headquarters of each SF group. This SOFJFE will form the core of the deployed ARSOTF/JSOTF JFE and can be further augmented as required. The first "proof of concept" SOFJFE is already in service with a deployed JSOTF. It is imperative that future ARSOF tactical and operational commanders and their senior operations officers and NCOs receive appropriate training on the proper employment of joint-fires support and proper utilization of their SOFJFE.

The success of the JFE in coordinating joint-fires support for CJSOTF-W through the use of a CGRS can be measured in the operational results. Over the 27 days of initial combat operations in the western desert of Iraq, the CJSOTF-W JFE conducted 393 joint-fires deconflictions, with no instances of fratricide or injury by friendly fire. Concurrently, CJSOTF-W prosecuted the highest percentage of dynamic target strikes within the Iraqi AOR, as reported in the initial CENTAF OIF after-action report.

This was a significant difference from OEF, during which there were several unfortunate incidents of friendly-fire fatalities. Lessons learned from both OEF and OIF indicate that centralized control and effective deconfliction of joint fires in support of ARSOF operations will not occur without a trained and capable JFE. The JFE and CGRS are combat-proven capabilities for enabling SOF mission success while reducing operational risks. They are valuable tools to be used and further developed in the support of all future SOF operations.

Colonel Robert Green, U.S. Army Reserve, serves as the assistant chief of staff (IMA) for the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He served as director of the joint-fires element for CJSOTF-W during initial combat operations in OIF. Prior to being attached to CJSOTF-W, he served as the J3, director of operations, for SOCJFCOM. Before being mobilized to active duty following Sept. 11, Colonel Green served in a civilian capacity in the Pentagon as the deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for reserve affairs. During his 25-year career in Special Forces, he has served in various active-duty and Army Reserve command and staff assignments. In "SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield," published in the May-June 2003, issue of Military Review*, Colonel Green, Colonel Mike Findlay and Major Eric Braganca examine the challenges that arose during OEF with the integration of SOF on the contemporary battlefield.*

Notes:

[1] During OIF, CGRS was referred to as the "killbox/keypad methodology," because the TST multiservice TTP, in which the term "CGRS" was first coined, had not yet been written.

[2] The recent addition of 5 minute-by-5 minute quadrants to the CGRS construct (not available during OIF) will greatly aid in closer coordination of air support for SF tactical units.

The Whole-Man Concept: Assessing the SF Soldier of the Future

by Major Will Cotty; Captain (P) Brendon Bluestein, Ph.D.; and Jat Thompson, Ph.D.

As the demand for special-operations Soldiers increases because of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the proponent for Special Forces training, has begun a transformation that will not only allow Soldiers to complete training in a more efficient manner but will also implement changes in the training program in response to lessons learned from the current battle space.

While changes are being implemented throughout the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, nowhere are they more apparent than in Phase I, the Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, where there is a move away from a more traditional method of selection to one based on the latest technology and assessment practices.

In the past, SFAS looked primarily at a candidate's physical fitness, mental sharpness and ability to get along in a team environment. Assessments utilized long-range individual land-navigation exercises and team events as the primary assessment tools. What required further evaluation was a candidate's ability to work by, with and through indigenous personnel while operating as a team. If assessed at all, that trait was not looked at until the culmination exercise, Robin Sage, which is held at the end of the SFQC. Candidates who became non-selects at the end of Robin Sage already had millions of dollars and as many as two years invested in their training. To reduce the potential for wasted money and time, the command has adopted the "whole man" approach to its assessment and selection.

In transforming SFAS, SWCS will use the whole-man concept to redesign assessment techniques and procedures in order to enhance the program without corrupting the current successful selection practices. The approach involves bringing together multi-disciplined psychological experts, as well as combat veterans and an array of contractors, to provide input into the development of Soldiers as whole men.

Taking a page from ARSOF's past, the process will use parts of the selection process used by the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, during World War II, as well as incorporating information from works that clearly define the ideal SF Soldier (DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*) and the SF working environment (*Army Research Institute Job Analysis*, 1996). SWCS also gathered valuable information from the force as to how well Soldiers completing the SF training pipeline perform in the real world. Lessons learned from the GWOT indicate that SF's roots in intelligence, language and guerrilla warfare should remain the building blocks of operations. The ongoing GWOT operations have shown that Soldiers need to be not only physically fit but also culturally savvy to operate in the current battlespace. With this in mind, six core SF attributes have been identified to define the whole man — intelligence, trainability, judgment, influence, physical fitness and motivation.

Taking these core attributes into consideration, SF trainers will judge a candidate in three quantifiable areas, the first being his intelligence quotient, or IQ. The IQ measures a Soldier's cognitive potential and his ability to learn. It is used to deter-

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In the February 2005 issue of Special Warfare*, LTC David P. Fitchitt's article, "Raising the Bar: The Transformation of the SF Training Model," gave an overview of the transformation of the SF training program. This is the first in a series of articles that will examine the individual aspects of that transformation in greater detail. — Editor*

USASOC PAO

SFAS has always emphasized a candidate's physical fitness, mental sharpness and ability to work as part of a team. The new whole-man concept adds an emphasis on the ability to adapt to the UW environment.

mine how well-educated a candidate is and how well he tests. The physical quotient, or PQ, defines a Soldier's physical strength, endurance and level of motivation. The last component, the unconventional-warfare interpersonal quotient, or UWIQ, is hard to define, but it includes a Soldier's judgment and his ability to influence others. Soldiers who are physically tired may have a difficult time learning new tasks, making good decisions and influencing others, so this last component is key to determining a Soldier's ability to act in an ever-changing environment. Evaluators give equal weight to all three aspects when assessing candidates and making selection decisions. The intent is to assess the candidate for potential success in special operations, as well as to determine his strengths and weaknesses.

The evaluation gives the training cadre the ability to look at a candidate's strengths and weaknesses. First Sergeant Robert Sinko, of SFAS, compares the three components of the whole-man concept to the legs of a stool. Sinko explained that a stool has to be so tall, and that all of its legs need to be tall enough for the stool to remain balanced and functional. Likewise, potential SF Soldiers must have the right mix of the three components in order to perform in the special-operations environment. Sinko noted that individuals who cannot demonstrate that balance become non-selects. "What we are looking for is someone who is smart, in shape and gets along well with others," he said.

While the whole-man concept adds emphasis to the mental aspects of the selection process, it in no way takes away from the rigid physical and technical standards that are in place. It instead allows the cadre to assess a candidate's ability to make decisions in dangerous or stressful situations.

To be effective at the two fundamental aspects of UWIQ — judgment and influence — a candidate must possess both situational awareness and self-awareness. Understanding what is going on around one is critical to working in an asymmetrical, ambiguous environment. The Army refers to situational awareness as battlefield awareness. During the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom, SF Soldiers in Afghanistan were put in the difficult situation of trying to negotiate the often-hostile relationships between the Afghan warlords and build a coalition. Those Soldiers had to first recognize that they were operating in a tenuous position and then react to it. To successfully navigate those hazardous waters, the Soldiers needed to recognize their own strengths and weaknesses in dealing not only with their new allies but also with their teammates. Their ability to solve problems, modify their behavior and adapt to the constantly changing environment was key to ARSOF success in OEF.

Recognizing this lesson learned was easy; however, assessing a candidate's ability to acknowledge weakness and adapt his personality is not as easy. It is not as simple as timing a ruck march or a run. So how does one assess a Soldier's ability to operate effectively in unconventional environments? Taking what the OSS

learned in World War II and incorporating recent research developments and technology, trainers designed a sophisticated selection tool to assess a Soldier's UWIQ. These assessments involve exposing Soldiers to unconventional and ambiguous environments and measuring their ability to operate in such environments.

While the cadre plays the key role in assessing the SFAS candidates, peer assessments are another powerful tool for evaluating a candidate's performance. Members of the cadre can predict how well a candidate will perform on a team, as well as his ability to perform in the UW environment, by watching his performance during SFAS and his skill in personal interaction. By design, there are many times when the cadre is not present, leaving candidates to rate one another's performance. These evaluations provide another perspective to the whole man by including behaviors that peers are able to capture but that may elude the cadre.

All these assessments, taken in concert, are used to measure the Soldier's UWIQ, which was addressed only indirectly in the past. The SF cadre's intuitive recognition of deficiencies in a Soldier did not allow them to pinpoint exactly where the Soldier's performance was out of balance. As we begin to capture UWIQ attributes in SFAS and track them through subsequent training in the SFQC, we can refine our understanding of UWIQ and its predictability of subsequent performance, making the selection process even more sophisticated.

Attrition will always be a reality; however, feedback from other phases of the pipeline and from the force operating in the field will allow SF trainers to hone and refine the process. This ongoing self-assessment will allow the selection process to identify non-performers and select performers with a high probability of success in the Q-Course and in the field.

The effect of long-term evaluations of UWIQ should be to shape a force that is adaptable and works well in the human terrain. The force's strengths lie in gathering intelligence, finding, fixing and destroying (by, with and through) the enemy quickly. At the end of each phase of the SF training pipeline, trainers will create a report showing where candidates rank on each of the six core attributes. Trainers will also generate reports from the unconventional exercises. The reports will give the cadre in the follow-on phases of training a snapshot of each candidate's strengths and weaknesses, allowing them to develop an individual training program that is unique to each Soldier. This is a key point in the transformation of the pipeline to a modular "SF university."

