Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



PB 80–02–2 June 2002 Vol. 15, No. 2

From the Commandant

June 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 2

In 1952, facing the threat of communism and mindful of lessons learned during the global war that had ended only seven years before, the United States established the 10th Special Forces Group, a small group of men that was capable of performing unconventional warfare in Europe.

In the 50 years since, the world has seen many changes, but not all of those changes have been for the better. The Cold War has ended, but new threats have emerged. Technology has provided capabilities undreamed of 50 years ago, but that technology can be targeted by enemies using simple or out-of-date weapons. Our conventional forces have no equal on the conventional battlefield, but we still require, perhaps more than ever, forces capable of performing unconventional warfare.

SF has grown to five active-duty groups and two groups in the Army National Guard. It has retained its UW focus, and the capabilities and training required for UW have given SF the capability to perform other missions. Even though SF did not perform its UW mission in Europe, it has performed its other missions in all parts of the world. Whenever the nation has required soldiers for difficult missions that must be performed discreetly, it has called on Special Forces.

The battle streamers of the SF Regiment read like a roll call of the trouble spots and conflicts of the late 20th century, and SF's performance thus far in the 21st century has been impressive. The quiet performance of their duties has in many cases kept SF soldiers from gaining a great deal of recognition, and yet within SF's ranks, there has been no shortage of heroes — men such as Bull Simons, Nick Rowe, Dick Meadows, and the many SF recipients of the Medal of Honor.

As the articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* make clear, SF soldiers continue to perform their missions throughout the world on a daily basis. The unique capabilities of SF soldiers, their flexibility, and their ability to operate on every continent are due in large part to their specialized training. That training is and always will be critical to the success and versatility of SF. As we celebrate SF's 50th anniversary, we should not forget that this year also marks the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Psychological Warfare Center, the organization responsible for training Special Forces and other elements of U.S. psychological warfare. As the inheritors of the legacy of the Psywar Center, we the personnel of today's JFK Special Warfare Center and School are both proud of our role and humbled by its responsibilities.

Major General William G. Boykin

PB 80–02–2

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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Features

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The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces

by Ian Sutherland

The operational elements of United States Army Special Forces are direct descendants of the units of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, that were infiltrated into metropolitan France during World War II. The OSS units were tasked to organize, train, supply and direct the *Maquis* of the *Forces Francaises de l'Interieur*, or FFI, in support of Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in June 1944; and Operation Dragoon, the invasion of Southern France, in August 1944.

This is not to imply that Army SF is not a direct descendant of the OSS units employed in other areas of the world that were active in the development, support and direction of the indigenous resistance to Axis occupation. However, the organization and the mission of the operational detachments of the original 10th SF Group bear a remarkable resemblance to the organization and activities of the OSS Operational Group, or OG, that became Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional) in August 1944.

The OGs were Major General William Donovan's idea. As Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky[1] explained when he introduced Major Alfred T. Cox to a group of newly assigned officers who would form the "French" OGs, the concept was to use American soldiers who had language skills and were trained in commando-type tactics.

The soldiers would not only provide training and material support for the resistance, they would also form the nucleus for local resistance forces who would attack enemy facilities and lines of communication deep behind the lines. Much of the training that Major Cox and others developed for the OGs was based on the experience of British commandos. It placed a heavy emphasis on physical training, demolitions, special weapons and the hit-and-run offensive operational techniques of guerrillas.

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Sergeant Caesar Civetella, a member of OG Lafayette, receives the Bronze Star from Major General William Donovan in 1945.

Al Cox, an Infantry officer, was a strong and agile athlete who had played three major sports while studying civil engineering at Lehigh University. During his senior year, he had been named captain of the football team and co-captain of the baseball team. He was elected president of his class during his junior and senior years, and he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa.[2]

The OSS had recruited Cox when he was an instructor of guerrilla warfare at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. With the assistance of men like 1st Lieutenant Art Frizzell, Cox led the French OGs through the demanding training in preparation for the day when the tactics and techniques would be put to use against the *Wehrmacht*.

The French OGs arrived in North Africa in February 1944. Referred to as Unit B, 1st Contin-

OSS Operational Group Field Service Headquarters



gent Operational Groups, 2677 Headquarters Company OSS (Provisional), the French OGs were organized as a field-service headquarters, or FSHQ, commanded by Major Cox. The OG FSHQ was the echelon above the OG, and it controlled and directed the activities of two to five OGs. The FSHQ consisted of eight officers and 20 enlisted men and was comparable to the SF B-detachment of later years. Organizationally, the FSHQ included the operations, medical, communication, supply and administrative personnel who were active in the training, preparation, deployment and support of the OGs in the operational area.[3]

In August 1944, Unit B was redesignated Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional) to distance the purely military OGs from the "agents, spies, and saboteurs" of the 2677th Headquarters Company of the OSS. The event that prompted the separation was the execution of two officers and 13 enlisted men of Mission Ginny from Unit A, 1st Contingent (Italian OGs). All the members of Ginny had been captured March 22, 1944, on an operation in Italy to destroy a railway tunnel on the *La Spezia-Genoa* railroad line. During interrogation, they had disclosed the details of their OSS association, and it was feared that they were executed because of their OSS connection.[4]

The French OGs were aware that their involvement in guerrilla warfare would bring harsh treatment from the enemy if they were captured.[5] Many of the soldiers may not have been aware of the implications of Hitler's *Kommandobefehl,*[6] but they sewed the patch of the Seventh U.S. Army on their left shoulders in the hope that it would somehow ensure their treatment as prisoners of war.

In the spring of 1944, the French OGs[7] were placed under the tactical control of the Special Projects Operations Center, G-3 Special Operations, Allied Forces Headquarters, in Algiers. The OGs of Unit B had been organized into 14 OG sections, and the plan was for each section to organize and train the French Resistance, the *Maquis*, for the purpose of delaying the movement of enemy reserves to the invasion lodgment area in Normandy; to harass enemy lines of communication in their area of operations in southern France; and to conduct such sabotage operations as were directed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean in support of Operation Overlord.[8]

To prepare the troops for com-

mitment deep within the enemy-occupied areas of southern France, the OGs' arduous training in the Atlas Mountains of North Africa had emphasized night patrolling and scouting, guerrilla warfare, demolitions and fieldcraft.

The first section to be deployed was Operation Emily,[9] commanded by Art Frizzell. Emily departed on the night of June 6, 1944. But the weather system that battered the Normandy beaches reached Southern France, as well, and the drop zone was obscured. Emily returned to Algiers. Two days later, Emily successfully infiltrated on drop zone *Chenier*, near La Bastride-du-Hautmont in the department of Cantal.[10] The members of Emily were met on the drop zone by British Major R. MacPherson of Jedburgh Team Quinine,[11] who had landed there only a few minutes ahead of them. Emily was assigned the mission of denying the *Wehrmacht* the use of the rail bypass from Cahors-Figeac and Figeac-Brive in the Department of Lot.[12]

OG Justine was the second section to deploy. Justine, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Vernon G. Hopper, parachuted onto drop zone *Taille Crayon* near Vassieux on the Vercours plateau during the early morning of June 29. Justine's mission was to strengthen the *Maquis* in the Vercours region and to carry out guerrilla warfare against German supply lines, lines of communication and telecommunications.

OG Louise arrived on drop zone *Tandem*, in the Department of Ardeche, July 18, to strengthen the *Maquis*, to harass the Germans, and to reconnoiter the west bank of the Rhone River and the area of Ales-Langogne. OG Betsy was also dropped onto drop zone *Tandem*, but it arrived July 26. Betsy joined Louise and assisted in attacking targets and harassing and attacking German installations and lines of communication.

OG Ruth infiltrated Aug. 4 and was met by a disorganized group of *Francs-tireurs et Partisans*, or FTP,[13] personnel who were expecting a supply drop. After a considerable delay in moving to its area of operation, Ruth began attacking bridges to prevent the Germans from moving along the railroads and highways in the area.

OG Pat and OG Alice were deployed Aug. 6. Pat parachuted onto drop zone *Virgule* in the Department of Tarn to cut lines of communication within the triangle of Toulouse, Bedarieux and Sever-

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Major Alfred T. Cox, commander of the "French" OGs, was an Infantry officer who was teaching guerrilla warfare at the Infantry School when he was recruited by the OSS.



ac. Further to the northeast in the Department of Drome, Alice landed on drop zone *Framboise,* three kilometers southwest of Bourdeaux, to reconnoiter National Highway Number 7 and Route Napoleon, to report German troop movements, and, with the *Maquis*, to interdict and harass German columns whenever possible.

Near dawn on Aug. 12, OG Peg parachuted onto the wrong drop zone. The reception party was expecting a supply drop. According to Lieutenant Grahl H. Weeks, the OG team leader, "The *Maquis* were very excited about the unexpected American arrival, and it was some time before we could get them started to work." Peg's mission was to harass German forces along Route Nationale 117 and to interdict lines of communication in the Carcassonne Gap area of the Department of Aude.

The next day, Aug. 13, an Italian-speaking section, OG Nancy, infiltrated onto drop zone *Armature* near Saint Christol on the Franco-Italian border to interdict lines of communication in the region of the Montgenevre pass. Another Italian-speaking section, OG Helen, also departed Aug. 13 for France to block Col de Larche in the Alps, but because of weather, Helen had to return to North Africa.

Cox was deeply involved in the pre-mission preparation of the OG, and he personally conducted the final briefing for each section before it departed. With the bulk of his unit in the field, Cox; Captain Morin, his executive officer; Captain J. "Doc" Hamblet, the unit medical officer; and five enlisted men, boarded a bomber in Algiers Aug. 24. As Mission Lehigh, they would parachute into southern France to aid the resistance movement in the Ardeche Department and coordinate the operations of the other OG sections in the Rhone River west-bank area.

Shortly after midnight on Aug. 25, Lehigh landed in German-occupied France. The infiltration was generally successful, but Sergeant Campbell, the unit first sergeant, was injured on landing.[14] Another casualty of the drop was the radio,[15] but Corporal Rockman was able to repair it and establish contact with

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Members of OG Alice pose with members of the French Maquis in September 1944. The Americans had great respect for the dedication of the French partisans.

the base station at the Special Projects Operations Center in North Africa. After assembling, the personnel moved by local motor transportation to an inn at Devesset.

At Devesset, Cox spoke for several hours with Commandant Paul Vaucheret, also known as Vanel, about the enemy and friendly situation in the Ardeche. Vanel was chief of the Interallied Military Mission Pectorial and was the appointed commander of the FFI in Ardeche.[16] Cox learned from Vanel that the resistance movement in Ardeche consisted of approximately 5,000 armed men organized into battalions. The *Armée Secrete*, or AS, some of whom were *sedentaries* (comparable to the minutemen of colonial America), owed their allegiance to General de Gaulle's *Comite Francais de la Liberation Nationale*, or CFLN,[17] and were well-trained, disciplined military units. On the other hand, the FTP, the military arm of the French communist movement, at best owed only begrudging allegiance to CFLN. Vanel considered the FTP to be poorly trained, undisciplined and generally unreliable.

Vanel explained that the areas along the German lines of communication were divided into sectors, and that each sector was assigned to either an AS or an FTP battalion. For political reasons, there was no liaison between the sectors, which complicated the coordination of operations.

During the afternoon, Hamblet and several others visited the hospital at Chambon-sur-Lignon. They found T/5 Bilodeau of OG Louise, who had broken his leg during the parachute jump on July 18. They also found Sergeant Linnell, T/5 St. Sauveur and Private Crough, all of OG Betsy, who had been wounded by shrapnel from a bomb dropped by a German aircraft Aug. 10; and Sergeant Lynch, also of Betsy, who had suffered a broken collarbone in a vehicle accident Aug. 20.

The four U.S. wounded from OG Betsy and 25 *Maquis* casualties from the German air attack were initially treated in the French infirmary at Vanosc and then evacuated to the hospital in Saint Agreve, 35 kilometers away. The French doctors had worked furiously on the wounded, but they were unable to save Sergeant Barnabe, one of the Betsy squad leaders, who died shortly after surgery. Some days later, the other wounded had been transferred to the hospital at Chambon-sur-Lignon.

Each OG section had a medical aidman who had received extensive medical training in the U.S. before joining the OSS. The medics provided excellent treatment in the field. Their medical supplies included sulfonamides, which the French lacked, and they were later able to obtain penicillin.[18] As a medical officer, Hamblet was available to assist the French in developing field medical services and evacuation systems, but the pace of operations precluded that type of advisory effort.[19]

Cox traveled by motor vehicle[20] to the sector where the members of OG Louise were operating. Louise had received 37 mm guns Aug. 15, and early in the morning of Aug. 25, near the city of Vallons, Lieutenant Rickerson, the executive officer of Louise, with other members of the section, took withdrawing German forces under fire. Late in the afternoon, the *Maquis* security force on the flanks of the gun position withdrew without warning. The Germans attacked the guns, which the Americans were forced to abandon after a fierce firefight. Cox learned that this was not the first time for a sudden withdrawal on the part of the *Maquis*.

Upon his return to Val-les-bains,

Cox recommended to Vanel that each OG section be assigned to a sector in which the *Maquis* had demonstrated good leadership, discipline and combat ability. Cox insisted that Vanel ensure proper liaison between sectors and that a centrally located reserve of materiel and troops be established. The reserve would be deployed to tip the scales when it appeared that the Germans were about to defeat the *Maquis*.

On the morning of Aug. 27, Cox, Hamblet, Morin, and Sergeants Delage, Beaudoin and O'Lear drove to Annonay. Shortly after arriving, they learned from the *Maquis* that a German column was moving north near Tournon. They departed immediately for Tournon. When they arrived there, a Frenchman warned them that Germans were only a few kilometers away.

Cox, Morin, Delage and O'Lear struck out toward the top of a hill to observe the German column, while Hamblet and Beaudoin hid the vehicle. Unfortunately, the advance guard of the German column — two open cars and a double line of infantry — appeared on the road in front of the four men and immediately began firing on them. Morin and O'Lear managed to fade safely back into the mountains, as did Hamblet and Beaudoin, who had moved up after hiding the motor vehicle. Cox and Delage, however, were caught in the open, and they ran, zig-zagging across a plowed field. Fortunately, the German column was more concerned with the *Maquis* than with the two fleeing men.

The German column leapfrogged forward with professional precision and placed small-arms fire, automatic-weapons fire and mortar fire on likely ambush sites along the road. Cox and Delange managed to sprint through a line of trees to a water-filled ditch some 300 yards from the road, where they lay, covered with brush, while several German patrols beat the bushes nearby.

An hour later, the two men were startled by two women who splashed up the ditch searching for a place to hide. The nerve-wracking wait continued, and the women added to the danger with their unconcerned chatter. Miraculously, the German patrols that were prowling the fields and tree line nearby failed to locate the group.

