

Special Warfare


The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



ARSOE in Afghanistan



From the Commandant



September 2002

Special Warfare

Vol. 15, No. 3

While all U.S. operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom have been characterized by the skill and dedication of United States military personnel, the contributions of U.S. special-operations forces have been particularly valuable. To ensure that the contributions of the Army special-operations forces involved do not go unsung, the Army Special Operations Command has undertaken a project that will record the activities of ARSOF units. The USASOC historian's office has interviewed soldiers from a variety of ARSOF units and is recording the results of the research in a book scheduled to be published later this year.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, we are fortunate to be able to present abbreviated versions of many of the articles that will be included in that book. While our selections do not encompass all the articles that will be included in the book, our intent has been to present vignettes that represent the wide range of ARSOF missions.

In many of the vignettes, the participants are identified by pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are used for security reasons, but they may have another, unintended effect: By obscuring the identity of the individuals, the pseudonyms allow the reader to realize that the activities were those of a team, any of whose members would have been capable of performing the same actions.

The number of vignettes is evidence of the wide range of ARSOF missions and the number of units that have participated in Afghanistan to date. Those missions include precision flying at night, disaster relief, psychological operations, direct action, unconventional warfare, coalition operations, counterinsurgency, and the provision of supplies and communications under extremely difficult conditions.

Despite challenges from weather and terrain, from cultural and language barriers, and from a sensitive political situation,



ARSOF have been able to perform their missions in Afghanistan quickly and effectively. It is difficult to read the accounts of their activities without feeling a sense of admiration and pride.

At the Special Warfare Center and School, we have another reason to be proud of the operations that ARSOF have performed in Afghanistan. The efficiency and professionalism that have characterized ARSOF soldiers' actions there are a result of the training programs that we have helped develop and administer over the past several years. Moreover, the bravery, flexibility and self-reliance demonstrated by ARSOF soldiers validates our assessment-and-selection procedures. In the end, ARSOF activities in Afghanistan have shown the world what we have known for some time — that we are training some of the finest soldiers in the world.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William G. Boykin".

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'Find Those Responsible': The Beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Taliban, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden — as the rays of the early morning sun reflected from the twin towers of the World Trade Center Sept. 11, 2001, few Americans had ever heard those names. Within hours, however, few Americans would not have heard them.

Not since Dec. 7, 1941, had the United States been attacked directly by a foreign power. Within 24 hours, intelligence reports linked Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden to the attacks, and congressmen and military officials were calling for retaliation. President George W. Bush characterized the attacks as “acts of mass murder” and pledged “to find those responsible and bring them to justice.”¹ While Secretary of State Colin Powell mounted a diplomatic offensive to garner support for action by the U.S., Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prepared an order to mobilize reservists and members of the National Guard. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz warned that the military was “entering into a campaign against terrorism.”²

On Sept. 15, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution that authorized “the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”³ Bin Laden quickly became the focus of an unprecedented manhunt, and Afghanistan was the prime area of attention.⁴

Afghanistan’s geography and demography are significant challenges to opera-

tions there. Two-thirds of the country is covered by mountains that rise to almost 17,000 feet. Only 15 percent of the land can support agriculture. Three major languages and 30 minor languages, religious divisions between the majority Sunni Muslims and the minority Shi’a Muslims, tribal cultures, oppression, illiteracy, famine, drought, and the lack of infrastructure have severely hampered military and diplomatic attempts to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorists and to remove the Taliban from power.⁵ Of no small import are the millions of undocumented land mines that are strewn about the country.

“We will rally the world,” declared President Bush, and Secretary of State Powell immediately launched a diplomatic offensive to rally support from both the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. “We’re building a strong coalition to go after these perpetrators,” Powell told reporters. Within days, the U.S. had received pledges of support from Russia, China, NATO and the European Union.⁶ Such coalition support would prove invaluable.

Any doubt as to the legality of military action against the terrorists and their supporters was laid to rest when the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... [who] aided the terrorist attacks.”⁷ To establish a secure footing for further coalition support,

Secretary Powell invoked Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which guarantees “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”⁸ Calmly, systematically, and methodically the U.S. was dotting the “i’s” and crossing the “t’s.”

In a warning issued at the Pentagon Sept. 17, President Bush stated that he wanted bin Laden brought to justice “dead or alive.”⁹ It was no idle threat. Two days earlier, during a meeting at Camp David, Bush and his national-security team had reviewed the options for responding to the terrorist attacks.

During the meeting, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet offered a plan for using the Northern Alliance opposition to the Taliban. Under his plan, U.S. ground forces would link up with the Northern Alliance fighters in order to attack terrorist supporters in and around cities in northern Afghanistan. According to the president, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld “understood the utility of having the CIA involved,” and “quickly grasped” the plan “to mate up our assets with the Northern Alliance troops.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton then presented three military options. In his third option, he recommended attacks by cruise missiles and manned bombers, with the addition of placing “boots on the ground” — the insertion of Army Special Forces.¹⁰

When President Bush told “everybody who wears the uniform to get ready,” on Sept. 15, *Washington Post* reporters already were speculating that SF was “certain to be at the center of the action.”¹¹ Little did the reporters know that while the National Guard and the Army Reserve were activating their soldiers, and while military installations were tightening their security measures, the U.S. Central Command, or USCENTCOM, was quietly summoning planners from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to investigate various means of retaliating against the terrorists. As the fight against terrorism began, Rumsfeld did acknowledge, “a lot of the effort ... will be special operations.” Army Secretary Thomas White seconded that acknowledgement.¹²

“On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes,” President Bush

told the American people in a nationally televised address Oct. 8. The previous night, U.S.-led airstrikes had struck targets near Kabul and Kandahar.¹³ However, it was clear that if the U.S. was going to wage an effective campaign in the remoteness of Afghanistan, the use of bases in the region would be critical. The efforts of the Secretary of State had paid off when the Uzbeks allowed coalition forces to be based at Karshi Kanabad, which would become known as K2. On Oct. 7, airplanes carrying logistics and communications personnel and equipment from both the 528th Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion began arriving at K2. Also in the process of deploying were elements from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 5th SF Group.¹⁴

Critical to the conduct of any military operation is the establishment of a logistics base and a communications network. While the 528th and the 112th valiantly labored to convert a primitive airfield into a usable facility, the 160th SOAR and the 5th SF Group began planning for future combat missions. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher admitted that representatives were in contact “with the whole gamut of Afghan factions, including the Northern Alliance.” Secretary Rumsfeld stated on “Meet the Press” that the U.S. was attempting to find ways of assisting antiterrorist forces.¹⁵

Civil Affairs units began planning for the distribution of blankets and food to displaced persons that would take place once the tactical situation had been stabilized. In the meantime, however, on Oct. 7, U.S. Air Force C-17s began air-dropping humanitarian-aid rations. Two days later Air Force EC-130 “Commando Solo” aircraft began broadcasting radio messages to emphasize the international nature of the mission to free the Afghan people from the oppressive rule of the non-Islamic Taliban. Other messages were directed at the Taliban: “You are condemned. Resistance is futile. Surrender now.” Those scripts were prepared by the Product Development Company of the 4th PSYOP Group.¹⁶

On the night of Oct. 19, Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment parachuted from MC-130s into Afghanistan. That same night, detachments from the 5th SF Group landed by MH-47E helicopters flown by the 160th SOAR. The articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* tell the stories of some of the Army's special-operations forces that were engaged in the operation to find those responsible for the terrorist attacks on the U.S. that September morning — Operation Enduring Freedom. ✕

Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Kansas. He previously served as an officer in Special Forces, airborne, and infantry units stateside and overseas. He also served on the Army Staff, and he was an instructor at West Point and at Fort Leavenworth. He earned his Combat Infantryman Badge and Purple Heart in Vietnam, where he served in the 5th Special Forces Group and as an infantry-company commander. His first book, Maj. Gen. John Alexander McClelland: Politician in Uniform, won the Pratt Award for best nonfiction Civil War book in 1999.

Notes:

¹ Rowan Scarborough, "Military Officers Seek Swift, Deadly Response," *Washington Times*, 12 September 2001, 1; Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Intelligence Points to Bin Laden Network," *Washington Post*, 12 September 2001, 1; eMedilMillWorks, Inc., "President Bush's Remarks," *Washington Post*, 12 September 2001, 2.

² Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Asks Call-Up of Reserves, As Many As 50,000," *New York Times*, 14 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Plans War on Terrorists, Not Infrastructure," *Washington Times*, 14 September 2001, 13.

³ David Von Drehle, "Senate Approves Use of Forces; Military Patrols Cities and Ports," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001, 1.

⁴ Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Intelligence Points to Bin Laden Network," *Washington Post*, 12 September 2001, 1.

⁵ Afghanistan Online, www.afghan-web.org; Country Watch – Afghanistan, www.countrywatch.com.

⁶ "A New World Order," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 September 2001, 1; President Bush's address to the nation, 12 September 2001.

⁷ Associated Press, "Text of Joint Resolution," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001, 4.

⁸ Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. Can Strike Without U.N.

Nod," *Washington Times*, 27 September 2001, 17; Charter of the United Nations, www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instrree/chapter7.html.

⁹ Dan Balz, "Bush Warns of Casualties of War," *Washington Post*, 18 September 2001, 1. This warning was issued on 17 September.

¹⁰ Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "At Camp David, Advise and Consent," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001, A01.

¹¹ Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Tells the Military to 'Get Ready'; Broader Spy Powers Gaining Support," *New York Times*, 16 September 2001, 1; Dana Priest, "Special Forces May Play Key Role," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001, 5.

¹² Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker, "Scarcity of Afghan Targets Leads U.S. to Revise Strategy," *New York Times*, 19 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, "Pentagon Prepares Variety of Responses," *Washington Times*, 21 September 2001, 1.

¹³ Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. And Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns 'Taliban Will Pay A Price,'" *New York Times*, 8 October 2001, 1; Peter Baker, "Kabul and Kandahar Hit in Attacks Through Night," *Washington Post*, 8 October 2001, 1.

¹⁴ C.J. Chivers, "2nd Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbekistan," *New York Times*, 8 October 2001; U.S. Army Special Operations Command Crisis Response Cell briefing, 092000Z Oct 2001.

¹⁵ Rowan Scarborough, "Northern Alliance Gets Help From U.S.," *Washington Times*, 28 September 2001, 1; Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, "Bush Approves Covert Aid for Taliban Forces," *New York Times*, 1 October 2001, 1.

¹⁶ U.S. Army Center for Military History, "Afghan War Chronology," 25 April 2002; Andrea Stone, "USA's Airborne Message: Taliban, 'You Are Condemned,'" *USA Today*, 17 October 2001, 10; Major Larry Paulson (pseudonym), 4th POG, interview by author, 3 April 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Into the Dark: The 3/75th Ranger Regiment

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

On Oct. 19, 2001, Ranger Task Force 3/75(-), with a regimental command-and-control element, conducted the first Ranger combat parachute assault since Operation Just Cause in Panama. Four MC-130s dropped 199 Rangers from 800 feet above ground level under zero illumination to seize a remote desert landing strip, or DLS; to destroy Taliban forces; to gather intelligence; to provide a casualty transload site; to establish a forward aerial refuel/rearm point, or FARP, for rotary-wing

targets on Objective Iron. They could not identify Objective Copper from the air. AC-130s also fired on buildings and towers within the walls of Objective Cobalt.

Company A(-), with a sniper team, had the mission of securing Objectives Tin and Iron to prevent enemy interdiction of Objective Cobalt and the landing strip. Specialist Martin Pasquez realized how low the airplane was flying when the doors of the MC-130 were opened and dust blew into the plane. As they were floating down, Sergeant First Class Ron Searcey and the men of his platoon were able to orient themselves by the light of Objective Tin, which was burning as a result of the bomb strike. Because both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft would be landing, the Rangers had to bag all of their parachutes before moving off the landing strip. The Rangers were prepared for resistance, but only one enemy soldier appeared. He was killed by several soldiers from Company C. Because they had performed numerous rehearsals, the Rangers were able to assemble, clear Objective Iron, and establish the pre-planned blocking positions quickly.²

The mission of the two platoons from Company C was to clear Objective Cobalt — the walled compound on the objective. Although the AC-130 had directed fire against the compound, damage was minimal. Concrete walls and roofs reinforced with rebar had absorbed the blasts, or the shells had simply penetrated the ceilings, leaving only a hole. The same was

En route to the drop, Rangers on each chalk recited the Ranger Creed. Subsequent actions proved that they indeed exemplified the creed: ‘Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission.’

aircraft; and to assess the capabilities of the airstrip for future operations.¹

Objective Rhino, located southwest of Kandahar, consisted of four separate objectives: Tin, Iron, Copper and Cobalt. B-1 bombers dropped 2,000-pound bombs that were guided by the global positioning system on Objective Tin, followed by fire support from AC-130s. Initial reports indicated that 11 enemy soldiers had been killed and nine had been seen running away. The aircrew identified no

true in the case of the towers. As Rangers moved toward Objective Cobalt, a loudspeaker team from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion broadcast tapes in three languages to encourage enemy soldiers to surrender. The Americans did not know that the compound was empty. Pre-assault fire had breached the wall, giving the Rangers an entry point into the area. The Rangers moved quickly to the specific target buildings and the towers that were to be cleared. Clearing the buildings proved to be a more difficult and time-consuming process than had been anticipated: Many of the locked steel doors could be opened only by multiple shotgun blasts or demolition charges.³

Fourteen minutes after Company C(-) had begun to clear the compound, an MC-130 carrying medical personnel arrived, and doctors began to treat two soldiers who had been injured during the jump. Six minutes later, a flight of helicopters that were participating in another operation arrived to be rearmed and refueled. While they were being serviced, orbiting AC-130s destroyed enemy vehicles and personnel that were moving toward the area. Meanwhile, members of a U.S. Air Force special-tactics squadron were surveying the DLS to determine its ability to accommodate larger aircraft.

Upon completion of the rearming and refueling operations, the helicopters departed and the Rangers who had been clearing Cobalt began to collapse toward the MC-130s that had been refueling the helicopters. The last MC-130 departed five hours and 24 minutes after the airborne assault had begun.⁴

“Rangers Lead the Way,” and the 75th Rangers led the way in accomplishing every objective assigned. Several factors contributed to the success of the Rangers. Accurate intelligence allowed them to conduct detailed rehearsals. The interior construction of the buildings on Objective Cobalt, however, caused the clearing operation to take longer than had been anticipated. Firepower provided by on-station AC-130s prevented enemy forces from interfering with the operation. The actions of the departure airfield control party — ensuring that fixed-wing aircraft taxied and parked where there would be no possibility of collision — were critical to overall success. As the helicopters arrived,

controllers smoothly directed them to the awaiting refuelers. Finally, each Ranger performed superbly.

En route to the drop, Rangers on each chalk recited the Ranger Creed. Subsequent actions proved that they indeed exemplified the creed: “Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission.”⁵ In addition to accomplishing their assigned mission, the Rangers proved that American military forces could strike swiftly, silently, with deadly force, at night. Ranger fortitude, technology and training combined to demonstrate to the Taliban and to al-Qaeda that there are no safe havens.

On Nov. 25, 2001, U.S. Marines occupied the site of the Ranger assault and designated their new facility Camp Rhino.⁶ ✕

Notes:

¹ “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 2001” (Masirah Island, Oman: 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 25 October 2001), 1; “The 75th Ranger Regiment: Combat Operations in Southern Afghanistan in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” briefing prepared by the 75th Ranger Regiment, n.d.

² 1st Lieutenant Kenneth Brown (pseudonym), Specialist Martin Pasquez (pseudonym), Sergeant First Class Ron Searcey (pseudonym) and Sergeant Thomas Evans (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

³ Staff Sergeant James Turner (pseudonym), Company B, 9th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, interview by author, 3 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Sergeant First Class Ron Searcey (pseudonym), Captain Stanley Davis (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁴ “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 2001,” 1.

⁵ Captain Sam Crevald (pseudonym), Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Ranger Creed, www.benning.army.mil/rtb/ranger/rggreed.htm.

⁶ Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Grabs Airstrip Near Kandahar, Gains Fixed Base Inside Afghanistan,” *Washington Times*, 27 November 2001, 1.

'We Don't Fail': The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

On Sept. 21, 2001, 10 days after the terrorist attacks on the United States, Company A, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion, received a U.S. Central Command deployment order to provide communications support to the Joint Special Operations Task Force, or JSOTF, that was being established in Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.¹ On Oct. 4, 37 soldiers deployed to the theater; they arrived there Oct. 6 and reported to the J6.²

The 112th is capable of deploying rapidly to establish the long-haul links that allow deployed special-operations forces, or SOF, to communicate with headquarters in Europe and in the United States, and with embassies in neighboring countries. Although the mission in Karshi Kanabad would be a combat mission, it was typical of the missions that the 112th had practiced many times on exercises in the U.S. and abroad. Those exercises had led Company A to develop standard communications deployment packages in order to minimize last-minute predeployment planning.

Upon its arrival in Karshi Kanabad, Company A faced the initial difficulty of determining where to set up its operations. This was a critical decision, because it is a guiding principle of communications that once communications have been established, the communications equipment should not be moved. There were only about 100 people on the ground when Com-

pany A arrived in theater, and there was little knowledge available about which other units might be coming or when.

In addition, the available real estate was littered with trash and discarded Russian equipment, and the soil was contaminated with petroleum, oil and lubricants. As units began to move into the base, some difficulties developed among the communicators from different headquarters and the allocators of real estate. For example, systems that would be used to process top-secret information were supposed to be located near a secure compartmented information facility, or SCIF. When units arrived, however, the SCIF had not been established. When it was established later on, some units had to move their equipment and interrupt their communications.

Company A arrived in theater with one



U.S. Army photo

The 112th Signal Battalion operates at Karshi Kanabad in Uzbekistan.

super-high-frequency satellite hub, a tactical telephone switch, a data-services team, one SCAMPI node capable of providing secure and nonsecure networking, data services and secure telephones, equipment for secure video teleconferencing, and three Special Operations Communication Assemblage, or SOCA, teams capable of providing tactical satellite communications. The 112th was also equipped with about 200 personal computers.

Within 48 hours, the company had installed communications to support the Joint Special Operations Air Component, which had already been established. Minor technical problems and real-estate allocation difficulties that required some equipment to be moved resulted in the SCAMPI not being re-established for about four days. Normally, some of those problems would have been resolved in a predeployment comms exercise. Under the conditions, however, it was not possible for Company A to troubleshoot problems beforehand.³

Once the JSOTF commander arrived, he assigned the 112th the mission of being fully capable by Oct. 13 to support future missions. Captain Steve Marks, who had commanded the company during operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, took it as a challenge that the company would not be the weak link in the execution of future missions. The unit met the challenge, and it was able to establish a secure video teleconferencing link from the theater back to the U.S. Eventually, the unit was executing 10-14 video conferences daily.⁴ These conferences enabled commanders to provide real-time reports and to receive immediate guidance on future operations. The company also arranged for two SOCA teams to deploy to embassies and for one SOCA team to provide communications between a Special Forces detachment at Mazar-e Sharif and its headquarters.

After approximately 100 days, a conventional Army signal battalion replaced Company A at Karshi Kanabad, but that did not end the 112th's involvement in the war against terrorism. In March 2002, the second platoon of the 112th's Company B deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to provide communications to the JSOTF that

was being established there. 2nd Lieutenant Tom Washington, a former enlisted SF soldier, and his platoon immediately appropriated space in a field near the perimeter and went to work. Within 48 hours, Washington's company had completed the links between the JSOTF and the higher headquarters, as Company A had done. In Washington's words, that accomplishment was possible only because "Incredible guys are running these systems." The next month, soldiers from the first platoon established communications in Kabul between the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and the JSOTF. The platoon also deployed three SOCA teams to support forward-operations bases in Khowst, Kandahar and Shkin.⁵

Operation Enduring Freedom validated the concept that a rapidly deployable signal battalion that is dedicated to supporting SOF is essential to the accomplishment of special-operations missions. Soldiers of the 112th have developed the attitude of the customers they serve. First Sergeant Martin Masterson of Company A summed up that attitude: "We don't fail; we just don't fail."⁶ ❧

Notes:

¹ United States Central Command Deployment Order, 19 September 2002.

² Briefing, Company A, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion, January 2002, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

³ Captain Steve Marks (pseudonym), Company A, 112th Signal Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁴ First Sergeant Martin Masterson (pseudonym), Company A, 112th Signal Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁵ 2nd Lieutenant Tom Washington (pseudonym), 2nd Platoon, Company B, 112th Signal Battalion, interview by author, 6 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁶ Masterson interview.

Meeting the 'G-Chief': ODA 595

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

As the sun rose Oct. 19, 2001, in the Dari-a-Souf valley in northern Afghanistan, Captain Mike Nash waited to meet his new Afghan ally.¹ General Abdul Rashid Dostum was the commander of the largest armed faction of the Northern Alliance. An ethnic Uzbek and former Soviet tank officer, Dostum had been fighting the Taliban in the canyons of the “Valley of the River of Caves” for years. He had been described to Nash in intelligence reports as a “ruthless warlord,” who would likely be unreceptive to Americans and might even attempt to kill him at their first meeting.