USASOC PAO

SFAS candidates negotiate a water obstacle. The 24-day selection process tests a Soldier's physical ability, but, more importantly, his ability to adapt to an ever-changing environment.

Identifiable behaviors and deficiencies in performance from multiple assessments will paint a clear picture for the candidate of his performance. This will force the Soldier to take responsibility for accelerating his own development and will encourage the Soldier to become a self-learner (one who identifies problems and designs ways to modify or fix behavior on his own).

Furthermore, the cadre can use the reports to identify each Soldier's areas for improvement and then provide him with the appropriate resources and experiences for making those improvements. The cadre can aid the Soldiers in this process by using the Socratic method — talking candidates through decision cycles; encouraging the Soldiers to attempt new strategies to hone their skills; and allowing the candidates to learn from their mistakes.

The SFAS candidates will also be encouraged to learn from their fellow Soldiers. Soldiers participating in the same exercise may take very different experiences away from it. For example, a Soldier who has trouble interacting with his peers will focus on his interpersonal style, while another Soldier who is weak in deci-

sion-making but strong in his interpersonal skills will focus on his decision-making ability.

Students will receive feedback on their progress at the end-of-course performance assessment. The cadre is the key for student development, through its use of feedback. The cadre provides a model to the candidates and its members often act as teachers, mentors and coaches. Cadre feedback has the potential to benefit not only those who are selected and complete the Q-course, but also those who return to their original unit. Individuals who leave the selection program are likely to become more self- and situationally-aware. They may become more receptive and adaptable Soldiers. The cadre can facilitate learning by encouraging Soldiers to step outside of their comfort zones and take opportunities that challenge their weaknesses. The most powerful argument for non-selecting a Soldier in subsequent phases of the Q-course is that the cadre gave the candidate the tools to better his performance and he failed to use them.

Modularizing SFAS enables the cadre to evaluate IQ, PQ and UWIQ as building blocks for success. However, significant challenges require discussion. The tools are now in place to streamline assessment and selection and create a selection process that is stable, easily validated and is easy to comprehend and use. Maintaining a secure testing site, which allows greater control over the assessment materials and results, is key. The execution of the assessment program is as important as its design and development. By maintaining all training at the Rowe Training Facility at Camp Mackall, N.C., the cadre, contractors and other evaluators can be retrained consistently and regularly.

SFAS is returning to its roots in the OSS assessment of men by including clinical, industrial and organizational psychologists in the design, implementation and execution of SFAS. This is important to the professionalism and future of the forces. Without this transformation, the process will become stale, and candidates may be selected for their personalities instead of for their capabilities to perform in the special-operations arena. We must remain open to objective feedback from the field and from the support personnel who will assist us in selecting the right man for the job.

We must ensure that the tools we are using are measuring what is intended, i.e., UWIQ. Recent research findings on neurobiological markers of extreme stress illuminate the need for eventually applying these findings to the selection process. However, further research is needed to determine whether individuals selected are already biochemically more stress-hardy or made more stress-hardy during the Q-course.

We must also look to the future and implement new tests. As technology and research become available, the selection process must continue to evolve to leverage them in creating the SF Soldier of the future.

USASOC PAO

SFAS has always tested a Soldiers' physical abilities, but new assessments during SFAS will test their ability to work in an unconventional-warfare environment.

Major Will Cotty is commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Company G, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. His previous assignments include small-group instructor, Company A, 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; A-detachment commander, 7th SF Group; and executive officer, rifle platoon leader and anti-armor platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. He received his bachelor's degree from The Citadel in 1994.

Captain (P) Brendon Bluestein is assigned to the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, as the psychologist for the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course. He was previously the psychologist for the 25th Infantry Division (L). Captain Bluestein served his residency in psychology at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.

Jat Thompson is a psychologist who works under contract with the Army Research Institute at Fort Bragg. He holds a Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychology from North Carolina State University.

G-Staff Organization Streamlines SWCS' Day-to-Day Operations

by Janice L. Burton

In an effort to streamline its day-to-day operations and maintain its relevance in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, has reorganized from the framework traditional within schools of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, to a general staff organization.

"We have adjusted our business practices to align ourselves with our major command. We have clearly defined the functions of our organization in a form more common to that of our higher headquarters."

According to Colonel Mike Rose, SWCS chief of staff, the SWCS transformation has been under way since 1989, when the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, was created, and SWCS was placed under its control.

"Prior to that time, our funding and our customer base was the Army," said Rose. "But with the creation of USASOC under the umbrella of the U.S. Special Operations Command, that all changed."

With that change, SWCS day-to-day business operations switched, as well. Over the next several years, manpower studies and organizational charts were developed and reworked to allow for the formation of the G-staff, under a two-star commanding general. The deliberate steps toward establishing a formal G-staff actually began some five years ago, with the creation of the G3, the assistant chief of staff for operations, and the G1, or assistant chief of staff for personnel.

Rose said the reorganization allows the school to work with USASOC, SWCS's major command, or MACOM, on its funding needs and lessons learned, while still working with TRADOC, which is the authority for training in all military occupational specialties, or MOSs. SWCS is the proponent for the Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations MOSs.

"In our organization we have retained selected directorates that are associated with TRADOC, such as the Department of Education and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, that allow us to retain that relationship," explained Rose. "But we have adjusted our business practices to align ourselves with our MACOM. We have clearly defined the functions of our organization in a form more common to that of our higher headquarters. Instead of the USASOC G3 trying to figure out who he is supposed to work with at SWCS, he can simply go to his newly designated counterpart, and that helps with the efficient conduct of day-to-day business."

Under the new organization, which was recently validated and approved as the fiscal year 2006 Table of Distribution and Allowances, SWCS has added a G4, assistant



chief of staff for logistics; a G6, assistant chief of staff for information operations; and a G8, assistant chief of staff for force modernization and integration. The SWCS resource-management officer has been redesignated as the comptroller.

Additionally, the command has stood up a digital training center, or DTC, and its own public affairs office. The commander has a complete personal staff comprising the judge-advocate staff, the secretary-general staff, the chaplain, the public-affairs officer and the inspector general.

Under this organization, there are two entry points for correspondence to the command. The first entry to the command group is routed through the secretary to the general staff, and the second entry is through the G3, for the routing for all operational items.

Rose said that the G-staff organization is notable in that it occurred while SWCS was in the midst of a major transformation of the Special Forces training pipeline. The transformation will allow SWCS to graduate more than 600 new SF soldiers this year. He added that changes were also forthcoming in the Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs training.

Janice L. Burton is a member of the Special Warfare *staff.*

SF PLDC/BNCOC: Setting the Standard for Enlisted SF Leaders

by First Sergeant Jack Stanford

As Special Forces training transforms to adapt to the demands of the Global War on Terrorism and an ever-shrinking in-service recruiting pool, so must the professional NCO education of SF Soldiers provided by the Primary Leadership Development Course, or PLDC, and the Basic NCO Course, or BNCOC.

BNCOC and its prerequisite, PLDC, are parts of the Army NCO Education System, or NCOES, the leader training that ensures that all Army NCOs at various levels are trained to standard in common-core subjects. Enlisted Special Forces Soldiers must be graduates of BNCOC when they graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. In the past, SFQC students attended two weeks of BNCOC common-core training between the SFQC's Phase II (small-unit tactics) and Phase III (military occupational specialty, or MOS, training). MOS-specific portions of BNCOC were covered during a Soldier's Phase III training. Soldiers who had not completed PLDC attended that course at the XVIII Airborne Corps NCO Academy before they began the SFQC.

In 2001, in an effort to increase the number of applicants for Special Forces, the Army began recruiting SF candidates "off the street." Soldiers in the Special Forces Initial Accessions Program, or IAP, are classified as 18X and attend Infantry one-station unit training and airborne training before reporting to Fort Bragg for the SFQC.

The advent of the 18X program posed a challenge in terms of NCOES training: None of the 18Xs had attended PLDC. Sending them to PLDC would have taxed the resources of the XVIII Airborne Corps NCO Academy and would have delayed the 18Xs' training in the SF Pipeline. To solve the problem, the cadre of the Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy, working closely with the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, reviewed the common-core tasks of both PLDC and BNCOC to determine if they were covered in the SFQC.

The review revealed that many of the NCOES common-core tasks were already included in the SFQC curriculum, and at a higher standard than that required by NCOES. The remaining common-core tasks were combined into a single 17-day course, SF PLDC/BNCOC. The course, which began in August 2002, is now taught 10 times each year at Camp Mackall.

Except for Soldiers who have already completed BNCOC, all SF candidates attend SF PLDC /BNCOC. Although it is a variant of the Army's NCOES training model, SF PLDC/BNCOC has evolved into a course that embodies and reinforces the desirable traits of an SF Soldier and helps to produce Soldiers worthy of membership in the SF brotherhood. Its success is due to three factors: the quality of the instructors, physical training and team-building competitions.

Instructors. The instructors in SF PLDC/BNCOC are vetted by a selection board conducted by the SWCS NCO Academy. Two qualities, individual physical fitness and combat experience, weigh heavily in a Soldier's selection as an instructor. These qualities are essential in the "lead from the front" and "do as I do" mentality that is the cornerstone of the example that young SF Soldiers should see and strive to emulate. SF NCOs are America's tip of the spear, and they cannot afford to fail. SF candidates must be trained in an environment in which desirable qualities are demonstrated and reinforced daily.