After dark, two Frenchmen discovered the little group and led them to a house away from the road. After they changed into French civilian clothing and hid their wet uniforms and equipment in the barn's hayloft, Cox and Delange were led to the house, where the French family, at the risk of their lives, provided the sanctuary of their home to the two men.

The women prepared a meal, which the soldiers devoured and washed down with a delicious red wine. Tired to the bone, the two Americans tumbled into bed, disturbed only by the noises coming from the German column that moved throughout the night.

The next morning, still in civilian clothing, the two men crossed the road during a break in the German column and gained the cover of the heavily forested hills, where they once again donned their uniforms. (Ten days later, Cox returned to the area to thank the family for their hospitality. He learned that German patrols had searched all the homes in the valley less than an hour after he and Delage had departed. The men, he was told, were taken further up the valley as hostages and later, for some unexplained reason, shot.)

Morin and O'Lear spent an uncomfortable night in the woods, and when daylight returned, they were located by the *Maquis*. Hamblet and Beaudoin hitchhiked to Devesset, where they were reunited with the other four men later in the morning. That afternoon, they learned that personnel from Betsy

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Soldiers of the OGs and members of the Maquis aboard local transportation. The OG members later agreed that their training should have placed more emphasis on the operation and maintenance of foreign vehicles.

had been strafed by what was thought to have been a U.S. plane. T/5 Raymond Bisson, the section medic, had been killed. Lieutenant Paul E. Boudreau, the section leader, had been seriously wounded and had been evacuated to the hospital at Chambon-sur-Lignon.

Information concerning the German column that Cox and Delage had narrowly avoided was passed to the OSS base station in Algiers. Intelligence received from the *Maquis* in the Tournon area over the next few days indicated that German combat forces and supporting units consisting of approximately 50,000 troops, more than a thousand vehicles, a few half-tracks and some artillery, had passed through Tournon continuously for four days and nights.

On Aug. 29, Cox and Lieutenant McKenzie, who had accompanied him to Val-les-bains, learned that a German column was preparing to move from Vallons to Privas. McKenzie hurriedly departed to bring up Louise and the 37 mm guns, which they had recovered from Vallons. Cox, Vanel and the local *Maquis* chiefs performed a reconnaissance of the area, but the *Maquis* became bogged down in endless discussion when they began planning.

The *Maquis* placed a company on every route the Germans were likely to use. Theoretically then, the *Maquis* would have the Germans surrounded, but in reality, the Germans blasted through the single *Maquis* company on the route they had chosen and continued on their way unmolested by the other *Maquis* units. Cox was exasperated; there had been too much talk and not enough action.

Cox knew that small bands operating in true guerrilla fashion — hitting and running, slashing continually at the enemy's flanks and fading into the countryside — could exact a tremendous materiel and psychological toll on the fleeing German forces. Unfortunately, the more certain the success of the Allied armies became, the more the *Maquis* leadership wanted to behave like a conventional force. The *Maquis* leadership focused more and more on the liberation of Lyon and other large cities in the area, ignoring the opportunity to batter the retreating German columns.

During the night of Aug. 29, OGs Helen and Lafayette had parachuted in. In the afternoon, Lafayette departed for the *Maquis* headquarters at Chateau Olivier in a truck provided by the *Maquis*. OG Helen remained in Devesset until Aug. 31, then moved by truck to Saint-Etienne.

In the early morning of Aug. 31, after spending the night at Chateau Olivier, Lieutenant Odilon Fontaine of OG Lafayette, joined by Lieutenant Rickerson and T/5 Henry D. Collette of OG Louise and a Maquis officer, traveled to Chomerac to investigate reports of German forces in the area. When they arrived, they learned the strength and the location of the German units from a German POW who was being held by the *Maquis*.

Another German prisoner agreed to assist them in contacting the German commanders. This POW went through the lines and returned with a Russian who was the company commander of a Russian volunteer unit with the German Army. The Russian told them that there were five battalions of German troops in the hills east of Chomerac.

The U.S. party left the Russian with the *Maquis* and made their way to the German position, where they contacted a German battalion commander, a major. The major contacted his commander, a colonel, who arrived with the other four battalion commanders.

The colonel, who spoke fluent French, explained to the interpreter, Collette, that he wished to discuss terms with the American commander. Collette contacted Cox at Devesset, but before Cox could arrive, a French armored-reconnaissance vehicle appeared and began firing at the Germans. Without further negotiation, the German officers threw their hands in the air, shouting, "We surrender to you Americans!"

The number of German prisoners taken was two colonels, six majors, 22 captains and lieutenants, and 3,794 enlisted men. The Americans later learned that the two colonels, one of the majors and 150 other German POWs had been executed on the orders of a *Maquis* chief for atrocities they had committed against the *Maquis* and French civilians.

At FFI headquarters in Yzeron, Cox learned that the long-awaited attack on Lyon was scheduled for Sept. 2, and he hurriedly returned to Devesset. On Sept. 1, OG William, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Harry L. Herres, arrived in southern France, parachuting in strong winds just before midnight. Cox issued OG William a warning order for the attack on Lyon, and he returned to Yzeron with Hamblet and McKinzie to arrange the use of the OGs in the attack. Cox established contact with the chief of staff of the French 1st Armored Division, which would take part in the attack.

The next morning, Cox joined OG Helen, which was to spearhead the attack in their sector. Apprehensively, Cox watched Helen move out in battle formation on the outskirts of the city. He knew only too well that if the Germans elected to put up a fight, it would take more than the lightly armed *Maquis* to drive them out. He and Hamblet proceeded on

foot toward the high ground on the west bank of the Saone River that overlooked Lyon. To their amazement, they found that they were ahead of the attacking *Maquis*. Huge crowds of French civilians swarmed around them, giving them a wild welcome. "No comic South American revolution ever had as much firing and as little effect. The opposition consisted of, at most, two German machine guns and the *Milice*[21] firing rifles and submachine guns from windows. The *Maquis* and the French armored cars opened up with all their weapons, spraying the front of the buildings. Civilians were everywhere, hugging and kissing the men as they fired, with complete disregard of all the firing."

The festive mood of the civilians and *Maquis* quickly turned nasty. The *Miliciens* were ruthlessly hunted down and summarily executed. Women who were accused of consorting with the Germans were stripped, branded, mutilated and tortured before being shot. In the frenzy, the mob killed several "agents" of allied intelligence, even as one victim was claiming that he could prove he was a loyal Frenchman. Fortunately, in a few days the FFI imposed control over the city, and the mayhem slowly diminished.

National Archives

In August 1944, French civilians shave the head of a French woman to punish her for having personal relations with members of the German occupation force.

Major Douglas G. Bonner of the 4th Special Forces Unit[22] located Cox in Lyon, and the two decided to assemble the OG sections at Grenoble. Cox sent Hamblet to arrange the evacuation of the wounded to the assembly area, and by Sept. 17, all units had closed on Grenoble.

The 14 OG sections that had infiltrated southern France were, in general, successful at organizing and training the *Maquis*. In concert with those *Maquis* forces, the OGs conducted operations to destroy priority targets on the railroads and highways. They also established roadblocks and ambushes, and they cut communication and power lines in order to harass and impede the enemy forces that were moving toward and away from the invasion beaches.

Through their communication link with Algiers, the OGs relayed vital order-of-battle information for their area of operations. Several of the sections located and assisted downed allied airmen. The least tangible, but probably the most important aspect, of the OGs was the tremendous lift their presence gave to the *Maquis*.[23]

As a result of their operations with the *Maquis,* the OGs reported 461 German soldiers killed in action, 467 wounded in action, and 10,021 German prisoners of war taken.

During the stay in Grenoble, Cox conducted a post-operations cri-

"Seen any signs of partisan activity?"

Bill Mauldin's cartoon is based on the fact that partisan activities took a psychological toll on the soldiers of the German occupation force.

tique. All OG members expressed the opinion that the extensive training they had received was effective. All personnel had received basic infantry, guerrilla warfare, mountain operations and parachute training prior to deployment. At least 50 percent of the training was conducted during darkness, and some of the men commented that the field training problems were more difficult than the operations.

The OG members generally agreed that more emphasis should have been placed on the operation and maintenance of foreign weapons and vehicles, on methods of instruction, on French military nomenclature, and on radio maintenance and repair (for the radio operators). The soldiers considered their equipment, on the whole, to be satisfactory. Complaints about the footgear and clothing indicate that the jump boot did not hold up well in the mountainous terrain, and that the U.S. field jacket did not provide sufficient protection against the cold. The use of the mountain sleeping bag allowed the soldiers to sleep comfortably almost regardless of conditions. The consensus was that the carbine with folding stock, the .45-caliber pistol and the Marlin submachine gun were useful at short range. However, the soldiers agreed that the Browning Automatic Rifle and light machine gun were essential and should have been available from the beginning.

The SSTR-1, the radio issued to the OG sections, was compact and lightweight, and it had the necessary range, but it was not durable. Most of its failures were due to minor flaws in the basic components and their construction. With only two or three exceptions, the operators had no idea how the radio functioned and therefore could not correct the failures. Even the operators who understood the sets had neither the tools nor the spare parts to repair them. The power pack was the second most likely component to fail. The majority of the power-pack failures were related to loose connections, shorts, lack of insulation and overheating of the unit.

The unanimous conclusion among the OGs, Jedburghs and other elements was that the OSS units were committed much too late to achieve maximum effect on the *Maquis*. In the experience of the OGs, every day that was spent in training the *Maquis* brought a greater combat effectiveness.

The consensus was that the real *Maquis*, the patriotic Frenchmen who risked everything in order to liberate France from the Nazis,

were above praise. Many of them, operating in small bands or as individuals, carried the fight to the Germans for three to four years without adequate supplies of food, weapons or ammunition. Their presence in the countryside made the occupation a continual hell for the Germans.

While the organization and the discipline of each *Maquis* unit varied, the presence of former officers and NCOs of the French army usually resulted in a well-disciplined and better-trained force. The FFI organizations could have been more effective had the *Maquis* been required to confine their efforts to guerrilla warfare, harassing the fleeing enemy at every opportunity. Instead, the FFI often attempted to bring together a large force as an army of liberation of the larger towns in the area.

In general, the OG sections were warmly received by the French; however, on rare occasions FFI chiefs deliberately hampered OG activities. The actions of the FFI chiefs often had a political basis: serious animosity existed between the various groups. The consensus among the OGs was that no political group should be permitted to have a "private" army.

After studying the experience of the Jedburgh teams in southern France, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. Baker, in his final report of the SPOC Debriefing Operations at Avignon, strongly recommended that all future operations contemplated for Jedburgh teams be strictly separated from political considerations. If that was not possible, then the team should be fully briefed on all the political aspects of its task, and personnel should be selected with the political aspects in mind. The same observations would be valid for OGs as well.

Similar to the French OG sections, the FA Team, SF Operational Detachment Regiment, as organized under the original TO&E 33-2 approved in April 1952, was authorized 15 men: a detachment commander, an executive officer and 13 enlisted men. The FA team was, in theory, capable of organizing, supporting and directing a *regimental*-sized guerrilla unit.

The functional specialties represented on the FA Team were medical, demolitions, communications, weapons, operations and intelligence. The scouts of the OG section were replaced on the FA Team by additional specialists in medical, weapons, demolitions, and operations and intelligence. The field radio repairman was added to the FA Team organization because of the problems the OSS operational teams had experienced with their communications equipment in the field. In southern France, the next echelon in the OG organization functioned in a similar manner to that envisioned for the FB Team, Special Forces Operational Detachment District B.

Colonel Aaron Bank, who was an OG, a Jedburgh and a member of the Special Operations Branch of the OSS, was involved in and exposed to the OSS/SOE field activities in the European, Mediterranean and China-Burma-India theaters of operation. Bank was personally involved in the conflicts that would arise over command and control. In an after-action report, he complained that Interallied Military Mission Isotrope "had decided beforehand as to our disposition and also the distribution of our arms, which immediately created a barrier between us, as I had been briefed to operate as a guerrilla organizer and leader, and the disposition of my arms was my own affair." Bank later concluded, "Jeds should never work with Missions as there is a

National Archives

OSS Jedburgh teams attend a demolitions class at Milton Hall, England, in 1944. The Jedburghs and the OGs agreed that they were committed too late in the war to achieve maximum effect.

constant clash."[24] His experience in southern France may account for the hierarchical arrangement of the FA, FB and FC teams in the 10th SF Group and for the concepts of their deployment and support.

Bank was also well aware of the OSS/SOE support organizations in North Africa, Britain, France and the Far East. He knew from firsthand experience what was necessary for the support of the UW mission that was envisioned for Special Forces. His experience was incorporated into the 1952 SF TO&E that established the SF group and the SFOB. The SF group and the SFOB would perform essentially the same role as the OSS/SOE command-and-control, logistics-support and communications organizations.

Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, who some insist was as responsible for the development of U.S. Army Special Forces as Bank was, certainly made an important contribution to the form and substance of the emerging Special Forces. Volckmann, who had refused to surrender to the Japanese in 1941, evaded into the mountains of northern Luzon and organized five regiments of Philippine guerrillas.[25] The OSS and SOE were not involved in the development, support or direction of those guerrilla forces. The Allied Intelligence Bureau, organized under the assistant chief of staff, G2 in the Southwest Pacific Theater, provided the organization and support for Volckmann's guerrilla forces.

However, the arrangement did not work well. "The special operations group was primarily concerned with fostering resistance and conducting sabotage behind the enemy's lines, while AIB was primarily concerned with strategic and combat intelligence."[26] Being that as it may, the "Philippine guerrilla units performed valuable services by operating coast-and-air watchers stations, providing information, obstructing Japanese communications and operations, and maintaining the morale and loyalty of the civilian population."[27]

Regardless of which person had the most influence on the Department of the Army's acceptance of the organization and on the concept of employment of the 10th SF Group in 1952, the implication is that U.S. Army Special Forces is a synthesis of the organizational and operational experience of the OSS. It is not clear whether Aaron Bank and Al Cox, who worked for the CIA after World War II, ever conferred during the development of the 10th SF Group. Veterans of the French OGs now insist that Cox taught Bank everything he knew about guerrilla warfare and that therefore Cox had a definite influence on the ultimate form and substance of the 10th SF Group. ✂

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Notes:

[1] Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky parachuted into Sardinia in September 1943 to persuade Italian General Basso, who was the commanding general of the Italian troops on the island, to assist in neutralizing the 270,000 Italian and 19,000 German troops on the islands and to assist in securing the flank of the Salerno invasion. In August 1944, Obolensky was infiltrated into the southern part of Indre Department of France as commander of Operation Patrick. Serge Obolensky, *The Memoirs of Serge Obolensky: One Man in His Time* (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

[2] The Lehigh University *Epitome* (yearbook), 1940.