Nash and the 11 other men of U.S. Army

Special Forces A-detachment 595 had arrived only a few hours earlier, flown in during the night by the crew of an MH-47E Chinook helicopter from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Relying on their multi-mode radar, the pilots had brought the SF soldiers over mountains higher than the Rockies and had flown them through a nighttime dust storm that forced back two MH-60 escorts. To reach the detachment’s objective, the Chinook had to conduct an aerial refueling while flying at 110 knots only 300 feet above the ground, in the moonless dark.

From the time of their arrival until 5 a.m.,



Special Forces soldiers from A-detachment 595 ride into battle with Afghan warriors.

U.S. Army photo

Nash, his executive officer and his team sergeant received a complete intelligence update. The ominous personality profile of Dostum that Nash had received in Uzbekistan was recast during the update. Dostum was now described as a smart, pragmatic fighter who was eager for the American soldiers to join him.

At 9 a.m., an advance security party of 30 Afghan horsemen, armed with AK-47 assault rifles, PK machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, rode into the American base camp. Dostum soon followed, also on horseback, guarded by 20 more heavily armed riders.

Dostum, Nash and two other men, one of them a translator, sat on carpets on the hillside. They drank a cup of hot “shai” (Afghan tea) and made their initial plans.² Nash sized up the Afghan general — much bigger than the average Afghan, he thought. Approximately six-foot-two and around 230 pounds, Dostum was decidedly the man in charge. Deep-voiced, with close-cropped gray hair and a short beard, Dostum looked Nash in the eye as he spoke. He shook hands frequently, in a confident, friendly way. Dostum said that he had enough horses to take six Americans with him to his headquarters several hours’ ride to the west, and he announced that he would be leaving in 15 minutes. Mules would bring their rucksacks later, he assured the Americans. Nash and his executive officer quickly chose the men for his “split team.” He left his warrant officer and the other half of his detachment behind to establish a base camp and to organize the force’s logistics with Dostum’s supply officer.

It was a coincidence that the captain chosen to ride with Dostum was the best horseman in the 5th SF Group. The lean, sandy-haired Nash was raised in north central Kansas on his parents’ cattle ranch, and he competed in collegiate rodeo in calf-roping while earning a degree in biology at Kansas State. Detachment 595 had initially been sent to Uzbekistan on a different assignment, which had subsequently been cancelled. As a result, the team was left without a mission until it was selected to support General Dostum’s anti-Taliban force. Intelligence staffs had not had the time to

discern that Dostum’s 2,000 troops were horse-mounted cavalymen, and in the crash planning sessions, no one noted that Nash had grown up as a cowboy.

As Dostum’s entourage moved up a rocky trail, Nash took measure of the SF team’s mounts. They were “tough little mountain ponies,” he noted, “like American mustangs from out West.” He thought the saddles were too small for American soldiers. The stirrups were also short and nonadjustable, forcing the team members to ride with their knees uncomfortably bent. The real problem, he thought, would occur if anyone were to fall

Approximately six-foot-two and weighing around 230 pounds, Dostum was decidedly the man in charge. Deep-voiced, with close-cropped gray hair and a short beard, Dostum looked Nash in the eye as he spoke. He shook hands frequently, in a confident, friendly way.

from his horse on the narrow mountain trails. Nash called out the first of several ad hoc “horse SOPs” (standard operating procedures): “Keep your feet light in the stirrups,” he ordered. Should anyone be thrown by a runaway mount with his foot caught in a stirrup, he added, the nearest man must shoot the horse dead. “You’ll be killed if you’re dragged on this rocky ground,” he warned his team.

Two days later, on Oct. 21, Dostum led Nash and his team from his mountain headquarters camp to the front lines, where Nash proposed to begin aerial bombardment of the Taliban forces. Oddly, Nash noticed, Dostum seemed exceedingly protective of him and his fellow Americans. Besides surrounding them with his personal bodyguards, Dostum would not allow the Americans to approach closer than eight kilometers from the Taliban front lines.

Nash’s team used its global-positioning-satellite receiver to establish its position, and then through the brownish haze, team members plotted the azimuth and direction to a far-off enemy bunker. A lone B-52

Special Forces soldiers from A-detachment 595 direct airstrikes in northern Afghanistan.



U.S. Army photo

bomber turned 20-minute-long racetracks in the sky 20,000 feet overhead, dropping a single bomb on each pass.

The first bomb turned out to be the one that landed closest to the target. Subsequent adjustments moved the strike of the bombs a kilometer or more farther away, and in a different direction each time. Nash even saw Taliban troops gather around to inspect one of the bomb craters with impunity. Disappointed with the results, Nash released the B-52 after its sixth pass. Dostum, however, was buoyant. The translator explained, “You made an aircraft appear and drop bombs. General Dostum is very happy.”

With each bomb that fell, rapport improved between Dostum and his commanders and the U.S. SF soldiers. Nevertheless, to improve the effectiveness of further bombing, Nash insisted to Dostum that he and his men be allowed to move closer to the front. Dostum objected. He told Nash that he was certain that if any American were to be killed, the U.S. government would withdraw all Americans from Afghanistan.

Eventually, through discussions at commanders’ meetings and through the personal example of Americans under fire, Nash convinced the general that he did not need to fear an American withdrawal. When Dostum began his “big push” Nov. 5,

Nash and his men were at the forward edge of the assault, riding with the attack force and guiding precision bomb strikes that would drive the Taliban from the Dari-a-Souf valley for the first time in five years. ✂

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp earned his Ph.D. in history at Harvard University. He previously served as an officer in Special Forces, Ranger, airborne, armored cavalry and artillery units stateside and overseas, and he was an instructor at West Point. He earned his Combat Infantryman Badge as a brigade adviser during the Salvadoran civil war.

Notes:

¹ This article is based on an interview with Captain Mike Nash (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, Fort Campbell, Ky., by the author, 26 March 2002. Dari-a-Souf is pronounced “DAH-ree-ah SOOF.”

² Shai is pronounced “shy.”

'We Support to the Utmost': The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Military theorist Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini defined logistics as "the art of moving armies."¹ Since its reactivation in 1987, the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion has become expert in the art of providing logistics support to special-operations soldiers who are deployed on exercises and missions worldwide.

In October 2001, elements of Company A, the 528th's forward-support company, again deployed to support special-operations soldiers. On this occasion, however, the soldiers were not on an exercise, but were instead fighting the war on terrorism. Because of considerations of operations security, or OPSEC, the 528th did not receive complete information about where it would deploy or exactly what its mission would be. However, the unit's experience

from numerous exercises with special-operations forces enabled commanders and section leaders to begin planning for a deployment of an unspecified period of time.²

The 528th conducted initial coordination with United States Special Operations Command to familiarize the command with the 528th's capabilities. The 528th also coordinated with the 5th Special Forces Group to reconfirm the SF group's support requirements. Again, OPSEC prevented the 528th from being informed that it would be supporting a bare-base operation and from coordinating directly with the 10th Mountain Division, which would provide base security.

The 528th's mission would be to establish a ration point and a warehouse for repair parts, to provide office supplies and clothing for deployed special-operations forces, and to establish a fuel point. Shortly before departure, the 528th's leaders were informed they would deploy to Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, and that there would be no conventional support units to assist the 528th once it was in country.³ The unit also received attachments to perform mortuary, medical and veterinary services. Both the company staff and the battalion staff had to constantly adjust the deployment package, which was based not on the anticipated requirements, but on the number of aircraft that would be available to deploy the force.



U.S. Army photo

Members of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion assemble racks at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan.

Upon its arrival in theater, the unit immediately coordinated with the advance party from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or SOAR, and an Air Force colonel from the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North for the allocation of the unit's real estate. Previous exercises had revealed the capabilities of the Air Force base-support package, and that knowledge enabled the 528th to tailor its support accordingly. Previous exercises had also produced close cooperation with other services' support forces, such as between Army and Air Force cooks. Staff Sergeant Manual Parsons, a 528th food-service specialist, took the responsibility for running the dining

arrived daily by airlift.

The 528th's reputation as a "can do" unit quickly spread throughout the camp. Soon, units that had deployed with little or no meals ready-to-eat, water, sleeping bags or winter clothing learned that the 528th would not turn away soldiers who needed support. Although the mission of the 528th is to support special-operations units, the battalion became, in essence, an area-support unit. The only item that the unit tended to hoard was toilet paper, which was in very short supply. Leaders also had not anticipated the tremendous need for office supplies, initial stocks of which soon ran low. The necessity of stocking deployment containers with more of those items is a lesson learned.

Although some sections of the 528th had established relations with other SOF units during exercises, not all of them had. For example, the warehouse section had never met the S4 sections of either the 160th SOAR or the 5th SF Group. This lack of familiarity could have been detrimental except for the message that the 528th made clear: It was supporting soldiers who were conducting dangerous operations. Staff Sergeant Celeste Holmes, the warehouse supervisor who would soon depart for Officer Candidate School, understood how critical the mission was. "We won't turn away a shooter," she said.⁵

Essential to the success of the support mission was the professionalism of the junior NCOs. Those soldiers, several of whom had 8-10 years of experience in the battalion, were accustomed to deploying and directing a team to support special-operations units. They were proficient in taking the initiative, in thinking on their feet, and in taking responsibility for their actions. It was the NCOs who determined what was needed, and their decisions allowed the unit to operate for two weeks in theater without resupply. They understood how important their mission was at the national level.

"We had little or no guidance, but lots of experience," commented 1st Lieutenant Michael Bridgewater.⁶ OPSEC, country clearances, speed and the lack of environmental information forced the 528th to rely

The 528th's reputation as a 'can do' unit quickly spread throughout the camp. Soon, units that had deployed with little or no meals ready-to-eat, water, sleeping bags or winter clothing learned that the 528th would not turn away soldiers who needed support. Although the mission of the 528th is to support special-operations units, the battalion became, in essence, an area-support unit.

facility as a 24-hour operation.⁴ Soldiers encountered such unforeseen difficulties as contaminated soil, trash dumps, remnants of Soviet equipment, and an occasional cobra emerging from the latrines — that is, after latrines were constructed.

A combat-arms soldier's most valuable tools are his weapon and his ammunition. 528th soldiers quickly learned that their most valuable tools were lumber and a forklift. Fortunately, Company A had deployed with plywood and other lumber that could be turned into floors and latrines. The forklift operator became one of the most sought-after soldiers on the entire installation. Forklift operators moved mountains of abandoned equipment and trash to make room to develop Camp Stronghold Freedom. They moved the containers that became the warehouse, and they moved the pallets of equipment that

on the experience it had gained from previous exercises. Having the ability to anticipate requirements enabled the unit to deploy with the items needed to assist in the establishment of the base camp, to construct facilities, and to provide logistics support to units based at the camp.

In early December 2001, most of the 528th's Company A redeployed to Fort Bragg. Its mission in Afghanistan was assumed by the 507th Corps Support Command. Operation Enduring Freedom validated the operational concept that had led to the activation of the battalion — a unit capable of deploying quickly, operating independently and supporting effectively the Army's special-operations forces.

There is no greater compliment than one given by one's peers. The true measure of how well the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion accomplished its mission was best captured by Staff Sergeant Timothy Matthews from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group: "The 528th is a class act."⁷ ❧❧

author, 4 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Notes:

¹ Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), 69.

² Captain Samuel Sims (pseudonym), Headquarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 6 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U. S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

³ "After Action Review for Operation Enduring Freedom" (Fort Bragg, N.C.: Alpha Forward Support Company, 528th Support Battalion, 13 March 2002), 1.

⁴ Staff Sergeant Manuel Parsons (pseudonym), Headquarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁵ Staff Sergeant Celeste Holmes (pseudonym), Headquarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁶ 1st Lieutenant Michael Bridgewater (pseudonym), Company A, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 6 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁷ Staff Sergeant Timothy Matthews (pseudonym), Headquarters and Service Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, interview by

Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: The Staff of the 3/5th SF Group

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

When 300 soldiers of the al-Qaeda surrendered near the city of Mazar-e Sharif Nov. 24, 2001, neither the chiefs of the Northern Alliance nor their American advisers anticipated an uprising that would become one of the major battles of the war in Afghanistan.



U.S. Army photo

U.S. Special Forces soldiers survey the damage to the Qala-i Jangi fortress

The mass surrender seemed to be more good news for the two dozen United States Special Forces soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, who staffed Forward

Operating Base, or FOB, 53.¹ FOB 53, which was based in Mazar-e Sharif's five-story Turkish School, was coordinating the consolidation of the newly-liberated city. The FOB commander was away, monitoring the Northern Alliance's encirclement of Konduz, a full day's drive to the east.

Late on the afternoon of Nov. 24, trucks carrying the 300 al-Qaeda prisoners arrived at the 18th-century fortress of Qala-i Jangi, 10 kilometers west of Mazar, where the prisoners were interned under the guard of about 100 troops of the Northern Alliance.

Built of adobe-style mud bricks, Qala-i Jangi dominated the local landscape. More than 300 meters in diameter, Qala-i Jangi was of the style known as Vaubanian — built with moats, ramparts, scarps and counterscarps and parapets. Its walls, 10 meters high and 15 meters thick, were topped with hundreds of firing ports. During the 20th century, the fortress had served the Royal Afghan Army, the Soviet Red Army, the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. General Abdul Rashid Dostum had reclaimed it as his military headquarters only two weeks before, and U.S. Army SF teams had briefly stayed inside the fortress before moving to the cleaner and more spacious Turkish School, which was deserted except for its caretaker and a few instructors.

That night, the FOB received a report of trouble with the prisoners at Qala-i Jangi: An al-Qaeda prisoner had killed two



U.S. Army photo

A view of the breach in the north wall of the Qala-i Jangi fortress. The breach was created by an errant U.S. Air Force bomb on Nov. 26, 2001.

guards and himself with a concealed hand grenade. The next morning, the FOB received news of another suicide-by-grenade that had killed three prisoners.

At 1:45 p.m. Nov. 25, Joint Special Operations Task Force-North, located at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, radioed FOB 53 that the prisoners at Qala-i Jangi had killed two Americans. The next report from JSOTF-North was that one American had been wounded and that another was trapped inside the fortress. Neither report was wholly correct.

As quickly as possible, the FOB operations officer formed an ad hoc rescue force. A squad of British troops with a U.S. Navy attachment that had been operating in the Mazar-e Sharif area formed the rescue force's assault element. Two U.S. Air Force intelligence officers, an Afghan interpreter, the SF battalion's surgeon, and two SF NCOs joined the rescue force to serve as medics, radiomen and translators.

The rescue force arrived at the main gate of Qala-i Jangi to the sounds of steady gunfire and explosions. Hiding inside the fortress headquarters in the north wall, the first American radioed that the prisoners had exploded a bomb, overpowered their guards and seized control of the southern half of the fortress. He added that he had last seen the second American in hand-to-hand combat with a swarm of al-Qaeda prisoners, and that he did not believe that the captured American was still alive. The first American later escaped over the fortress's north wall.

The al-Qaeda prisoners had ransacked

an armory in the southern compound, and they were now as well-armed as the Alliance forces who were trying to contain them inside the fortress. From the ramparts of the fort, the British squad poured machine-gun fire into the south compound. The Americans directed aerial bombing against the prisoners' positions, while only 150 meters away, Northern Alliance troops struggled to contain the al-Qaeda. As darkness gathered, the rescue force withdrew to the Turkish School to plan the next day's operations. Throughout the night, they heard gunfire and explosions coming from the fortress.

On Nov. 26, the rescue force, reinforced by a platoon of infantrymen from the 10th Mountain Division and by additional SF soldiers, returned to the fortress to continue the aerial bombardment that would support ground assaults by the Northern Alliance. The force was almost wiped out when an errant 2,000-pound bomb pulverized a section of the massive fortress wall. Eight American and British troops were wounded, and several Afghans were killed. That night, two AC-130 Spectre gunships orbited over Qala-i Jangi, raking the southern compound with fire from 40- and 105-mm cannon. Their last rounds detonated a hidden munitions dump, shaking the entire fortress and hurling artillery shells over the walls, while burning rockets shot in all directions. From nearly 20 kilometers away, FOB members on the roof of the Turkish School watched the ammo dump blaze fiercely all night.

On the third day of the uprising, Alliance

troops fought their way into the southern compound with the support of fire from tanks. Room-to-room fighting precluded the use of airstrikes. The next morning, pockets of al-Qaeda were still holding out, but a squad of Alliance soldiers found the second American's body and delivered him to the Anglo-American rescue force in the northern compound. The body was transported to the Mazar-e Sharif airfield that evening, for a flight to Uzbekistan.

As the rotors of the MH-47 helicopter

from within. The al-Qaeda had not anticipated that the prisoners would be interned outside the city, or that the Alliance soldiers, supported by American and British forces and airstrikes, would be able to contain and then defeat the uprising at Qala-i Jangi. ✕

Notes:

¹ This article is based on interviews with members of Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, Fort Campbell, Ky., by the author, 22-23 March 2002.

² The American John Walker Lindh was in this group of recaptured prisoners, but he did not identify himself until a day later, when he was interned at Shebergan Prison, west of Mazar-e Sharif.



U.S. Army photo

Dead al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters litter the ground as Afghan soldiers and members of the 5th SF Group gather inside the fortress of Qala-i Jangi after four days of fighting.

turned, the U.S. and British soldiers held a brief service and rendered military honors to their fallen comrade. An SF sergeant major produced an American flag that he had carried in Iraq during the Gulf War and had brought to Afghanistan. Unable to drape it over the body because of the rotor wash, he handed the folded flag to the two officers who would escort the body on its journey home, so that they could present it to the American's family.

The next day, Nov. 29, the last pocket of al-Qaeda resistance in Qala-i Jangi surrendered. The 86 holdouts were the only survivors of the 300 who had entered the fortress six days before.² Intelligence reports later revealed that the mass surrender had been a deception to get the al-Qaeda troops inside Mazar-e Sharif, so that they could retake the district capital

'Of Vital Importance': The 4th PSYOP Group

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

In 1961, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace wrote: "The psychological warfare program is of vital importance to national security and defense."¹ Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, that importance became evident as the 4th Psychological Operations Group, or 4th POG, began planning for anticipated psychological operations, or PSYOP, in Afghanistan. The mission would be to provide operational and tactical level PSYOP that would undermine the terrorists and separate them from their support systems.

Although teams from the 4th POG are constantly deployed in the United States Central Command, or USCENTCOM, region, there were no PSYOP teams focused on Afghanistan at the time of the terrorist attacks. But within weeks, PSYOP teams were ready to deploy into the specific area of operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF.

The 8th PSYOP Battalion established a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, or JPOTF, for all PSYOP within the area of operations. Different elements of the 4th POG, as well as mobilized Army Reservists, provided tactical PSYOP forces to augment special-operations forces, or SOF, and conventional forces. These PSYOP elements deployed not only to Afghanistan, but also to other forward areas. PSYOP elements deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to support the debriefing of captured terrorists and to the Philip-

pinas in support of OEF-Philippines and the Country Team. Tactical PSYOP forces also supported TF 1-187 during Operation Anaconda in the Shah-i Khot region.

All PSYOP plans and programs required policy-level approval from both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD-SO/LIC, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or USD-P. Once the overarching plans and programs were approved, a prototype of each individual PSYOP product was sent to the commander in chief of USCENTCOM for approval. The product was then submitted to ASD-SO/LIC for policy review. Once it was approved, it was released for dissemination.²

If the product was a digital radio program or a video program, it was sent into theater by satellite for local broadcast. Once printed products received final approval, they could be printed at Fort Bragg or they could be transmitted digitally to a forward-deployed print facility for production. So far, approximately 135 soldiers — print personnel, staff augmentees and a tactical PSYOP company — have been mobilized from the Army Reserve to assist in support of OEF.

Critical to PSYOP planning is target-audience analysis, which is provided by civilian analysts in the regionally oriented strategic-studies detachments of the 4th POG's Research and Analysis Division. These cultural experts, most of whom hold

Ph.D.s, use the extensive research resources and contacts at their disposal to develop themes and to identify potentially effective target audiences. For example, hard-core al-Qaeda or Taliban members might not be affected by a PSYOP campaign, whereas villagers who have suffered at the hands of the repressive regime would be viable targets. Included in the supporting PSYOP plan developed by the JPOTF were a number of themes, among them ones that sought to encourage support for the Partnership of Nations forces; undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda; emphasize the inevitability of Taliban/al-Qaeda defeat; rally support for the Afghan Interim Authority; promote the capture of Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders by offering rewards; and strengthen Afghan-U.S. friendship. Once the plan and

leaflets informed the people which channels to tune to for U.S. PSYOP-produced programs.³ Initially, Commando Solo was able to broadcast only 10 hours a day, but once Special Operations Media Systems Broadcast, or SOMS-B, radio stations were established in Afghanistan, programs could be broadcast 24 hours a day.