Physical training. Physical training is another important aspect of SF PLDC/BNCOC. Physical training is conducted twice daily to

develop in these younger, oftentimes off-the-street Soldiers a sense of the lifestyle adjustments they will have to make to succeed in SF.

Team-building competitions. Because the core NCOES tasks taught in SF PLDC/BNCOC are the Army's model of leadership, the course has integrated leadership-driven competitions into the curriculum. These situational events are collective challenges that hone individual leadership skills, foster teamwork and help students develop a sense of the physical conditioning that is necessary for success on an SF detachment. Each team's performance, good or bad, earns a response — the enemy would offer no less. Responses during the course usually take the form of rewards or remedial training. On the surface, remedial training may appear to be punitive, but the lessons it teaches can have a far-reaching impact on a leader's future operational performance in regard to planning, communication with subordinates, and making and executing decisions.

The SF PLDC/BNCOC course offers future SF NCOs insight into what life on an SF team is all about while establishing a standard that will ensure their success in the SFQC and ultimately in the operational groups. The Army's common-core leader training thus serves as a conduit to success. Many recent graduates of the SFQC describe SF PLDC/BNCOC as "The best two weeks of the Q-course," and credit the course with giving them the direction, leadership and physical training required to start them on the path to success in their chosen profession. That fact alone speaks volumes.

First Sergeant Jack Stanford is the first sergeant for the SF PLDC/BNCOC at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School NCO Academy.

NCOs Must Lead Change and Ensure Safety

By Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

CSM Dave M. Bruner

As the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School continues to transform, we must remember that the most powerful weapons we have are the NCOs assigned to the center. They will lead transformation and enforce changes that will ensure that our Soldiers are prepared to meet, engage and destroy the enemy.

Throughout all phases of our world-class training, our NCOs will continue to find areas that need improvements related to the changing battlefield. Our training will remain relevant, enforce core skills for unconventional warfare and place a greater emphasis on foreign-language training.

Understanding the plan and vision of the SWCS Pipeline Transformation is easy. There are two basic principles: (1) Never lose the focus on rigorous training standards; and (2) None of the innovative changes will harm the current success of the SF Pipeline. Our training must continue to provide our Soldiers with the confidence and the broad range of capabilities needed to continue to win in the Global War of Terrorism and across the entire spectrum of conflict.

With the high pace of transformation, I would ask that all NCOs and leaders pay special attention to safety and to risk-management. All leaders must work extra hard to educate all of our Soldiers, civilians, staff and family members about potential hazards. The Army's strategic message is clear: The involvement of leadership at every level is our primary weapon against accidents. I urge all leaders to be involved and committed to safety, so that we can protect our most valuable resource: "the SWCS family."

Veritas et Libertas!

Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner is the command sergeant major for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

SOFTACS to Support C4I Requirements of Special Operations Forces

by Major Gregory Oquendo

In May 1992, foreseeing a need for United States special-operations forces, or SOF, to have a state-of-the-art tactical automation system and digital telecommunications network with a high capacity to support the information flow for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, or C4I, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, approved the development of the Special Operations Forces Tactical Assured Connectivity System, or SOFTACS.

Since then, SOF operational experience, as well as the deficiencies and looming obsolescence of existing equipment, have borne out the validity of that decision. In the future, SOF-unique, joint, combined, coalition or interagency operations will require even greater data capability and interoperability among SOF, general-purpose and allied C4I systems.

File photo

The SOF Deployable Node will be a deployable, lightweight, multichannel satellite communications assemblage.

SOFTACS was designed to provide the bandwidth critical for passing nonsecure, secure and compartmented intelligence data, imagery and large-volume data. Without SOFTACS, Special Forces groups will not have the capability to support the C4I requirements for high-capacity, digital, secure, interoperable transmission and switching systems.

SOFTACS, a satellite-communications, or SATCOM, system, has a data-rate range from 512 kbps–8.2 mbps. With its associated baseband/digital circuit switch, it will operate over military and commercial satellite space segments and provide high-capacity communication links that will support voice, data, imagery and video teleconferencing, or VTC. SOFTACS will also interface with military and commercial switching systems, such as the Defense Information Systems Network, USSOCOM's SCAMPI transmission media, and commercial dial central offices.

The operational requirements document, or ORD, identified a need for two variants of SOFTACS: a heavy version that could be mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, and a lighter version to be loaded into a transit case. The ORD specified a requirement of four systems for each of the seven SF groups — one system per SF battalion and one for the group headquarters — a total of 28 systems.

On July 29, 2002, the SOCOM acquisition executive approved a SOFTACS acquisition-decision memorandum that structured SOFTACS as an umbrella program containing two sub-programs: the

SOFTACS Transit Case Variant, or TCV, and the SOFTACS Wheeled Variant.

The deployable multi-channel SATCOM, or DMCS, terminal and the SOF deployable node, or SDN, are the materiel solution for the SOFTACS TCV. The TCV provides a deployed SOF headquarters with a robust C4I system with "first in" capabilities and is interoperable with legacy terminals as a multiple-carrier terminal. In prolonged, large-scale operations, larger ground-mobile-forces terminals, such as the Phoenix multichannel SATCOM terminal, will provide sustained C4I support, and the TCV will perform a supporting role.

Within the SOFTACS program there will also be a terminal called the SOF deployable node-medium, or SDN-M. The SDN-M will be a deployable, lightweight, multi-channel SATCOM assemblage that can be easily transported, set up and operated by one person. SDN-M will provide secure and nonsecure voice, data, VTC and video services to an early-entry team of five to 15 SOF personnel. SDN-M will fill the gap between the services provided by the SDN-Lite (which has a data rate of up to 64 kbps) and the much heavier and larger DMCS, terminal and SDN baseband switching system.

The SDN-M will provide a bandwidth in the range of 512 kbps–2 mbps. SDN-M can be used in peacetime and in all threat environments across the spectrum of conflict.

There is currently no contract for a vendor to produce the SDN-M. The contract is scheduled be awarded in June, and the first unit equipped is scheduled to receive its SDN-M in October. For additional information, contact the author at DSN 239-6490 or commercial (910) 432-6490, or send e-mail to: oquendog@soc.mil.

U.S. Army photo

Soldiers in the 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky., assemble a SOFTACS system. The Deployable Multi-Channel SATCOM will allow SOF headquarters to deploy with a "first-in" system that is interoperable with other C4I systems.

Major Gregory Oquendo is assigned to the C4I CA and PSYOP Branch of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command G8.

SOFTACS Fielding Chart

Unit	Basis of Issue	On Hand	To Be Fielded
1st SF Group	3	3	
1/1st SF Group	1		1
3rd SF Group	4	4	
5th SF Group	4	2	2
7th SF Group	4	3	1
10th SF Group	3	2	1
1/10th SF Group	1	1	
19th SF Group	4		4
20th SF Group	4		4

Data updated as of 27 Jan 05

Operation White Star: A UW Operation Against An Insurgency

by Major Dean S. Newman

The Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, has caused the Army, particularly its special-operations units, to take a second look at its current doctrine on unconventional warfare, or UW. Army doctrine strictly limits UW's objective to attacking regimes that the United States government considers unfavorable; however, the U.S. has exercised UW options in combat against the regimes of both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the GWOT, as well as on multiple transnational nonstate targets inside those countries.

These nonstate targets include terrorists such as al-Qaeda and its subsidiary cells, which may exist within a country without being part of the country's ruling regime. Consequently, removing a ruling government solely to unseat a transnational terrorist organization within its borders is not a viable option. Despite the limitations, U.S. Special Forces have the capability of using UW operations to destroy targets located within the sovereignty of a regime that does not necessarily need to be eliminated.

Operation White Star, a campaign in Laos during the pre-Vietnam era, provides a historical example of SF Soldiers successfully attacking an insurgency by employing UW methods without attacking the regime in power.

Operation White Star, a campaign in Laos during the pre-Vietnam era, provides a historical example of SF Soldiers successfully attacking an insurgency by employing UW methods without attacking the regime in power.

Limits of doctrine

Army doctrine limits the application of UW in two ways. To understand these limitations, we must make a few doctrinal points clear. Army doctrine defines UW as "a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source"[1]

Doctrine further specifies the types of "indigenous or surrogate forces" that SF troops can support: "When directed, SF personnel support selected resistance organizations that enhance U.S. national interests. During a limited or general war, Special Forces Operational Detachments normally infiltrate hostile areas to organize, train, equip and advise or direct an indigenous resistance organization."[2]

Finally, doctrine outlines the approved objectives of resistance organizations, and in turn, their American counterparts:

An insurgency is an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage and armed conflict to achieve its aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy — the central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency

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Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Army, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

In January 1962 the 3rd Kha Marquis Company was raised as part of an SF guerrilla-warfare program to secure the Bolvens Plateau in southern Laos.

has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek [1] *to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also seek to:* [2] *overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution;* [3] *establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state;* [4] *cause the withdrawal of an occupying power;* [5] *extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means* [numerals added].[3]

Herein lie the two limitations: First, doctrine limits SF to working with resistance movements, of which insurgencies are one type. Second, the five objectives identified above for insurgencies are characteristically oriented toward attacking a targeted government. Doctrine doesn't consider that a surrogate force, not being in opposition to a regime, might have objectives or targets that are independent of the government in power. In other words, doctrine does not consider that SF teams could design surrogate units with the sole intent of attacking nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups.