[3] During World War II, the operational units, including the OGs, were imbedded in an elaborate organization for command and control, logistics support and communications that, in many respects, was replicated in the U.S. Army Special Forces operational base.

[4] Information supplied by Albert Materazzi, operations Officer, Company A, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional), including basic operating instructions for Ginny, report of the Ginny operation, report of the first attempt to relieve Ginny party, report of the second attempt to relieve Ginny party, and other documents related to the execution of the officers and men of Mission Ginny. Copy in the Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[5] Cox wrote to the commander of the 2677th Headquarters Company OSS (Provisional), in early May 1944, "I sincerely believe that I am speaking for myself, for many of my officers, and for many of my men, in saying that we realize fully the risks entailed in our type of operations and that we are ready and anxious to assume those risks. … It would be a terrible disappointment to many of us if the OG idea were to be abndoned [sic]"; A. Materazzi documents, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Gamble, Subject: Future Employment of Operational Groups, dated 8 May 1944.

[6] Part of Hitler's *Kommandobefehl* (Commando Order) stated, "From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man.

It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships or aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals when found should be prepared to give themselves up, as a matter of principle, no pardon is to be granted them."

[7] In April 1944, two OGs and personnel for a field service headquarters from Unit B, 1st Contingent, were transferred to the United Kingdom under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky, who was concurrently the commanding officer of the OGs, European Theater of Operations. NARA Microfilm M-1623, Roll No. 9, Vol. 4-A, January-June 1944, Operational Groups, 6.

[8] Directive SHAEF/17240/13/ops, *Role of resistance groups in the South of France*, dated 21 May 1944, contained in *Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations*, Section VII, "Resistance in France." Copy located in the Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[9] The operation name was used to identify the OG section and FSHQ. Each operation had a named signal plan: For Emily it was Helium, and for Lehigh it was Simone.

[10] Personal communications with A.P. Frizzell, May 2000.

[11] Arthur Brown, *The Jedburghs: A Short History*. Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Jedburgh teams were ostensibly composed of American, British and French soldiers, when in fact, only 10 of the 101 Jedburgh teams were so composed. Eighteen of the teams had two Frenchmen or Dutchmen, depending on the destination; 32 had two Americans; and 41 had two British soldiers. The teams were infiltrated into France for the purpose of organizing, supporting and directing the Resistance. Eight teams, Clarence, Claude, Daniel II, Dicing, Dudley II, Edward, Gambling and Stanley II, were deployed to Holland.

[12] Initially, the railway bridge over the Cele River at Conduche was selected, and on June 12, 1944, the bridge was destroyed by OG Emily, which was supported by FTP personnel. Operations Report, Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Prov.), Operation Emily.

[13] The FTP was controlled by the French communist party and was often at odds with the other resistance groups.

[14] Of the 27 officers and 155 enlisted men who parachuted into southern France, 23 were listed as wounded in action, 10 of whom were injured on the jump. Commanding Officers Report, Operational Report. Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Prov.), Grenoble, France, 20 September 1944, 2. Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. (Also located at Record Group 226, E 190 Box 741, National Archives II.)

[15] Damage to radio gear during the parachute drop was a problem that plagued the operational units.

[16] Paul Gaujac, *Special Forces in the Invasion of France* (Translated by Janice Lert) (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 1999).

[17] Arthur Layton Funk, *Hidden Ally. The French Resistance, Special Operations and the Landings in Southern France, 1944* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).

[18] Personal communications with Dr. John Hamblet, 10 April 2000.

[19] Hamblet was not the only medical officer who was infiltrated into France. Captain Fred B. Agee, U.S. Army Medical Corps, was infiltrated into the Haute Vienne Department, as Mission Antagonist, to provide medical services to members of the Maquis; to assist in organizing such other medical services as were available for the purpose of serving members of the Maquis; and to cooperate as far as possible with any doctors located in nearby villages who were in any way serving the Maquis. NARA Microfilm Set M-1623, Roll No. 9 (OSS Aid to the French Resistance).

[20] Motor transportation was readily available to the Maquis. Unfortunately, the vehicles were notoriously unreliable and the driving was often reckless.

[21] Michael Pearson, *Tears of Glory: The Betrayal of Vercors 1944* (London: Macmillan, 1978). The *Milice* were political police directed by the puppet government at Vichy; they wore distinctive blue uniforms. They were the French equivalent of the Gestapo. Their methods were every bit as brutal as the Gestapo's and even more hated.

[22] Funk, *Hidden Ally*, 38-39. Special Forces Unit No. 4 was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William G. Bartlett. British Lieutenant Colonel E.S.N. Head was the deputy commander. The unit consisted of 22 officers (10 U.S. and 12 British) and 42 enlisted men (12 U.S. and 30 British).

[23] Operations Report, Commander's Report.

[24] Isotrope had promised the FTP eight Bren automatic rifles and 40 Enfield rifles that Team Packard had brought in. Bank concluded that the FTP "was always more interested in politics than fighting the Germans. They never used all the arms they received and in my opinion are keeping the arms for ulterior motives. They should be disarmed as fast as possible." Operational Report, Team Packard. National Archives Record Group 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders 34 and 35, Location: 190/6/15/4; Martin, "Report on Jedburghs (Zone Sud)."

[25] Operational Report of Team "Packard" in Gard and Lozere Departments, dated 10 October 1944, signed Aaron Bank, Captain, Infantry. National Archives Record Group 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders 34 and 35, Location: 190/6/15/4; "History of OSS Aid to French Resistance," National Archives Record Group 226, Entry 190, Box 741, Location: 190/10/4/2.

[26] The Special Forces Regimental History Calendar, 1994. Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[27] FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1951, 6-7.

The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines: 1957-2002

Since its activation in July 1957, the 1st Special Forces Group has maintained a close association with the Philippines.

The 1st SF Group has conducted numerous missions, ranging from humanitarian assistance and foreign internal defense to the ongoing unconventional-warfare operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. No matter which mission they have been assigned, the soldiers of the 1st SF Group have always stood "balikatan" (shoulder to shoulder) with their counterparts in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP.

During the late 1950s, the 1st SF Group began training the cadre of the Philippine Scout Rangers. Using a curriculum that mirrored that used by U.S. Army Rangers at that time, the 1st SF Group focused on developing the cadre's leadership abilities and training them in infantry tactics. Eventually, some of the Philippine scout units split off to form the Philippine Special Forces, which were activated to counter both the growing communist insurgency in the northern provinces and the resurgence of Islamic nationalism in the southern provinces.

During the late 1960s, the Philippine Special Forces were disbanded because of political infighting. The Philippine Scout Rangers survived those turbulent years and became the nucleus of a Philippine special-operations command that continues to accomplish a variety of missions ranging from special reconnaissance to civic action.

The 1st SF Group's heavy involvement in humanitarian-assistance and civic-action programs throughout Asia contributed significantly to the success of the Philippine civic-action program. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 1st SF Group reorganized into the Special Action Force Asia, or SAF Asia. This organization ensured theaterwide security assistance and provided a U.S. presence in Asia while simultaneously supporting the 1st SF Group's mission in the Republic of Vietnam. The 97th Civil Affairs Group, the 156th Medical Detachment, the 400th Army Security Agency Detachment, the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment and the 539th Engineer Detachment augmented the 1st SF Group's efforts in accomplishing the SAF Asia mission.

U.S. Army photo

Graduation ceremony for the 1st Advanced Ranger class of the Philippine Army, in 1958. The instructors were members of the 1st SF Group.

Having gained a vast amount of experience in Thailand and in Vietnam, the personnel of SAFAsia earned the respect and the admiration of the Philippine people. In 1972, the rapid response, dedication and professionalism of SAF Asia's disaster-assistance-and-relief team saved thousands of lives in severely flooded provinces of the Philippines and earned the 1st SF Group the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation.

In 1974, the 1st SF Group was deactivated, ending 17 years of SF influence in Southeast Asia. Almost 10 years later, the 1st SF Group's colors were unfurled again at Fort Lewis, Wash., and within one month of its reactivation, the 1st SF Group once again had deployed soldiers to the Philip-

Photo by Kyran V. Adams

A soldier from the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, teaches Philippine soldiers to conduct insertion and extraction operations. The training took place at Fort Magsaysay in May 2001.

pines to ensure the stability of the region. 1st SF Group soldiers continued to hone their combat skills at Clark Air Force Base, at Subic Bay's Green Beach live-fire area, and at the Crow Valley bombing range.

Unilateral training, however, was not the 1st SF Group's only focus during the late 1980s. The group's detachments, companies and battalions continued to participate in the annual Exercise Balikatan. They also conducted numerous humanitarian-assistance and civic-action projects through the program known as Joint Combined Exchange Training, or JCET. But political and environmental forces became training distracters for the 1st Group — the U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines, coupled with the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and unsuccessful negotiations of the military base agreement, forced the group to reduce its operations in the Philippines.

After 1992, the 1st SF Group continued to send soldiers to the Philippines, but they were restricted to training Philippine soldiers for "other than combat" missions. However, the Philippine and American people realized the value and necessity of increasing the combat capability of the AFP, and by the end of the 1990s, soldiers of the 1st SF Group were once again training the AFP in the war-fighting skills that are vital to success in combat.

Even after the Philippine government signed peace treaties with Islamic nationalist groups, and even after communist insurgencies had almost ceased to exist in the Philippines, a new menace emerged. Bandit groups in the southern provinces were kidnapping and killing Filipinos and foreigners. These groups were not only destroying the Philippine tourist industry, they were spreading fear and discontent among the people. In the depths of the Asian economic crisis, the Philippine government sought a military solution to help deal with the problem.

After a careful analysis of the possible courses of action and after consultation with the U.S. State Department, the Philippine government decided to establish the light-reaction company, or LRC. The unit consists of a company of AFP soldiers from the Philippine special-operations command, armed with the latest equipment and trained by the 1st SF Group. Accompanied by soldiers of the 1st SF Group, the LRC is currently conducting a variety of operations throughout the Philippines.

Almost immediately after the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, the president of the Philippines offered to assist the U.S. in the global war on terrorism. After definite confirmation of links between Philippine bandit groups and terrorist cells, the Philippine people once again welcomed the soldiers of the 1st SF Group to train, advise and assist the AFP in destroying those organizations. Today soldiers of the two countries are once again standing shoulder-to-shoulder, helping to rid the world of the terrorist plague.

The 1st SF Group has a proud history in the Philippines, and today's 1st SF Group soldiers go forth in the spirit of the SF soldiers who went before them. Alongside their AFP counterparts, they will accomplish their assigned missions with the dedication and the quiet professionalism that are symbolized by the green beret.

This article was written by members of the 1st Special Forces Group.

A History of SF Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995

by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski

The conflict in Somalia provides an excellent example of the value of integrating United States Army Special Forces, or SF, in conjunction with other special-operations forces, or SOF, in a military operation other than war in both rural and urban combat environments.

Although A-detachments from the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th SF Groups operated in Somalia during the period of U.S. involvement, the seven casualties of the conflict — one killed in action and six wounded in action — occurred during the rotation of the 5th SF Group.

The United Nations role in Somalia was unique. For the first time, U.N. forces were used to resolve an intra-state conflict in a failed state. Fourteen warring tribal clans had devastated the country in a civil war that had begun with the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. A severe drought, widespread banditry and escalating clan warfare had brought on the largest famine of that decade. By the end of 1991, more than 4.5 million people had been displaced as refugees, and more than 300,000 Somalis had died of starvation.

The first use of SF occurred in January 1991, during the noncombatant evacuation operation, or NEO, of the U.S. Embassy. An SF sergeant from the 5th SF Group, who was already deployed to Somalia as a member of a technical assistance field team, was tasked to serve as an SF liaison element to the U.S. Marines. From aboard a circling AC-130, the SF NCO provided information about locations throughout Mogadishu to assist the Marines as they conducted the

DoD photo

A U.S. Air Force C-130 off-loads humanitarian-relief supplies in Somalia during Operation Provide Relief. The delivery of food supplies was difficult because of a lack of force protection for the airlift personnel.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Special Forces Command, USASOC, USSOCOM, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

operation.

By Jan. 31, 1992, a tenuous cease-fire was in place, and a small contingent of U.N. military observers had deployed to Somalia. The cease-fire was ineffective: thefts by bandits and confiscations of relief supplies by warring clans still posed a threat to the delivery of relief supplies. The U.N. deployed forces in April 1992 (under U.N. Security Council Resolution 751) to provide protection for the U.N.-sponsored humanitarian aid and to provide a secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies.

When the additional observers from the U.N. Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM, were unable to improve the situation, President George Bush authorized the use of U.S. forces to increase the airlifts of food. Operation Provide Relief began Aug. 15, 1992, and ended Dec. 9, 1992.

The U.S. involvement in Somalia represented a new use of the armed forces as a means of resolving and containing an intra-state conflict. The mission of the joint task force (the staff of the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM; and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force) was threefold: Provide airlift of humanitarian relief, provide support services, and provide force protection for airlift forces.

In August 1992, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, deployed to Mombassa, Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Relief. Their mission was to provide security to U.S. Air Force personnel during humanitarian-assistance airlift flights. The deployment consisted of approximately 70 personnel: seven personnel from the 2nd Battalion's forward operating base, FOB 52, who acted as the command-and-control element; and SF B-detachment 540 with four A-detachments. To assist in the security role, the 2nd Battalion personnel brought along two desert-mobility vehicles, or DMVs, armed with .50-caliber machine guns and MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers.

Photo courtesy Ken Barriger

A desert mobility vehicle of the quick-reaction force is loaded aboard a C-130. While aircraft delivered food supplies, the QRF aircraft circled overhead to provide security.

Air Force C-130s and C-141s flew multiple relief flights of humanitarian supplies to airfields at Bardera, Baledogle, Baidoa and Kismaayo. The SF security teams loaded their DMVs aboard Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, or ABCCC, aircraft. The ABCCC C-130s circled the airfields while the relief flights were on the ground. The planes were prepared to land and provide security or to participate in ground combat-search-and-rescue missions, as required.

SF medics and other team members would occasionally fly in the landing aircraft. They conducted assessments and facilitated the transfer of supplies by coordinating with clan factions; tribal elders; the U.S. Agency for International Development; U.N. relief agencies; and personnel from nongovernment organizations, or NGOs.

In early October 1992, SF personnel made their first landing in Somalia. A three-man survey-and-assessment team from the 2/5th SF Group accompanied members of an Air Force engineering team into Belet Huen. Led by CWO 3 Rick Dietrich, the team contacted the factions and clan elders to work out agreements for the continued landing and delivery of relief supplies. On occasion, if the threat warranted, the mounted SF security element would land and deploy into positions on the airfields while the off-loading of humanitarian supplies took place.