Ensuring an adequate supply of native linguists has been a challenging problem. Because of the huge volume of work, the 4th POG had to augment its Pashto and Dari speakers by hiring contract linguists who could translate proposed leaflets and radio programs and could serve as radio announcers. The Army has the only comprehensive military PSYOP capability and thus must perform the lion's share of the work in executing a PSYOP plan. Air Force capabilities are limited, but they include an important broadcast platform (Commando Solo aircraft) and the means of delivering leaflets on target. The Navy has one shipboard system and one land-based system, neither of which was available for Operation Enduring Freedom.⁴

The airborne assault on the airstrip southwest of Kandahar by the Rangers was filmed by a combat camera team. Two tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams also accompanied the Rangers on the jump. Immediately following the operation, the video footage was turned over to PSYOP forces in theater, who used their digital video distribution system to send it to the 4th POG headquarters at Fort Bragg. From Fort Bragg, it was immediately transmitted to Washington, where it was reviewed and then released to the national media. Digital PSYOP technology made it possible for the major news networks to show the footage shortly after it had been recorded.⁵

Measuring the overall effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign presents a challenge because it is difficult to precisely ascertain the relationship between a leaflet or a radio program and the actions taken by an individual or a group. Some effect measurements are based on anecdotal evidence. For example, Afghans reported that they enjoyed the radio programs because they broadcast music, and it was the first time the Afghans had been permitted to

Intelligence sources reported that the PSYOP campaign was a key factor in the surrender of Konduz. Additional feedback indicated that PSYOP leaflets and radio broadcasts were important in leading the Afghan population to withdraw its support from the Taliban and especially from al-Qaeda.

themes were completed, specific products were developed. The entire process draws heavily on the knowledge, analytical acuity, and cultural empathy of Ph.D.-level area experts as well as military PSYOP specialists.

Within a few weeks after Sept. 11, two liaison officers deployed with the 5th Special Forces Group; they were soon followed by tactical PSYOP forces, a deployable print center, and a satellite downlink for radio programs. In a matter of a few months, more than 75 million leaflets were dropped from B-52s and C-130s, more than 3,000 hours of radio programs were broadcast by Commando Solo, and more than 7,500 hand-held radios were distributed by air drop and by tactical PSYOP teams operating with SF A-detachments. Certain

hear music in six years. The broadcast music was selected by POG area experts; changes in the music programming were made based on feedback provided by the PSYOP teams accompanying the SF A-detachments. Intelligence sources reported that the PSYOP campaign was a key factor in the surrender of Konduz. Additional feedback indicated that PSYOP leaflets and radio broadcasts were important in leading the Afghan population to withdraw its support from the Taliban and from al-Qaeda.⁶

The 4th POG employs personnel from the rank of colonel to that of private; their education levels vary from high-school graduate to Ph.D. The PSYOP products in Afghanistan are reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; they are distributed by U.S. Air Force aircraft; they are received by people living in a country that has for years been dominated by foreign invaders and oppressive rulers; and they are scrutinized by the American media.

Major Henry Blackaby, commander of a psychological development company, recognizes the seriousness of the PSYOP campaign and the level of scrutiny that it receives. Leaflets and radio broadcasts are a critical element in Operation Enduring Freedom. All of the links in the chain are important, but according to Blackaby, "The real heroes are the young troops who develop the products."⁷

Following World War II, General Dwight Eisenhower stated, "The exact contribution of psychological warfare toward the final victory cannot, of course, be measured." He added, "However, I am convinced that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to resist."⁸ There is reason to believe that Eisenhower's assessment will be equally valid when the final history of Operation Enduring Freedom is written. ✂

1951, Record Group 319, National Archives.

² Dr. Darren Curtis, Strategic Studies Detachment, 4th POG, interview by author, 15 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., transcript, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

³ Keith B. Richburg and William Branigin, "U.S. Bombs Aid Rebels in North; Propaganda Campaign Intensifies," *Washington Post*, 8 November 2001, 13.

⁴ Andrea Stone, "Soldiers Deploy on Mental Terrain," *USA Today*, 3 October 2001, 7.

⁵ Staff Sergeant James Turner (pseudonym), Company B, 9th Battalion, 4th POG, interview by author, 3 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁶ Curtis interview.

⁷ Major Henry Blackaby (pseudonym), Psychological Development Company, 8th Battalion, 4th POG, interview by author, 17 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁸ Letter, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western European Campaign," October 1945, 1, Record Group 319, National Archives.

Notes:

¹ Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Importance of Army-Wide Support of the Psychological Warfare Programs, 2 February

'Have Tools, Will Travel': Company D, 109th Aviation Battalion

by James A. Schroder

The initial success of the war on terrorism depended heavily upon the availability of assets from Army Special Operations Aviation, or ARSOA — the organization that could infiltrate special-operations forces throughout Afghanistan.

Helicopter maintenance was key to that success, and maintenance requires a large amount of resources — especially personnel. To meet the great demand for aviation

assets, ARSOA sought help from the Army National Guard. Company D, 109th Aviation, an aviation intermediate maintenance, or AVIM, company that is capable of providing maintenance expertise for the various models of helicopters organic

to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, was uniquely suited to augment the 160th's maintenance resources.

The maintenance company, composed of personnel from Nebraska and Iowa under the direction of Major Martin Jackson, a former CH-46 pilot in the Marine Corps and a veteran of the Gulf War, had completed a three-week annual-training rotation in Germany Sept. 15, 2001. During the weekend of Oct. 20, while the unit was con-

ducting its monthly drill, Jackson informed the unit's personnel to be prepared for a probable activation and to make arrangements for deployment. The call came the following week, and the unit reported to the 160th's facilities at Fort Campbell, Ky., and at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga., Nov. 12.

Company D's relationship with the 160th SOAR was a new one.¹ Although the 109th was being activated for the first time in more than 30 years, extensive training had left the company well-prepared. The unit's readiness rating was more than 90 percent for people and equipment, a notable achievement in the National Guard.

To prevent any delay in delivering urgently needed mechanics, the 160th accepted full responsibility for the administrative requirements of activating the National Guard unit. The 109th's post-mobilization training would be performed as time permitted. Major Jackson and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Simpson,² the SOAR's executive officer, worked together to develop a pioneering plan that would capitalize on the experience and the capabilities of Company D, which consisted of mechanics experienced at working on Chinooks, Blackhawks and Kiowas. Although doctrine calls for an AVIM company to remain separate from its supported unit, the newly established plan divided Company D's personnel into four contact teams that were assigned to the 160th's 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions and to the regiment's training company.

Each contact team rapidly assimilated



U.S. Army photo

Mechanics from Company D, 109th Aviation, work on helicopters of the 160th SOAR at Fort Campbell, Ky.

the fast pace of the 160th's maintenance sections. Although they required some familiarization and training on special-operations helicopters, the 109th mechanics brought their talent and years of experience to the maintenance effort, and they promptly established credibility. Within a month, the Company D mechanics were working long hours, on multiple shifts, side by side with their Night Stalker contemporaries. This teamwork enabled the 160th and the 109th to complete helicopter phase maintenance in as few as 28 days, a remarkable feat. Both the National Guard and SOAR personnel benefited from the relationship: The experienced Guard members passed their knowledge to the younger mechanics, and the SOAR personnel shared their knowledge of special-operations aircraft with the Guard members.

Company D was also integrated into Green Platoon, the 160th SOAR's training-and-selection course. More than 60 soldiers from Company D completed the course within the first six months of their activation. Their accomplishment further increased the credibility of the Guard members. Green Platoon is a prerequisite for deployment overseas, and the graduates provided a source of mechanics for potential overseas deployment. So far, approximately 30 mechanics of the 109th have deployed overseas to Afghanistan, Korea or the Philippines. One soldier from the 109th who had a background in law-enforcement excelled in the course and was selected to be an instructor because of his special background and capabilities.

This working association was unique in another respect. Company D arrived with 14 female mechanics, an unfamiliar sight for the 160th's mechanics. Female soldiers are precluded by regulation from being assigned to active-duty special-operations aviation units as mechanics or as crew members. The 14 female mechanics in the 109th had the exclusive opportunity to serve in a unit that is outside the reach of their active-duty counterparts.

The mutually beneficial association between the 160th SOAR and Company D, 109th Aviation, greatly contributed to the enormous helicopter maintenance effort.



U.S. Army photo

Members of Company D, 109th Aviation, negotiate obstacles during training with the 160th's Green Platoon.

Success was achieved as a direct result of pioneering ideas, highly competent personnel, specialized training and a commitment to maintenance. The Guard soldiers demonstrated the same work ethic and dedication to mission accomplishment that the Night Stalkers do, and they provided continuity in the maintenance sections during the rotation of 160th personnel overseas. They enthusiastically attended Green Platoon and energetically accepted all training. The 160th SOAR was able to meet the high demand for its helicopters because of its joint enterprise with Company D. ✕

James A. Schroder earned his MBA at Murray State University. He previously served as an NCO and as a warrant officer in Special Forces, military intelligence and aviation units stateside and overseas, and he completed Ranger training and Russian language training. He earned two Air Medals piloting CH-47D Chinook helicopters in the Gulf War, and he piloted MH-47Es for seven years as a member of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Notes:

¹ This article is based on an interview with Major Martin Jackson (pseudonym), commander of Company D, 109th Aviation Battalion, by the author and Dr. Chuck Briscoe, 24 April 2002, at Fort Campbell, Ky.

² "Edward Simpson" is a pseudonym.

The Campaign in Transition: From Conventional to Unconventional War

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

Unexpectedly, the war in Afghanistan accelerated ahead of the estimated timetable prepared by the staffs of the United States Central Command and its special-operations units.

As had been planned, U.S. Army Special Forces detachments flew into Afghanistan beginning in October 2001. The winter was to have been a “Valley Forge” experience for the supposedly beleaguered Afghan Northern Alliance. SF detachments were to spend those cold, snowy months in the valleys of the rugged Hindu Kush, drilling the loose collection of warrior bands into a well-trained and well-equipped army. The commander of the 5th Special Forces Group would employ his unit as Joint Special Operations Task Force-North to carry out this effort. He hoped that one of the northern towns, maybe two, might be taken from the enemy before the cold forced the traditional winter hiatus from military operations.

Around April or May 2002, this new anti-Taliban army was to begin a spring offensive to secure the northern tier of Afghan cities. The offensive would also open roads into Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Those roads would facilitate the movement of supplies overland and possibly facilitate the entrance of U.S. combat divisions into Afghanistan. Then, perhaps later that year, a general offensive toward Kabul could be launched. Operations in the southern region around Kandahar were thought to be problematic. Strong anti-Taliban leaders had not yet been identified among the ethnic Pash-

tuns who constitute the majority of the Afghan population below Kabul. But events would soon outstrip these assumptions.

In both the north and the center of Afghanistan, the local warlords went on the offensive as soon as the first SF troops stepped off their helicopters to join them. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Northern Alliance was ready to begin conventional-style maneuver warfare against its Taliban adversaries. With the support of aerial bombing and other aid, including air-dropped arms and ammunition, the Northern Alliance took the initiative — sometimes on their own, sometimes prompted by their new American advisers.¹ Deft U.S. diplomatic maneuvering garnered bases for American and coalition forces in Pakistan and in Uzbekistan, and simultaneously isolated the Taliban from their former sources of money and aid.

In rapid succession, city after city fell to the Northern Alliance. First, the Alliance took Mazar-e Sharif, the second largest city in Afghanistan, on Nov. 10. The towns of Bamian in the center, Taloqan in the north, and Herat in the west surrendered within days, and Konduz was besieged. Then on Nov. 13, in a single day, Northern Alliance forces advanced from the trenchlines at Bagram into Kabul, which had been hurriedly abandoned by the Taliban. The next day, Jalalabad fell. Just before Thanksgiving, the Taliban forces at Konduz capitulated.

On Thanksgiving Day, the first major U.S. conventional ground forces arrived in

Afghanistan. Two U.S. Marine battalions occupied a dirt airstrip in the desert 80 kilometers from Kandahar, where a Ranger task force had conducted a parachute raid in October. The Marines relocated three weeks later to the Kandahar airport, which had been captured Dec. 1 by Pashtun forces and U.S. SF troops.

In the south, two anti-Taliban Pashtun leaders finally emerged. Aided by SF teams, they marched their forces toward Kandahar, the “spiritual capital of the Taliban movement.” One of those two men was Hamid Karzai, who was chosen to head the Afghan Interim Authority at the Bonn Conference Dec. 3. He narrowly escaped being killed by an errant U.S. Air Force guided bomb two days later, as his forces battled the Taliban on the northern approach to Kandahar. Gul Agha Sherzai’s Pashtuns, attacking up the southern route, won the race to Kandahar Dec. 7. Every major Afghan city and town was now liberated from Taliban control.

American and allied Afghan forces destroyed the entire Taliban government and army in Afghanistan in two months. Some observers had predicted that the campaign might take two years.²

The focus of the Afghan war now shifted to the east, along the Pakistan border. While thousands of Taliban soldiers simply changed allegiance to the victorious side — a long-established Afghan tradition — and thousands more lay dead, other thousands were retreating to sanctuaries and strongholds in eastern Afghanistan and in western Pakistan. To cut them off, the coalition air forces bombed the caves of Tora Bora. Meanwhile, the Afghan soldiers — variously called the Anti-Taliban Forces, Opposition Group Forces, and the Afghan Military Forces — advanced into the mountains to finish off the enemy. This effort had little result. SF teams also established bases around the eastern town of Khowst, and various special-operations units conducted direct-action raids inside Afghanistan in search of fugitive al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Preparations were made to assist Pakistani army units in this hunt on their side of the border, but the operation never came to fruition.

The emerging concern was the possibility of a major human disaster in Afghanistan, brought on by a shattered infrastructure, a million refugees, and the coming of winter. Civil Affairs units and engineer units were hastily deployed into the theater of war to begin recovery efforts and disaster-relief operations. Humanitarian aid of every description, promised by the signatories of the December 2001 Brussels Accord, would have to be airlifted into the country. In addition, the multifarious agencies that needed to oversee the distribution and application of the aid would have to accompany it, and they would have to be protected and supported as well.

It became evident that the campaign was not going to transition neatly into a post-conflict paradigm of peacekeeping forces overseeing nation-building projects; rather, the campaign was becoming more like a counterinsurgency. The task of creating a new, multiethnic Afghan National Army to prosecute this new campaign fell to the soldiers of the 3rd SF Group and to French mountain troops.

On Dec. 24, 2001, the first elements of the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force arrived in Kabul. A week before, the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, had been established under British command, to serve as a peacekeeping force. These efforts would be essential in stabilizing Afghanistan against any Taliban resurgence, or in preventing a new civil war among the Afghan warlords who had been restored to power in their various provinces.

The number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan continued to grow from the hundred-plus special-operations-forces soldiers who had fought the initial battle for Afghanistan, to nearly 5,000 troops. U.S. Army infantry battalions arrived in February 2002 to replace the Marines. Detachments from the National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, and the Regular Army’s 3rd SF Group arrived to take over from departing 5th SF Group teams. The

Chinook helicopter company from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment's 3rd Battalion arrived to relieve the 2nd Battalion's initial Chinook contingent. The 3rd Ranger Battalion, after conducting its second parachute raid in November, rotated its companies in and out of Afghanistan to support continuing countrywide operations.

The 5th SF Group members who were manning Joint Special Operations Task Force-North at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, prepared to transfer their missions and remaining forces to JSOTF-South at Kandahar, and to return to the U.S. at the end of February. In turn, JSOTF-South, constituted from the headquarters of Naval Special Warfare Group-One, was likewise scheduled to close down on March 30 and would hand-off its operations to the recently-formed Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-Afghanistan, which was building a new base camp at Bagram Airfield. Two hundred soldiers from the 3rd SF Group, and 100 soldiers from the National Guard's 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group, staffed the CJSOTF-Afghanistan headquarters.

At the same time, U.S. and coalition military staffs planned a brigade-size tactical operation to root out Taliban and al-Qaeda survivors hiding in the rugged escarpments around the isolated Shah-i-Khot valley. Codenamed Operation Anaconda, the sweep was intended to flush its quarry toward ambushes and blocking positions that would be set around the valley. When the action began, the stubborn and effective enemy defense of the Shah-i-Khot took the American commanders by surprise. Planned as a two-day operation, Anaconda extended into two weeks of heavy bombing and hard fighting, with significant losses of troops and aircraft.

The Afghanistan campaign was taking an unexpected turn. It became evident that the campaign was not going to transition neatly into a post-conflict paradigm of peacekeeping forces overseeing nation-building projects; rather, the campaign was becoming more like a counterinsurgency. The task of creating a new, multiethnic Afghan National Army to prosecute this new campaign fell to the soldiers of the 3rd SF Group and to French mountain troops. In the capital of Kabul, the Germans schooled a national police force, and the British trained

Afghan national-guard battalions to provide "internal security" for the new government.

The initial phase of the war was essentially conventional in nature, notwithstanding the fact that it was fought by Afghan irregulars and U.S. special-operations forces. Paradoxically, once the enemy was beaten in open combat and had transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the U.S. Central Command placed conventional division and corps commanders in overall charge of military operations in Afghanistan.

American troop strength in country reached 7,000, and the allied troops in the ISAF, manned by 18 nations, numbered nearly 5,000. Subsequent large-unit operations by U.S., British and Canadian soldiers and special-reconnaissance units found that Taliban fighters were re-entering Afghanistan from Pakistan. The "Loya Jirga" — the grand national council — was scheduled for June, the same month during which the Afghans were to choose their new post-Taliban government. As Afghan infighting grew in scope and in intensity, and as intelligence sources reported that the Taliban forces were regrouping, a successful outcome of the Loya Jirga was not assured. The campaign to seal the military victory with political, social and economic stability was a long way from conclusion. This meant that the work of Army special-operations forces in Afghanistan was far from over as well. ✕

Notes:

¹ U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, "Informal Press Opportunity with Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, 30 October 2001." "We're providing weapons and ammunition to a variety of opposition groups in a variety of ways." (<http://www.uscentcom.mil/news/transcripts/20011030.html>).

² U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, "Gen. Franks Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 27 February 2002." Gen. Tommy Franks, Commander, USCENTCOM: "Combining the resources and capabilities of the Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Federal government has produced results [in Afghanistan] no single entity could have achieved." (<http://www.uscentcom.mil/news/transcripts/20020227.htm>).

Change of Mission: ODA 394

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

The “fog and friction of war” so often cited in military theory became a reality for the 12 soldiers of Special Forces Operational Detachment A-394 soon after their arrival in Afghanistan.¹

At the “Rose Garden,” a former Taliban military training camp near Kandahar, Captain Jed Samuels, the leader of the SF team, received his first change in mission from his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Terry Sanders.² “Three-Nine-Four,” which is assigned to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, had come to the theater of war Feb. 8, 2002, equipped with four ground-mobility vehicles (armed “Humvee” trucks) and prepared to conduct mounted special-reconnaissance and direct-action missions.³

Now, as Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, was preparing to redeploy to the United States, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, would instead take over the departing unit’s mission of sensitive site exploitation, or SSE. The Company C commander, Major Mickey Hensen, directed Sergeant Major Rudy Madden and Master Sergeant Gregg Corr to immediately train the company in close-quarter battle, or CQB — fighting inside buildings.⁴

The training in CQB was not refresher training. Company C normally trained for mounted desert reconnaissance, its specialty. The team members had to teach themselves to perform the advanced CQB tasks. Samuels turned to his second-in-command, Warrant Officer Max Gorley, and to Master

Sergeant Ty McFadden to build on the company’s two-day initial training program.⁵ The men of Three-Nine-Four reequipped themselves with sledges and pry bars, and they reconfigured their body armor and weapons for combat within the confines of the mud-walled structures common to the hinterlands of Afghanistan.

Then, after almost two weeks of intense rehearsals, Three-Nine-Four received a warning order to move against a suspected target. But the target was not a building — it was several square kilometers of mountainous terrain. Samuels’ team was to be part of a coalition task group of units from New Zealand, Canada, Norway and Denmark that would identify caves for destruction by aerial bombing. But as the mission start-time approached, Three-Nine-Four and SF A-Detachment 391 were redesignated the quick-reaction force, or QRF, for the allied forces, and Hensen and his company headquarters would serve as the QRF’s command element.⁶

Leaving their vehicles behind, the members of the QRF flew to Bagram Airfield, the abandoned Soviet base north of Kabul. While waiting for orders, the QRF spent the night freezing on the cement floor of the only available facility — a bombed-out hangar.

The next morning, Madden asked Command Sergeant Major Marc Lorenzo, the senior NCO in the 10th Mountain Division, if the 10th could feed the SF teams, which were still huddled in the hangar on QRF

standby.⁷ The SF soldiers were unshaven, some with full beards, and they were wearing an assortment of jackets and pants. “Come with me,” Lorenzo said, and he led them to a mess line where he ordered the servers to give the SF soldiers all they could eat for breakfast. Later, after the mission was completed and the QRF stood down, Three-Nine-Four was ordered back to Kandahar to prepare for a major new operation code-named “Anaconda.”

The nature of 394’s new mission was special reconnaissance, and the team re-fitted and rehearsed to establish clandestine observation posts in enemy-held territory on two rocky mountaintops. But after two days of preparation, Three-Nine-Four was ordered to stand down to allow Danish and German troops to conduct the operation.

Because the team had left almost all of its equipment behind at Kandahar, it was now having difficulty gathering the gear it needed for the mission. Australian troops operating from the same base were astounded at the team’s lack of extreme-cold-weather clothing; ‘You blokes’ll perish up there,’ they warned.

The succession of unexecuted missions was wearing on the morale of the SF soldiers, who were eager to get into the fight. The biggest action of the war so far was about to begin, and they were being held in reserve at the Kandahar “Rose Garden.”

On D-Day of the operation, as the SF soldiers listened to the various American and allied commanders sending orders and information over the radio, it became apparent to them that Anaconda was not going as planned. The radio chatter indicated unexpectedly strong enemy resistance and numerous U.S. casualties from the fire of mortars and machine guns.