Military planners should not confuse UW operations that attack nonstate actors with foreign internal defense, or FID. The Department of Defense defines FID operations as "the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency."[4] Furthermore, "the primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of [government] forces, so they can defeat the insurgency without direct U.S. involvement."[5]

In other words, when U.S. SF conduct FID operations, they do so through, with and by another government's programs, especially its military forces. But many governments may have political or military limitations that prevent them from eliminating an organization that is both within their sovereignty and antagonistic to the U.S. Since those governments are unlikely to have either the indigenous capabilities or the necessary willingness to create programs through which SF can prosecute a target, FID is not an option for them.

UW operations can design surrogate units that are independent of governments. For that matter, SF is capable of conducting "covert, clandestine and low visibility" operations because of the inherent "political-military considerations [that] frequently shape special operations."[6] The targeted organization may be an insurgency that opposes the regime within whose sovereignty it exists, or it may oppose other regimes in the region or far away.

Whatever the case, if the host nation does not have the willingness or the capability to work with the U.S. government in eliminating an antagonistic organization — which is FID, then UW is still an option. In fact, UW is possible even if the U.S. determines that the regime in power must remain in power while U.S. SF destroys all of its hostile indigenous nonstate actors. This form of UW is what SF teams and the CIA did in Laos during Operation White Star, 1959 to 1964.

Operation White Star

As early as 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower perceived that communists were aggressively trying to "subjugate" the entire Southeast Asian peninsula to their political ideology.[7] The Geneva Conference of 1954 split Vietnam and labeled Laos and Cambodia neutral. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Thailand felt that Laos was at the root of conflict between an expanding communist trend and pro-Western regimes. As a result, the U.S. began diplomatic, eco-

nomic and military efforts to keep Laos "neutrally" biased toward the West and capable of self-defense.[8] In 1955, the Pentagon established a military assistance advisory group, or MAAG, which it hid under an economic-aid mission called the Program Evaluation Office, or PEO.

The PEO intended to create a modern army, in direct violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords.[9] "During the late '50s, 80 percent of the annual American aid to Laos of $40 million went to the Royal Laotian Army, or RLA. Laos became the only foreign country in the world where the United States supported 100 percent of the military budget."[10] Ironically, Eisenhower had little intention of this army ever amounting to anything more than a "tripwire" that could justify outside intervention should communist forces attack.

By 1958, the Laotian government, receiving strong incentives from the U.S., was moving more and more away from the communists. Meanwhile, the communist were gaining a few but noticeable seats in the National Assembly. Soon, the King of Laos renounced portions of the Geneva accords and tried to dissolve both the communist parties and their militaries, using diplomacy and aggression.[11] By July, a civil war had begun. In 1959, despite fears of Chinese and North Vietnamese military intervention, the U.S. sent 100 additional military advisers and increased the size of the RLA from 25,000 to 29,000.

In April 1960, General Phoumi Nosavan won a suspicious election to rule the government. In August of that same year, Captain Kong Le, traditionally considered a neutral in the fighting, drove Phoumi out of office, appointed a prime minister, and tried to win Phoumi over to his side by appointing him "both deputy prime minister and minister of the interior."[12] With American aid, Phoumi returned to power in December 1960. Kong Le led his forces out of the capital to join the communist faction, the Pathet Lao, or PL, as well as their North Vietnamese, or DRV, supporters.

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

In October 1961, mobile training team member Ernie Tabata (left) taught small-unit tactics to the Royal Laotian Brigade.

The operation

In January 1961, shortly after taking office, President John F. Kennedy ordered the commencement of Operation White Star. This operation expanded MAAG-Laos with 400 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel from Okinawa. In the face of rapidly expanding Soviet support to the PL and DRV involvement in Laos, White Star had two strategic goals: "to keep the Mekong Valley out of Pathet Lao control, thus easing the pressure on the Thai government, and consolidating a bargaining position vis-à-vis the communist bloc in the increasingly likely event of a new international conference."[13] Decisive annihilation of the USSR- and DRV-backed PL insurgency was not a specified task.

White Star marked a significant change in the U.S. approach to defeating the PL insurgency. U.S. military intervention in 1959 was decidedly FID in nature. The 100 advisory forces, as part of Operation Hotfoot, worked to develop the existing Laotian government forces' capability for defeating the PL. Chalmers Archer Jr. was a SF participant in Operation Hotfoot. Of the mission's objectives, he writes:

The next rather long-range step was to make the battalion the nucleus for Laotian counterinsurgency forces. The unit would possess the ability to conduct combined unconventional intelligence and commando operations in enemy-controlled areas and secret zones. A major plan was to use this camp as a model. We would work with the battalion in setting up similar ones. In due time, we also planned to assist the battalion in developing the capability to stab away at the evasive Pathet Lao networks, with small bands of its own trained security teams. At this point, though, we saw our ultimate goal as helping the troops to harass the communists and to slow them down as they tried to divide Laos.[14]

In fact, Archer admits that the "situation dictated that [FID] be conducted" even though the Laotian battalion did not originally plan to receive such training.

White Star, however, had a distinctively different scheme. Even though FID remained an integral part of the operation, SF Soldiers also had the specific mission of conducting UW "in any of its forms — guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, subversion and sabotage."[15] FID and UW were both included as discrete missions of the operation. Archer's SF team, in particular, had the mission "to help raise unconventional forces among the Lao Theung tribesmen on the

Bolvens Plateau and among the Hmong hill tribes in the north."[16] Archer and his team were no longer working through existing government forces. Instead, they were creating unconventional forces from among the many civilian inhabitants of Laos, training them to wage war against the Pathet Lao and its USSR and DRV sponsors.

UW that seeks to overthrow existing governments should target the discontent of a constituent population and exploit problems in order to build an organization capable of meeting its political counter-regime objectives. Comparatively, UW in Laos "would depend upon the counterinsurgents' ability to strike at the roots of the population's dissatisfaction," to include poverty, corruption, taxation, inflation and health care.[17] Archer's team and other U.S. SF units "had to act rapidly enough and effectively enough to wrench the initiative from the insurgents. … However, working closely with the CIA, [Archer's team] learned that the majority of the 'peasant' population was not committed to either side. [The peasants] simply wanted to survive and live in peace."[18]

Soldiers had to engage in civil operations to better the living conditions of the population in addition to engaging the PL in combat. Archer writes, "Because of some of our efforts, we were able to attract support from the civilian population almost anywhere we went."[19] While the UW was conducted neither against the Laotian regime nor through its existing programs, the tactical execution remarkably resembled other more traditional interpretations of UW.

The Lao Theung and Hmong hill tribes of Laos were not the only populations in which the U.S. government created unconventional forces. The Meo tribesmen were well-reputed warriors of the Laotian northern highlands who in 1960 already had a history of opposing the PL and the DRV.[20] Unlike many other Laotian tribes, the Meo fought tenaciously, unrestrained by the pacifistic Buddhist dogma that mollified other fighters.[21]

During their resistance efforts against the PL in 1960, the Meo sent emissaries outside of their region to seek assistance. Eventually, they turned to their U.S.-backed ally, General Phoumi. The CIA and U.S. SF organized, trained, advised, assisted and supported the Meo tribes in developing and employing an "irregular armed force" under the military command of Vang Pao and the political leadership of Touby Lyfong.[22] The purpose of the force, like Archer's force, was to "establish a force of irregulars to collect intelligence and [to] harass the PL/DRV and their allies, the neutralists."[23]

In the alliance, the Meo, the U.S., the Laotian government and even the Thai government shared concerns about the control of the Plain of Jars, one of the most significant pieces of terrain in all of Laos. At the same time, nothing suggested that the Phoumi regime would formally sponsor, lead, advise or assist the

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

A Special Forces sergeant (standing middle) instructs infantrymen south of Luang Prabang during a temporary lull in combat.

military activities of the Meo. They left those tasks exclusively to the U.S. government.

During the power struggle between Phoumi and Kong Le, Phoumi forced Le's troops out of the capital. Because of Le's alliance with the PL, the communist insurgents retained control of the Plain of Jars. Even after White Star created large surrogate forces to attack the PL, the communists successfully and repeatedly defended this terrain. It is noteworthy that while the conventional RLA and its SF advisers initially failed to retake the Plain of Jars, the Meo forces — independent of the government's conventional apparatuses — had continued success during the same time. The Meos accomplished "their limited mission of intelligence reporting and harassment by ambush, despite hardship and the greater strength of the enemy."[24]

As a result of their successes, the Meo people were hunted by the communist factions and dispossessed of their communities. They received both increasing aid from the U.S. government and new recognition from the Laotian government, including basic necessities, schools, health care and authorized local self-rule.[25]

Eventually, a neutral Laotian government backed by Washington, and led again by Souvanna Phouma, came to power. The PL continued its resistance against this regime as well, while, with DRV assistance, it also continued its offensives against the Meo. Tragically, the Meo vacillated between war and cease-fire after 1973, suffering extensively as involuntary nomads dependent upon U.S. aid. As U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia waned in the mid-1970s, the PL successfully won control of the Laotian government, and the Meo were at considerable risk because of their longtime defiance of communist encroachment.[26]

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

SF Soldiers, Specialist 4 Deveraux and Sergeant Newton, instruct Laotian soldiers in bore-sighting a 57 mm recoilless rifle.