In November, the staff of the 2nd Battalion redeployed to the U.S. Company C, 2/5th SF Group, which had just arrived in Somalia, assumed the quick-reaction-force, or QRF, mission. The ABCCC aircraft made two flights each day (morning and afternoon), with a two-hour overlap between the flights. A six- to eight-man QRF flew in each aircraft. Each SF team flew a morning flight one day, flew an afternoon

flight the next day, and took the third day off. Company C's four detachments flew the QRF missions from Nov. 23 to Dec 28.

On Dec. 4, personnel from B-detachment 560 landed at the Baledogle airfield to provide security for Air Force engineers who were there to conduct an airfield assessment for follow-on landings of forces of the 10th Mountain Division. The Americans were met by the local Somali airfield security force, who greeted them by pointing their weapons at them. The security force and the engineers departed the airfield.

On Dec. 10, A-detachment 565 was given the mission of securing the Baledogle airfield. Detachment 565's plan was to infiltrate its two DMVs, its eight personnel, and an Air Force combat-control team riding motorcycles, from a C-130. B-detachment 560 would conduct command and control, and maintain security around the aircraft on the ground until the airfield was secure. Two Marine Corps AH-1 Cobra gunships provided air cover and relayed information about the strength and positions of hostile forces. Once on the ground, Detachment 565 confiscated 27 weapons and large quantities of ammunition from the Somali airfield security force at gunpoint. The SF soldiers found three technical vehicles, two jeeps equipped with 106 mm recoilless rifles, and a land rover with an M-2 .50-caliber machine gun and an M-1919A4 .30-caliber machine gun. The team disabled the 106 mm recoilless rifles and confiscated the 106 mm ammunition. After the airfield was secure, the ODB established command and control in the control tower, which offered a better view of Detachment 565's roving vehicle security force. Air Force engineers arrived to assess the asphalt surface of the runway. By late afternoon on Dec. 10, all elements had returned to Mombassa by C-130.

On Dec. 11 and 12, the team returned to the Baledogle airfield. They did not encounter any Somali gunmen this time. The Air Force engineers brought in heavy equipment to clear vegetation from the sides of both the runway and the taxiways. On Dec. 11, Detachment 565 confiscated 18 more weapons from Somalis who were moving near the airfield. On Dec. 12, Detachment 565 confiscated 10 more weapons from Somalis.

On Dec. 16, Detachments 565 and 564 were assigned to an airfield-security mission in Kismaayo. The purpose of the mission was to secure the airfield for the landing of coalition Belgian peacekeeping forces. Detachment 565 confiscated 18 weapons. Detachment 564 confiscated eight cases of small-arms ammunition, rounds for a 57 mm recoilless rifle, and two rifles.[1]

Photo courtesy Ken Barriger

SF soldiers of the QRF conduct a security sweep of the Baledogle airfield on Dec. 10, 1993. The SF soldiers secured the airfleld so that Belgian peacekeeping forces could land.

Restore Hope

When clan violence continued to interfere with UNOSOM relief operations, the need for expanded peacekeeping in Somalia was clear. On Dec. 3, 1992, U.N. Resolution 794 authorized "all means necessary to establish a secure humanitarian assistance environment." President Bush authorized the deployment of U.S. forces on Operation Restore Hope.[2] Operation Restore Hope — called the unified task force, or UNITAF — was a U.S.-led joint and multinational force that would use military means to enforce the U.N. mandate.

On Dec. 9, to ensure that relief supplies would be delivered to Mogadishu's outlying districts and that the lines of communication necessary for humanitarian relief would be protected, CENTCOM deployed combat forces from the U.S. Marines, the 10th Mountain Division, and Army SOF, including SF coalition-support teams, or CSTs, from the 1st, 3rd, 5th and

10th SF Groups.

UNITAF was responsible for seven major operational areas: The French were in Oddur; the Canadians in Belet Huen; the Australians in Baidoa; the Italians in Buulo-Barde; the Marines in Bardera; the Belgian contingent and an infantry-battalion task force from the 10th Mountain Division in Kismaayo; and forces from the Marines and the 10th Mountain, along with the remaining members of the multinational force, in Mogadishu.

Members of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, performed the first SF ground mission in Somalia. They had deployed from Mombassa to Belet Huen in late December 1992 with five A-detachments to form the Army SOF, or ARSOF, component of a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, led by Special Operations Command-Central, or SOCCENT. Company C was augmented by Detachment 526 from Company B, 1/5th SF Group, which was assigned to the Marine-controlled Bardera sector. As CSTs from the other SF groups arrived, the requirement for a command-and-control element larger than an advanced operational base, or AOB, became obvious. On Jan. 12, 1993, the FOB from the 2/5th once again deployed to Mogadishu to serve as the ARSOF headquarters.

The Marines had secured the port of Kismaayo Dec. 20, 1992. SF B-detachment 560 (with two A-detachments) was assigned to Kismaayo as the special-operations command-and-control element, or SOCCE. The SOCCE had one team located as far south as the Somalia-Kenya border, living with and monitoring the activities of General Morgan and his armed clan. The team assisted in the demobilization of Morgan's armed soldiers and in collecting the soldiers' weapons (a classic mission of unconventional warfare, or UW).

Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski

SF soldiers at a base camp in Belet Huen display weapons they had seized from warring Somali factions during area-reconnaissance patrols.

One team in Belet Huen was reassigned to the town of Fer Fer (along the Ethiopian border) to monitor Ethiopian military incursions into Somalia and to monitor and interdict shipments of illegal arms. A-detachment 316 (from the 3rd SF Group) was the Moroccan CST; teams from the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 10th SF Group were assigned as CSTs with the Italian, German and French contingents.

The missions of the Army Special Operations Task Force, or ARSOTF, were to conduct UW by sending teams to meet with clan leaders and by assisting the U.N. with demobilization efforts and weapons collection; to provide force protection (countersniper and battlefield information gathering); to provide area assessments that update intelligence; to provide selected CSTs to U.N. forces; to facilitate humanitarian activities; to conduct border surveillance and interdict shipments of illegal arms; and to provide area security to relief operations (including convoy security-escort duties).

A significant amount of combat occurred in the Kismaayo sector between armed Somali factions and troops of the 10th Mountain Division. Initially, the 10th did not have access to intelligence on the clan factions, and it required human intelligence. After coordinating with the intelligence assets of the 10th, SF teams began supplying reconnaissance reports and area assessments. CSTs were also able to provide situational awareness related to their clan factions and their multinational partners.

Other missions that SF performed in support of the 10th Mountain Division included:

- Mounted reconnaissance of remote areas in order to conduct area assessments and to make contact with clan and faction leaders. During a recon operation in March 1993, four members of a CST from Company A, 2/5th, were traveling to a meeting of tribal elders in Belet Huen. Their vehicle struck a

Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer

SF soldiers from Detachment 525 depart Mogadishu on an area-assessment mission in April 1993.

mine, mortally wounding the medic and injuring the other three passengers. The medic, Sergeant First Class Robert Deeks, was able to treat the wounded before he died. He was the only SF soldier killed in action in Somalia.

- Surveillance of the Ethiopian border in order to report acts of banditry against humanitarian organizations, to ascertain the source of arms-smuggling, and to report incursions by Ethiopian forces into Somalia.
- Special reconnaissance of named areas of interest in and around Kismaayo.[3]

SF teams were assigned to work with all three of the major clan factions — General Morgan's, General Aideed's and Colonel Jess's — to assist in demobilizing clan fighters and to confiscate the armed factions' heavy weapons. In accomplishing these UW tasks, the SF teams became the primary source of battlefield intelligence.

By the end of February 1993, the SOCCENT JSOTF had redeployed, leaving the FOB of the 2/5th SF Group as the commander of the ARSOF component of the JTF. The teams from the other SF groups also returned home, and from that time on, SF's Somalia involvement was handled through a rotation of units from the 5th SF Group.

In mid-February, Company C, 2/5th SF Group, consolidated its teams to establish the AOB headquarters and a base of operations on the compound of the American Embassy in Mogadishu. For the remainder of their time in Somalia, the SF soldiers assisted in providing security for food-relief operations.

Armed and mounted A-detachments traveled in relief columns to provide protection from snipers and from looting and attack. The JTF commander also assigned the A-detachments to perform several long-range reconnaissance missions. On those missions, the detachments, despite carrying a full war-load of weapons and ammunition on their DMVs, attempted to appear less threatening by assuming a casual posture — wearing soft caps or Middle-Eastern style headgear. They would enter a village, find out which clan was in charge there, and establish a rapport that helped to set the stage for the arrival of Marine mechanized infantry who would come to disarm the locals.

Continue Hope

On April 12, 1993, the 2/5th Group's FOB and its organic teams redeployed to Fort Campbell, Ky. On May 4, with food supplies flowing again and with more than 37,000 U.N. soldiers deployed to Somalia, UNITAF passed operations to the U.N.-led UNOSOM II. On May 5, the U.S. forces remaining under Operation Restore Hope assumed a new mission, Operation Continue Hope, which expanded the U.N. mandate to include operations under the Title VII charter — peacemaking.

A large U.S. logistics-support element remained in Mogadishu, as well as a U.S. QRF composed of assets of the 10th Mountain Division. The SOCCE from Company B, 1/5th SF Group, which had deployed to Somalia in March 1993 with two mounted A-detachments (523 and 525), was under the operational control of the QRF. Without the presence of the massive combat power of the U.S., the warring factions became more aggressive in their activities. By early June, UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu were closed-up in their separate compounds.

Prior to the assumption of responsibility by UNOSOM II, SOCCE 520 had conducted operations during April 1993 in support of UNITAF. Each of its area-familiarization missions produced valuable intelligence for UNOSOM, CENTCOM, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other government agencies. SOCCE personnel

met many of the indigenous leaders and gained an appreciation for the terrain and operations of coalition forces in the areas of Kismaayo, Bardera, Baidoa, Merka, Belet Huen and Galcaio. On April 23, Detachment 525 engaged in combat with militiamen from the Al-Itihad Al-Islami, or AIAI, fundamentalist Islamic organization near Gaarbaharey.

Mounted SF teams frequently encountered "technicals." The light civilian pickup trucks served as the armed clansmen's firepower-and-mobility platforms. The trucks had been hastily camouflaged with spray paint, and heavy machine guns had been mounted on the truck beds. Members of the militia would pile onto the trucks, armed with AK-47s, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs. Many of the armed trucks were initially rented by NGOs for protection. NGOs could not legally pay for protection with humanitarian funds, so they would list their armed guards as "technical assistants" on their books — thus the nickname "technicals."

A split team from Detachment 525, led by Sergeant First Class Otto Hicks, was in the area of Bardera when the company received the mission to attempt to co-opt the AIAI in the town of Bela How into working with the U.N. The team drove its two DMVs to Bela How and attempted to negotiate with the AIAI. When the negotiations failed, the team left town, followed by one technical. When the two DMVs were close to friendly lines, Hicks decided to stop the technical so that the team wouldn't be caught between two militia factions. After deploying his two vehicles in a wadi, Hicks and another NCO walked back to intercept the technical and to direct the Somali militia to stop following them. The technical stopped and opened fire while its armed militiamen deployed. The Somalis were immediately engaged by one of the DMV gunners, who killed the technical gunner, disabled the truck's .50-caliber machine gun and destroyed the vehicle.

The Somalis suffered one dead and three wounded. There were no friendly casualties. For their actions that day, several members of Detachment 525 were recommended for decorations.

In mid-May, SOCCE 520 was tasked to deploy mounted detachments and a liaison element to Kismaayo following an outbreak of fighting there. SOCCE 520 participated in a combined contingency operation with the QRF and Belgians and conducted special-reconnaissance, or SR, missions in and around Kismaayo. As warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed's anti-UNOSOM propaganda increased, SOCCE 520 also took the lead in planning the seizure of the main radio station in Mogadishu.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, conducted force-protection activities in support of UNOSOM II. The company employed counter snipers in static positions at the embassy compound and roamed to "hot spots" around the university complex. As the situation warranted, the company extended its sniper positions to external areas and to U.N. strongpoints throughout Mogadishu. As one of the commanders of the 10th Mountain Division task force stated, "Periodically, one of our sniper teams armed with Barrett .50-caliber or M-24 7.62 mm sniper rifles would observe and engage a militiaman driving a technical or carrying a crew-served weapon. These snipers were lethal, and they proved [to be] a superb deterrent against the movement and transport of militia weapons near our compounds. With a single shot, they could reach out and touch a belligerent at 1,000 meters, and they did so frequently."[4]

Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski

SF soldiers in DMVs accompany convoys of relief supplies to provide security from attacks by bandits and warring Somali factions.

In Mogadishu, U.S. military snipers made shots that averaged 400 meters. The rules of engagement for UNOSOM II were unique in that they allowed forces to engage technicals or men who were carrying crew-served weapons (e.g., RPGs or machine guns) without provocation. Any Somali clansmen armed with sniper weapons (a rifle with a scope could fit the category) could also be engaged without provocation. However, clansmen who carried AK-47s but did not point them at U.N. forces in a threatening manner were considered to be off-limits.

SF aerial snipers assisted the aviation assets of the 10th Mountain Division's 2-14th Infantry Task Force when they began the "Eyes Over Mogadishu" program — the nearly constant presence of armed helicopters over the city. Retired Colonel Lawrence E. Casper, who commanded the Falcon Brigade Task Force in Mogadishu, wrote about the use of urban snipers in his book, *Falcon Brigade*: "A Special Forces soldier, equipped with night optics and a Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle suspended from the troop compartment ceiling of a Black Hawk, was able to place a couple of armor-piercing rounds through the tube of an abandoned 120 mm mortar, rendering it useless. The mortar crew fled in haste upon hearing the approaching helicopter."[5]

Casper further describes this unique employment of snipers in an urban environment, "Our helicopter snipers also proved extremely effective. Equipped with the Barrett, the sniper flights were usually in concert with our 'Eyes Over Mogadishu' night missions. The sniper aircraft (UH-60) would trail the lead helicopter by about a half-mile. Although the aircraft were completely blacked out, if the lead helicopter attracted ground fire, the sniper aircraft would observe, acquire, and engage the target with the aid of night-vision accessories. Typically, the helos carried two teams of snipers and spotters equipped with a handheld laser designator. The Special Forces snipers would sit on wooden benches in the troop compartment with their feet braced against cargo straps and their rifles slung from the ceiling. Airborne snipers were only employed for a couple of months; we eventually ceased operations because of concerns for the teams' safety if the aircraft experienced a hard landing."[6]

Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer

Two SF snipers set up a Blackhawk helicopter prior to an aerial sniper mission as part of "Eyes Over Mogadishu." The wooden bench was taken from a U.N. dining hall.