The team received a terse message: “You have one hour to pack your rucksacks for a dismantled mission.” Details would be provided later, they were told. Meanwhile, an aircraft was waiting to fly them back to Bagram airfield, where Company C’s new

advanced operating base, or AOB, had just been established. Later that night, Three-Nine-Four was in the 10th Mountain Division’s tactical operations center, receiving a grim intelligence update. Five Apache attack helicopters had been badly shot up, and A-detachment 372 had taken casualties, including Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman, who had been killed while leading an Afghan truck convoy to the battle. About 25 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division had been wounded, and soldiers from the 10th were still trapped near their landing zones in the Shah-i-Khot valley. “Not a good first day,” commented one of the SF NCOs. Ominously, the C-130 transport that was flying the team to Bagram was also carrying an empty metal coffin for Harriman.

The unexpectedly intense fighting had forced the commitment of the QRFs from the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne Division and Joint Special Operations Task Force-South. At Bagram, every available Australian, German and American unit was urgently mustered to create another viable reaction force. The team members now heard troubling rumors about an American who had fallen out of a helicopter into enemy hands, and of one, maybe more, Chinook helicopters that had been shot down by enemy ground fire. After two days on standby, Samuels’ team was detached from the ad hoc QRF and told to prepare for a reconnaissance mission.

Three-Nine-Four was to land at night by helicopter. The team was to climb to an observation site that was 10,400 feet above sea level and blanketed by an estimated three feet of snow. From the jagged escarpment, it would overlook two trails on which Taliban troops were believed to travel.

Because the team had left almost all of its equipment behind at Kandahar, it was now having difficulty gathering the gear it needed for the mission. Australian troops operating from the same base were astounded at the team’s lack of extreme-cold-weather clothing; “You blokes’ll perish up there,” they warned. Generously, they loaned the Americans snowshoes, walking poles, and snow-camouflage clothing. The team medic, Sergeant First Class Jason “J.D.” Thurman,

coaxed the airfield's Spanish military hospital into giving him morphine autoinjectors. Staff Sergeant Jake Millett traded boxes of rations to the Aussies for spare "double-A" and D-cell batteries.⁸

Staff Sergeant Jerry Rawlins was particularly interested in acquiring a Barrett M-82A1 .50-caliber sniper rifle.⁹ Given the vast open spaces in Afghanistan, many targets would be visible beyond the 800-meter range of the team's Remington M-24 model 7.62 mm rifles. While still in the U.S., Rawlins had requested one of the Barrett "fifty-cals" from the joint operational stocks at the Lexington Bluegrass Arsenal, but he was told that the entire inventory had already been requisitioned. However, by trading his extra 7.62 mm match-grade cartridges to a 10th Mountain Division reconnaissance platoon, Rawlins gained an introduction to the chief of the division's explosives-ordnance-disposal unit — who had a Barrett to spare. Rawlins signed for the rifle and carried it into the Anaconda battle.¹⁰

By midnight, the team members were ready, and they settled down for some much-needed rest before their insertion into enemy territory. Just a few hours later, McFadden received some news: An estimated 200 enemy soldiers had been spotted moving around Three-Nine-Four's intended landing zone. The team's recon mission was cancelled, and the area was bombed instead.

Anaconda was about to begin an unplanned second phase, to try to accomplish the operation's original mission of destroying Taliban and al-Qaeda units that had escaped to mountain hideouts. ODA Three-Nine-Four would now join a seasoned team from the 5th SF Group, A-detachment 594, and travel in a convoy of pickup trucks and sport-utility vehicles lent by the 10th Mountain Division, to Gardez, a four-and-one-half hour drive away.¹¹

Just before sunset, the teams arrived at their new base, a mud-walled compound crowded with more than 100 coalition soldiers. Samuels took stock of his team. He determined that before the team could attempt any operation, it would need the equipment that had been left behind in Bagram and Kandahar. Within a few days, Three-Nine-Four had recovered all

its gear — just in time to get orders from its new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Carl Hooper of 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, to whom the team had been attached.¹²

When the second push of Anaconda began, Three-Nine-Four would not be left behind. The team was elated to learn that it was going into combat. The objective would be the rocky massif west of the Shah-i-Khot valley called the "Whale." The men of Three-Nine-Four would guide bands of Afghan mercenary troops to fight religious fanatics on some of the most inaccessible terrain on Earth, at altitudes that would leave them gasping for air as they climbed into the battle over rocks and snow. The "fog and friction of war" that had held the team out of combat now drew it in. This time, for the first time since arriving in Afghanistan a month ago, Three-Nine-Four's mission would not be changed. ✂

Notes:

¹ This article is based on interviews with the members of Operational Detachment A-394, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, by the author, 10 May 2002.

² "Jed Samuels" and "Terry Sanders" are pseudonyms.

³ Because of space constraints on transport aircraft, the team's vehicles arrived four days after the team had landed. The detachment personnel traveled on two different aircraft, as well.

⁴ "Mickey Hensen," "Rudy Madden" and "Gregg Corr" are pseudonyms.

⁵ "Max Gorley" and "Ty McFadden" are pseudonyms.

⁶ There were not enough helicopters to lift the entire force as originally organized, so the SSE force was reduced.

⁷ "Marc Lorenzo" is a pseudonym.

⁸ "Jason Thurman" and "Jake Millett" are pseudonyms.

⁹ "Jerry Rawlins" is a pseudonym.

¹⁰ Rawlins never fired his Barrett during the Anaconda battle. Because the al-Qaeda fighters often concealed their weapons beneath their robe-like coats, Rawlins was unable to identify any of the distant figures he spotted as "definitely enemy."

¹¹ Several senior members of the 3rd SF Group later remarked on the excellent support that they received from the 10th Mountain Division, in contrast to their experience with the same division in Haiti in 1995.

¹² "Carl Hooper" is a pseudonym.

Caves and Graves: The 19th SF Group

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Any doubt as to whether Army National Guard Special Forces groups can meet the standards of the active-component groups has been dispelled by SF A-detachment 923, from the 19th Special Forces Group, headquartered in Utah. Despite limited training time,

Department of Defense in support of national objectives.

After having undergone a period of preparation at Fort Campbell, Ky., during which it was placed under the command of the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, Detachment 923 arrived in Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, in early March 2002. There, it was assigned the mission of operating as a quick-reaction force in Pakistan to interdict members of the Taliban who were fleeing Afghanistan — a mission that the detachment never executed.

On April 25, the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, ordered the team to Bagram, where the 3rd SF Group assigned it the mission of supporting cave searches in the Tora Bora region. The team then came under the tactical control of Task Force Rakkasan, from the 101st Airborne Division. Specifically, the team was to reconnoiter potential helicopter landing zones, or HLZs, determine the level of enemy activity, and observe possible cave sites.¹

On April 27, Captain Kerry Barnes found himself moving Detachment 923 to Jalalabad, which is a long way from the drug store where Barnes plies his trade as a pharmacist. In Jalalabad, the detachment met another SF team, A-detachment 966, and the Afghan soldiers that A-966 was advising. Because A-966 had already established rapport with the Afghans, Barnes incorporated six of its members and 50 Afghans into his operation. On



U.S. Army photo

Members of A-detachment 923 talk with Afghans near Alefkhel, Afghanistan.

these National Guardsmen unhesitatingly exchanged their mufti for desert camouflage when they were called to duty in December 2001. During the two years prior to that, the members of the 19th SF Group had participated in exercises in Thailand, Korea, Tonga and the Maldives in preparation for any special-operations mission that might be assigned to them by the

April 30, the force began to move to its objective by truck.

Although the distance to the objective was about 50 kilometers, vehicles could traverse only the first 30 kilometers, to Tangi Qolleh. The Afghan commander dispatched a reconnaissance element to Alefkhel, while the SF detachments contracted for 16 mules to move equipment from Tangi Qolleh. The force left Tangi Qolleh at 7 a.m. on May 1 and arrived in Alefkhel at 11 a.m. The terrain was so steep that the mules could go no farther, so the teams contracted for porters from the village.

After an hour and a half, the teams had covered only 300 meters (straight-line distance). The distance from Alefkhel to the proposed observation site was only 2,500 meters, but the elevation increased 1,500 meters. After a climb of three and one half hours, the teams reached the site. From there, they could observe two ridges, and there appeared to be two caves on each ridge. The teams soon located three potential HLZs, but the HLZs would require the use of demolitions to make them usable. On May 2, two SF engineers arrived with the demolitions. The next morning, they began clearing the landing zones.

Team members observed the caves, and then, together with the Afghans, they moved to the sites. Two caves had been sealed by bombs; the third was only an illusion of a cave, caused by the shadows of overhanging rocks. The fourth suspected cave was a fighting position with overhead cover. Nearby were several bunkers that appeared not to have been occupied recently.²

Villagers from Alefkhel reported that about 25 Arab bodies had been buried in a mound in the village. SF team members also located two graves on one of the ridges. On May 4, American and Canadian conventional forces, accompanied by reporters and forensic experts, arrived. The media immediately began to film the grave mound, but they did not film the excavation that was being conducted by the forensic personnel. In all, 25 bodies were found at the sites. After the forensic experts took DNA samples, they reburied the bodies. The story appeared on CNN and was reported in major newspapers.³



U.S. Army photo

Alefkhel villagers receive humanitarian aid.

In exchange for villagers' permission to excavate the graves, the SF detachments coordinated with U.S. Civil Affairs personnel and arranged for more than 12,000 pounds of humanitarian-assistance supplies to be distributed to the villagers. On May 7, CH-47 helicopters brought in the aid, and the village elders began to distribute it.

By truck, by mule, and by foot, this National Guard SF A-detachment accomplished its assigned mission — searching for caves and locating landing zones. In addition, the team located grave sites that contained 25 bodies, and it arranged for humanitarian assistance to be distributed to a village that had an estimated 2,000 inhabitants.

Superior training, flexibility and dedication are the hallmarks of the SF soldier. SF A-detachment 923 proved that those qualities are as prevalent among National Guard soldiers as they are among their active-duty counterparts. ✂

Notes:

¹ Master Sergeant Andy Stewart (pseudonym), Company B, 1st Battalion, 19th SF Group, interview by author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

² Captain Kerry Barnes (pseudonym), Company, 1st Battalion, 19th SF Group, interview by author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

³ Ryan Chilcote, "Hunt for bin Laden's remains," www.cnn.com, 7 May 2002; Peter Baker, "Mass Grave Is Discovered at Tora Bora," *Washington Post*, 8 May 2002, 16; Carlotta Gall, "Allies Exhume 23 Bodies Thought to Be al-Qaeda Fighters," *Washington Post*, 8 May 2002.

To Educate And To Motivate: The 345th PSYOP Company

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf declared, “Psychological operations are going to be absolutely a critical, critical part of any campaign that [the United States] must get involved in.”¹

Now, more than 10 years later, another operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, has reaffirmed not only the value of psychological operations, or PSYOP, but also the value of and the necessity of using

The teams also developed themes relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance and to the value of education. The low level of education among the Afghan people was a hindrance to the PSYOP campaign. Because the low literacy rate restricted the effectiveness of written products, leaflets had to depict the PSYOP themes clearly and simply.

reserve-component PSYOP forces to augment active forces.

Because there are only six active-component PSYOP battalions, the U.S. has found it necessary to activate reserve-component PSYOP units during Operation Enduring Freedom to ensure that commanders have access to the full spectrum of PSYOP operations. The first unit to be activated was

the 345th PSYOP Company, from Dallas, Texas. After being alerted in early December 2001, the 345th, commanded by Major Ralph Marshall, reported to Fort Bragg Jan. 7, 2002. As an airborne company with a focus on the U.S. Central Command’s area of operations, the 345th was the logical choice for activation.

The active-component 9th PSYOP Battalion conducted a one-month validation program for the 345th that included subjects such as marksmanship, troop-leading procedures, battle drills and drafting operations orders. The validation program confirmed that the 345th was prepared for its wartime mission.²

In early March, the company learned that it would deploy to Afghanistan to support the 3rd Special Forces Group. Although the Texans had never worked with SF teams, Staff Sergeant Max Carson and his tactical PSYOP team, or TPT, had trained with SF units at the Joint Readiness Training Center during Carson’s 10 years in the company.

The 345th’s early coordination with the 3rd SF Group and the SF group’s detailed planning during the preparation of the PSYOP annex to the operations order ensured that the two units would be able to integrate their operations effectively. The 3rd Group sent an advance party to Afghanistan to make plans for the deployment. Recognizing the importance of PSYOP, the 3rd included Captain Timothy

Issacson from the 345th to serve as a PSYOP planner with the advance party.³ Later, when the National Guard's 19th SF Group arrived in Afghanistan to augment the 3rd Group, the 345th continued its close coordination with the 19th Group as well.

It is critical to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom that all U.S. forces stress the themes of the legitimacy of the existing Afghan government, the surrender of antigovernment forces, and the importance of education. During the first two weeks that the 345th was in country, TPTs deployed countrywide to emphasize that the U.S. force was not an occupying force, and to assess the effectiveness of the themes of Afghan unity and the capability of the Afghanistan National Army.

The teams also developed themes pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance and to the value of education. The low level of education among the Afghan people was a hindrance to the PSYOP campaign. Because the low literacy rate restricted the effectiveness of written products, leaflets had to depict the PSYOP themes clearly and simply.

Reserve-component TPTs patrolling with National Guard SF detachments provided the 345th with the feedback that was essential for determining the effectiveness of PSYOP themes. Using immediate feedback from forces in theater, the 345th's Product Development Detachment (also located in theater) was able to develop concepts and recommend products to the Joint PSYOP Task Force.⁴

The integration of the 345th PSYOP Company with both the active-component 3rd SF Group and the National Guard's 19th SF Group is testimony to the vital role that reserve-component special-operations forces can play in supporting the war on terrorism. ✂

cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

³ Staff Sergeant Max Carson (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP Company, interview by the author, 16 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁴ Major Paul Fletcher (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP Company, interview by the author, 9 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Notes:

¹ Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2000), 1-2.

² Major Ralph Marshall (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP Company, interview by the author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Spe-

Armed Convoy to Kabul: The 3/20th SF Group

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

When the National Guardsmen of the 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group, arrived at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, they proved that they were ready for anything — even for the disbandment of their unit.¹

The headquarters of the Regular Army's 3rd SF Group had been designated the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, or CJSOTF, for Afghanistan. The CJSOTF was to receive 120 Army

assigned to the named task force. Faced with these circumstances, Colonel Mark Phelan, the 3rd SF Group's commander, created his own augmentee pool from an arriving unit that had been assigned to his command — the headquarters and support personnel of the 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group.

The 3/20th's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Sykes, had earned his nickname "Hurricane" because of his energy and because of the driving pace of training in his Florida-based unit.² Without a unit to lead, Sykes threw himself into his new job: J5 plans officer in the 3rd SF Group's joint operations center.

Sykes' soldiers also found themselves in new jobs: They filled out staff sections so that the command post could operate around the clock, they built fortifications and guard posts, and they renovated the bombed-out Russian buildings scattered about the base. The imposing command sergeant-major of the 3rd SF Group strode through the staff tents and motor bays of the camp, assigning soldiers to the necessary tasks.

One ad hoc collection of the 3/20th's SF soldiers was responsible for managing the armed convoys that the CJSOTF dispatched across Afghanistan. Late in the morning of May 7, 2002, those 3/20th soldiers prepared to accompany three officials from Bagram to the Kabul Military Academy, some 40 kilometers away.

“When General Tommy Franks visited the Special Forces units here,” recalled the executive officer of the West Virginia National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, “he said, ‘I’ve seen the 3rd Group and the 19th Group, and I can’t tell them apart.’ ” The XO joked that both the 3rd Group and the 19th Group had been offended by the remark.

Reservists who had been called to active duty specifically to fill out the task-force staff.

However, the CJSOTF received none of the Army Reserve soldiers, because the Special Operations Command of the United States Central Command in Doha, Qatar, kept the augmentees there, even though doctrine called for the soldiers to be

Sergeant First Class Sandy Marcello was the NCO in charge of the task-force convoys.³ Marcello, the owner of an auto body shop in Tennessee, had served on active duty as an SF weapons sergeant and as an SF engineer sergeant. He had deployed on a series of operations to Pakistan in the 1980s during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Recalled to active duty for Operation Enduring Freedom, Marcello returned to a territory that he understood well. He called the crew and the passengers of the two-vehicle convoy together, and in quick, well-rehearsed phrases, he described the mission, the route, the timetable, the checkpoints, the communications and the emergency procedures that would be followed if the convoy encountered mines or ambushes.

The two armed “Humvee” trucks had been inspected and were ready to roll. Staff Sergeant Darryl Albright drove the lead vehicle. In civilian life, Albright worked as a nurse; in the 3/20th, he served as an SF medic. Sergeant Aaron Lawless was also an SF medic; his duties complemented his pre-war career as a physician’s assistant and as a nurse. Lawless held a carbine across his lap. On the roof of the vehicle, Specialist Albert “Wes” Cassidy, a policeman from Hollywood, Fla., manned the M-2 .50-caliber machine gun. In the 3/20th, Cassidy was a parachute rigger, but he had once been a rifleman in a mechanized-infantry unit, where he mastered the workings of the heavy machine gun.

The trailing vehicle was armed with a MK-19 40 mm grenade launcher, manned by Sergeant Jules Burgette, who in civilian life was a college student in Florida. At the right-side rear door, Sergeant Jamie Barber kept an M-240 machine gun at the ready. Once his tour of duty in Afghanistan ended, Barber intended to return to his job as a hotel manager. The only Regular Army SF soldier in the convoy was Sergeant First Class Timothy Nixon, a medic from the 3rd SF Group’s Support Company, who drove the second vehicle.

Although the passengers might have been tempted to make the observation that there was no distinguishing the National Guardsmen from the Army regular in the

group of dust-covered soldiers, they had been light-heartedly cautioned against saying so out loud. “When General Tommy Franks visited the Special Forces units here,” recalled the executive officer of the West Virginia National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, “he said, ‘I’ve seen the 3rd Group and the 19th Group, and I can’t tell them apart.’ ” The XO joked that both the 3rd Group and the 19th Group had been offended by the remark. That morning, as the soldiers drove down the road to Kabul, through minefields and past burned-out tank hulls, there was no sign of offense taken by either party. The Guardsmen said they were simply glad to be in Afghanistan, “to finally have our turn at bat” — whatever the mission. ✂

Notes:

¹ This article is based on interviews with members of Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group, and with members of the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, at Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, Afghanistan, by the author, 7-8 May 2002.

² “Jack Sykes” is a pseudonym.

³ “Sandy Marcello,” “Darryl Albright,” “Aaron Lawless,” “Albert Cassidy,” “Jules Burgette,” “Jamie Barber” and “Timothy Nixon” are pseudonyms.

Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP Teams in Afghanistan

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

While deployed to Afghanistan, two coalition humanitarian liaison cells, or CHLCs from the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Knoxville, Tenn., performed similar tasks but worked for different commands and coordinated with quite different populaces.



Photo by Kevin P. Bell

A member of the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion (left) talks with workers who are reconstructing a warehouse in Konduz.

Working in conjunction with local elders and government officials, the four- to six-man CHLCs (commonly referred to as “chiclets”) are responsible for assessing humanitarian needs (water, food, shelter, clothing, and education), for establishing priorities based on need, for preparing con-

tract requirements for projects, for arranging the delivery of food and clothing, and for overseeing work in progress.

In Afghanistan, the CHLCs focus on basic necessities and seek to create positive impressions for future generations. Their mission continues to be tough and demanding; it requires consummate professionalism and a positive “can do” attitude in the face of daily frustrations.

Getting troops on the ground to take the hand-off from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and to sustain the momentum of the humanitarian effort launched by the 96th was critical. Members of the 489th CA Battalion’s CHLC 6, which was assigned to support the 101st Airborne Division’s Task Force Rakkasan, lived out of their rucksacks for a month at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan.

Initial meetings with the Afghan regional commander who was responsible for the outer-perimeter security of Kandahar Airfield facilitated the hiring of local interpreters and the leasing of two pick-up trucks that would be used to transport members of CHLC 6 to outlying Alliance camps and villages. With the CHLC’s two Iridium telephones, Major Gregory Jernigan and Staff Sergeant Eric Nolan, both civilian law-enforcement officers, established communications, and CHLC 6 was “in business” in less than a week.

Using common civilian transport, and wearing civilian clothes and beards, the



U.S. Army photo

Because Afghanistan has been plagued with drought for seven years, many of the CHLC projects involved drilling wells.

CHLC minimized the “footprint,” or obvious presence of their military connection. But the impact of their presence was significant. Within two weeks, 42 village elders had gathered at Kandahar Airfield. Some had walked as far as 30 miles to meet Jernigan and to listen to his proposals. Since Afghanistan had been plagued by drought for seven years, all of Jernigan’s proposals — ranging from well-digging to irrigation projects — involved water.

For the first time, village leaders were being invited to share in the prioritization of solutions. They were also seeing some response to requests for assistance — which was a radical change. In the past, the further the villages were from Kandahar, the less prosperous they were: Distance reduced interest.