Operation White Star represents the success of UW against an insurgency. The U.S. government, using CIA and SF units, built surrogate forces independent of the Laotian government in order to attack indigenous nonstate forces that were antagonistic to American interests. Most importantly, these surrogates, as part of a larger operation, kept the communists from dominating the Mekong Valley and, in turn, threatening the Thai government. Eventually, in 1969, the success of surrogate Laotian forces initially trained by U.S. SF forced the North Vietnamese to divert combat power from their conventional forces fighting the U.S. Army in Vietnam. In the U.S., White Star also validated UW methods in combat, increased the credibility of U.S. SF with the White House, and asserted a strong SF-CIA relationship within the government.[27]

Implications

Some of the important lessons learned from White Star are those that advance the dialogue about the use of UW as a method of

counterinsurgency, or COIN.

Current doctrine clearly excludes the use of UW for engaging insurgencies and other nonstate enemies of the U.S. This counterinsurgent option is not FID by definition, but its objectives are not bound to the counter-regime intentions of traditional Cold War UW. In fact, White Star shows that SF Soldiers can apply UW inside the sovereignty of regimes that do not have the capability (or the willingness) to attack America's enemies either unilaterally or with U.S. FID support. Changing control of the Laotian government was never a goal of White Star.

In White Star, planners integrated a combination of FID and UW as a more comprehensive COIN approach. SF Soldiers had little time in a fractured and unstable country to train a conventional force to attack a well-developed and combat-experienced insurgency that held key terrain in the defense. Furthermore, the forces executing the FID mission did not receive sufficient resources, including time, to accomplish their mission given the situation.

On the other hand, their counterparts who developed the surrogate units in UW were not bound by the paradigms of "conventional warfare," and they could develop irregular units with unconventional capabilities sufficient to accomplish their two limited missions: intelligence-collection and harassment. Continuing the FID programs over a long term, in conjunction with the UW initiatives, probably would have brought greater success and stability to the ruling Laotian regime. Unfortunately, all SF left Laos after the "Declaration of Laos Neutrality," denying the FID operations time for success.

The UW portion of White Star presented some disadvantages

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

Unmarked aircraft brought the first clandestine SF teams into Laos. Team members wore civilian clothing and carried no visible identification or weapons.

worth mentioning. First, Meo surrogates became extensively involved in the opium trade, independent of their U.S. government advisers. Impoverished living conditions make the quick profits of drug trade or other illicit markets covetable in any country, in any era, including the present one (as seen in Afghanistan). Even during White Star, any connection of opium to forces associated with the U.S. government, even unintentionally, had inflammatory effects.[28] Illicit surrogate activity, however inadvertent, incalculable or indirectly linked to U.S. forces, can be one liability associated with UW operations.

Also, UW operations can create a moral obligation for the U.S. to an ally. That relationship can extend beyond the strategic interests of America. Douglas S. Blaufarb writes of the Meo in 1977:

Thus this tiny ally of the United States has been brought to a rather desperate pass while its powerful senior partner has little leverage left to protect and assist it. Among the indirect costs to the U.S., therefore, are the after effects of the ambiguous result of the Meo resistance. There is very little the U.S. can do to meet the undoubted moral obligation it has incurred, not so much because of monetary costs but because of its sharply reduced ability to intervene in the area. Unhappiness with this outcome has led some to criticize the U.S. sharply for involving the Meo in an unequal battle against a superior enemy, on the grounds that Washington should have been aware that the fight was hopeless, whereas the Meo, with their limited understanding of the total scene, could not have made their decision to join in full knowledge of the consequences.[29]

At one point late in 1970, the Meo had a refugee population of around 110,000 people involved in a "tragic exodus." The U.S. limited its protection of the Meos to increasing bombing and infiltrating more Thai volunteer battalions. In defense of the U.S., Blaufarb points out, "Washington did not know that the cause was hopeless" when it began to develop its relationship with the Meo. The Meo already had a long history of resistance against the PL and the DRV before they solicited outside assistance from Phoumi and the U.S.

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

A forward Special Forces advisory team sets up quarters in a typical upland Laotian infantry battalion post.

In the end, UW arguably preserved Meo culture by providing humanitarian assistance as well as providing a means of resisting the devastating oppression of the PL and DRV forces.

Nevertheless, advocates of UW as a COIN alternative should not dismiss the consideration of moral obligations too quickly. Today, the U.S. Special Forces Association continues to help Montagnard expatriates develop communities in the U.S. These efforts are undeniably a result of the same sort of moral obligation that resulted from a relationship founded between the two cultures in Vietnam. The U.S. must fully consider the repercussions associated with developing such relationships before it cultivates new ones in the Global War on Terrorism.

Finally, and maybe most notably, is a concern that despite the time, resources and efforts of U.S. SF in White Star and those of the CIA before, during and after the operation, the PL insurgency eventually won control of the Laotian government. The Declaration of Laos Neutrality in the early 1960s denied the U.S. government the opportunity to build on the success of its UW surrogates. The CIA was left to handle the mission under more clandestine circumstances, which, when combined with the shifting priority to the Vietnam War, became a far more arduous task.

Even so, White Star proved to be a valuable investment that produced high returns for years after its completion. The Meo continued to have success far beyond White Star, even in the face of waning U.S. support. In 1969, the North Vietnamese had to commit an entire NVA Division, the 316th, against the Meo surrogates. Not only did this represent how serious the DRV perceived their Meo enemies to be, but it also represented how difficult North Vietnam thought it would be to solve the Meo problem. With the insurgents continuing to fight, the DRV employed a conventional response: They sent in more troops, augmenting their 316th Division with a large part of the 312th.

The Meo were no match for the overwhelming resources of the DRV. Even though the Meo never achieved another major military victory, they clearly forced North Vietnam to commit regular forces to the Laotian front at a time when their conventional efforts in Vietnam, like the Tet Offensive, had already failed. The Meo continued to serve its U.S. allies by distracting North Vietnam and forcing the DRV to commit troops away from U.S. units in South Vietnam.

The CIA and U.S. SF originally designed the Meo and other surrogate units with two limited objectives in mind: gathering intelligence and harassing the PL. Attacking and holding terrain against large conventional forces was never a part of White Star's UW mission, and neither was decisive annihilation of all communist forces. To hold the U.S. government accountable for the ultimate victory of an overwhelmingly large and well-resourced communist force is unmerited.

In fact, given the limited U.S. investment during White Star and after, the argument can be made that UW operations in Laos were encouraging. Those surrogate units delayed the communist forces from taking over the Laotian government for more than a decade, nearly as long as the massive American conventional efforts delayed North Vietnam from winning Saigon — but at a fraction of the cost.

In the war on terror, UW as a COIN effort is inviting. The need for large surrogate units capable of decisive annihilation of large enemy units is likely to be an exception, even inside Iraq and Afghanistan. Today's targets will typically be smaller, more cellu-

lar, and far more vulnerable to activities such as harassment and unconventional intelligence-collection. Therefore, SF teams could build surrogate units that are smaller, easier to manage and undemanding of massive resources.

Operations would have to be covert or clandestine, but that condition hardly disqualifies UW's potential. In fact, the smaller surrogate units make secrecy more possible, especially when compared to the deployment of large, slow-moving conventional brigades that have limited indigenous intelligence capabilities. Furthermore, small, precise, surrogate harassment operations are arguably even more effective against cellularized networks than they are against large guerrilla or conventional units. SF units can more effectively survey any potential illicit activities of surrogates if they size the surrogate units more manageably. This contemporary organization scheme makes liabilities less likely and more easily averted.

Small, cellular surrogate units do not bring the burdensome moral obligation that UW efforts in Laos and Vietnam bestowed upon American operators. Individuals in the war on terror who place their loyalty in the goals of the U.S. would be easily protected and cared for, in comparison to the commitments required for the entire Meo or Montagnard populations. The U.S. could enter into UW relationships with these smaller surrogate units far more easily and with fewer repercussions than those in Southeast Asia during the 1960s.

UW as part of the war on terror might also be balanced worldwide with FID operations in countries that are willing and capable of working with U.S. forces in order to increase their capabilities to interdict indigenous enemies of the U.S.

Courtesy USASOC Historical Archive

Laotian paratrooper trainees use the mock door-exit structure in front of the 34-foot tower at Sono. Such rickety platforms did not meet U.S. Army standards, but they were effective.

White Star hinted that this approach, if given the opportunity, might have worked, and the war on terror provides us with an unfortunate opportunity for exploring that course of action.

Conclusions

Chalmers Archer Jr. writes, "All this is not to say that the United States should disband the armed forces or do away with traditional notions of applying overwhelming force. It does mean, however, that the nation should seriously consider all action alternatives."[30]

A study of Operation White Star reveals that special-operations Soldiers can wage UW against enemies of American interests that are not necessarily ruling governments in power. Current SF doctrine limits its UW guidance strictly to counter-regime efforts. White Star not only set a precedent for success; it also presented the UW approach as an alternative to attacking nonstate actors that are characteristic of the war on terrorism.