After Aideed's militia attacked and killed several Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993, U.N. forces took a more aggressive role to subdue Aideed's influence. On June 5, personnel from SOCCE 520 accompanied officials of the UNOSOM Ceasefire and Disarmament Committee on an announced forced inspection of the so-called authorized weapons-storage sites. SF personnel assisted in the categorization of the various weapons and in developing target folders for possible use in the future. Using the targeting information, SOCCE 520 briefed AH-1 pilots, AC-130 crews and QRF commanders and staff on all targets prior to the seizure-and-destruction operations conducted June 12.

The first direct activities against Aideed began with AC-130 gunships destroying his home, his garage compound (a storage area for technicals), and his clan's weapons-storage areas. SOCCENT deployed a JSOTF with four AC-130s and two KC-135 air-refueling tankers to control this phase of the mission. The deputy commander of the 5th SF Group, Lieutenant Colonel "Moe" Elmore, was assigned to the headquarters of UNOSOM II as the special-operations coordination element, or SOCOORD, to enhance coordination between the JSOTF and UNOSOM. Beginning June 12, the gunships conducted four nights of

armed-reconnaissance and direct-action operations. From June 12 to June 17, SOCCE 520 provided ground control for AC-130 strikes on selected targets in Mogadishu.

During the same period, the company also provided CSTs to coalition forces that were conducting cordon-and-search operations at the Aideed enclave, and it placed a sniper team atop a building overlooking the Aideed compound. During the AC-130 strikes, the Company B commander and his sniper team were perched atop the building and called for close air support, or CAS, from the AC-130s.

On the fourth night of the gunship attacks, UNOSOM II forces mounted a cordon-and-search mission with four multinational units to flush Aideed's leadership from his compound, to clean up Mogadishu and to reassert U.N. control. The SOCCE and its two A-detachments split into three CSTs in order to maneuver with Pakistani, Italian and Moroccan forces. The CAS team with the Moroccan task force came under intense fire during the operation and responded upon the task-force commander's request with fire from MK-19 grenade launchers that silenced observed sources of enemy fire. Following nine hours of combat, the team's disabled DMV was towed back to the U.S. Embassy compound under the supporting fire of a counterattack by forces of the French Foreign Legion.

During the remainder of June and July, Aideed clansmen constantly attacked U.N. forces in retaliation for the actions early in June. In late June, CENTCOM directed SOCCE 520 to develop a concept for the capture of Aideed. Major Dave Jesmer, the Company B commander; a British SAS officer who was observing the company's operations; and Lieutenant Colonel Elmore devised a plan to

Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer

The Aideed compound, following attacks by AC-130 gunships on June 12, 1993.

capture Aideed during his vehicular movements. The concept was to employ SR teams and aerial snipers to detect Aideed when he was in vehicular movement, then attack the column with Cobras from the 10th Mountain Division. Upon the arrival of the Marine Expeditionary Unit, the mission was handed over to the Marines. However, Detachment 523 continued to provide an aerial sniper team that performed aerial target interdiction at night. The mission, later referred to as Eyes Over Mogadishu, proved to be a valuable alternative to the use of Cobra gunships at night. On Aug. 10, the aerial sniper team evaded antiaircraft fire and destroyed a Somali technical armed with a 57 mm rocket pod that had been firing on the airfield and that had killed at least two Somali militiamen.

The security of Mogadishu deteriorated throughout July, as was evidenced by the increasing frequency of attacks on the U.N. compounds and by the ambushes of U.N. vehicles in the city. The danger inherent in urban guerrilla warfare was brought home to SOCCE 520 when a two-vehicle convoy carrying Elmore to the airport was ambushed not more than two miles from the embassy compound.

On July 23, Sergeant Major Pat Ballogg planned to accompany Detachment 523 on a counter-sniper operation.[7] The group, mounted in 523's DMVs, was going to a range area out of town to zero weapons before moving into the operational area. Elmore had missed his helicopter taxi from the embassy compound to the airfield, and the unit gave him a lift. One of the column's DMVs was armed with a MK-19 grenade launcher; the other carried a .50-caliber M-2 machine gun. The trail vehicle also had one squad automatic weapon and an M-24 sniper weapon. Each member of the group had his personal weapons with the basic load, as well as other ammunition for firing at the range. Individuals were protected by Kevlar helmets and "Zinner" body armor. As a precaution against land mines, the DMVs had been equipped with Kevlar soft blast blanket linings and with armored front windows. The SF personnel locked and loaded their weapons, pointed them outward, and departed the embassy compound around 10 a.m., choosing an unused route along side streets.

The column rounded a corner onto a straight dirt road about 300 meters long. The two-story, flat-front buildings on either side of the road left just enough room for two vehicles to pass. The street was deserted, and a ruined blue bus sat on the left side. About 200 feet down the road, Ballogg (in the lead vehicle) could see a side street or alley. Suddenly, Ballogg's vehicle was hit by two rounds: one in the center of each side of the armored windshield. The shooters were in the blue bus. Simultaneously, armed clansmen in the alley to the

Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer

One of the DMVs involved in the ambush in Mogadishu on July 23, 1993. Note the bullet strikes on the front and side windows.

right opened fire. The Somalis (8-12 personnel) had AK-47s and either threw grenades or fired RPGs (this was uncertain in the confusion). The enemy was as close as 14 feet, and the action took place in seconds.

Ballogg was hit in the right shoulder and in the right hand by an AK-47 round. Pieces of one of the rounds that hit the windshield came through and inflicted additional wounds on his side and in his mouth. SFC Mike Bowers, riding in the hatch position as the gunner in the lead vehicle, was hit above the right knee and lost four inches of his right femur.

Sergeant First Class Chuck Beebe, riding in the trail vehicle, immediately provided effective fire, killing the Somalis who were attempting to sweep forward to the lead vehicle. Ballogg, although wounded, could still use his M-16, and he returned the Somalis' fire as Sergeant First Class Lance Hoepner drove through the kill zone while firing his 9 mm pistol over Ballogg's right shoulder. The vehicle came within five feet of the attacking Somalis.

To clear the ambush zone, the trail vehicle backed up and fired as the lead vehicle moved forward. Bowers was combat-ineffective because of the pain of his wound. The Zinner vest kept him in the turret, and he could not get out. He had to stand on his injured leg. Hoepner, in the lead vehicle, drove as fast as he could to the airfield — on flat tires.

Fortunately, when the group arrived at the airfield, a Moroccan medical platoon was training there. The Moroccans immediately began to bandage the wounded SF soldiers. Hoepner, an SF medic, took over the treatment.[8] Ballogg and Bowers were flown by helicopter to the field hospital, where they remained for a short time before being transferred to Landstuhl, Germany. They were later awarded Purple Hearts; Hoepner and Beebe received decorations for valor. Bower later received the Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services Award as the "Operator of the Year" in 1995 for his actions.[9]

During early August, Detachment 525 trained Malaysian snipers, who had received new equipment just prior to their arrival in Somalia. At the same time, Detachment 523 intensified its aerial sniper coverage to include support for a renewed attempt by the QRF to capture Aideed.

JTF-Somalia

Company C, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, deployed on its rotation to Somalia in September 1993. Upon arrival, it assumed the ongoing missions from elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group. Primarily, the B-detachment performed as the SOCCE to the UNOSOM II QRF while the A-detachments performed traditional roles of SR, DA and coalition-support. The employment of SF sniper teams became the primary form of DA throughout the city, including the continuation of the Eyes Over Mogadishu program aboard aviation assets of the 10th Mountain Division. Company C employed sniper teams at the embassy compound, at the Pakistani stadium and on top of the soap factory. It also had a team of snipers hidden in a shipping container at the new port area.

CSTs operated with Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Moroccan and Egyptian forces at their strongpoints in the city. These teams were instrumental in providing daily situational awareness and direct links to AC-130 CAS, if needed. The remaining teams were tasked with SR to ascertain the locations of shipments of illegal weapons.

As a result of increased hostilities from Aideed's warring clan faction, CENTCOM deployed TF Ranger to apprehend Aideed. That decision resulted in the tragic

Ranger mission and the clash with Aideed's forces on Oct. 3, 1993. The raid by TF Ranger was just one of a series of raids conducted throughout Mogadishu to apprehend key members of Aideed's leadership infrastructure. Task-force Ranger's picture-perfect air assault quickly changed to brutal, close combat when members of the task force attempted to rescue the pilots of a Blackhawk downed by RPG fire. After the battle and the subsequent extraction of TF Ranger from Somalia, U.S. armor units deployed to UNOSOM II under the command of JTF-Somalia.

Company C, 3/5th SF Group, was present in Mogadishu during the Oct. 3 raid by Task Force Ranger, but it did not participate in the battle. The company did assist in other ways: Two of the unit's DMVs were on loan to the Rangers that day. All the company's medics were dispatched to the hospital to treat the task force's wounded, and other members of the company reported to the hospital to give blood. Lieutenant Colonel John Holcombe, the surgeon general of the 46th Combat Support Hospital in Mogadishu, later remarked, "The SOF medics treated every casualty correctly. They made tough medical decisions. They ran out of supplies. They did an outstanding job. They were very, very good."

Immediately after the raid, SOCCENT was ordered back into Mogadishu to form the JSOTF-Somalia under an expanded U.S. military presence, JTF-Somalia. Company C, 3/5th SF Group, was placed under the operational control of the JSOTF. The company commander was assigned the mission of forming a sniper task force composed of organic SF, Navy SEALs from the carrier battle group, and Marine snipers from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. These snipers were deployed to positions around the city to provide force protection.

The snipers carried out several successful engagements, including a shot taken by SF snipers at the Pakistani stadium on a technical at a range of 900 meters. Throughout the remainder of October and into mid-December, SOF snipers counted more than 26 successful engagements on armed clansmen.

Company C performed other missions, such as providing armed escorts for U.S. Air Force personnel who were performing airfield assessments on airfields in Baledogle, Baidoa and Kismaayo. The company also performed humanitarian activities — mainly delivering school supplies and clothing to Somali children in various safe suburbs of Mogadishu. For a short period of time, one SF detachment performed foreign internal defense with an element from the United Arab Emirates. The UAE contingent had received new sniper weapons, and SF personnel formed an impromptu mobile training team to teach the UAE soldiers about the weapons system and about the employment of urban snipers.

The withdrawal

When the drawdown of U.S. forces began in mid-December 1993, the JSOTF-Somalia began a phased withdrawal to the environs of the airfield. Company C, 3/5th SF Group, with its six teams and an additional A-detachment from the 1/5th SF Group, withdrew from the embassy compound to sniper positions surrounding the airfield and old port area. One team remained at the university compound to provide force-protection for U.S. logistics units. More than six sniper engagements occurred during this period, involving Somali hostiles equipped with RPGs or crew-served weapons. The JSOTF continued to provide armed reconnaissance missions over Mogadishu

Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski

Members of Company C, 3/5th SF Group, distribute school supplies and children's clothing during a humanitarian-assistance mission.

nightly with the AC-130s.

On Jan. 15, with the arrival of the B-detachment headquarters from 1/5th SF Group, Company C redeployed. As the mission continued to draw down, the Marines were given the responsibility for providing a presence on the perimeter of the airfield, and the remaining SF contingents in theater redeployed home. By March, the Marines had relinquished responsibility to the Egyptian forces under UNOSOM II. The U.S. Congress mandated the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, and the JSOTF headquarters and staff withdrew to Mombassa. They returned to the U.S. in April.

Photo courtesy Rickie Young

Mounted teams from Company B, 1/5th SF Group, aboard the USS Belleau Wood *at the port of Mombassa, Kenya. The ship was en route to Mogadishu.*

NEO Somalia

As UNOSOM II forces began to withdraw and to downsize after American forces had withdrawn, it was feared that the Somali clans would once again assume their belligerent posture toward the U.N. In April 1994, the commander of U.S. Central Command tasked SOCCENT to be prepared to conduct an NEO in the coming months.

As the situation deteriorated in the fall of 1994, the USLO in Mogadishu felt it prudent to remove the bulk of the 150 or so American citizens from Mogadishu. In September, SOCCENT was tasked to assist with a low-key, semi-permissive NEO of the USLO in Mogadishu. It formed a small JSOTF with AC-130 gunships to provide overhead CAP during the operation to evacuate the Americans through the western portion of Mogadishu. The Americans were collected, processed and moved to the airfield via an old airport bypass road outside of town. From the Mogadishu airfield (still UNOSOM II-controlled), they were flown to safe havens in Kenya. The NEO was conducted without incident.

Operation United Shield

In January 1995, Combined Task Force United Shield, formed from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, was given the mission to assist in the withdrawal of all UNOSOM II forces from Mogadishu. SOCCENT was alerted and began planning for the mission Sept. 30, 1994. In early January 1995, SOF planners deployed to Camp Pendleton, Calif., and briefed the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Zinni, to gain his approval for the SOF portion of the operations plan.

The JSOTF United Shield was formed to conduct operations from Jan. 9 through March 10, 1995. The JSOTF headquarters was formed from members of the SOCCENT staff, augmented by a senior warrant officer and NCOs from the 1/5th SF Group. The JSOTF also had an Air Force detachment of AC-130s and KC-135s from the 16th Special Operations Squadron, headquartered at the Mombassa Airport.

From Jan. 26 to Jan. 28, the JSOTF deployed to Mombassa. In early February, the *USS Belleau Wood*, with the 23rd Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU, steamed north from Mombassa, rehearsing amphibious assaults along the coast of Kenya. The commander of the 1/5th SF Group (who was the ARSOTF commander) and his S3 were the SOCOORD to the MEU. Company B of the 1/5th and four of its A-detachments, deploying as CSTs, were on board. Aboard ship, SF teams joined with civilian subject-matter experts to teach the Marines nonlethal means of combat for use against the Somalis. The A-detachments learned to use sticky foam, beanbag rounds, weapon-fired nets, etc., and then instructed the Marines in their use. The JTF commander was interested in employing nonlethal weapons to avoid an

all-out firefight.

The SF advanced operating base, or AOB, and three CSTs went ashore via Marine hovercraft in mid-February, approximately two weeks ahead of the Marines' relief-in-place of the remaining UNOSOM II forces. One CST was held in reserve, to provide guides as required, or to act as a CST for withdrawing Pakistani and Bangladeshi units. An Air Force combat-control team went ashore with the AOB to provide air traffic control for evacuation aircraft, as well as to provide additional control of JTF aircraft over Mogadishu.

The CSTs linked up with their Pakistani and Bangladeshi counterparts, made detailed sector sketches, performed tactical recons, and conducted rehearsals for the upcoming relief-in-place by the Marines. The CSTs maintained contact with their counterparts to facilitate the Marines' coming ashore. The relief-in-place began Feb. 27, 1995. The CSTs passed their sector sketches and their area information to the Marines as they came ashore.