While refining, validating, and updating the contract process, CHLC 6 used ARSOF and TF Rakkasan helicopters to begin distributing wheat, rice, dates, beans, and blankets to the 51 villages and towns around the airfield. Having visited most of the villages and having talked with the elders, CHLC 6 and Detachment 910, Company A, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion, wanted to repay the hospitality of the villages. As a way of reciprocating, they established links with relatives in Palm Beach, Fla., and Knoxville, Tenn., and with family-support groups at Fort Campbell and Fort Bragg, who were willing to donate simple toys and school materials for the

Afghan children. The stateside response was tremendous, and the actions of the families and the family-support groups built strong bridges for the future.

Despite limited communications in outlying areas, “word of mouth” quickly spread the news that a small village that had needed internal water for more than 10 years had a new well. Engineers from the 489th CA Battalion had provided the necessary technical supervision and the experience to ensure that drilling went to the bottom of the aquifers — the critical element of reliable water sourcing.

Meanwhile, in Kandahar, some 40 miles from the former Soviet airfield, the soldiers of CHLC 2 performed “hands on” missions in a different way. CHLC 2 was an integral part of an ARSOF team built around an SF detachment from the National Guard’s 19th SF Group. ARSOF integration had been prompted by rocket attacks, the deaths in Kandahar of an SF medic and three members of an explosive-ordnance-disposal team, and the wounding of an SF lieutenant who had been on patrol in the Kandahar market area.

Major Harry Singletary, Major Gregory Mulligan and Captain Terry Rounds (not all from CHLC 2) emphasized that combat tactical skills became primary when CHLC 2 was told to help defend the ARSOF team’s compound at night, and when CHLC 2 was dispatched to clear suspected rocket-launch sites in a nearby apartment building. How-

ever, during the day, the CHLC's Civil Affairs missions (medical, food distribution, and education) took priority.

CHLC 2's medical and education team, Specialists John Harriman and Arthur Walton, dressed in civilian clothes to conceal their rank. They concentrated on significant projects that would help residents and that would counter Iranian-sponsored anti-Amer-



Photo by William A. Jones

CHLC 6 arranged for family-support groups in the United States to donate school supplies to children in Afghanistan.

ican propaganda. One dual-purpose project was the air conditioning of the building that housed the popular Afghan radio station.

The radio-station project would expand communications to a population that has a 75-percent illiteracy rate. Because the antiquated Croatian radio equipment used by the Iranians tended to overheat after two hours, air-conditioning the Afghan station would allow the Afghans to dominate the local airways.

Harriman also learned that employing locals, whom he said could “talk to the people and connect with them,” as radio announcers was preferable to using U.S.-schooled Afghans. Employing locals also improved the station's credibility and expanded its listening audience. Both Harriman and Walton admitted that their toughest task was convincing nongovernmental organizations to shift from simple emergency actions to more complicated developmental projects that would yield long-term benefits.

As Civil Affairs projects, such as the rebuilding of Mirawyse hospital by the 96th CA Battalion, were completed, the psychological-operations team — Detachment 1-2 of the 345th PSYOP Company, from Dallas, Texas — publicized the successes.

However, when the 19th SF Group liaison team at Kandahar Airfield discovered that Detachment 1-2 had a squad automatic weapon, or SAW, and an M-203 with basic loads of ammunition, the detachment was “reassigned and transported” to the SFOB in Kandahar. Within 48 hours, Detachment 1-2 had become part of an SF-Afghan vehicle-mounted task force that was en route to Nowzad to capture a noted Taliban leader. Because almost everyone in the village was illiterate, the assistant team leader, Sergeant Tim Elton, brought along several loudspeakers. The team sergeant, Staff Sergeant Charles Milton, a veteran of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, was carrying the M-203. Milton, Elton and the SAW gunner, Specialist Joshua Danner, along with 12 other Americans, were crammed into four pickup trucks. Two-hundred-fifty Afghani soldiers were stuffed aboard 10 other trucks for the 18-hour cross-country trek. “It was a ‘Rat Patrol’ but twice as hairy. It wasn’t a convoy — it was more like a herd racing across the high desert at night,” remembered Milton.

When the task force arrived, the entire village was pitch black: the village had no electricity and no generator. Night visitors usually meant trouble. Thus, an explanation was necessary to ease tension among the villagers about the “unexpected” intrusion. That’s when Elton’s loudspeakers were brought into play. Although the Taliban leader was not in the village, Detachment 1-2 demonstrated combat skills that made it a true force multiplier. Thus, true ARSOF integration was achieved in the heart of Afghanistan. ❧

Editor’s note: All the names given in this article for U.S. military personnel are pseudonyms.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Ambush at 80 Knots: Company B, 3/160th SOAR

by James A. Schroder

One particular aviation mission during Operation Enduring Freedom proved that all the aviators within the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment are trained to the same high level of competence.

After executing an operation on the Takur Ghar Mountain on March 4, 2002, in which several helicopters from units of the 160th were either damaged or destroyed by enemy fire, the 160th temporarily combined some of the assets of Company A of the 2nd Battalion with those of Company B of the 3rd Battalion.

On March 16, members of the composite unit were alerted that the next day they would fly their helicopters, loaded with Navy SEALs, to intercept a convoy of al-Qaeda forces and either capture or destroy the enemy.

The operation would require MH-47D helicopters from Company B and MH-47Es from Company A. Chief Warrant Officer Gary Black,¹ the MH-47E flight leader, had previously served with Company B. Black had overall responsibility for the mission. He assembled all the helicopter crews and briefed them on the mission, diagramming the procedure on butcher-block paper. Once he was confident that the participants fully understood their tasks and all contingencies, Black told the group to get some rest.

Early on March 17, after attending a quick update briefing, the elements of the combined flight departed, with an MH-47E in the lead and the remaining Chinooks

mixed within the flight. Unfortunately, daylight came quickly: A daylight mission increases the risk, both to aircraft and to personnel.

The formation received continual intelligence updates from an observation plat-



U.S. Army photo

An MH-47D Chinook and assault force wait for the order to launch a mission in Afghanistan.

form that routinely surveyed the battlefield.² As the flight raced to intercept the convoy, the SEALs aboard the MH-47Ds asked for permission to remove the windows on the Chinooks. Removing the windows would allow the soldiers to fire on the convoy in case one of the Chinook's M-134 miniguns failed or jammed. The pilots agreed, and the crewmembers and the assault element jettisoned the windows on

each helicopter en route to their objective.

The enemy convoy of three trucks was traveling down a wadi, a dry steam bed that functions as a road, and a fourth truck trailed about two miles behind in the same stream bed. The pilots had expected to be able to see the vehicles far enough out to plan an approach for the assault. However, 30-foot granite cliffs prevented the aviators from seeing the convoy until they were almost on top of it.



U.S. Army photo

An MH-47D conducts an in-flight refueling over Afghanistan.

Black, executing a gut-wrenching 90-degree right turn with a rapid deceleration, landed his helicopter approximately 20 feet in front of the lead vehicle and forced the convoy to stop. The rules of engagement stated that if the occupants pointed weapons at the helicopters, the gunners could shoot the enemy. The al-Qaeda soldiers aimed their weapons at the helicopters as they exited their trucks. The left minigun on the lead Chinook immediately fired on the first vehicle.

Black's maneuver forced Chief Warrant Officer Charles Elkenback,³ flying the second helicopter, to bank hard to the left in order to avoid a collision. As Elkenback's helicopter banked, the right cabin-door minigun, the ramp gunner and the SEALs aboard fired on the convoy. The other Chinooks moved into position to engage their respective vehicles. The enemy scrambled out of their trucks, shot at the helicopters and attempted to run to a nearby ravine. A storm of gunfire from miniguns, M-4s and

M-249s followed them.

As Chief Warrant Officer Mark Reagan⁴ landed his helicopter, the right-side minigun jammed after a 15-second burst. Staff Sergeant Charles Martin,⁵ the flight medic and a former squad-automatic-weapon gunner in the 75th Ranger Regiment, immediately began using his M-4. Firing in semi-automatic mode to conserve ammunition, he shot the nearest enemy soldier; then he and Sergeant Walker, the right door gunner, who was also firing an M-4, killed a second foe.

As the crewmembers and SEALs shot through the window holes, the pilots quickly repositioned the helicopter to a new spot just over the crest of a small hill. The new position masked the helicopter and gave the assault force a superb position, overlooking the convoy, from which they could engage the surviving al-Qaeda forces.

Meanwhile, Elkenback and his crew spotted the fourth truck in the stream bed to the north. They rapidly closed on the vehicle and stopped it by executing a 180-degree decelerating turn with the helicopter's left minigun trained on the truck. There was no place to land. As the helicopter hovered, a woman exited the truck and held up a child; five other people in the vehicle simply stared at the Chinook. The crew maintained excellent fire discipline. After the ground force performed a quick assessment of the situation, the team leader instructed the crew to abort, and Elkenback returned to the main convoy.

The ground-force commander ordered two Chinooks to return to the fourth truck to perform an extensive search. This time, one Chinook hovered ahead of the vehicle as the second helicopter landed nearby and unloaded the ground force. The passengers exited the vehicle, sat on the ground and waited for the team to complete its search of the vehicle. Meanwhile, the two helicopters had departed, but they would return after the search and take the team back to the main convoy.

By now, however, the helicopters were running low on fuel, so the ground commander released them so that they could refuel from a MC-130P tanker that was flying nearby. After refueling, the helicopters returned to exfiltrate the ground

force. The operation yielded 16 enemy soldiers dead and two taken prisoner, along with the destruction of enemy vehicles and weapons. Despite moderate enemy fire, the helicopters suffered only minor battle damage.

The mission was a success, and the integrated aviation assets worked well together. The aviators of both companies had demonstrated their professionalism and competence in battle, and the SEALs congratulated the Night Stalkers on a job well-done. ✂

Notes:

¹ “Gary Black” is a pseudonym.

² Bill Gertz, “U.S. Attacks Afghan Convoy,” *The Washington Times*, 19 March 2002, 6.

³ This article is based on an interview with Chief Warrant Officer Charles Elkenback (pseudonym), Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

⁴ “Mark Reagan” is a pseudonym.

⁵ Interview with Staff Sergeant Charles Martin (pseudonym), Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by author, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

An Army For Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and the Afghan Army

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Years of civil war have left Afghanistan without a national army. Tribes and ethnic groups led by warlords were able to defeat the Soviets and, with American assistance, they drove out the Taliban. Subsequently, those tribes and ethnic groups became the dominant military forces within the country.

The Afghanistan Interim Authority, or AIA, as well as members of the antiterrorist coalition, recognize that the security of

Afghanistan can only be ensured by a well-trained army composed of all members of Afghan society. In May, President George Bush, in a conversation with interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, pledged \$2 million to help equip an army for

Afghanistan.¹ To that end, soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, have begun training the first recruits for an ethnically-diverse Afghan national army.

Providing that type of training is a typical SF mission — SF soldiers frequently assist other countries in training their military forces to prevent or defeat subversion or insurgency. Cross-cultural communications skills and regional expertise enable SF soldiers to organize and train host-

nation forces in order to enhance the nation's security. General Tommy Franks, commander of the United States Central Command, emphasized the importance of SF's training mission in Afghanistan: "The national army of Afghanistan is going to be an essential element of [Afghanistan's] long-term security," he declared.²

The Kabul Military Academy was a Russian training site during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Bombing by U.S. B-52s and small-arms fire during the fighting in Kabul demolished or heavily damaged many of the academy's buildings. In addition to the destruction, arriving SF soldiers found rooms piled several feet high with human feces. To make the facilities usable as classrooms and as barracks for the Afghan officer and enlisted recruits, American engineers performed extensive reconstruction. Their efforts include decontamination, wiring for electricity, and extensive structural repairs.

The 1st Battalion was given 10 months in which to train nine 600-man infantry battalions and six 300-man border-guard battalions. At the end of that time, the Afghan military cadre trained by the SF soldiers would begin training additional forces. The objective, according to the commander of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Keith McDaniels, is to build "a credible, capable force."³

Recruits for the Afghan army are selected by provincial officials, and then they are



Photo by Kevin P. Bell

Soldiers from the 3rd SF Group issue new uniforms and equipment to recruits for the National Afghan Army.

sent to Kabul for training. Travel to Kabul is extremely difficult, and although transportation is the responsibility of the government, American and coalition forces have periodically had to assist with the movement of Afghan forces. In Afghanistan, birth certificates are nonexistent, so verifying a soldier's age is almost impossible. Afghanistan has no national identification method, such as a card, so the SF soldiers must ensure that only those recruits who have passed the initial screening are allowed to begin training.

Each Afghan recruit is supposed to bring an AK-47 and four magazines of ammunition when he reports for training, but not all of them do. The AIA is responsible for providing equipment for the recruits, but its supply process is slow. The SF trainers have adapted to the situation by using their personal equipment to teach basic tasks such as camouflage.

The trainers teach basic soldier skills — marching, marksmanship, map-reading, first aid, physical fitness and small-unit tactics. Training then progresses to the study of mortars and communications. There is no NCO tradition in Afghanistan, so enlisted recruits who are identified as having leadership potential receive additional leadership training in an attempt to create an NCO corps. After undergoing two weeks of training, officer recruits begin receiving leadership training, and they are then incorporated into leadership positions within their battalions. Compounding training difficulties is the fact that the recruits speak either Dari, Pashtu or Farsi; most are illiterate; most have little concept of teamwork; and the recruits come from tribes that have been fighting one another for decades.

Few recruits have any knowledge of Afghanistan's origins or of its government. Tactical Psychological Operations teams assist the SF soldiers by teaching classes on the history of Afghanistan; Afghanistan's geography and the make-up of its various tribes; the Afghan government; and the Afghan election system. All instruction emphasizes national unity, the identity of the leaders of the AIA, and the legitimacy of the new government. Because many of the AIA leaders are unknown to the recruits,

the trainers emphasize the importance of learning to recognize leaders by their appearance and their position. Critical to the success of both the Afghan army and the nation is that the recruits understand their individual and unit relationships to higher headquarters and to the government of Afghanistan.⁴

The Afghanistan training mission is only one of the missions that SF is trained to perform. Previous training missions have prepared the SF soldiers to occupy a bare-base facility and to train a native military force.⁵ No other force in the U.S. military has the capability or the flexibility needed to perform such a highly political mission with such global implications. One SF trainer summed up the importance of the mission as follows: "That we are here during this time is key to stabilizing Afghanistan for long-term growth and development."⁶ ❧



U.S. Army photo

An SF soldier from the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, works with recruits for the National Afghan Army during their first week of training.

Notes:

¹ "U.S. to Help Equip Afghan Army," *Washington Post*, 3 May 2002, 5.

² Laurie Goering, "Kabul Sees Army as Key to Peace," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 May 2002.

³ J.S. Newton, "New Ranks Emerge From Dust," *Fayetteville Observer*, 2 June 2002, 1A. "McDaniels" is a pseudonym.

⁴ Major Henry Deaver (pseudonym) and Chief Warrant Officer 4 David Carson (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, interview by author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 7 May 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁵ Captain John Montgomery (pseudonym) and Master Sergeant Charles Dunleavy (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, interview by author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 7 May 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.

⁶ Carson interview.

'Deminimus Activities' at the Bagram Clinic: CA Team A-41

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

It was a newsworthy story from Afghanistan, said CBS "Sixty Minutes Two" producer Shawn Efran.¹ With the military defeat of the main force of Taliban and al-Qaeda units, the difficult task of helping Afghans rebuild their country fell to small groups of United States special-operations soldiers like Civil Affairs Team A-41. They were professional soldiers of the first order, but they wore beards and dressed in local garb in order to gain better access to the people they wanted to help. Their job was "nation-building," which stood in sharp contrast to the destructive morality of the al-Qaeda.

As characters in a news story, the four men of A-41 were "good copy." Major Silas Greene led the team with energy and excellent judgment. To Efran, Greene's urbane, articulate style belied his background as a tank officer who had successfully completed airborne and Ranger training. His effectiveness at leading his team was derived in large part from his previous assignments in the U.S. Army's 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, a special-operations unit based at Fort Bragg, N.C. Greene had become an expert horseman while pursuing a bachelor's degree in animal science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and he had just received a master's degree in defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. His thesis, coincidentally, was "Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia."

The team moved constantly in and

around the town of Bagram to determine where U.S. resources could be applied. Sergeant First Class Roger McDonald, the team sergeant who never quite lost his Queens accent, served as "front man" for the team. He made travel plans; arranged meeting agendas with the local political and military leadership; and prepared the security plan for the gatherings. The team's expert on civil infrastructure, Sergeant First Class Lyle Canberra, surveyed and assessed water and sewage systems, aqueducts, wells, power grids, roads and bridges. He also organized demining operations, as he had done on other former battlefields. Sergeant First Class Bart Schuyler was A-41's medical specialist, and like McDonald and Canberra, he was a veteran of Special Forces. He had practiced his skills on the edges of civilization on all the continents of the world.

The team was trained in foreign languages, but not in any of the languages of Central Asia. A-41 was oriented for employment in the European Command area: Greene spoke French; McDonald, Polish; Schuyler, German and Spanish; and Canberra, Spanish and Portuguese. The scale of the crisis in Afghanistan required as many Civil Affairs teams as could be deployed. In any case, given the variety of Pashtu, Dari and Urdu dialects endemic to the various ethnicities of Afghanistan, local translators were the best choice for local communications.

The “Sixty Minutes Two” producer brought his cameraman and his sound man to meet A-41 in mid-January 2002. Their correspondent, Scott Pelley, would fly in after the crew completed the background research and prepared the story. As they would have done with any new team members, McDonald and Canberra gave the crew rudimentary weapons training and put them through security drills, for their self-defense. Schuyler taught them basic first-aid procedures for gunshot wounds and related trauma. The cameraman had once served in the 82nd Airborne Division, and he cooperated happily; the sound man, a freelancer like the cameraman, fit in just as well.

When Pelley joined A-41 and the “Sixty Minutes Two” crew a week later, Greene simply followed his normal, crowded schedule. That day, A-41 was scheduled to revisit the emergency clinic in the city of Bagram. It was one of 23 clinics that, along with a hospital, were supported by an Italian private volunteer organization. However, Doctor Mohammed Atta, the clinic’s doctor, had not been paid in eight months. He had remained in his hometown through both the Soviet and Taliban occupations, even when Bagram became the center of fighting. He was now living hand-to-mouth in a nearby bunker and was planning to start a garden on its roof.

Minutes after A-41 and Pelley’s crew arrived at 11 a.m., a mob of local children rushed in carrying a badly injured 16-year-old boy, whom Doctor Atta recognized. The boy had reached down to pick up a grenade, and it had detonated in his right hand. His little finger and part of his ring finger and thumb were gone, and the dorsal portion of his hand was “de-gloved” to the wrist — that is, the skin was peeled back. The boy also had a grenade fragment projecting from his cheek, but most of the blood on his face had come from his hand.

While the “Sixty Minutes Two” crew was recording the event, A-41 responded in an almost automatic fashion. McDonald and Canberra took up security positions to hold back the gathering crowd. Greene found himself helping to push-start the clinic’s worn-out ambulance, a battered old mini-

van whose back seats had been removed. Schuyler knew he could participate in “deminimus activities” in this situation — that is, on Greene’s orders, Schuyler could use U.S. resources to alleviate the immediate suffering of non-U.S. personnel. After allowing Doctor Atta to take the lead in the treatment, Schuyler began coordinating a follow-up visit with a U.S. Army surgeon at the Italian-run hospital in Kabul. He also made arrangements for skin grafting and physical therapy. Schuyler himself checked on the boy later and was pleased to learn that there was no secondary infection. The boy’s hand was saved.

A-41 responded in an almost automatic fashion. McDonald and Canberra took up security positions to hold back the gathering crowd. Greene found himself helping to push-start the clinic’s worn-out ambulance. ... Schuyler began coordinating a follow-up visit with a U.S. Army surgeon ... in Kabul.

The incident in the Bagram clinic was over in less than 20 minutes, and all of it was caught on tape by the “Sixty Minutes Two” team. Scott Pelley featured the incident in his story on A-41, which was aired nationwide under the lead-in title, “Mission Impossible.” For Greene, McDonald, Schuyler and Canberra, who made one of the 10 Civil Affairs “alpha” teams operating across the country, the incident represented just another morning of another day of trying to give Afghanistan “a good start” toward making itself a nation that would not become a sanctuary for terrorists again. ✂

Notes:

¹ This article is based on interviews with three members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., conducted by the author 5 April 2002. Silas Greene, Roger McDonald, Lyle Canberra and Bart Schuyler are pseudonyms.

Forty-Five Seconds on a Hot LZ: The 2/160th SOAR

by James A. Schroder

For two months early in 2002, the special-operations-aviation warriors of the 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, conducted numerous missions from Bagram air base.