In the war on terrorism, UW as a COIN alternative would look markedly different from the way it did in Laos, if for no other reason than that the threat in today's war is configured far differently and requires different force configurations against it. However, these differences, if anything, reduce the limitations and liabilities that were present during White Star, making the UW course of action even more appealing. Reduced resource requirements, economy-of-force advantages, manageable moral obligations and demonstrated historical successes are among the reasons why UW can effectively interdict global targets in today's war without the need for massive

conventional buildups that have yet to prove successful.

Major Dean S. Newman is a member of the faculty of the Department of Military Instruction at the U.S. Military Academy. He is the USMA SF Branch representative as well as the course director and instructor for both the special-operations and low-intensity conflict elective and the counterinsurgency-operations elective. He holds a master's degree in defense analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

Notes:

[1] Department of the Army, FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 1-1.

[2] FM 3-05.201, 11.

[3] FM 3-05.201, 1-3 to 1-4.

[4] Department of the Army, FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* (Washington, D.C.: 1994), v.

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[7] Len E. Ackland, "No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos," in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., *Laos: War and Revolution* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), 140.

[8] Ackland, 140-41.

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[10] Ackland, 143.

[11] Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), 116-18.

[12] Ackland, 152.

[13] Dommen, 184.

[14] Chalmers Archer Jr., *Green Berets in the Vanguard: Inside Special Forces, 1953-1963* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001) 97.

[15] Archer, 115.

[16] Archer, 115.

[17] Archer, 119.

[18] Archer, 119-20.

[19] Archer, 120.

[20] Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 134-38.

[21] Blaufarb, 134; Dommen, 165.

[22] Blaufarb, 140-41.

[23] Blaufarb, 142.

[24] Blaufarb, 143.

[25] Blaufarb, 147-51.

[26] Blaufarb, 166.

[27] Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces In Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 66-67.

[28] Blaufarb, 151.

[29] Blaufarb, 166.

[30] Archer, 139.

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Manuscripts should be 3,000 to 5,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double spaced, in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Letters

SFQC should teach advanced shooting skills

I would like to recommend that the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) be changed to include Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) for all SF MOSs except 18B (SF weapons sergeant). The SF Weapons Sergeant Course should be changed to include the Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance Target Acquisition and Exploitation Techniques Course (SFARTAETC).

By implementing these changes, we would produce the following results: our weapons sergeants would report to the teams with the ability and the skill-set needed to plan and execute SFAUC training for the team. Our SFQC graduates would arrive with standardized tactical capabilities in the most unforgiving scenario, urban close-quarters battle. Pre-mission training would be streamlined because new team personnel would have a greatly reduced learning curve for unit instruction purposes. And our regiment would finally be able to move realistically toward meeting the mandate of having "all 18-series SFAUC qualified."

I have spoken with many people regarding this idea, and I have met no one who feels it is a bad one. This plan would institutionalize our shooting skill-set, and it would prevent us from having to outsource training from civilian shooting schools.

It must be noted that every team in every theatre is likely to call on [its] shooting skills. I have conducted six months of unilateral raids in [Operation Iraqi Freedom] on a non-specialty team. During OIF III, we found ourselves clearing rooms and buildings in order to occupy sniper hides in Fallujah. When a simple meeting with a local police chief took an unexpected turn (the building was empty and appeared to have been ransacked), we cleared the compound to establish security and situational awareness. And there are numerous instances of 7th Group elements being ambushed in country, with only their pistol skills to fall back on.

It is time to establish our priorities in clear and certain terms. Special Forces Soldiers must be shooters first. All environments have the propensity to deteriorate. By definition, we deploy to volatile situations and attempt to bring order. We owe it to our Soldiers to give them the proper tools.

SFC Troy H. Thomas
1st Battalion, 10th SF Group

The SWCS commander responds

SFC Thomas,

I agree with you 100 percent on the importance of shooting skills for our Special Forces Soldiers. As we reshape the SF training pipeline, we are incorporating as much weapons training and shooting as is feasible.

We have added sniper weapons and MK-47 ALGL training to the 18B course, and in Phase II, we have added a Special Forces tactics module and AMOUT instruction. During the language phase, students will go to weapons live-fire ranges in addition to performing PT, combatives training and airborne operations. We are also studying the feasibility of offering SFARTAETC as collective training to select units.

Thank you for your letter and for your service.

MG James W. Parker
Commander
USAJFKSWCS

Special Warfare *is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in* Special Warfare *or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor,* Special Warfare; *Attn: AOJK-DTD-DM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28310, or send them by e-mail to steelman@soc.mil.*

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

CA and PSYOP skill identifiers added

In an effort to appropriately credential Soldiers eligible for the branch or military occupational specialty, or MOS, the Army Special Operations Proponency office has created new skill identifiers for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. The skill identifier 6K, Civil Affairs Staff Planner, and 6J, Psychological Operations Staff Planner, will be integral in supporting the operational needs of current and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in creating greater CA and PSYOP capacity across the Army in the Global War on Terrorism. The skill identifiers provide motivated officers and NCOs greater flexibility in making career choices. The identifier and operational CA or PSYOP staff-planner experience will provide a strong basis for future branch transfers or MOS reclassifications.

ARSOF enlisted Soldiers sought for Special Recruiter Assistance Program

The United States Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command are asking Soldiers of CONUS-based enlisted Army Special Operations Forces, or ARSOF, (Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Forces and Rangers) who are 25 years of age or younger and who have participated in operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom to volunteer for the Special Recruiter Assistance Program, or S-RAP. Soldiers who volunteer and are approved by their chain of command for S-RAP will return to their hometown or to a location in proximity to their hometown to assist in local recruiting efforts by promoting Army awareness in general, and Army special-operations awareness in particular, in their communities through Soldier-centric activities. ARSOF S-RAP participants will serve in a temporary-duty status for a period of up to 14 days and may claim reimbursement for travel expenses and per diem allowance for the period of TDY. ARSOF S-RAP may be taken in conjunction with ordinary leave. Soldiers interested in participating in the program should submit their applications online at www.usarec.army.mil. Questions may be directed to the Special Operations Recruiting Company, Sergeant First Class Steven Hill, at 910-432-1641/50, or to USAREC headquarters, Mr. Withers, DSN 536-0448 or (502) 626-0448.

Successful promotions lead to ANCOC scheduling challenges

The fiscal year 2005 sergeant first class promotion board selected all eligible Soldiers from Career Management Field 18 (Special Forces) and CMF 37 (Psychological Operations) for promotion. While the successful promotion in both fields is commendable, it has created new challenges in scheduling seats for the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, or ANCOC. The majority of the FY 2005 ANCOC class seats are filled with Soldiers who were selected on the calendar year 2003 SFC board; most of the Soldiers recently selected will not be able to attend ANCOC until FY 2006. Group command sergeants major should work closely with ANCOC to schedule Soldiers for the course, based on unit deployment schedules. The SF and PSYOP branches need to be notified through the chain of command immediately if an issue arises that will preclude a Soldier from attending his scheduled class.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF warrant officer pipeline in transformation

The Special Forces Warrant Officer education pipeline and system are changing to meet the transformation requirements of Special Forces and the Army Officer Education System, or OES. The Special Forces Warrant Officer Education System, or WOES, will maximize the use of shared training opportunities, and the appropriate integration of courses will eliminate redundancies in the current 180A education pipeline. The development of credible training will incorporate intelligence, operations and advanced special operations, and it will integrate joint and special-operations lessons learned from operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The Army is consolidating the education pipeline into a single officer education system, as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The chief warrant officer of the SF branch, CW5 William McPherson, is managing the SF warrant-officer redesign program and is soliciting input from the field for use in the redesign. Proposals include 180A candidates attending the Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Rucker, Ala., for a two-week officer training course instead of the existing six-week course. Select modules of the SF Intelligence Sergeant course are being incorporated into the Warrant Officer Basic Course, or WOBC, with an emphasis on intelligence management and oversight, removing the SF Intelligence Sergeant course as a prerequisite. Warrant officers will attend the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or WOAC, earlier in their careers. The creation of shared training opportunities between the WOAC, Command and General Staff Officer course, Intermediate Level Education SOF Track/Operational Studies, and the Joint Special Operations University is also under consideration. Information concerning the WOES and 180A MOS can be found on the Army Knowledge Online, or AKO, Web site. Log-in to AKO, go to Groups, Special Forces 180A home page, or contact the CW5 McPherson at DSN 239-1879/7597, commercial (910) 432-1879/7597 or e-mail: mcphersw@soc.mil.

CA/PSYOP branch initiative goes forward

Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, approved the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Branch Initiative for release to Headquarters, Department of the Army, for formal staffing and approval on March 8. If approved, the proposal will eliminate the current CA and PSYOP functional areas and create two separate and distinct non-accession branches.

CA, PSYOP to receive separate functional areas

On Oct. 1, Functional Area 39 (Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations) will be replaced by Functional Area 38 (Civil Affairs) and Functional Area 37 (Psychological Operations). This realignment of career fields is meant to more accurately recognize and differentiate the professional skills and competencies of each functional area. Additionally, the separation of CA and PSYOP from a single functional area will more effectively utilize the CA and PSYOP career force in assignments within the functional area of each officer's greatest experience and knowledge.

Update

Special Forces teach ROK soldiers to call fire from sky

YONGSAN ARMY GARRISON, Republic of Korea — After spending two weeks in the classroom studying under United States instructors from Special Forces Detachment-Korea, 30 Republic of Korea special-forces soldiers from across the peninsula successfully called in U.S. Air Force precision air strikes March 2 at a range in South Korea.