On Feb. 27 and 28, the AOB and the CSTs moved their vehicles and equipment back to the *Belleau Wood*. The members of both the B-detachment and the A-detachments exfiltrated with the Marine elements on March 1. The JTF left the beach March 2, without incident. Lieutenant General Zinni was the last Marine off the beach. By March 3, all units had steamed out of the operational waters of Somalia. The task force returned to Mombassa, and Operation United Shield was over. The assets of the 5th SF Group conducted redeployment activities throughout early March, and all forces were back at Fort Campbell by March 10, 1995.

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski is commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group. His previous assignment was deputy commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Colonel Celeski enlisted in the Army in 1974. In 1978, he graduated from Army Officer Candidate School and was commissioned as an armor officer. In 1983, Colonel Celeski completed the SF Qualification Course and was assigned to the 5th SF Group as a detachment commander. His other assignments in the 5th Group include company commander, battalion S3, group S3, and battalion commander. Colonel Celeski has also served as adviser to the Royal Jordanian 1st Armor Battalion; as the J3 ground operations officer and as the deputy J5 for plans in the Special Operations Command-Central; as G3 and as chief of staff with the U.S. Army SF Command; and as commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Sarajevo, in support of NATO's Operation Joint Forge. Colonel Celeski is a graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Marine Amphibious Warfare Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Force Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Army War College and the Army Force Management Course. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Columbus College and a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg University.

Notes:

[1] Written summary provided by Master Sergeant Ken Barriger, February 2002.

[2] "United States Special Operations Command History," USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, Fla., September 1998, 44-48.

[3] "US Army Forces, Somalia," 10th Mountain Division After Action Report, Summary, Headquarters 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y., 2 June 1993.

[4] Lawrence E. Casper, *Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2001), 133.

[5] Casper, *Falcon Brigade*, 96.

[6] Casper, *Falcon Brigade*, 133-34.

[7] Interview with Command Sergeant Major Pat Ballogg, 4 February 2002.

[8] "The … true hero in the ambush was SFC Lance Hoepner, who had the presence of mind to call in a SITREP to me enabling us to get a MEDEVAC to the airport and a Cobra gunship in the air, return fire with his 9 mm and get the damaged vehicle out of the kill zone. Once at the airfield, he was the one to treat our two casualties in the vehicle." E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel Dave Jesmer, 27 February 2002.

[9] The story as related, courtesy of CSM Pat Ballogg.

Operation Focus Relief: 3rd SF Group Builds Relations in Western Africa

From August 2000 until December 2001, elements of the 3rd Special Forces Group, in coordination with the United States Department of State, deployed to western Africa to train units of three countries as part of Operation Focus Relief, or OFR.

The Focus Relief initiative was first announced by President Bill Clinton in an address to the Nigerian National Assembly in August 2000. The operation's primary goal was to equip and train as many as seven battalions of soldiers from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to conduct peace-enforcement operations in Sierra Leone, where rebels of the Revolutionary United Front, or RUF, were battling United Nations peacekeepers and the government of Sierra Leone over control of that country's diamond mines.

Photo by J.B. Keefer

A soldier from the 3rd SF Group trains a Nigerian soldier in combat lifesaving techniques during Operation Focus Relief in August 2000.

Another goal of OFR was to rebuild relations with the Nigerian military and to help improve its effectiveness. Until May 1999, when President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected and Nigeria was returned to civilian rule, the country had spent 16 years under a military government, and it was trying to re-establish its military forces. As part of OFR, the U.S. extended a $66 million military-aid-and-training package to Nigeria, of which $20 million was to be used for a military training program.

The 3rd SF Group's primary goal was to develop and implement a program to instruct soldiers of Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal in the tactics and techniques of combat operations that they would need in combating the RUF. The 3rd SF Group delivered nearly seven battalions' worth of uniforms, medical equipment, communication systems, rifles, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and light-wheeled noncombat vehicles to the three nations.

On Aug. 23, 2000, the first of the 3rd SF Group's soldiers in Nigeria, A-detachment 353, established a medical mobile training team, or MTT. In addition to training nearly 100 Nigerian soldiers in combat lifesaving techniques used for preventing shock and for stabilizing and evacuating injured or wounded people, the MTT began building rapport with the Nigerian soldiers. That rapport would be beneficial later on, when the 3rd SF Group would begin training Nigerian infantry battalions.

On Oct. 9, 2000, 250 members of the 3rd Group's 2nd Battalion began the first 10-week OFR training rotation, in Nigeria. The Nigerian 26th and 195th motorized infantry battalions (from Sokoto and Ibadan) participated in training that focused on individual and collective combat tasks that would be required in conducting

Photo by David D. Underwood Jr.

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, issue weapons to Senegalese soldiers who are receiving small-arms training as part of Operation Focus Relief.

company-level offensive and defensive combat operations against the RUF in Sierra Leone. The training was also designed to build up the capabilities of combat-support units and to strengthen company-level command and control. The program of instruction, or POI, had been vetted by both the U.N. and the Department of State.

During the training rotation, each Nigerian soldier received uniforms, load-bearing equipment, a Kevlar helmet, a poncho, canteens, an entrenching tool and a new rifle. The 2nd Battalion trained more than 1,200 soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Dino Roth, commander of the 2nd Battalion, said the Nigerian soldiers were willing and eager to learn. The greatest problem for U.S. and Nigerian soldiers was the heat — temperatures ranged from 88 to 95 degrees. With the majority of training taking place on rifle ranges and mortar ranges, water supplies were a major concern. Ceremonies were held in mid-December 2000 to celebrate the end of OFR I. Many Nigerian dignitaries praised the success of the training and thanked the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SFG, for a job well-done.

On May 29, 2000, the 3rd Group's 1st Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jay Glover, began the second training rotation, OFR II, in Ghana and in Senegal. The 1st Battalion's Forward Operational Base, or FOB, 31 was located in Accra, Ghana. FOB 31's Advanced Operational Base, or AOB, 310 instructed one battalion of Ghanaian infantrymen, while AOB 330 instructed one battalion of Senegalese infantrymen in Theis, Senegal.

OFR II taught the same 10-week POI that had been used during OFR I. Both Ghana and Senegal provided a 750-man battalion, continuing the strenuous training during possibly the worst months of the year. The weather fluctuated from hot to hotter, increasing the number of heat casualties. Both battalions graduated early in August, providing two additional battalions for peace-enforcement duties in Sierra Leone.

OFR III was the largest of the three rotations. Elements of the 3rd Group's 3rd Battalion, which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Sherwood, conducted the training from Sept. 17 to Dec. 15, 2001. The 3rd Battalion trained three Nigerian battalions — more than 2,200 soldiers — at four locations in Nigeria: Abuja,

where FOB 33 provided command and control for the three other locations; Ilorin, where AOB 370 trained the 222nd Nigerian Infantry Battalion; Serti, where AOB 380 trained the 20th Nigerian Infantry Battalion; and Bernin Kebbi, where AOB 390 trained the 1st Nigerian Infantry Battalion. Training for all three Nigerian battalions followed the 10-week POI that had been used during the previous OFR rotations. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Howard F. Jeter, OFR III facilitated an unprecedented level of cooperation, rapport and interoperability between the government of Nigeria, the Nigerian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Embassy.

Photo by Jim Hampshire

A Nigerian battalion commander thanks the soldiers from the 3rd SF Group who trained his soldiers during Operation Focus Relief.

FOB 33 was the first U.S. Army unit to deploy with the Joint Base Station, or JBS, and to integrate the JBS into its communications package. JBS allowed the FOB to connect to SIPR and NIPR nets and to operate DSN phone lines. The JBS provided communications with the SCAMP radio, which transmitted secure high-frequency communications to the AOBs and to the 3rd SF Group base operations at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Each AOB developed excellent rapport with the Nigerian battalion it was training, resulting in outstanding host-nation participation and cooperation in the training program. Each OFR rotation ended with a field-training exercise that maximized the participation of the host-nation military forces.

OFR owes its success to the men of the 3rd SF Group. Each battalion in the 3rd SF Group deployed its entire FOB into theatre, providing command and control, logistics support, and internal and external communications for seven AOBs and 28 A-detachments. Each battalion was responsible for training more than 1,500 soldiers, for monitoring their progress and for providing any necessary remedial training. The team members taught the classes and issued the equipment.

Addressing the soldiers of his company, Major David Duffy, commander of Company B, 3/3rd SF Group, said, "The hard work and effort you have put into the last 10 weeks of training … have been remarkable. The cooperation, camaraderie and professionalism demonstrated every day of the training period have been nothing less than phenomenal." ✂

This article was written by members of the 3rd Special Forces Group.

Exercise Balance Magic: 19th SF Group Practices Medicine in the Heart of Asia

While America was being rocked by the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, a group of Special Forces medical sergeants and other medical personnel from the 19th Special Forces Group were training in one of the most remote areas of the world, Mongolia, as part of Exercise Balance Magic. Far from the 21st-century technology that is available in the United States, the soldiers gained a unique insight into the practice of unconventional medicine.

Eight SF medical NCOs, the 19th SF Group surgeon, the 19th SF Group dentist, the former 19th SF Group surgeon and the 20th SF Group veterinarian, along with personnel from the 426th Civil Affairs Battalion, trained in Mongolia to improve their skills in obstetrics (childbirth), in dental care and in veterinary medicine — skills that are critical in unconventional warfare, or UW. The exercise was supported by a dedicated C-130 from the U.S. Air Force's 353rd Special Operations Group. In addition, personnel from the 19th Group performed an airborne operation with the Mongolian defense forces, making the exercise truly a joint-combined event.

The medical focus of Exercise Balance Magic required SF medical NCOs to develop their skills in non-trauma subspecialties — veterinary, dental and obstetric — that are difficult for SF medics to acquire in the U.S. The goals in those skill areas are outlined in the 18D scope of practice, formulated by the surgeon's office of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Because 18Ds now have to meet a paramedic requirement, more than 90 percent of the 18D refresher medical training during the last three years has been devoted to trauma. But in deployments for UW, as detachments gain and maintain rapport with the local population, many of the demands placed on SF medics will involve the non-trauma subspecialties.

Mongolia

Mongolia offers a unique training environment. Its terrain is mostly open plains or steppe, but about 10 percent of the ter-

U.S. Army photo

The 19th SF Group's dentist talks with a local horseman during Exercise Balance Magic, conducted in Mongolia in 2001.

U.S. Army photo

A medical NCO from the 19th SF Group assists a Mongolian dentist. NCOs performed fillings, extractions and other dental procedures.

rain is forest. Mongolia's average altitude is more than 5,000 feet above ground level, and its average annual temperature is below freezing. The population of 2.5 million is predominantly Mongol, but the country has many minority groups, such as Kazakhs and Uzbecks. Forty percent of Mongolians are under the age of 15. Almost half of the people of Mongolia live in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar.

Agriculture and livestock are Mongolia's economic foundation, but the growing development of the country's vast mineral resources will drive Mongolia's growth in the future. Foreign investment is encouraged, and Mongolians welcome Americans warmly. The Mongolian language is difficult to master. The U.S. Army's only Mongolian speaker, a member of the Utah National Guard's 300th Military Intelligence Battalion, accompanied the mission to provide crucial language support. Civilian-contract translators also provided valuable assistance, making it possible for the SF medics to conduct training at different locations simultaneously.

Obstetrics

The obstetrics portion of the medical mission required all eight SF medics to perform at least one hands-on delivery (most medics performed more), and several of the NCOs observed other procedures, such as Caesarean sections. The obstetrics training was conducted in Ulaanbaatar at the 1st Woman's Hospital, which averages 15 deliveries a day and accounts for 45 percent of the babies born in the city each year. By the end of the mission, the medics had performed 20 deliveries, had observed another 100, and had examined and cared for 34 newborns. The two physicians had delivered two babies under primitive conditions, and they had observed three Caesarean sections and a hysterectomy.

Dental training

The purpose of the dental training was to allow the SF medics to develop the skills needed to provide emergency dental care to team members and to provide basic dental care to the local population. Training included diagnosis and treatment of simple and complex dental problems (including oral infections and abscesses, extractions, and simple restorations). The training was conducted in Ulaanbataar, at the oral and maxillofacial clinic of the Central University Hospital, the main teaching hospital for the National Medical University of Mongolia. By mission's end, the medics had treated 122 patients and had performed 241 extractions. Their training experience in the oral clinic was unique: All the cases involved complex extractions, and the patients had been referred by other facilities. The objective was for the 18Ds to acquire as much experience as possible. Fortunately, the doctors had sufficient time to allow the NCOs to perform the

U.S. Army photo

Medical NCOs from the 19th SF Group assist the 19th SF Group surgeon and Mongolian medical personnel in performing a Caesarean section.

extractions themselves and to work through most of the complications that they encountered.

Veterinary medicine

With the help of the School of Veterinary Science and Biotechnology at the Mongolian State University of Agriculture, medics participated in hands-on procedures with horses, cattle, sheep and goats. During the training, the medics performed physical exams, selected methods of animal restraint, made casts and administered medication (including vaccinating and deworming 250 sheep and 25 horses). The medics encountered advanced cases involving canine keratoconjuntivitis and ulceration, canine traumatic injury with multiple orthopedic injuries, and infectious respiratory diseases of sheep. Additional classes and practical exercises taught the SF medics subjects such as foodborne diseases and carcass evaluation.

While the primary mission of the SF medic is to preserve the health of the team, knowledge of veterinary care is invaluable in extended or UW operations, where animals play a key role either by transporting equipment or from their role in the economic stability of a community. Many of the medical skills that are necessary for the treatment of humans are similar to the skills needed for the treatment of animals. Veterinary training gives SF medics additional practice and experience that will strengthen their diagnostic and treatment skills for human patients as well.

Throughout the exercise, the team augmented the hands-on exercises with lectures to ensure that medics understood the theoretical basis for the treatment. Exposure to highly competent Mongolian health-care personnel, who are well-trained in Russian-style medicine, and time spent working with the group dentist and the group surgeon gave the 19th SF Group medics unique insights into the practice of low-technology medicine in a rugged and austere environment. The skills the medics acquired will be critically important to success in UW, and to establishing trust with indigenous forces. The exercise also set the stage for further training with the Mongolian military forces during 2002.

U.S. Army photo

An SF medical NCO performs a veterinary medical inspection on Mongolian livestock during Operation Balance Magic.

This article was written by the medical staff of the 19th Special Forces Group.

The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan

The liberation of the city of Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan on Nov. 10, 2001, marked the first major military victory of Operation Enduring Freedom and boosted the confidence of the Northern Alliance. The liberation heralded the defeat and the collapse of the Taliban, not only in northern Afghanistan, but throughout Afghanistan.

DoD photo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum, leader of the largest Afghan faction of the Northern Alliance.