By March 3, 2002, they had inserted many coalition and United States teams into the Shah-e-Kot valley in Afghanistan in support of Operation Anaconda. The Night Stalkers had completed the infiltrations under the cover of darkness using MH-47E Chinooks. The flights had been routine, with little enemy contact. The helicopter landing zones, or LZs, had been at altitudes ranging from 8,000 feet

to 11,500 feet mean sea level, or MSL. The LZs offered limited space to land, and the margin for error was slim. The altitude of the LZs challenged aircraft performance and pilot skill; single-engine flight was never an option.

trate two special-operations teams into two separate LZs, one in the northern area of Objective Remington and the other in the southern area. Razor 03 would fly to the northern LZ with Razor 04, drop off Razor 04 and then proceed to the southern LZ. Razor 04 planned to land at the northern LZ, drop off his team, and then proceed north at a slow airspeed in order to allow Razor 03 to link up. Once they had rejoined, the two Chinooks would return to Bagram air base and end the mission.¹

Razor 03 and Razor 04 departed the air base on the night of March 3 to fly to an off-set location. The flight arrived at the pickup zone, or PZ, without incident, loaded two special-operations teams, and departed on time. Intelligence indicated that the flight routes and the LZs were relatively secure, but an AC-130 gunship was to check the LZs and confirm that the area was clear.

When the flight of Chinooks was six minutes from the objective, the AC-130 was diverted because of its proximity to an incoming B-52 airstrike. The AC-130 therefore failed to establish “eyes on the objective.” Chief Warrant Officer 3 Alfred Mann,² the flight leader, and Captain Timothy Dickerson,³ the air-mission commander, or AMC, decided to return to the PZ, which was only a 15-minute flight from the objective, and to wait for the bombing operation to end. At the PZ, the flight crews reduced the helicopter engines’ speed to ground idle in order to conserve fuel.

Next, an air assault by the 101st Air-

The delay caused a problem for the ground force: There wouldn’t be enough time for the ground force to move to its observation position, or OP, under the cover of darkness. The team leader requested permission to go directly to the OP.

to 11,500 feet mean sea level, or MSL. The LZs offered limited space to land, and the margin for error was slim. The altitude of the LZs challenged aircraft performance and pilot skill; single-engine flight was never an option.

The mission planned for the night of March 3 was uncomplicated: Two Chinooks, Razor 03 and Razor 04, would infil-

borne Division onto Objective Remington further delayed the mission. The helicopter crews shut down the engines to conserve fuel. The delay caused a problem for the ground force: There wouldn't be enough time for the ground force to move to its observation position, or OP, under the cover of darkness. The team leader requested permission to go directly to the OP. Mann calculated the performance figures and stated that the team leader could get in, but there was no guarantee that the LZ would be suitable for landing. The team leader replied that he saw the imagery and that there were places to land.

The air-assault mission ended, and the flight began the engine start-up procedures. Unfortunately, the right engine on Razor 03 exceeded its limits on start-up. Mann decided that it would be foolish to take an aircraft with a questionable engine to 10,000 feet MSL. He immediately shut down the helicopter. Dickerson contacted the rear and requested a replacement aircraft. Coincidentally, two Chinooks were in the forward arming and refueling point, or FARP. Dickerson coordinated with the operations center for the two Chinooks in the FARP to become replacement helicopters. Once the replacement Chinooks arrived at the PZ, the pilots in Razor 03 and Razor 04 decided to use the replacements, because now both of the original aircraft were low on fuel. Mann informed the team leader that in the best-case scenario, he could get the team to the LZ by 2:45 a.m. The delay would allow the team only one hour of movement under the cover of darkness. The team leader again requested permission to go directly to the OP.

At 2:30 a.m., the flight departed en route directly to the OP and executed the mission exactly as planned. The first AC-130 gunship reached its fuel limit and handed its mission over to a second AC-130, which cleared the new LZ and departed for another tasking approximately six minutes prior to Razor 03's arrival at the LZ. During the approach, the crew members thought that the LZ appeared to be suitable for landing, although they noticed footprints in the snow that was common at those high altitudes. Coming closer, they noticed an unmanned DSHK machine gun (in pretty good shape) at the

one o'clock position. The machine gun was not an unusual sight, because the mountains of Afghanistan are littered with abandoned military hardware. Next, they spotted a donkey tied to a tree at the three o'clock position. Upon landing, Mann informed the team leader that they were not alone.

As the team stood near the ramp hinge, poised to exit the helicopter, Sergeant Jerald Curtis,⁴ saw a man duck behind a berm at the nine o'clock position. Mann relayed that information to the team leader, who stated that his team was taking the hill. Sergeant Derick Mackenzie,⁵ the right ramp crewmember, held the team up as the information was relayed.



U.S. Army photo

Just as Mackenzie dropped his arm to release the team, an enemy soldier stood and launched a rocket-propelled grenade, or RPG, at the left side of the helicopter. The RPG hit Razor 3, knocking out all of the electrical power. The exploding round wounded Curtis' right leg. The flaming projectile passed through the aircraft and knocked out the transfer rectifiers, which eliminated all of the multifunctional displays; the Advance Flight Control System, or AFCS; radios; all of the aircraft's mission equipment; and the M-134 miniguns. Smoke filled the cabin and obscured the vision of those in the back.

Small-arms fire caused the No. 1 hydraulic system to fail. The RPG had also knocked out the intercrew communication

Razor 03's battle-damaged aircraft at the forced-landing site. The aircraft was later recovered and is being returned to service.

When Razor 03's controls locked up, the aircraft was 10 feet above the ground. Although the crew expected it to roll over, the aircraft remained upright.



U.S. Army photo

system between the front door gunners and the pilots. The team stayed on the aircraft, and the team leader yelled, "Get us out of here!" Mackenzie, the only crew member who could communicate, yelled to Mann over the intercom system, "Fire in the cabin rear ready! Pick it up, pick it up! Go, go, go!" and fired an M-60 machine gun mounted in the aft right cabin window. Mann took the controls from Chief Warrant Officer 3 George Tucker⁶ and quickly departed without the use of the AFCS.

The oil-soaked ramp, which had been rendered inoperative when small-arms fire damaged the helicopter's utility hydraulics, was stuck in the down position. As the helicopter lurched off the ground, Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts, slipping on the greasy floor, fell and rolled toward the open ramp. Sergeant Paul Parcelli,⁷ the ramp gunner, rushed toward the tumbling SEAL and caught him. Mackenzie, reacting to movement, rushed after both of them. Mackenzie and Parcelli temporarily held Roberts, but they could not maintain their hold during takeoff. As the helicopter shuddered, Roberts and Parcelli fell out of the helicopter. Parcelli, tethered by a safety harness, remained with the Chinook, but Roberts fell to the ground from about five feet. When the helicopter cleared the ridge line, Parcelli dangled 3,000 feet above the ground.

Using his flashlight to illuminate the four-

inch-square back-up altitude indicator, which was the only flight instrument that remained operative, Tucker called out airspeed, altitude and direction. Mackenzie confirmed that both engines were running. He informed Mann that a man had fallen out at the LZ and that they had to go back. Then he focused his attention on Parcelli, who was dangling beneath the helicopter, and pulled him in as the aircraft took more small-arms fire.

Mann and his crew immediately decided to go back, fully aware that the miniguns were inoperative and that they had only the M-60 and their individual weapons. Mann banked the helicopter to the right and felt vibration in the flight controls. As Mackenzie looked forward, a red haze, caused by hydraulic fluid spraying from a severed line, enveloped the ramp area. Soon it became apparent that the hydraulic system was failing — a condition that could render the Chinook unflyable. Mackenzie read the maintenance panel and confirmed that the hydraulic pressure for all three systems was zero. Aware of the gravity of the situation, he opened a can of hydraulic fluid, one of four that he routinely kept near the pump, and poured it into the hydraulic-fill module. He quickly hand pumped the life-saving liquid into the system. This procedure temporarily restored cyclic control, but the cyclic controls continued to lock up even as Mackenzie added more fluid.

Mann determined that he couldn't make it

back to the LZ and that he would have to land immediately in order to save the lives of those aboard. He identified a potential landing zone and put the helicopter in a landing attitude. The cyclic controls locked up when the helicopter was 10 feet above the ground. Mann pressed the pedals to turn the nose, and he lowered the thrust. The aircraft hit the ground with the nose 15 degrees high and the right side 10 degrees high. The crew, expecting the helicopter to roll over, conducted an emergency shutdown, secured all sensitive items and executed the emergency-action plan. The team leader exited the helicopter and established communications to effect recovery. Soon, Razor 04 arrived at the crash site, recovered all the personnel before the closing enemy could reach their location, and returned to the PZ.

“Leave no man behind” has become an unofficial motto of special-operations forces. Despite severe damage to their helicopter, Mann and his crew valiantly attempted to rescue Roberts. Only when Mann could not maneuver the unstable helicopter because of the loss of hydraulic power, a lack of electrical power, and inoperative miniguns, did he decide to abandon the rescue attempt. Through his exceptional flying skills and complete coordination with Tucker, Mackenzie and the rest of the crew, Mann landed the aircraft without further casualties. This mission is a testimony to the skill and courage of special-operations aviators in the face of overwhelming odds. “Night Stalkers don’t quit!” ✂

Notes:

¹ This article is based on an interview with Chief Warrant Officer 3 Alfred Mann (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, Ky.

² “Alfred Mann” is a pseudonym.

³ “Timothy Dickerson” is a pseudonym.

⁴ “Jerald Curtis” is a pseudonym.

⁵ Interview with Sergeant Derick Mackenzie (pseudonym), Company A, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 9 July 2002, Fort Campbell, Ky.

⁶ “George Tucker” is a pseudonym.

⁷ “Paul Parcelli” is a pseudonym.

Observations: ARSOF in Afghanistan

by James A. Schroder

The success and the speed of execution of the war on terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, were a result of years of strategic investment in personnel, training and equipment of United States Army special-operations forces, which consist of Special Forces; Rangers; Civil Affairs; Psychological Operations; the special-operations support units — the 112th Signal Battalion and the 528th Support Battalion; and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The accomplishments of OEF were possible because of the expertise, commitment, ingenuity, adaptability and warrior ethos of these dedicated soldiers — a direct result of their personnel-selection processes and their specialized training. The technological advances of the past few years contributed to the victories, but individual soldiers made the difference.

Special Forces verified their invaluable capacity during OEF, fighting alongside Afghani soldiers against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the austere, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. Numerous members of SF detachments attributed their success during OEF to the realistic final phase of the SF Qualification Course, exercise Robin Sage. During the exercise, the SF students learn to address a myriad of problems associated with working with “guerrilla forces,” ranging from logistical, administrative, financial and operational issues to cultural conflicts and language

barriers — all of which the soldiers encountered in Afghanistan.

SF training encourages ingenuity, autonomy and adaptability because, by design, the 12-man SF detachments infiltrate many miles into enemy territory or into semi-permissive environments, having only each other to rely on. All three SF attributes were brilliantly demonstrated as SF soldiers called in close air support from remote locations, conducted direct actions against the Taliban hierarchy, and performed foreign internal defense — creating a national army from disparate local Afghan forces.

The Rangers illustrated their lethality as an exceptionally competent Army strike force. Their seizure of the airfield south of Kandahar was an example of flawless execution: They fought as they had trained — with speed and ferocity. They took no casualties, and they confiscated valuable intelligence information.

At Takur Ghar mountain, in a firefight reminiscent of the one in Mogadishu, the Rangers attacked an enemy force entrenched atop a 10,000-foot high mountain, neutralized it, and then kept other hostile forces at bay for more than 15 hours until all friendly forces could be extracted at night. The valiant effort cost the lives of three Rangers, and many more were wounded, but no man was left behind.

Civil Affairs units deployed to Afghanistan with a mission to assist the Afghan people, who were suffering from

years of restrictive and negligent Taliban rule. Because the CA teams are combat forces, they were able to operate in dangerous and hostile areas that were unreachable by nongovernment organizations. After conducting an assessment of basic survival needs — water, food and shelter — the CA teams began providing humanitarian aid to the needy people.

The teams also conducted many construction-project estimates for water wells, hospitals, schools and road repairs. Unfortunately, the funding for these projects was not readily available: The nations that had promised the necessary financial aid were slow in delivering the funds. The delay created resentment among the local governors or chieftains who had believed that if they cooperated fully with the CA teams, the construction projects would begin immediately and endear them to their native populace.

The CA teams also operated as combat forces when necessary. One CA team, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell 2, responded as a quick-reaction force during a crucial mission to recover an explosive-ordnance-disposal team whose members were killed while attempting to destroy an enemy ammunition cache. The CA team performed its military duties with proficiency, in an extremely dangerous situation, on very short notice, and while adjusting its plan en route to the objective.

Psychological Operations units contributed to the strategic and tactical objectives of the war. PSYOP teams demonstrated their ability to produce and deliver leaflets that were culturally sensitive and targeted to specific themes that met the combatant commander's objectives. The strategic importance of the leaflets was immense. The Afghan people needed to know why American and coalition forces were in their country. The PSYOP leaflet campaign provided that knowledge, but the effectiveness of the leaflet campaign was difficult to measure because most of the Afghan people could not read. The leaflets presented simple messages about mine awareness, explained the source of the humanitarian rations that fell from the sky, and stressed that the Americans were friendly and not an occupying force.

The tactical importance of PSYOP was also beneficial. The 910th Tactical PSYOP Detachment educated and warned villagers during tactical operations around their villages. The 910th's soldiers also proved that they were a combat multiplier that could fight alongside infantry forces.

Teams from the 112th Signal Battalion provided rapid and continuous connectivity, across a broad spectrum of communications, between deployed commands and the state-side combatant commander, as well as between intratheater commands. OEF created an enormous demand for bandwidth to accommodate all the secure and nonsecure

The accomplishments of the war were possible because of the expertise, commitment, ingenuity, adaptability and warrior ethos of these dedicated soldiers — a direct result of their personnel-selection processes and specialized training. The technological advances of the past few years contributed to the victories, but individuals made the difference.

data — including voice, data and video — that was essential to mission completion. Small ARSOF signal teams deployed to remote locations, overcame harsh environments and technical and tactical difficulties, and never failed to deliver communications. The signal teams reacted promptly to the many urgent demands imposed upon them, for each request was of great importance to the requesting customer.

The units of the 528th Support Battalion contributed to OEF in various ways. Company A provided the SOF-specific expertise necessary for equipping and supplying demanding customers. At Task Force Dagger, the 528th's support soldiers established a warehouse system and assisted Air Force personnel in correcting an accountability problem so that they could better control the off-loading of personnel and equipment from aircraft. The 528th soldiers also established accountability for every item transferred or issued to non-

Army SOF personnel.

By doctrine, the 528th acts as a medium between special-operations supply channels and conventional supply channels. Unfortunately, the transition from SOF support to conventional support suffered because of a limited availability of SOF personnel, and Task Force Dagger immediately felt the impact as it battled the inflexibility of conventional supply systems. The maintenance-support team from the 528th's Company B distinguished itself by maintaining the decrepit civilian vehicles used by SF soldiers. The mechanics kept the vehicles operational by making "controlled substitutions" from comparable nonworking vehicles. Many times, especially when they were repairing all-terrain vehicles in remote locations, the mechanics could rely on nothing except their tools and their ingenuity.

The Night Stalkers of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment used their vast collection of organic assets — multi-million-dollar flight simulators, state-of-the-art helicopters, advanced mission-planning programs, and outstanding training — to execute nearly impossible missions in Afghanistan to the promised standard: time on target plus or minus 30 seconds. Combating some of the harshest environmental conditions in the world, the Night Stalkers doggedly completed many arduous and hazardous aviation missions in support of OEF.

The "Don't Quit" attitude of the Night Stalkers played a crucial role early in the campaign, when the 160th's aviators completed numerous challenging infiltrations of personnel from SF units and from other government agencies. The MH-47E proved to be the most capable helicopter in Afghanistan. Its terrain-following technology enabled it to fly in zero visibility, several hundred feet above the ground, for long durations. The powerful MH-47D/E Chinook provided the primary means of transportation across soaring mountaintops and remote desert locations. The MH-60 DAP provided armed escort for the Chinooks in Afghanistan, a salient source of armed protection.

For months, the mechanics and crew members worked long, grueling hours to keep the machines in the air. The 160th

never dropped a mission because of a maintenance problem, and its operational rate was in the high 90s. Whether they were treating troops who had been injured in battle or who had been rescued from aircraft crashes, or whether they were caring for civilians who had been injured by subversives, the 160th's flight medics, all graduates of the Special Operations Combat Medical Course, demonstrated their life-saving skills.

When National Guard and Army Reserve SOF soldiers mobilized to augment active-duty forces, they left behind their civilian jobs and families, well aware that their deployments would last at least a year. The deployments caused financial, family and personal stress, but the recalled SOF soldiers enthusiastically embraced their assigned responsibilities. They experienced the same combat situations as the active-duty soldiers, and they executed their duties to the same standards expected of all SOF personnel.

While the learning curve may have been steeper for the RC soldiers, who had previously practiced their soldiering tasks only on a monthly basis, National Guardsmen and Reservists play a critical role in the implementation of "rotational warfare." Rotational warfare depends upon a competent, well-trained reserve force that can replace the limited number of active-duty SOF personnel in combat after a specified amount of time, usually 3-6 months. The reserve-component forces also contributed to stateside successes by helping maintain helicopters for the 160th SOAR, by augmenting the cadre and staff at SF schoolhouses, and by producing high-quality PSYOP products.

While the phenomenal success of OEF is not due to the efforts of any one SOF unit, the valuable contributions of every individual soldier in each component of the well-trained and dedicated ARSOF community are to be commended. Without the efforts of ARSOF soldiers, the war on terrorism could not have progressed so rapidly and so effectively. ✂

Vigilant Warrior 2002: War Game Demonstrates ARSOF's Value to the Objective Force

by Major General William G. Boykin

The 2002 Army Transformation war game, Vigilant Warrior, demonstrated the value that United States Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, will offer to the Army Transformation's Objective Force.

This year's Vigilant Warrior, which concluded April 26, focused on assessing both the design of the Objective Force and its capabilities for global and full-spectrum war-fighting. Set in the year 2020, the war game was based on a global situation that included a major regional contingency and several smaller-scale contingencies. Joint forces participated in the exercise, and a series of joint task forces provided command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or C⁴ISR. The U.S. Special Operations Command provided augmentation to the joint special-operations task forces.

ARSOF participated in all scenarios of this year's war game. The war game proved to be an excellent means of evaluating concepts of the future and identifying issues that require further development. During the evaluation of each of the scenarios, one common lesson emerged: ARSOF are a key component of the Objective Force. It is more important now than ever before that ARSOF be better integrated into both joint and Army war-fighting doctrine. ARSOF represent a multifunctional battlefield operating system, a maneuver element, and an operational enabler for achieving objectives

that range from strategic to tactical.

In the future, the U.S. will maintain a strong interest in achieving its objectives through, with and by indigenous or surrogate forces. ARSOF are the combat multiplier. When the U.S. commits forces to any of the full range of ARSOF missions, the nation's demands and expectations run high. Because of the demands and the challenges of the missions, ARSOF must continue to invest the majority of their time and resources in training adaptive, mature and intelligent soldiers. Leader development and specialized training remain key to maintaining a quality force that will be capable of meeting the demands of future war-fighting.

A mission that continues to be critical to the achievement of U.S. objectives is nation- and army-building. When it is in the U.S. national interest to help develop the military capabilities of foreign nations or of indigenous groups, ARSOF will serve as a key enabler by developing the concepts and by executing the programs related to foreign internal defense. Special Forces works with foreign militaries and indigenous groups to develop focused war-fighting capabilities. Beginning at the individual level and working through battalion operations, SF soldiers can assist a host-nation's soldiers in developing and refining a full range of military capabilities.

ARSOF are capable of building other nations' armies because they have mas-

tered basic and advanced warrior skills and are able to teach those skills in a foreign environment. While language skills and cultural awareness are important, ARSOF's ability to effectively teach warrior skills is paramount. Unless SF soldiers are expert war-fighters, they cannot be effective in training others in the fundamentals of war-fighting. Basic marksmanship, patrolling, raids, ambushes, movements to contact, and offensive and defensive operations remain critical common denominators for all armed forces. Furthermore, much of the training in foreign environments must focus on operations in urban terrain. The Special Forces

During the evaluation of each of the scenarios, one common lesson emerged: ARSOF are a key component of the Objective Force. ... ARSOF represent a multifunctional battlefield operating system, a maneuver element, and an operational enabler for achieving objectives that range from strategic to tactical.

Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC, enhances the survival skills of SF teams and serves as a mission-enhancer. SFAUCC will continue to progress and to integrate new technologies, and in the future, SF soldiers will integrate SFAUCC into the training they provide to foreign armies.

ARSOF must not only stay abreast of conventional war-fighting doctrine, they must become experts in Army, SOF and joint doctrine. As ARSOF move toward the Objective Force, new doctrine emerges, and ARSOF continue to rapidly integrate new doctrine, tactics and techniques, as well as new technologies, into the training programs of all ARSOF war-fighting units. In the future, few operations will be unilateral U.S. actions, and coalition operations will be pre-eminent. When called into action as a coalition support team, or CST, with foreign forces, ARSOF must be adept at interpreting the principles of U.S. doc-

trine for the other members of the coalition. In many cases, the members of the CST will later work with the same forces they have trained. That fact mandates that new U.S. Army C⁴ISR systems be fielded to ARSOF so that the coalition commanders can integrate maneuvers into the common operational picture that U.S. commanders will use in providing command and control to the coalition partners during tactical operations.