SFD-K Soldiers and Airmen trained their South Korean counterparts in ROK Special Warfare Training Group classrooms. During the two weeks, the ROK special-forces soldiers learned about coordinating close air support and using laser range finders to mark targets for A-10 and F-16 aircraft.

"Because we're working with special-operations soldiers, they won't be operating near friendly units," said Major Jefferson R. Panton, SFD-K commander. "So what we do is terminal-guidance operations."

After the targets were determined, the attacking aircraft were called by radio from the ground. The ROK special forces spoke English to make sure the pilot was moving in the right direction, and they give him the target's elevation, description and Global Positioning System coordinates.

The special-forces operators guided eight sorties of attacking aircraft out of the clouds and watched as the GPS-guided practice bombs and real bullets tore into the targets with deadly precision.

"We're able to do this because the ROK soldier is highly educated, highly motivated, and able to speak enough English so that we can conduct this course in a very short time. Outside of NATO countries, I think this is the first time this has been attempted with an allied force," said Panton.

USASOC Historical Archive

U.S. Special Forces Detachment-Korea trainers look on as a Republic of Korea special forces soldier calls in an air strike during a training exercise in March.

The newly trained ROK special-forces soldiers will train others in their units on the same tactics.

"If you're a special-forces element on the ground, all you have as far as firepower is what you're carrying with you," said Panton. "This allows you to tap into all the firepower of the U.S. Air Force. It increases your lethality and your survivability tenfold."

While these tactics support the mission of special-operations units, they also support the mission of the Air Force.

"Especially in Korea, because of the terrain, it's important that the pilots get an accurate marking onto the target. These munitions are multimillion-dollar munitions, and you're not going to drop them onto a target unless you know you have an exact grid coordinate. It's the evolution of warfare. They know that when they have SF marking on the ground, that they have an accurate marking of that target.

"We needed to increase our interoperability between ourselves, because we work hand-in-hand with each other," said Sergeant First Class Jeffery Johnson, a coalition-support-team leader for the 3rd Republic of Korea Special Forces Brigade. "Some of our missions may have joint targets, and we have to be

able to function together." — *SPC Daniel Love, 8th Army Public Affairs Office*

USASOC names new deputy commander

A former staff officer at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., was named the deputy commanding general of the organization March 28 by Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker.

Phelan

Brigadier General Mark V. Phelan, a career Special Forces officer, is currently serving as deputy director for special operations on The Joint Staff in Washington, D.C.

A former commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, Phelan has also served as USASOC's deputy chief of staff for personnel.

PSYOP working on MTPs 'doctrinal umbrella'

The Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, is developing a "doctrinal umbrella" of multiple mission training plans, or MTPs, to address PSYOP units at all levels.

Until recently, collective tasks for PSYOP battalions were articulated and organized in one overarching MTP, ARTEP 33-725-60-MTP, *MTP for the Psychological Operations Task Force*, July 1998. This MTP included command and control, sustainment and other common collective tasks for a PSYOP task force, or POTF. It also addressed the tasks performed by the dissemination, enemy-prisoner-of-war, regional and tactical PSYOP battalions.

ARTEP 33-725-60-MTP was rescinded in February 2005 in favor of creating multiple MTPs to cover battalion- and company-level PSYOP units.

ARTEP 33-712-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the PSYOP Group and Headquarters and Support Company of the PSYOP Battalion*, is the first MTP in the new architecture. The multiple MTP approach for PSYOP collective training takes into account all unique missions of PSYOP battalions and companies. The MTPs will also address the tasks performed not only by POTFs, but also by the PSYOP support elements and PSYOP assessment teams.

ARTEP 33-712 lays out the process of deploying a PSYOP element, mobilizing a reserve-component PSYOP unit and providing PSYOP support to a conventional maneuver unit or special-operations element. Additional unit-specific changes to these tasks will be delineated in subsequent MTPs, if necessary. ARTEP 33-712 focuses primarily on planning PSYOP support. The initial draft is being staffed to the community for review and comment. The MTP is scheduled for release in December 2005.

Work continues on the second MTP in the series, ARTEP 33-715-MTP, *MTP for the Psychological Operations Dissemination Battalion*. ARTEP 33-715 addresses the tasks of active- and reserve-component PSYOP dissemination companies and incorporates emerging tasks for the CQ-10A "Snow Goose" unmanned aerial vehicle. The MTP also includes tasks for the employment of the latest additions to the family of PSYOP dissemination platforms such as the Theater Media Production Center and reach-back enablers such as the Product Distribution System.

The majority of tasks addressed in ARTEP 33-715 are not performed by Soldiers in military occupational specialty, or MOS, 37F (Psychological Operations specialist). The task descriptions in ARTEP 33-715 are being written by Soldiers on active duty for special work who are assigned to the 17th PSYOP Battalion. These Soldiers, possessing the appropriate non-PSYOP MOSs, provide the subject-matter expertise and knowledge needed to make the task descriptions understandable and accurate.

The projected completion date for the initial draft of ARTEP 3-715 is December 2005. The MTP will then be staffed to the community for review and comment. The projected publication date is September 2006.

ARTEP 33-737-30-MTP, *MTP for the Tactical PSYOP Company*, is the third in the series of MTPs for PSYOP units. Included in this MTP will be all the tasks necessary to support the seven-phase PSYOP process at a tactical PSYOP company and its elements. Currently, the mission-to-task analysis for ARTEP 33-737 is being completed. The projected date for beginning the author's draft is third quarter, fiscal year 2005. The

PSYOP ARTEP MILESTONES

	STAFFING	COMPLETION
ARTEP 33-712-MTP, HHC PSYOP Grp/Bn	2nd Qtr FY 05	1st Qtr FY 06
ARTEP 33-715-MTP, PSYOP Dissem Bn	1st Qtr FY 06	4th Qtr FY 06
ARTEP 33-737-MTP, Tactical PSYOP Co	2nd Qtr FY 06	1st Qtr FY 07
ARTEP 33-727-MTP, Regional PSYOP Co	2nd Qtr FY 06	1st Qtr FY 07

MTP will be staffed to the community for review and comment in the middle of 2006, and completion is set for late 2006.

The final MTP under the doctrinal umbrella, ARTEP 33-727-MTP, *MTP for the Regional PSYOP Company*, will address the employment of a regional PSYOP company. Work on ARTEP 33-727-MTP will begin in July 2005 after the initial revision of FM 3-0-5.301, *PSYOP TTP*, has been completed.

The new architecture of PSYOP MTPs will provide PSYOP commanders with a foundation of collective tasks, conditions and standards that will enable them to plan their training more effectively, focusing it on maintaining proficiency in critical wartime missions.

For additional information, telephone SFC John Tuel, DOTD PSYOP Division, at DSN 239-7257 or commercial (910) 432-7257, or send e-mail to: tuelj@soc.mil.

Civil Affairs GTAs approved for release

The Civil Affairs/Civil Military Operations Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine is releasing two new graphic training aids, or GTAs.

GTA 41-01-002*, Civil Affairs Arts, Monuments and Archives Guide*, was released in March, with unlimited distribution. The guide, produced in conjunction with the JFK Museum, is designed to assist CA Soldiers and G5 staffs who are conducting CA activities in support of military commanders of interagency and multinational forces throughout the scope of operations. The guide will also be helpful to Soldiers responsible for protecting, safeguarding, preserving, restoring, rehabilitating or making restitution to their rightful owners of damaged or endangered cultural property within areas under military control.

GTA 41-01-003*, Civil Affairs Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Guide*, was also released in March, with unlimited distribution.

The guide covers a wide range of information on foreign-humanitarian-assistance, or FHA, including: general principles and types of FHA, CA's role in FHA, scenarios, planning considerations, assessments, property control, checklists, international legal considerations, funding, policy and directives, and sources of information.

The FHA guide is intended to assist CA Soldiers and civil-military operations staffs as they plan and conduct FHA in support of military commanders and interagency and multinational forces throughout the scope of operations.

The guides will be distributed throughout the Army and will also be available on Army Knowledge Online and the Reimer Digital Library in April. Hard copies of the guides will be available at Army training audio-visual support centers later this summer.

For more information, telephone Rob Miller at DSN 239-1654, commercial (910) 432-1654, or send e-mail to: millerob@soc.mil.

Photo by K. Kassens

On Target

Soldiers participating in Phase II of the Special Forces Qualification Course spend time on the 9 mm pistol range at Fort Bragg, honing their skills. Students participating in the SFQC divide their time between developing physical skills and exercising their mental skills in the military-occupational-specialty section of the course, as well as in language training. All phases of the SFQC are in transformation.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. *By Robert D. Kaplan. New York: Random House, 2002. ISBN: 0-375-50563-6. 198 pages. $22.95.*

In *Warrior Politics*, Robert Kaplan seeks "to wrest from the past what we need to arm ourselves for the present." Kaplan argues that skepticism and constructive realism are required for America to successfully act in the contemporary world. He selectively draws on examples from Western and Asian classics, and from more recent thinkers and actors, such as Machiavelli and Churchill, to assert that there is no "modern" or "post-modern" world. Rather, the challenges that America will face in the 21st century could be understood by the ancients, and should be viewed by contemporary thinkers, as merely a continuation of conditions from ancient times.