After the liberation of Mazar-e Sharif, the Taliban suffered defeat after defeat at the hands of opposition forces that were integrated with United States Special Forces detachments. The success of the opposition forces not only vindicated the strategic choices made by the U.S. national leadership, it also demonstrated the power, viability and full-spectrum utility of U.S. Army Special Forces and the relevance of SF's role in unconventional warfare, or UW, in the 21st century.

Moving forward to our past

On Aug. 10, 2000, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command issued a memorandum stating that SF would return to its core mission of UW. In that memo, he stated, "Unconventional Warfare is the umbrella mission for everything we do." Only 13 months later, elements of the 5th SF Group participated in the liberation of Mazar-e Sharif, after fighting one of the most unusual campaigns in the history of UW. The past was indeed prelude.

Background

Mazar-e Sharif, the second largest city in Afghanistan, is the cultural, economic, religious and strategic center of northern Afghanistan. The magnificent Blue Mosque at the center of the city is believed to be the burial place of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed and the fourth Caliph of Islam. The city was once a waypoint on the ancient Silk Road, and it boasts an ethnically diverse population of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Pashtuns. Because it has the longest airfield runway in Afghanistan, and because of its proximity to Freedom Bridge, a road/rail bridge that spans the Amu Darya River between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, Mazar-e Sharif is also a major economic hub.

Mazar-e Sharif served as a strategically vital Soviet base during the 1980s. During the late 1990s, the city was the scene of bitter internal fighting, and it changed hands several times. A militia under General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Afghan of Uzbek ethnicity who served as an officer during the com-

DoD photo

Despite its relative lack of experience on horseback, A-detachment 595, which had no organic mobility assets, borrowed horses and mules from General Dostum's horse-mounted forces.

munist regime of Najibullah, had controlled much of Northern Afghanistan since 1992. However, Dostum had been forced to flee Afghanistan in May 1997 when some of his subordinates betrayed him and joined forces with the Taliban. An uprising by ethnic Hazaras forced the Taliban from Mazar-e Sharif after only five days, but it also led to fighting between the militia forces of the Uzbeks and the Hazaras.

Although Mazar-e Sharif had been spared the shelling that devastated other major cities in Afghanistan, thousands died as the Taliban and factions of the Northern Alliance struggled to control the city. The dead included 11 Iranian diplomats and an untold number of Hazaras who were massacred when the Taliban seized the city Aug. 8, 1998. When the city fell, the remnants of the Northern Alliance forces, representing three of the major factions, withdrew southward through the Balkh Valley to strongholds in the mountains. The largest faction was the predominantly Afghan-Uzbek Jumbish Milli Islami forces, commanded by General Dostum. General Mohammed Atta commanded the mainly Afghan-Tajik Jamiat-e Islami forces, and Haji Mohammed Mohaqqeq led the Hazara forces of Hizb-e Wahdat. Although the factions were relatively secure in the steep mountains and deep river valleys, they were effectively cut off from nearly all external support. They remained isolated, poorly equipped and struggling to survive, until early November 2001.

Combat operations

On Oct. 20, 2001, the first SF element (Detachment 595) infiltrated the Darya-e Suf valley, whose rugged terrain provided the Northern Alliance forces with a sanctuary approximately 110 kilometers south of Mazar-e Sharif. After linking up with General Dostum, the detachment immediately began an assessment of the situation and began preparing for offensive action against the Taliban.

During the next two weeks, Detachment 595 continued its assessment and began directing a series of airstrikes against the Taliban forces to the north. With both Northern Alliance and Taliban forces widely dispersed, it was sometimes necessary for the detachment to split into multiple cells. In order to move effectively on the battlefield, the detachment, which had no organic means of mobility, adopted indigenous methods of transportation. Despite a relative lack of experience on horseback, especially in difficult terrain and at night, the detachment borrowed horses and mules from General Dostum's horse-mounted forces. Using horses and mules as their primary means of battlefield move-

ment, the SF soldiers achieved a level of battlefield mobility that, in the inhospitable terrain, was unmatched by any motorized vehicle.

The success of the initial airstrikes provided the Northern Alliance forces an opportunity to begin pushing northwest toward the Balkh Valley. But the ill-equipped Northern Alliance forces lacked the arms and ammunition necessary for a sustained offensive. Their ability to defend against a Taliban counterattack after they had mounted an offensive operation was problematic at best. Although the Northern Alliance forces had received limited supplies of blankets, rice and horse feed, the expected deliveries of arms and ammunition had not yet arrived. Furthermore, as surviving Taliban forces regrouped and concentrated their defenses, it became more difficult for the Northern Alliance to advance.

Except for the senior commanders, the forces of the Northern Alliance lacked a reliable means of battlefield communication. … Furthermore, the multiple subordinate commanders, many of whom had never been trained in map-reading, lacked any means of tracking and reporting their locations as the offensive progressed.

In preparation for an expanded SF presence and in anticipation of a protracted campaign, ODC 53, a small command-and-control element, infiltrated Darya Suf Nov. 2, 2001. This eight-man element, composed of SF soldiers and personnel from U.S. Air Force special-tactics squadrons, was tasked to provide high-level liaison with General Dostum, to assist in operational planning and to provide command and control for the expanded SF presence. Two days later, A-detachment 534 infiltrated at Darya-e Balkh, which is located approximately 40 kilometers west of Darya Suf, and linked up with Jamiat-e Islami forces under General Mohammed Atta.

The three SF elements, working in concert, would assist the Northern Alliance forces in the critical battle for Mazar-e Sharif. Despite their past differences, the three Afghan factions had agreed to cooperate in order to achieve their shared goal of liberating Mazar-e Sharif. Furthermore, all the Afghan factions had agreed to nominally subordinate their forces to General Dostum. This cooperation, while welcome and necessary, required a great deal of coordination to synchronize the maneuver of ground forces and, most importantly, to prevent fratricide.

Few of the factional commanders, at any level, possessed any experience in the conduct of large coordinated offensives. Most were extremely proficient at performing small-unit actions. But combining their forces (three separate and distinct major formations and numerous subordinate commands) into a coordinated offensive under one major formation was clearly uncharted territory and a distinct challenge.

Except for the senior commanders, the forces of the Northern Alliance lacked a reliable means of battlefield communication. Their communication systems, mainly two-way radios, had no interoperability with those of U.S. forces. Furthermore, the multiple subordinate commanders, many of whom had never been trained in map-reading, lacked any means of tracking and reporting their locations as the offensive progressed.

Finally, because the disparate forces lacked any semblance of a uniform, visual identification, particularly at long distances, was nearly impossible. The tasks of preventing fratricide and synchronizing multiple combat elements fell to the SF detachments. The SF detachments were split into sub-elements — three-man cells in many instances — so that they could support as many commanders as possible and provide accurate reporting on the progress of the battle.

The planned offensive called for simultaneous attacks through the Darya Balkh River valley in the west and through the Darya Suf River valley in the east. The advancing forces would meet at the confluence of the two rivers. At the southern edge of the Balkh Valley, where the steep mountain passes give way to fertile plains, the forces of Dostum and Atta would attack on axes parallel to the Tangi Gap. Mohaqqeq forces would conduct supporting attacks in

DoD photo

Not all members of the Northern Alliance were lucky enough to have motorized transportation. General Dostum's forces used horses and mules as their primary means of battlefield movement.

the east to screen Dostum's flank. All three forces would join for an assault on the heavily mined and well-defended Tangi Gap. Once they passed through the gap, the city of Mazar-e Sharif would lie 40 kilometers to the north.

Dostum had boldly declared that the city of Shulgerah, centrally located in the Balkh Valley, was key to controlling northern Afghanistan, and that once Shulgerah fell, Mazar-e Sharif and the six northern provinces would fall like dominoes. Dostum believed that his forces required only sufficient arms, ammunition and air support. But given the stiff resistance of the Taliban and the tentative advances of the Northern Alliance forces, Dostum's claims appeared to be far from a sure bet.

The diligent efforts of the SF detachments, their interagency partners and the Air Force personnel provided the arms, ammunition and air support, and the offensive began Nov. 5, 2001, with an MC-130 delivering two BLU-82 15,000-pound bombs. In the west, Atta's forces had seized the village of Akopruk with little resistance as local Taliban forces surrendered and pledged allegiance to the Northern Alliance. That victory was short-lived, however. In a stunning turnabout, the same Taliban forces attacked Atta's forces as they entered Akopruk. The surprise attack forced the stunned Jamiat forces to withdraw and regroup.

The battle resumed Nov. 6. In the east, after a rapid initial advance facilitated by devastatingly accurate airstrikes, Dostum's and Mohaqqeq's forces stalled near the village of Boi Becha, where a series of well-defended Taliban positions controlled key avenues of approach. In one instance, the Taliban mounted a counterattack and nearly overran a position manned by three members of Detachment 595. The team members maintained their position and calmly directed airstrikes, preventing a serious setback for the Northern Alliance offensive.

Meanwhile, precision airstrikes against the Taliban positions in Boi Becha had seriously weakened the Taliban defenses, but the airstrikes had failed to dislodge the defenders. Throughout the day, Dostum's cavalry had massed behind the ridges to the east of the village. As the sun began to set, the cav-

alry mounted a charge. Hundreds of horsemen, firing their rifles while at a full gallop, assaulted the Taliban positions. The first cavalry attack of the 21st century, facilitated by SF-directed airstrikes, sent the stunned Taliban forces fleeing, and the morale of the Northern Alliance forces soared.

While Dostum's forces were engaged around Boi Becha, Atta's forces were engaged in a fierce battle to retake Akopruk. Again, airstrikes directed by teams of SF soldiers facilitated the ground action of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance forces made a series of rapid advances through the Balkh Valley against Taliban forces. Despite being reinforced by thousands of volunteers from Pakistani *madrassas* and by contingents of al-Qaeda forces, the Taliban were in a headlong retreat toward the Tangi Gap.

DoD photo

Airstrikes directed by teams of SF soldiers assisted the ground operations of the Northern Alliance and allowed its forces to make rapid advances.

By Nov. 9, the retreating Taliban forces had reorganized, and they concentrated their defense on the key terrain around the Tangi Gap. While his forces advanced, Dostum communicated not only with his commanders but also with Taliban commanders throughout northern Afghanistan. Using an international maritime satellite telephone powered by car batteries and solar panels, Dostum, in keeping with Afghan tradition, negotiated with Taliban commanders in every northern province for their surrenders and for their loyalty. Although negotiations with some Taliban commanders were successful, other commanders resisted, particularly those who had close ties to the Kandaharis and to al-Qaeda.

The Afghan tradition of surrender and transfer of loyalty is not unlike what the U.S. experienced during the Civil War, with prisoner exchanges, paroles and pardons. The Afghans, in keeping with their custom, expect soldiers who have surrendered to abide by the conditions of their surrender agreement and to behave honorably. But the vast numbers of Arabs, Pakistanis, Chechens, Uighers and other foreign nationals who were members of al-Qaeda ignored the Afghan custom. They used individual surrenders as a means of furthering their cause, often creating treacherous conditions.

The final push began early on the morning of Nov. 9, with Northern Alliance forces massing near the Tangi Gap. The Taliban forces were well-positioned around the narrow, heavily mined gap, and they were supported by rockets and artillery. Once again, teams of SF soldiers, moving around the battlefield and directing airstrikes against Taliban positions, helped establish the conditions necessary for successful ground assaults by Northern Alliance forces. As key Taliban positions were systematically reduced by SF-directed airstrikes, the Northern Alliance forces advanced. The precision of the airstrikes left the surviving Taliban forces stunned, and those who could do so began to flee their positions.

As word of the defeat reached the Taliban forces in Mazar-e Sharif, many of them abandoned their positions and retreated toward Konduz, but the path of their retreat was heavily interdicted by

SF-directed airstrikes that produced a swath of destruction. Near midday on Nov. 10, triumphant Northern Alliance forces, accompanied by their SF advisers, streamed into Mazar-e Sharif and were welcomed by jubilant crowds of citizens. In the other provinces, simultaneous advances by Northern Alliance forces, coupled with negotiated surrenders, led to an almost complete collapse of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan.

The remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, still more than 600 strong, consolidated and formed a stronghold at the former Sultan Razzia Girls School near the heart of Mazar-e Sharif. Their position was located in a heavily populated residential district, only blocks from the Blue Mosque. The forces fortified the school compound and, although surrounded, they refused to surrender. When fighting erupted, Dostum, who was highly confident of the capabilities of the SF detachments, requested airstrikes against this last bastion of Taliban power in Mazar-e Sharif, despite the proximity of the Blue Mosque and the density of the civilian population. SF soldiers directed four bombs into the three-story school building, reducing part of it to rubble and setting the conditions for an assault that would clear out the surviving Taliban forces. With the elimination of the Taliban resistance, Mazar-e Sharif was completely liberated.

As Dostum had predicted, the northern provinces fell like dominoes, and the Taliban was dealt a stunning defeat from which it would not recover. Within two weeks, despite a four-day insurrection staged by Taliban prisoners at Qala-I-Jengi prison, the last remaining pocket of Taliban resistance in northern Afghanistan, at Konduz, was cleared. Within four weeks, the Taliban had surrendered at Kandahar, the birthplace and the heart of the Taliban movement. On Dec. 21, Afghanistan established an interim government in Kabul.

The challenge of UW

Although the missions assigned to the SF detachments operating in northern Afghanistan appeared to be relatively straightforward — advise and assist the Northern Alliance in conducting combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda — there were many challenges that made the mission difficult and that required the ingenuity and adaptability of SF soldiers.

The situation on the ground presented challenges in four areas: organization, training, logistics and morale. Although the major factions were united in their opposition to the Taliban, they had significant differences with each other, and they felt no real allegiance to anything higher then their own party or ethnic group. At one time or another during the previous decade, the groups had taken up arms against one another or supported each other's rival factions. Although none of these events were uncommon in internal Afghan politics, they created a significant level of distrust between the factions. All the factions had a common distrust of Dostum. His history as a commander in the Afghan army under the puppet regime of the hated Najibullah, and his role in fighting the *mujahedeen* still generated tension among the leaders of the factions.

As Dostum had predicted, the northern provinces fell like dominoes, and the Taliban was dealt a stunning defeat from which it would not recover. Within two weeks, … the last remaining pocket of Taliban resistance in northern Afghanistan, at Konduz, was cleared.

The Northern Alliance forces generally lacked organization at either the tactical or the operational level. Even within the factions, there appeared to be little organization. Contingents were developed around geographic or ethnic loyalties. A force from one village might have 200 men, while the force of another village might have only 50.