Promoting security cooperation with allies and friends will continue to be a task for the U.S. Army as part of its campaign strategy. Occasionally, the U.S. Army will "create" favorable balances of power by assisting friendly nations' efforts in internal defense and development, or IDAD. It is reasonable to believe that most U.S. campaigns will continue to require IDAD during some phase of the campaign, if not throughout the campaign. As a means of reducing the potential for hostilities in areas in which U.S. forces are conducting operations, security-cooperation efforts could be performed in other areas nearby in order to divert the war-fighting forces and logistics of hostile groups.

While IDAD is a multiagency responsibility, ARSOF remain an invaluable combat multiplier. Conventional forces may be employed to establish a secure environment within which a nation can rebuild unimpeded. Soldiers in Special Forces; Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, integrate their operations with the operations of other elements of the U.S. government, of foreign governments, of nongovernment organizations and private volunteer organizations, and of host-nation national systems. CA works through the indigenous leadership to assess or re-establish government infrastructures and civil infrastructures. PSYOP elements play a critical role in the information campaign to influence the behavior of designated target audiences at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Through a variety of mediums, PSYOP units also inform the public and indigenous populations of U.S. objectives in an effort to gain popular support and to provide public-service information.

On the future global battlefield, ARSOF will offer Army and joint-force commanders a multispectrum, specialized force capable of performing full-spectrum unconventional operations. ARSOF can help commanders achieve national objectives with a unity of effort and an economy of force. They can wage unconventional warfare, or UW, to shape the operational environment and, occasionally, to create a situation that will compel adversaries to divert their forces and to shift their focus from the primary area of operations. As required, ARSOF may execute a UW campaign as the main effort, and then employ their integrated assets to provide security-cooperation programs once combat operations have been completed. ✂

Major General William G. Boykin is commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

As I Saw It: The Eyewitness Report of a Soldier Who Fought During World War II and Survived

by Colonel Vernon E. Greene, U.S. Army (ret.)

When I was born in West Virginia May 11, 1923, World War I was still a vivid memory to most Americans, and war clouds had already begun to darken the skies over Asia and Europe.

I was the middle of nine children — three boys and six girls. When my father died in 1938, I did as my older brother had done: I dropped out of school to work in the coal mines to supplement the family income. The daily wage was just short of \$5. Although we were required to report to work Monday through Friday, we were paid only if we were needed. Otherwise, we returned home without pay. Those who were fortunate worked three days a week.

One evening the younger of my two brothers and I were trying to sneak into a boxing arena. When an official came to the door and asked if anyone wanted to box, my brother volunteered me. We got in free, but I lost the fight. I fought a few more times before I entered the Army. I got three dollars if I lost, and five dollars if I won. I usually picked up three dollars. At the age of 16, I was going to work not knowing whether I was going to earn a wage each day or whether I

would even earn \$3 for a three-round fight. I seemed to be locked in for life.

An uncle whom I never had a chance to meet helped shape my course. He was a Georgia boy, my father's brother, Reney, whose neat, handsome World War I soldier's picture hung in our front room. I never knew what rank Uncle Reney held, but from those who knew him, I learned that he set an outstanding example for others

and that he was admired and respected. I decided that I wanted to become a soldier and move away from the coal dust and the daily risk of losing life or limb.

As the Japanese, German and Italian governments became more vocal and as their military capabilities became more visible, the United States was becoming concerned about a possible worldwide conflict. The U.S. Army welcomed volunteers and paid privates \$21 a month. Too young to enlist without an adult signature, I asked my oldest sister to sign the necessary papers, and on Oct. 18, 1939, I was en route from Bluefield, W.Va., to Fort Thomas, Ky. Upon arrival at Fort Thomas, I was physically and mentally tested and then sent, still in my civilian clothes, directly to what would be my home for the next three years, Company M, 10th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division.

I was not to become familiar with the terms "basic training," "boot camp," and "advanced training" until I returned from Iceland in 1943. In the 10th Regiment, a soldier learned by on-the-job training. It was a difficult environment for a tenderfoot. I lived with my peers, my leaders, my superiors and my



Photo courtesy Vernon Greene
Vernon Greene on the day he entered the Army, Oct. 18, 1939, at the age of 16.

evaluators. There was little room for me to err without being critiqued. Punishment was readily available through extra guard duty, kitchen police, policing for match sticks and cigarette butts, marking targets on the rifle range, oral and written reprimands, and reduction in rank by local authority.

Early in my 10th Infantry days, a corporal assembled about 30 of us new soldiers from different units for basic close-order drill. He showed us a black pen and said, "This is a yellow pen." He then walked up to each soldier and asked him the color of the pen. Each soldier, including me, responded, "Yellow, Corporal." He said, "That's great. We understand each other."

Late in 1939, we moved to Fort McClellan, Ala., to join other units of the 5th Infantry Division and to spend a cold winter living in tents. At Fort McClellan we learned to function as a team during squad, platoon, and larger-unit field exercises. In the spring of 1940, the 5th Infantry Division moved to Fort Benning, Ga., for field maneuvers — the largest peacetime field maneuvers in U.S. history — conducted in Louisiana and Texas.

In the fall of 1940 we moved into new wooden barracks at Fort Custer, Mich. — our first permanent shelters in more than a year. Our training there concentrated on individual proficiency and small-unit tactics. By that time I had been promoted to corporal, and I was the leader of a machine-gun squad. My promotion brought my monthly pay up to \$42, from which I sent my mother an allotment. We enjoyed our stay at Fort Custer. I fought a few bouts, but I soon learned that being both a good squad leader and a good boxer required more time than there was in a day. Because I loved soldiering, and because I was not very profi-

cient in the ring, the decision was easy for me, especially after a professional fighter knocked me out in my last fight.

In the fall of 1941 we took a motor trip from Michigan to the harbor in New York City. The Army did not want anyone to know that we were on our way to Iceland to augment the British forces who had been rushed there after the Germans took Norway. Later, we learned that some of the British soldiers were veterans of Dunkirk. They seemed twice our age, and they became valuable instructors and friends. During our stay in Iceland, we called our regiment the

I soon learned that being both a good squad leader and a good boxer required more time than there was in a day. Because I loved soldiering, and because I was not very proficient in the ring, the decision was easy for me.

10th Labor Regiment. We worked 12 hours a day, seven days a week, primarily unloading ships and building fortifications and roads. We also manned defensive positions and patrolled the beaches. With our work schedule, the summer days and winter nights seemed even longer than they were. It was rumored that prisoners in the guardhouse worked only eight hours per day, five days a week. Perhaps the appeal of the guardhouse workday caused discipline to get out of hand. Our first sergeant called a meeting of the

NCOs. In a few words, he stated that he would stop sending people to the guardhouse, that the work would be done, and that if we could not get our soldiers to perform, we could turn in our stripes, and he would find someone who could. Discipline improved.

German military air and sea power in the North Atlantic region had increased considerably after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and of France in 1940. Prior to the U.S. entry into the war, German reconnaissance aircraft would fly over our firing ranges, but we were not permitted to fire on them. One morning in December 1941, as the first sergeant was about to dismiss us from the 4 a.m. reveille formation, he said, "Oh, yes! The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Dismissed!" After that, we saw more enemy aircraft and submarines, and many allied ships were sunk en route to us and to our European allies. Caring for the shipwreck survivors (mostly Merchant Marines) became an additional mission for us.

On Oct. 24, 1942, I was promoted to sergeant and appointed section leader of two machine-gun squads. Shortly thereafter, I appeared before a board for Officer Candidate School and was selected for the Infantry Officers' School at Fort Benning, Ga. Although I attended OCS there, I did not graduate, and I was assigned to Company M, 311th Infantry Regiment, 78th (Lightning) Infantry Division, located at Camp Butner, N.C. The division had been activated Aug. 15, 1942, from a reserve unit. Most of the cadre were from the 29th Infantry Regiment. They were much older than I, and they knew each other. I did not know any of them. For the first time in my military career, I was a replacement, an unknown quantity.

I was assigned to be a section leader to two machine-gun squads, the same position I had held in Iceland. Following three weeks of maneuvers in South Carolina in November 1943, the division returned to Camp Butner to prepare for departure to the Second Army maneuvers in Tennessee in January 1944. The month prior to our departure, I was promoted to first sergeant, at age 20. For the next 2 1/2 months, we slogged our way through mud, through streams, and over mountains. We were being hardened for combat. On April 1, the division rolled into a new station at Camp Pickett, Va.

After undergoing many personnel changes directed by Washington, the division began field exercises at the battalion, regimental, and combat team levels. By September, there was no doubt that the division was going overseas, and by Sept. 26, we were sailing for England. The 78th Infantry Division spent approximately four weeks in Bournemouth, England, but by the end of November, it had moved to Tongres, Belgium. In December, the 78th moved into Germany, first to the Rotgen area and then to the outskirts of Lammersdorf.

The 311th Regiment was introduced to combat Dec. 9, 1944, when the regiment took over 7,000 yards of the line in the Hurtgen Forest, one of the bloodiest battlegrounds of the war. By Dec. 23, the snow-lined foxholes of our defensive position covered 12,000 yards. Our positions were on the northern shoulder of the Ardennes salient, the "Bulge." With Germans on three sides of us, we stayed there until Jan. 30, 1945. During 130 days of continuous combat, the 311th fought in the Hurtgen Forest, on the Siegfried Line, in Nideggen, along the Roer River, on the Cologne plain, in Remagen, and in the Ruhr Pocket. To tell fully of

the death, bravery, fear, sorrow and suffering of those operations would require volumes, and I will leave the details to more gifted writers.

On Dec. 11, the 78th Division, now attached to V Corps and the U.S. First Army, received the mission to seize the town of Schmidt and to capture the Schwammenauel Dam. However, the execution of the mission was postponed because of an increase in enemy air and ground activities, including the infiltration of enemy para-



Photo courtesy Vernon Greene
Corporal Vernon Greene (top) with members of his machine-gun squad in Iceland, 1941.

troopers dropping into our zone. The increased activity was part of the German counteroffensive into the Ardennes. The 78th was instructed to halt its drive and to take the defensive. The division's sector, north of the enemy thrust, had to be held, so the 78th's soldiers dug into the snow and prepared coordinated defensive positions throughout the sector.

By mid-January, the German offensive into the Ardennes had been smashed, and the 78th prepared to resume the offensive. On Jan. 28, during a heavy snowfall,

the division staff assembled the regimental commanders to discuss the new offensive and to receive the field orders. The 311th Infantry Regiment was assigned the task of seizing Kesternich and Huppenbroich. The 311th's 2nd Battalion priored Kesternich away from the Germans during a two-day battle. For this action, the 2nd Battalion was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. Staff Sergeant Jonah E. Kelley of the 2nd Battalion was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, the only one awarded to a member of the 78th Division during World War II.

The 3rd Battalion (my battalion), dressed in white camouflage suits, advanced over open, snow-covered terrain, then crossed a cavern-like ravine to reach Huppenbroich. The fierceness of the struggle is evidenced by the casualty list for the battle. The battlefield was liberally covered with dead soldiers. More than a year later, while I was stationed at Camp Robinson, Ark., I was surprised to receive the Silver Star for my minor role at Huppenbroich.

The way was now clear for further action against the Schwammenauel Dam and Schmidt. Still a first sergeant, I was assigned to be a platoon leader (a lieutenant's position), in charge of four machine-gun squads. The 3rd Battalion and other division units received orders to move toward Schmidt, which was located 2 1/2 miles west of the Roer River. Other divisions thrown against Schmidt had been driven back with heavy losses.

The plan called for us to ride into Schmidt on tanks. We had difficulty finding the tanks and loading onto them because of incoming artillery fire and a lack of communication with the tank crews. When we were about 200 yards from Schmidt, the lead tank was

knocked out by an anti-tank gun located near the edge of town. The other tanks turned and started toward the rear. My battalion commander ordered us off the tanks. We assembled our platoons, moved rapidly across the open fields and dispersed toward the town. Bullets from machine guns zinged overhead while the enemy gunners adjusted their range. Fortunately, most of the enemy artillery was targeted on our assembly areas, now vacant. With adjacent units, we reached the center of town by nightfall. After dark, tank crews on foot led their tanks forward in low gear to our new defensive positions.

The 311th was instructed to assemble in Schmidt as the division reserve. While we were there, I received mysterious orders: 1. Take a driver, a jeep with a full tank of gas, and a five-gallon can of gas; 2. Go to the regimental headquarters, take a bath, get a clean uniform and report to the adjutant. I did as I was told. When I reported to the adjutant, I was formally discharged from the Army of the U.S. and told to report to the 78th Division headquarters. There I was given a hot meal and a bed and instructed to eat breakfast early and be ready to meet the division commander, Major General Edwin P. Parker Jr., at 8 a.m. the next day.

The next morning I was seated in a room filled with officers when General Parker entered. All present snapped to attention. I was introduced to the general, an outstanding soldier, who swore me into the Army of the U.S. as a second lieutenant and placed a gold bar on my collar after the adjutant read that I was commissioned "for the duration of the war plus six months." I was surprised when the general took the crossed rifles from the collar of a lieutenant colonel and placed them on my col-

lar opposite the second-lieutenant bar. That gesture concluded my commissioning, and I went back to the war.

When I returned to the 311th, Schmidt and the Schwammenauel dam had been secured, and the 311th had crossed the Roer River at Zerkall and Nideggen. I was pleased to be back home. It was a bit awkward for my friends to call me "sir" instead of Sergeant Greene. I wondered what they called me behind my back.

Although none of us knew it, we

I was surprised when the general took the crossed rifles from the collar of a lieutenant colonel and placed them on my collar opposite the second-lieutenant bar. That gesture concluded my commissioning, and I went back to the war.

were about to end the slow, tough fighting of the previous months and begin the race to the Rhine River. None of us could have guessed that within a month, we would be on the east bank of the Rhine. Along a route of attack that was thickly wooded and hilly, the regiment slugged its way forward against elements of the proud 3rd Parachute Division and other German units. Town after town fell rapidly. Late in the afternoon of March 7, after a day of hard fighting, troops of the U.S. 9th Armored Division reached the west bank of the Rhine at the town of Remagen, midway between Cologne and Koblenz. Remagen was an old

Roman town with a population of about 5,000. As a place from which we could launch an attack across the Rhine, Remagen offered many difficulties, but it had a double-track railroad bridge, just over 1,000 feet long, that had been built at the end of World War I.

The 311th was placed under the command of Brigadier General William M. Hoge, commander of the 9th Armored Division, for the expansion of the Remagen bridgehead. Hoge informed the 311th's commander, Colonel Chester Willingham, that he wanted one battalion of the regiment to move east astride the main highway in the HovelHimberg area, and the rest of the regiment to move north, in a column of battalions, along the east bank of the Rhine River to Honnef.

Early on March 8, the 311th rushed in to the bridge at Remagen to cross the Rhine and to expand the bridgehead. Riding in trucks, the regiment rolled through the rubble of crumbled rock, abandoned equipment and mangled bodies that littered Remagen. The 1st Battalion, in the lead, moved across the bridge and toward the front line, which was about 1,000 yards from the bridge. Because of an increase in combat activity, the 2nd and 3rd battalions had to dismount from their trucks west of the Rhine and follow on foot, bringing only their personal weapons. The heavier, crew-served weapons (machine guns, etc.) that would have provided needed firepower would follow later, on vehicles. Enemy bomber- and fighter-aircraft activity, added to the German's effective field artillery, encouraged us to move rapidly. The 311th was the first complete U.S. infantry regiment to cross the Rhine.

By 3:30 p.m. on March 8, the 311th, fighting to expand the crucial bridgehead, had closed on



The 10th SF Group Coin

In July 1969, while commander of the 10th Special Forces Group, Vernon Greene designed a coin intended to give the soldiers of the 10th SF Group a sense of pride in their unit. According to the 50th-anniversary annual published by the 10th SF Group in 2002, "A tradition was thus begun, calling for each Group member, past and present, to carry his coin at all times."

On the front of the coin, beneath the unit's official designation, is a replica of the Trojan-horse crest worn by members of the 10th SF Group on their berets during the 1950s, when the beret was still unofficial. The reverse side of the coin features a scroll with the Special Forces motto, "De Oppresso Liber." Beneath the scroll is an image of a beret carrying the SF crest. Below the beret is a large scroll that has space for engraving the owner's name. Below that is another scroll with the words, "The Best," which according to the annual, "signifies the goal of the Group and all its members — pre-eminence in all endeavors."

The original die for the coin was produced by the Robbins Manufacturing Company of Attleboro, Mass., which the annual says has minted all the coins to date. The 10th SF Group retains exclusive rights to the use of the coin.

Erpel. By nightfall, the 311th was joined by two armored infantry battalions of the 9th Armored Division; one battalion of the 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division; a troop of the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; one company of the 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion; and the 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry, 78th Infantry Division. In all, the U.S. force amounted to no more than a few thousand men and a handful of armor. While the total cost to the Germans was unknown,

a 60-hour accounting reported that 578 German soldiers were brought to our prisoner-of-war cages.

On March 10, Army engineers began constructing a pontoon bridge and a treadway bridge that were needed to replace the damaged railway bridge at Remagen. The Remagen bridgehead, 10 miles deep and 30 miles long, posed a serious threat to the heart of Germany. The Germans had planned to blow up the bridge rather than let it be captured, and they had

wired the necessary explosives for its detonation. They made several unsuccessful attempts to detonate the explosives. On March 15, the Germans sent bombers against the bridge, and swimmers armed with explosives. They also used a large railroad gun and V2 rockets to attack the bridge. On March 17, the bridge at Remagen collapsed. The Allied armies had drawn up along the entire length of the Rhine's west bank to attack in conjunction with the largest air assault of World War II, which occurred March 24.

In late March, as the 78th Division was defending the First Army's northern flank along the Sieg River, the 311th Regiment was relieved of duty for a five-day period of rest, recuperation, and training. Following those wonderful days, we were ordered to occupy newly acquired territory along the Sieg River. The regiment remained in this position while other elements of the First Army conducted a pincers movement to encircle the Ruhr Valley, Germany's richest industrial district. Later, attack orders placed the 78th Division in an offensive movement that was to culminate with the capture of Wuppertal (estimated population: 270,000). This maneuver played an important role in the elimination of the area called "The Ruhr Pocket," from which about 300,000 prisoners were taken by our forces.

As a subordinate unit, the 311th advanced about seven miles per day for eight days. Wide attacking zones, rugged terrain, and piecemeal resistance of the enemy dictated the nature of the action in the pocket. The climax of the regiment's drive came with the capture of Wuppertal on April 16, which proved to be our last day of combat. The Ruhr Pocket was not exactly a picnic, as the regiment suffered 37 men killed and 218 wounded. On

the credit side of the ledger, we captured 266 towns, overran 149 square miles of territory, took more than 15,000 prisoners, and captured large quantities of materiel and equipment.

In addition to performing many small, time-consuming tasks, the 311th Regiment also assisted in securing First Army communication and supply lines against any guerrilla-warfare activities that the enemy might instigate. These tasks continued after the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 7 at Rheims, France.

Another task was tending to the thousands of displaced persons the Germans had brought from conquered countries to be used as slave labor. We assisted in feeding, clothing and housing these people until they could be returned to their homes. However, some of these individuals attempted to loot German houses and farms. We attempted to maintain law and order in the communities throughout our assigned areas.

During this period, the ground forces in Europe provided a source of manpower for the expected invasion of Japan. The 78th Division was sent to Berlin as part of the occupation force. Earlier, I had let it be known that I wished to remain in the Army after the war. I was placed in the 70th Infantry Division, a unit that was deploying to the Far East. We were moved to France to await ship transportation through the Suez Canal. The victory over Japan came while I was in France. I had accumulated enough credit points to return to the U.S. early, and my port of embarkation was changed to a port in the Normandy area. As I boarded the ship, I was humbled and pleased to recognize a soldier who had been in Company M, 10th Infantry, when we were sent to Iceland in the fall of 1941. I was hum-

bled because he appeared to be finishing a four-year tour overseas, and I was pleased because he was still "vertical and mobile."

When we arrived in New York, Red Cross ladies greeted us with smiles, coffee and doughnuts. Everywhere, we were greeted with unhesitating handshakes or pats on the back. What a contrast that welcome was to the silent treatment we received upon our return from Korea. An even greater contrast was the reception we received when

With time, the recollections of ice-covered foxholes, the rip of burp guns, and the screams of the wounded have dimmed, but the friendships formed during the common danger of war remain forever bright.

we returned from Vietnam: U.S. citizens carrying protest posters and calling us murderers. Maybe those later reception groups were not sufficiently aware of our governmental structure to know that their duly-elected civilian officials had placed the soldiers in harm's way. Why spit on the uniform?

In May 2000, I had the privilege of visiting the area in Europe over which we had fought 55 years earlier. We visited battlesites as well as two cemeteries, one in Belgium and the other in Holland, where thousands of American soldiers are buried. In Belgium, Holland and Germany, people ranging from mayors to school children were eager to tell us how much they appreciate our friendship today

and our accomplishments of years past. I wish every American citizen could make a trip of that sort; it might give them a better idea of where we have been and who we are.