Warriors should adopt, Kaplan asserts, an amoral view of self-interested statecraft based on *raison d'état*, *raison d'économie* and *raison du système*. Virtue should be properly understood as the ancients and Machiavelli interpreted it — as *virtu*: that conduct and those actions that conform to the requirements of maintaining a given state order in the global context of unending conflict between irreconcilable interests.

Kaplan, the author of *The Coming Anarchy*, is among the most pessimistic of the seminal writers (others are Huntington, Barber and Fukuyama) portending the effects of globalization, and his assertions must be seen in the context of this dark view. "I am not an optimist or an idealist," Kaplan states. "Americans can afford optimism partly because their institutions, including the Constitution, were conceived by men who thought tragically. … Our founders were constructive pessimists to the degree that they worried constantly about what might go wrong in human relations."



In Chapter One, Kaplan suggests that the concept of modernity is a "rejection of the past" and a "celebration of progress" that discounts the unknowable effects of demographics, technology and globalization. In this context, and combined with man's inherently savage nature, institutions and policies must be based on a "constructive realism" that deals with the way things are, rather than the way one might hope them to be.

In Chapters Two and Three, Kaplan lauds Churchill as an example of a modern hero whose understanding and methods were derived from a study of the past. Citing numerous examples, Kaplan argues that morality is not a modern concept, drawing an interesting parallel between the *virtu* of the Punic Wars generation (as described by Livy) with that of the World War II "greatest generation."

The key segment of the book's argument can be found in Chapter Four, in which Kaplan asserts that there is no such thing as a good or evil state, only states that sometimes do good things and sometimes do bad things. He draws on Sun Tzu and Thucydides to argue that by thinking strategically, and managing anarchy in accordance with self-interest, statecraft can reduce the chance and magnitude of war, which, ultimately, are moral outcomes.

Chapters Six and Seven take up the role of fate and determinism (a key concern for the ancients), and the ideas of Hobbes and Malthus. Kaplan agrees with Hobbes' notion of a "war of all-against-all," and the general thrust of Malthus' concern that population pressures will increase the future threat. The "pop" summation of Kaplan's conclusion on fate is, "There is no fate," rather, each situation must be managed as it comes.

In Chapter Nine, Kaplan invokes Kant's notion of morality of intention (how one ought to act) to replace religious transcendent order as a guide to morality. In Chapter 10, he echoes Ralph Peters and others, saying that the sav-

agery of future wars will resemble that of ancient ones. Kaplan muses on whether a world government will arise as a solution to problems inherent in globalization. Although he sees such a government forming based on a global cosmopolitan class, Kaplan ultimately doubts whether it will be particularly effective in decreasing war.

In the final chapter, Kaplan provides the unlikely example of the Roman emperor Tiberius as a ruler who illustrates *virtu*. Although Tiberius was personally a monster, he increased the imperial treasury and strengthened the empire in troubled times.

Kaplan's exhortation to learn from the past is welcome. Those who value history will agree that "we need to recover the allure that the classics held for 19th-century schoolboys like Churchill, who read them not as critics or fact checkers but for their inspiration." Those who love history, especially the classics, will recognize the serious effort that Kaplan has made to display their contemporary wisdom. Those who are under-read in history would do well to use Kaplan's book as a primer and guide for further reading. The judgment of American leaders and commanders in far-flung "imperial" borderlands "require(s) … intellectual seasoning, of which literature is the great provider, because it augments one's own experience with the acumen of the finest minds."

Kaplan's thesis is likely to be controversial, as military and government professionals, whose imperative motivation is the transcendent order of the Judeo-Christian value system, will likely object to the relativistic implications of his neo-paganism. Such professionals may even interpret his argument as a contemporary critique of the good-vs.-evil rhetoric of the Bush administration. Any advocate of Machiavelli will welcome Kaplan's outlook.

In either case, the exhortations to mine the wisdom and experience of the past, and to maintain an attitude of "anxious foresight" in the present, cannot but enhance our understanding of an unsettled and unsettling future.

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Non-State Threats and Future Wars. *Edited by Robert J. Bunker. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass and Company, 2003. ISBN: 0-7146-8308-6 (paperback). 208 pages. $26.50.*

Are the days of battles between professionally trained warriors gone? From now on, will wars be waged between and by opposing "network capacities" and opposing "net worth" ideologies? Will a "winner" be ultimately decided not by weaponry, but by determination? The careful reader of editor Robert Bunker's *Non-State Threats and Future Wars* will be able to answer these questions that are posed in a pithy, erudite and instructional book.

Bunker and his fellow authors were already at work on this book on 9/11, a date considered by former CIA director James Woolsey as the beginning of World War IV. The authors' collective insights demonstrate that the U.S. armed forces, having won the Cold War (World War III), were thought to be preparing for a 9/11 scenario because they had shifted their doctrinal concepts in 1995 to include "asymmetrical" warfare.

However, as many of the book's authors point out, about all that the armed forces did was to acknowledge the concept and continue to acquire heavy, digitally deadly and Mach III-capable weaponry. It would be a mistake for a reader to believe that the contributors are not experts. The authors are world-class and include the likes of Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters, Max Manwaring, Russell Glenn and Phil Williams — the same men who have been warning the Department of Defense that the likes of al-Qaeda were coming to our shores. Furthermore, these same authors have coined the terminology used today by the armed forces; i.e., asymmetrical warfare; gray-area phenomena; transformation of war; nonstate actors; nonstate threats; and fourth epoch. Therefore the question is, will the DoD now take their conclusions and recommendations to heart?

The book presents a blueprint for the military and law-enforcement agencies of the U.S. to innovate and prepare for the battles of World War IV. It is a comprehensive and intensely composed book on the subject of asymmetrical warfare as fought by nonstate warriors. It is based on historical evidence (the "Fourth Epoch War") that rings true. It is also based on a complete understanding of transnationalism: that being stateless and homeless no longer means being unable to wage devastating warfare.

The authors explain how nonstate actors' threats are now "virtual" but their actions are real. The example they use is al-Qaeda: Its leaders and core functions (money, resources, logistics, plans) exist simultaneously in different countries, gaining a competitive edge through the availability of fanatics, capital, low costs or proximity to the next target. Al-Qaeda is known to operate in more than 60 nations. Linked virtually, its members have grown into an organization that has become a true nonstate threat.

Bunker and his contributors clarify the future of war and the threats that an organization can bring to a Western nation — threats just as serious as those posed in previous decades by conventionally and nuclear-armed nations. For counter-

ing the likes of al-Qaeda, the book presents six "realities" worthy of consideration and three solutions that may never be implemented.

Reality number one is that the world of international security is more complex than ever before. It is no longer sufficient to focus on states with defined borders and ideologies. We must now include individuals whose organizations are established to wreak havoc on the citizenry of Western societies. This will be extremely difficult to accomplish because our nation's security apparatus was not designed to identify them.

Reality number two is that our leadership should not make a distinction between foreign and domestic security; i.e., we cannot have a homeland-security organization that does not have direct access and control of global security. Likewise, we cannot have a global security organization that does not have direct access and control of homeland-security functions.

Reality number three has been elucidated for the past decade: Nation states are not what they once were. The balance of power requires that states, corporations and organizations be interactive and co-coordinated in the areas of policy, capability and action.



Reality number four is that non-state enemies are unlike anything DoD has faced before. We must understand that America's enemies are networked, transitional and flexible. They learn from their mistakes, they are embedded into existing financial, religious and educational communities, and they possess the capacity for regeneration — all to a degree that policy-makers cannot begin to fathom.

Reality number five is that globalization, once thought to be the "end-all" concept for global commerce, has a darker side. Once an organization like al-Qaeda gets embedded, Western infrastructure (electrical power, gas/oil production-storage-delivery, telecommunications, banking/finance, water supply, transportation, emergency services and government operations) becomes almost totally vulnerable.

The final reality is that there is now a diffusion of technology and expertise from traditional great powers to other states and to sovereignty-free actors. These actors are using their knowledge of technology to go after the critical systems the U.S. maintains using computer systems that are vulnerable to exploitation.

Unfortunately, the three solutions proposed by Bunker and the other authors are not within the immediate capability of the executive or legislative branches of government. The first is to cooperate through multilateral efforts in the area of intelligence-gathering and dissemination. Sun Tzu would recognize his own axiom, "know the enemy," but this is an area so jealously guarded and compartmentalized that it now works in the favor of al-Qaeda.

The second solution is to adopt new ways of thinking that go well beyond the conventional wisdom. It would behoove DoD to emulate the way multinational corporations collaborate "outside the box." Today, most managers file electronic activity reports with their superiors, who in turn pass them along, via e-mail, until a summary reaches the one boss who, constantly traveling from place to place, makes an immediate decision about shoring up a vulnerable area.

The final solution offered by *Non-State Threats* is a call for a complete overhaul and reassessment of the institutions and procedures through which national-security policy is made and implemented. The authors recognize how difficult that solution seems, but they warn that it must begin as soon as possible because of the length of time needed and the difficulty in overcoming bureaucratic inertia.

In summary, the authors recognize the new enemies of our nation, encourage innovative thinking in our institutions, demand that bureaucratic demarcations be overcome, and, above all, call for the creation (and growth) of smarter institutions to combat an "even smarter" enemy. They realize that because the enemy is flexible, nimble and innovative, so must be those who combat them. Therefore, this book should be required reading by those who serve in special warfare.

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Special Warfare

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