It is a pleasure now to reflect on these significant years of my youth. With time, the recollections of ice-covered foxholes, the rip of burp guns, and the screams of the wounded have dimmed, but the friendships formed during the common danger of war remain forever bright. My old companions, my current pillar of friends and my wonderful family form my cornerstone. To all these, I dedicate these remembrances. ✕

Colonel Vernon E. Greene's 34 years in the U.S. Army include service during World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Colonel Greene enlisted in 1939 at the age of 16, became a first sergeant at the age of 20 and received a battlefield commission while serving in Europe during World War II. His duty assignments include service both at NATO headquarters and at SHAPE headquarters. While in Special Forces, he served as an SF staff officer in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; served at the Special Warfare Center as a division chief and as an instructor in the SF School; served as a member of the 7th SF Group; and served as commander of the 10th SF Group (1968 to 1970). Colonel Greene attended the Army War College and the National War College. Following his retirement from the Army in 1974, he taught at both the high-school and community-college level for several years.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Moscow reports Israelis recruiting Russian veterans

According to Russian reports, former Russian servicemen who have settled in Israel are being recruited by the Israeli military. Former marine and airborne soldiers, as well as others who have served in Chechnya and in other Russian conflict areas, are said to be especially sought. While the recruiting action incorporates the skills of former soldiers into the Israeli forces, it also lowers the unemployment rate among Russian émigrés.

Mexico's Yucatan state to create armed auxiliary

While the Mexican Attorney General's Office has undertaken a "weapons for provisions" trade-in program in Yucatan state to reduce drug and other criminal violence, Mexican military authorities in the 32nd Military Zone are creating an armed auxiliary. Under the military's plan, armed contingents will be drawn from the local populations in eastern rural areas of Yucatan to assist the army when necessary. The auxiliary will be required to provide assistance during natural disasters and to provide back-up in combating drug traffickers and other criminals. The auxiliary will comprise 21 10-man squads. After receiving basic weapons training and self-defense training, the members of the auxiliary will be armed with "short-range" weapons (presumably shotguns). The program is analogous to other efforts in Central and South America that deal with organized criminal and insurgent activities in areas where the military or police presence is limited.

Tri-Border area may have links to terrorism

In the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S., a number of regions have received scrutiny as potential vectors of international terrorism. One of those regions is the "Tri-Border" area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, where frontiers of the three countries come together. Like many frontier regions, the Tri-Border area has become known for its smuggling ventures and other assorted criminal enterprises. The largest Arab community in Latin America is centered in the area, and some of the Arab inhabitants are said to be strongly anti-U.S. and anti-Israel in their views. Because of the substantial Islamic population in the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este and in the surrounding area, and because of enduring reports of terrorist training camps, rest areas, and terrorist-associated alien and materiel smuggling, the area has also been considered a potential jump-off point for international terrorist activity. Recent developments have fueled further interest. For example, the importing of 30,000 ski masks to Ciudad del Este by a Lebanese importer who had connections to the area raised many questions and suggested a terrorist nexus. So, too, did the Brazilian arrest of Egyptian Mohammed Ali Abul-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, an alleged member of the extremist group Gamaa Islamiya, which has cells in Brazil and in Ciudad del Este, and ties to al-Qaeda. Growing foreign interest regarding terrorist links to the Tri-Border area has sometimes provoked strong adverse reaction both from the respective national governments and from media commentators. For example, statements made by senior U.S. government representatives in May about the existence of terrorists in the Tri-Border area sparked irritation and denials from regional commentators. Nevertheless, the area is likely to remain an object of interest for international-security specialists.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

PSYOP gains additional drill-sergeant positions

The Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office has negotiated the expansion of the role of the PSYOP specialist in the Army Training and Doctrine Command's drill-sergeant program. Beginning in mid-2003, the PSYOP MOS (37F) will gain four authorizations for E6 drill sergeants at Fort Benning, Ga. The positions will support one-station unit training in Fort Benning's Infantry Training Brigade. Selection for the positions will be highly competitive. A drill-sergeant assignment will provide outstanding opportunities for a soldier to enhance his individual leadership skills. Because it may also carry a great deal of weight with senior enlisted promotion boards, the assignment may also enhance the soldier's opportunities for career progression. The SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM will begin selecting soldiers for the male-only positions in October 2002, based on the following criteria (in order of precedence):

- At least 18 months of successful tactical leadership experience in the 9th PSYOP Battalion and a combat-arms-secondary MOS.
- At least 18 months of successful tactical leadership experience in the 9th PSYOP Battalion.
- At least 18 months of successful leadership experience in PSYOP and a combat-arms-secondary MOS.

The selection criteria emphasize the importance of successful tactical leadership experience. Soldiers who are interested in the drill-sergeant positions or who are interested in obtaining more information should contact SFC Neil Dziemian in the PERSCOM SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at DSN 221-8901 or commercial (703) 325-8901; or send e-mail to: Neil.Dziemian@hoffman.army.mil. Soldiers may also contact Sergeant Major Eric Scheib, SWCS SOPO, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: scheibe@soc.mil.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Major promotion board selects 65 CA officers

The 2002 reserve-component major promotion board considered 106 officers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 65. The selection rate for the CA branch continues to be higher than the average rate for the Army Reserve. The following table summarizes the CA Branch's results:

	Considered	Selected	% Selected
USAR (previously considered)	1990	288	14
CA (previously considered)	16	6	38
USAR (first consideration)	4533	1745	38
CA (first consideration)	90	59	66
USAR (total)	6523	2033	31
CA (total)	106	65	61

For additional information, telephone Major Charles R. Munguia at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: munguich@soc.mil.

FA 39 LTC promotion rate dips below Army's average

The FY 2002 lieutenant-colonel promotion board was the first promotion board to be held under Officer Personnel Management System III. The board considered 68 officers who were members of FA 39 and selected 19. The board selected one officer above the zone, 15 officers in the promotion zone and three officers below the zone. The FA-39 promotion-zone selection rate of 71.4 percent was slightly below the Army's promotion-zone rate of 77.3 percent, but the FA 39 below-the-zone selection rate of 11.5 percent was double the Army's rate.

FY 2004 LTC command board will fill FA 39 positions

The FY 2004 lieutenant-colonel command board will convene Oct. 1, 2002. The following commands will be available to FA 39 officers: 1st PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group (FA 39B); 3rd PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group (FA 39B); ARFOR, JTF-B (FA 39A); 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (FA 39A); 96th CA Battalion (FA 39C). The Department of the Army has approved the addition of the 4th PSYOP Group's PACOM battalion (FA 39B) to the list of commands that will be available to FA 39 officers during the FY 2004 board.

FA 39 officers may apply for constructive credit

FA 39 officers may request that both their military and civilian experience be considered as a basis for granting constructive credit toward completion of the Regional Studies Course. To be considered for constructive credit, applicants must submit a memorandum that addresses the following qualifications:

- *Political-military analytical proficiency.* The officer must have experience that demonstrates a proficiency in international studies and in political-military analysis related to the use of special operations.
- *Regional expertise.* The officer must have experience that demonstrates performance of a comprehensive, detailed area analysis of a region of concentration.
- *Cultural expertise.* The officer must have experience that demonstrates possession of the skills necessary for successful communication across cultural boundaries.
- *Comparative political studies.* The officer must have experience that

SWCS, USASOC, DA pursue SF warrant-officer initiatives

- demonstrates an understanding of major modern political ideologies.
- *Economics*. The officer must have experience that demonstrates an understanding of the basic theories of national and international economic phenomena.

When requesting the substitution of college or graduate-level courses for experience, applicants must furnish course descriptions. Requests must be submitted to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, Attn: Jeanne Goldmann. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Department of the Army are pursuing several initiatives to assist in the recruiting and retention of Special Forces warrant officers.

Short-term

- NCOs who become SF warrant officers will be able to retain their special-duty assignment pay as a part of "save pay." This action is expected to be approved shortly and should become effective in October 2002.
- SOPO has requested that DA allow SF sergeants first class who become SF warrant officers to be promoted to CWO 2 when they complete the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course. This initiative, if approved, is anticipated to last only two years.

Long-term

- SOPO has requested a warrant-officer accession bonus for NCOs who become SF warrant officers. The proposal is being considered by DA and is expected to be approved for implementation in FY 2004.
- SOPO has requested a critical-skills retention bonus for CWO 3s and CWO 4s in MOS 180A.
- SOPO has requested that designated SF warrant officers below the rank of CWO 5 be allowed to serve 24 years of warrant-officer service. The Warrant Officer Management Act requires warrant officers below the grade of CWO 5 to retire when they reach 24 years of warrant-officer service or 30 years of active federal service, whichever comes first.
- SOPO has requested that the Army adjust the pay scales for warrant officers so that an NCO who becomes a warrant officer will not have to rely on "save pay."

PERSCOM points of contact

SF Branch chief	LTC Dave Maxwell DSN 221-3173
LTC assignments	MAJ (P) Jack Jensen DSN 221-3169
MAJ assignments	MAJ Ken Hunt DSN 221-5739
CPT assignments	CPT Steve Johnson DSN 221-3175
Accessions	CPT Joe Lopez DSN 221-3178
Field-grade technician	Ms. Sandra Bryant DSN 221-7915
Accessions/CPT technician	Ms. Pam Redman DSN 221-2452



Update

Special Warfare

Kensinger takes command of USASOC

Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger Jr. took command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command from Lieutenant General Doug Brown in a ceremony at Fort Bragg Aug. 29.

Kensinger was formerly the Army assistant deputy chief of staff for operations. His special-operations assignments include commander, Special Operations Command-Central; deputy commanding general and chief of staff, USASOC; commander, 3rd SF Group; commander, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group; executive officer, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group; commander, SF Battalion Task Force, Joint Task Force 11, in Honduras; and detachment commander in the 7th SF Group.

Kensinger is a 1970 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He earned a master's degree from Louisiana State University in 1980.

Brown is slated to become the deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.

Emblem represents ARSOBL's missions

The Special Warfare Center and School's Army Special Operations Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, now has its own emblem.

The emblem was created by the Army Institute of Heraldry. The five lightning bolts represent the following: Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Operations Aviation and Rangers; sea, air, land, space and information; or concept development, war gaming, simulation, experimentation and analysis. The



The emblem of the Army Special Operations Battle Lab

Trojan horse head denotes cunning and stealth, and the scales symbolize analysis and assessment. The checkered field in perspective symbolizes strategy and simulation directed toward a future horizon. The torch reflects learning and guidance; the shield represents national defense; and the wreath represents honor and high achievement.

USASOC announces Soldier, NCO of Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command announced the winners of the Soldier and NCO of the Year competition July 25.

The USASOC Soldier of the Year is Specialist Joshua C. Simmons, a radio and communications security repairer with Company A, Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

The USASOC NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Peter N. Johnson, an Army Reserve psychological-operations specialist assigned to Headquarters Support Company, 17th Psychological Operations Battalion, Joliet, Ill.

Runners-up were Specialist Aaron J. Laurich, Company C, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; and Staff Sergeant Thomas N. White, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

SWCS videotapes available through DoD Web site

Two videotape products produced at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School are now available to requestors through a Department of Defense Web site.

The mountaineering video series, produced at the request of the 10th Special Forces Group, consists of six videotapes: "Basic Mountaineering" (production identification number, or PIN, 710962); "Level 2 Mountaineering Techniques Part 1" (PIN 710963); "Level 2 Mountaineering Techniques Part 2" (PIN 710963); "Mountaineering Rescue" (PIN 710964); "Backpacking with Mules and Llamas" (PIN 710965); and "Medical and Weather Considerations in a Mountain Environment" (PIN 710966).

The second videotape, "Army Oil Analysis Program" (PIN 711439), was produced for all Army units and Army laboratories.

To order copies of these training products, visit the following Web site: <http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil>. Click on "Central DoD Production Database DAVIS/DITIS," then search for videos by subject, title or PIN. The database will allow requestors to locate most special-operations training subjects. The videotapes are free to requestors within DoD. Because of their con-

tent, some video products may have limited distribution and will not be available to all requestors.

The mountaineering and oil-analysis tapes were produced by SWCS's Audiovisual Branch, Directorate Management Office, Directorate of Training and Doctrine. For additional information, telephone Diana Wells, DMO AV Branch, at DSN 239-2472 or commercial (910)432-2472.

96th CA Battalion soldiers receive awards for OEF

Forty-nine soldiers from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion received awards Aug. 26 for their efforts during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Awards included the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device, the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Combat Medical Badge, the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal and the Army Achievement Medal.

The soldiers had been deployed to either Afghanistan or the Philippines, assisting those nations with the task of eliminating terrorism and rebuilding infrastructure. The soldiers also provided food and technical assistance to local populations.

"We went there as a group. ... All that we do ... is a team concept, and I am just one of the members of a team," said Sergeant First Class Byron R. Shrader, a medic assigned to the 96th, who received both the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device and the Combat Medical Badge.

112th SOSB receives new commander

Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Gallagher took command of the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Bell Jr. in a ceremony at Fort Bragg July 3.

Gallagher, a native of Pittsburg, Kan., received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at Pittsburg

State University in 1985.

His previous assignments include division telecommunications officer, platoon leader and executive officer, 123rd Signal Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division, Wuerzburg, Germany; and assistant division signal officer, signal battalion operations officer and secretary of the general staff, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

Bell, who had commanded the 112th since June 29, 2000, will attend the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. — *Barbara Ashley, USASOC PAO*

Efforts to measure PSYOP effectiveness continue

The Special Warfare Center and School's Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division is encouraging all sectors of the PSYOP community to help improve the success of PSYOP by offering recommendations for refining the recently proposed PSYOP measures-of-effectiveness, or MOE, model.

The MOE model offers a means of evaluating PSYOP effectiveness by examining PSYOP task execution and target-audience behavioral responses (*Special Warfare*, June 2002, 67). The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division is working to refine the proposed MOE model in order to produce a valid methodology that can assess the accuracy, persuasiveness and productivity of PSYOP products.

U.S. military PSYOP specialists target the emotions, motives and reasoning of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals to effect attitudinal and behavioral changes consistent with U.S. policy objectives. They analyze numerous factors while trying to develop effective PSYOP programs. But, given the unpredictability of human behavior and the cultural, historical, social and environmental factors that can affect a particular target audience, measuring the effectiveness of PSYOP prod-

ucts can be difficult. Correlating a significant behavioral response with a specific PSYOP activity is another difficult but necessary step. A third critical step is determining whether the PSYOP objective has been met.

The MOE model recommends a systematic approach that would consider tasks at the "micro" and "macro" levels, from the analysis, planning and development processes through the execution of programs. The model examines the PSYOP objectives, themes, collective and individual tasks, and product introduction. It also examines behavioral responses in order to determine the level of success. Specifically, it examines task execution during the planning, preparing, distributing and disseminating phases of a PSYOP campaign.

Members of the PSYOP community may derive worthwhile information regarding the effectiveness of past and present PSYOP programs from the following documents:

- Situation reports from strategic, operational and tactical missions and exercises.
- After-action reviews.
- Reports of PSYOP or IO working groups.
- Evaluations performed by PSYOP assessment teams.
- Campaign plans and programs.
- Notes or logs.
- Intelligence requests for PSYOP-relevant information.
- Survey research proposals and designs.

The MOE project will be a long-term endeavor, and the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division will provide periodic updates. To submit recommendations or to obtain more information, telephone Lynn Gilfus, project officer, at DSN 236-1318 or commercial (910) 396-1318; or e-mail gilfusl@soc.mil.



Book Reviews

Special Warfare


The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War. By Ralph Wetterhahn. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2001. ISBN: 0-7867-0858-1. 400 pages. \$27.

Ralph Wetterhahn's *The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War* tells the story of the seizure of the United States merchant vessel *Mayaguez* by the Khmer Rouge in 1975. The operation to rescue the vessel and its crew was this reviewer's first combat mission: I was a second lieutenant flying one of the HH-53 rescue helicopters.

In *The Last Battle*, Wetterhahn presents two stories. The first is an account of his visit to the island of Koh Tang during the late 1990s, as a member of JTF Full Accounting. Cambodians and Americans fought at Koh Tang May 15, 1975, over the *Mayaguez* and its crew, which the Cambodians had seized. Wetterhahn tells how he and others searched for the remains of the Americans left on that battlefield and in the wreckage of the helicopters that had crashed and sank offshore.

Wetterhahn's first-person narrative of the search and of the discovery of the remains of three Marines who were missing in action establishes his credibility. Then, from telling the tale of researchers digging for bones and relics, Wetterhahn flashes back to the story of the battle itself, which he tells from various points of view.

His account relates decisions made at the White House by then-President Gerald Ford and his staff, as well as decisions made by the



leaders of the forces of the Marines, Navy and Air Force. He also tells the stories of the fighters themselves — the captains, sergeants and lance corporals — and explains the chaos of battle, the shooting-down of helicopters and even the workings of tactical communications in each aircraft. Wetterhahn also includes the experiences of a member of the *Mayaguez* crew and the memories of one of the Khmer company commanders, whom he interviewed during the 1990s.

Wetterhahn manages to sustain an interesting narrative. He keeps the reader informed regarding the point of view and the time of the action, and he provides some good observations on the chaos of battle. But his analysis of the motives of the U.S. leaders, whom he appears to despise, is questionable. Those leaders are shown as devoid of concern about the crew of the merchant ship, the Marines in battle, and the helicopter crews who

were shot down. In Wetterhahn's account, they seem to care only about the public-relations potential of providing the American people with an apparent victory. The Marines appear to be led by officers who only want to kill and who care little for their men. Conversely, the Cambodians appear to be the ones who were attacked. The Cambodian motive for seizing the ship is not covered, and the book contains very little of the murderous history of the Cambodian regime of Pol Pot. As a historical analysis, the book displays clear bias.

Wetterhahn also fails to verify some of his information. The most glaring example is that he accepts as true the Khmer assertion that 72 men held off the U.S. Marines, airstrikes and helicopters. But in *A Very Short War*, an earlier book about the *Mayaguez* incident, Dr. John F. Guilmartin confirmed that Khmer casualties were 50 killed in action and more than 70 wounded. Wetterhahn seems to have put his story of the battle together in order to provide context to the search for the missing Marines. In doing so, he put his story together hastily and researched it poorly.

It is sad that the story of the search for and the recovery of the Marines — Joseph Hargrove, Gary Hall and Danny Marshall — is overshadowed by the errors in the story of the *Mayaguez* incident and in the author's "blame America" analysis. In making the search and recovery a small part of the book, Wetterhahn missed his chance. *The Last Battle* could have been a tale about the perseverance to give closure to three men's lives. That tale should have been the largest part of the book. It is one in which Wetterhahn took part personally, and it is one

that he could easily have gotten right. As it is, the reader is unsure what to believe, because so little care was taken with so many facts. The bottom line of this review is that Wetterhahn tries to do too much, tries to analyze too many characters, and strays from the facts. Overall, *The Last Battle* is a good read — spoiled.

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In Athena's Camp: Preparing For Conflict in the Information Age. Edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1997. ISBN 0-8330-2514-7. 501 pages. \$36.

In Athena's Camp is a collection of essays that discuss ways in which conflict can be waged in the postindustrial world.

In the first section of the book, the essays examine the current revolution in military affairs, or RMA, and note that it is mainly information-driven. RMAs occur periodically in history, evolving out of a particular technological or organizational breakthrough that has radical effects on doctrine. In the current RMA, as in previous ones, those who have the wisdom to see more profound meanings of new systems will be the most successful.

The essays in the second section maintain that information systems have become so critical to the military world and the civilian world that those systems can be both the means of attack and the target of an attack. An information-warfare attack, made with the same level of audacity as the Sept. 11 attack, might be less bloody but could have the potential to be far more obtrusive into the ways that our society operates.

The third section of the book discusses ways in which information technology is changing society. Global interconnectivity can bring profound societal changes, as soci-

eties are pushed in seemingly contradictory directions. Access to information makes hierarchies less efficient: Component groups may not feel it necessary to participate in a state hierarchy of groups that have different interests. At the same time, groups and individuals that are geographically dispersed can form supranational communities, based on a common element that transcends national borders. These communities are not organized as hierarchies, but as networks.

The information revolution favors networked organizations. Networked organizations are more flexible and can act upon information faster than hierarchies can.


The book uses the Zapatista revolt of 1994 as an example of a networked organization waging a conflict. The Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN, in Chiapas, Mexico, occupied several local towns and declared war on the Mexican government. Besides performing traditional guerrilla operations, the EZLN linked into communication nodes that had been formed by a network of nongovernment organizations, or NGOs, operating in the area. The NGOs included religious groups, human-rights groups and

peace groups. The members of the network shared information and coordinated their activities, and NGOs "swarmed" on Mexico, both physically and electronically.

The fourth section focuses on some paradigms for thinking about conflict in the information age. Whoever masters the network form of organization will realize a major advantage. Military and government organizations will need to establish network-hierarchy hybrids. Interagency task forces are an example of network-hierarchy hybrids. A military organization could establish a network-hierarchy hybrid by forming smaller units with a flattened chain of command. Advances in communication technology may make it possible for smaller units to communicate and coordinate rapidly with each other and to attack by swarm; i.e., to converge rapidly and stealthily from several directions. One general officer could command a multitude of platoon- or company-sized units from different services without the additional battalion or brigade layer of command. That sort of approach is not unprecedented in history: The Mongols and the German U-boat "wolf packs" are examples of geographically dispersed units swarming at the critical time and place.

Although some of its passages will be of more interest to philosophers than to soldiers, *In Athena's Camp* is an interesting book. It should be read by anyone in the special-operations community who is interested in information operations, especially those in PSYOP, a field that is only beginning to better use technology to form network-hierarchy hybrids in order to act faster than our competitors.

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Special Warfare

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