The lack of organization was compounded by the fact that the Afghan commanders, who were more pragmatic than ideological, changed sides frequently (usually going to the side that appeared to have the best chance of winning) and took their

troops with them. Dostum's ability to persuade opposing commanders to switch sides — often demonstrated during late-night negotiations conducted outside the purview of U.S. forces — did not lessen tensions. Although switching sides is a traditional Afghan approach to conflict resolution, the ill will that commanders feel toward their former enemies is not easily dissolved. And, as the reversal at Akopruk demonstrated, new allies can quickly revert to enemies.

As former Taliban switched their allegiance to the Northern Alliance, the factions sometimes tried to win their loyalty in order to ensure post-conflict power. For example, ethnic Pashtuns who had been staunch supporters of the Taliban changed their allegiance to the Jamiat-e Islami, but were still identified as Taliban by the ethnic Hazaras of Hezb-e Wahdat, who had suffered mightily at the hands of the Pashtuns. The resentment necessitated frequent and close cooperation between the SF detachments who were working with the different factions in order to prevent fratricide. The SF detachments also exercised care to prevent the appearance that the U.S. forces favored one faction over another.

DoD photo

An SF soldier gives medical aid to a captured Taliban soldier who was wounded during the liberation of Mazar-e Sharif.

Although the Northern Alliance forces had been fighting the Taliban for several years, many of them lacked any formal military training. Having been recruited from rural populations of farmers and nomads, few of the soldiers could read, and fewer still could use a map or a compass. While many of the soldiers were proficient in the use of their individual weapons and were capable of conducting ambushes, they were only marginally capable of conducting larger offensive operations.

When the SF soldiers arrived in Afghanistan, they found that even the units that appeared to be well-trained and well-organized did not have sufficient training and organization to overcome the shortages of weapons, ammunition, food and clothing. The overall logistics posture of the Northern Alliance forces was less than favorable, as were the type, quantity and condition of the weapons used by the Northern Alliance. Finally, the success of the Taliban had left the Northern Alliance forces with low confidence and low morale.

These challenges, while not uncommon in a UW scenario, were exacerbated by strategic and environmental pressures. Operation Enduring Freedom had begun with a series of airstrikes against key targets throughout Afghanistan. Although the attacks caused significant damage, they did little to reduce the Taliban's control of Afghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban became more defiant and accused the U.S. of striking civilian targets. Despite the falseness of the claims, the Taliban forces were successful in garnering some international sympathy, particularly in the Middle East. That sympathy resulted in international demands, some of which came from key U.S. allies, for the U.S. to bring an end to civilian casualties.

Simultaneously, domestic pressures for tangible results were also mounting. Finally, because of an already dismal humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, many observers feared that a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions would befall the country with the onset of the harsh winter. These factors combined to produce an operational imperative for rapid and tangible progress.

The difficulty of placing U.S. forces on the battlefield made the compressed timeline even more problematic. The Hindu Kush mountain range, with peaks rising

above 17,000 feet, combined with the onset of winter and increasingly poor weather to make infiltration difficult. The treacherous terrain made airborne operations almost impossible, and the high altitudes and low temperatures made rotary-wing infiltration extremely difficult.

When the imperative for quick results combined with the difficulties of infiltration, the SF detachments were compelled to go on the offensive only days after they hit the ground. There was no time for detailed assessments, force reorganization or remedial training for the Northern Alliance forces. There was barely enough time to gain the trust and confidence of the notoriously xenophobic Afghans. Nevertheless, each SF element managed to do so. The key elements in overcoming the obstacles presented by the compressed timeline were the SF soldiers' cross-cultural-communications abilities, their demonstrated competence and professionalism (especially with regard to medical care), their ability to operate in a decentralized manner and their genuine commitment. Those qualities contributed immeasurably to the SF elements' ability to rapidly integrate with the Northern Alliance forces.

The weather and the difficult terrain also limited the allowable cargo load of the infiltration platforms; therefore, the amount of equipment that the detachments could bring was limited. The most significant limitation was that detachments were unable to bring any vehicles that would provide them with battlefield mobility. The detachments were able to partially overcome that limitation by adopting indigenous methods of transportation. However, there are no "extra" horses and mules in Afghanistan. Every horse that an SF soldier used was one less available for use by a Northern Alliance soldier, and every mule that carried rucksacks was one less available for carrying food or ammunition for the Northern Alliance forces.

Again, the adaptability and the ingenuity of the SF soldiers allowed them to develop a solution. In what may have been a first for SF, one detachment managed to infiltrate with two six-wheeled vehicles that resemble large golf carts. They had been borrowed from the 1-87th Infantry at a forward staging base. The vehicles, which were easily loaded onto MH-47s, provided a much-needed logistics-support capability. Despite their unsuitability for the most severe terrain, the vehicles allowed two detachments to move large quantities of supplies rapidly. Their utility became more critical as the pace of the offensive became more swift. The vehicles not only supported a movement of more than 100 km, they also survived the conflict. They were returned to their owners with a few bullet holes and some marks of wear, but they remained fully mission-capable.

DoD photo

Six-wheeled vehicles provided the SF soldiers a much-needed logistics-support capability. Two of the vehicles fit easily onto an MH-47.

Despite significant challenges, SF elements demonstrated that a small number of SF soldiers can produce sizable results. The principal reason that SF can produce such results (and will continue to do so) is the quality of the soldiers found on SF detachments.

It was the young men on those detachments who won the war in the north: men who fought alongside their Afghan counterparts, becoming, for a time, the focus of the American effort in Afghanistan. And considering the individual strength and resolve of those men, they can be described in the words of Shakespeare: "He is a soldier, fit to stand by Caesar and give direction."

This article was written by personnel of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group.

7th SF Group Provides Two Decades of Excellence in Latin America

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton and Captain Robert Lee Wilson

The 7th Special Forces Group, with its regional focus of Latin America, has played an important role in Central and South America. The group's presence has been particularly important over the last 20 years. Whether battling Marxist guerrillas, maintaining peace along contested borders, restoring legitimate government to besieged nations, or stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, 7th Group soldiers were ready for each new requirement. Their missions over the last two decades highlight the many successes of the Latin American people and U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Evolution

In 1982, numerous right wing and Marxist dictatorships existed throughout Latin America; two decades later, every country in the region except Cuba has a democratically elected government. The primary focus of U.S. Latin American foreign policy in the 1980s was regional stability through containing communism, mainly in Nicaragua, El Salvador and neighboring Central American countries. Today, counternarcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge region of South America have become a dominant concern of U.S. foreign policy. The policy of engagement — developing, and maintaining close socioeconomic and military ties with countries to strengthen their democratic institutions — has also been a key U.S. goal. This policy evolution, from counterinsurgency to counternarcotics and engagement, can be clearly illustrated in the 7th SF Group's missions of the past two decades.

El Salvador, 1979-1990

After suffering a military coup late in 1979, El Salvador rapidly destabilized and appeared to be headed toward civil war. Within a year of the coup, the Marxist Farabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional, or FMLN, arose from the union of five smaller insurgent groups.[1] The FMLN fueled its movement with popular dissatisfaction for government reforms, and it was backed with weapons and training received from other communist regimes.

Shortly after the suspension of U.S. aid to El Salvador, the U.S. State Department decided that the biggest threat to the country and the region was the leftist insurgents, and aid was promptly restored. In 1982, the U.S. military began training and advising the Salvadoran army in Honduras, and by 1983, U.S. military advisers were living with and advising Salvadoran brigades throughout the country.[2] Many of the advisers were from the 7th SF Group.

The U.S. placed an informal cap of 55 soldiers on the advisory mission in El Salvador, and typically one officer and one NCO worked with a brigade.[3] The advisers provided much-needed tactical and technical assistance to their Salvadoran counterparts. While the principal mission of the

U.S. Army photo

A soldier from the 7th SF Group (left) instructs Mexican soldiers in advanced marksmanship techniques during the Mexican Training Initiative in 1997.

U.S. soldiers was advising, at times they found themselves engaged in combat. Sergeant First Class Gregory Fronius, of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, was killed March 31, 1987, during an FMLN attack on a Salvadoran camp in El Paraiso. One year later, the same camp was attacked again.[4]

The SF advisors provided more than technical and tactical assistance during the El Salvador mission. They incorporated human rights into all aspects of their training and worked to transform the Salvadoran army into the type of professional organization that could gain the respect and support of the civilian populace. The hard work of the SF advisers had a profound effect on the conflict. As the Salvadoran army increased in professionalism and capability, the guerrillas found their popular support waning, and in 1990, the FMLN signed a peace treaty with the Salvadoran government. The work of the soldiers of the 7th SF Group in El Salvador, largely overlooked by people outside of the special-operations community, is one of the great military success stories of recent times. It illustrates how a small group of SF soldiers can dramatically alter the strategic situation and affect national centers of gravity.

Panama, 1989-1990

During the late 1980s, relations between the U.S. and Panama deteriorated. General Manuel Noriega, commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces, or PDF, effectively seized power in Panama in 1988 when he decided to ignore all orders of Panama's civilian government. Relations between the countries soured further when Noriega was indicted in the U.S. on drug-smuggling charges. In 1989, when Panama held its elections, Noriega invalidated the results. The opposition candidates organized a large parade and protest in Panama City, but Noriega promptly suppressed the demonstration using pipe- and bat-wielding thugs he named his "dignity battalions."

As Noriega consolidated power in 1989, he set the stage for a collision between his country and the U.S. In December, he declared a state of war with the U.S., and there were several skirmishes between U.S. forces and the PDF. The 7th SF Group had one element, its 3rd Battalion, permanently stationed in Panama. As the situation worsened, one company from each of the group's two stateside battalions rotated to Panama to augment the 3rd Battalion. To prepare for the looming hostilities, the SF units participated in several joint training exercises. On Dec. 19, 1989, U.S. forces began Operation Just Cause to neutralize the PDF; to create a stable, democratic environment in Panama; and to apprehend Noriega.

The 7th Group's 3rd Battalion, reinforced by troops from Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th

Soldiers from the 7th SF Group who are serving as observers with JTF Safe Border receive an operations briefing in Patuca, Ecuador, in 1995.

U.S. Army photo

Group, formed the key combat element known as Task Force Black. Elements of TF Black already in-theater disabled vital PDF-controlled TV and radio stations at H-hour, just prior to the invasion of U.S.-based forces.[5]

Another element of TF Black received the mission to secure the Pacora River bridge, which would be the key avenue of approach for the PDF as it attempted to reinforce its forces at the Torrijos-Tocumen airport. This element, commanded by Major Kevin Higgins of Company A, 3/7th SF Group, arrived at the bridge as a PDF armed convoy prepared to cross. Staff Sergeant Daniel McDonald fired an AT-4 and halted the lead vehicle instantly, as other members of Company A fired on trailing vehicles. The men of Company A cleared the remaining vehicles, seized several prisoners, and established a blocking position to prevent the PDF from crossing the bridge. Throughout the night, TF Black defended the bridge against several attacks by motorized PDF forces, at times directing fire from AC-130 gunships circling overhead. At 2:30 p.m., Dec. 20, TF Black was relieved in place by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division.[6]

Personnel from the 7th Group secured many PDF garrisons throughout Panama.[7] Many of the SF soldiers in Task Force Black had lived in Panama for years; they knew the psyche of the typical PDF commander, and in some cases, they knew the Panamanian officers personally. SF soldiers would approach garrison commanders and demand that they surrender unconditionally in order to avoid a battle with follow-on U.S. forces. Most of the PDF commanders surrendered on the spot.

As garrison after garrison surrendered or fell to U.S. forces, Panama was rapidly liberated from Noriega. The strongman himself surrendered to U.S. forces Jan. 3, 1990, after hiding in the Papal Nunciatura for nearly the whole invasion. Just Cause ended officially Jan. 12, 1990, but the 7th Group's work was far from over. Operation Promote Liberty began immediately after hostilities ended in Panama, and the group transitioned into foreign-internal-defense and nation-building activities.

The 7th Group deployed its headquarters and its 2nd Battalion (reinforced with ele-

ments of the 1st Battalion) to Panama to support Promote Liberty, and its forces were operational by Jan 4, 1990. The forces were instrumental in restoring order and in re-establishing a civil-defense force throughout the country. The 7th Group accomplished its objectives rapidly in Promote Liberty, and it redeployed all but one company Feb. 15, 1990.

The defense of the Pacora River bridge was the 7th Group's most dramatic mission during Just Cause, but it can be argued that th group's greatest contribution to the operation was orchestrating the surrender of numerous PDF garrisons. The cultural expertise and interpersonal skills of the SF soldiers were force multipliers; they conserved combat power that would have been used to neutralize the garrisons (not to mention numerous lives). The final effects of Just Cause and Promote Liberty are evident: Panama assumed control of the Canal in 1999, and the country has had numerous free elections during the last decade.

MOMEP, 1995-1998

In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war over disputed territory in the Amazon basin, a dense jungle region that both nations have claimed for decades. Following some bloody skirmishes earlier in the year, the two countries signed the Itamaraty Treaty in February 1995, establishing a cease-fire and created a peacekeeping mission — The Military Observer Mission, Ecuador and Peru, or MOMEP, to ensure that both sides adhered to the treaty.[8] The U.S. component of the peacekeeping force was organized under Joint Task Force Safe Border, and it consisted primarily of officers and soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. MOMEP was headquartered in Patuca, Ecuador, and it maintained a presence in Bagua, Peru. From the two sites, soldiers of the 7th Group maintained checkpoints in the isolated jungle regions to help keep the peace. Enlisted soldiers and officers selected from all three of the 7th Group's battalions, initially spent 179 days deployed to Joint Task Force Safe Border; rotations were later shortened to 90 days.

The 7th Group's presence in Latin America was a key factor in getting the two contentious nations to work toward a permanent settlement. MOMEP was another mission that accomplished a great deal but received little recognition outside military circles. General Barry McCaffrey, the commanding general of U.S. Southern Command at the time of MOMEP's inception, stated, "This was the most successful peacekeeping mission in U.S. history."[9] The continued peace along the Ecuador-Peru border is a testament to the accomplishments of the soldiers who participated in MOMEP.

Mexican Training Initiative

As part of a renewed commitment by the Clinton administration for increased military cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico, the U.S. Army was directed to perform the Mexican Training Initiative, or MTI, to provide training that would enhance the capabilities of the Mexican army. The mission of training Mexico's counterdrug forces was delegated to the commander of the 7th SF Group.

MTI training began in April 1996 at Fort Bragg, N.C. Soldiers from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, trained officers of the Mexican army in advanced marksmanship, reconnaissance, close-quarters battle and human rights to enhance the Mexican army's counterdrug capabilities. The MTI mission later rotated to personnel from the 7th Group's 1st and 2nd battalions and Group Support Company. Training also included MTI instructor courses, which taught selected Mexican army officers to build effective training cadres in Mexico. A large number of Mexican officers deployed to Fort Bragg for MTI from 1996 until September 1998, when the program was discontinued.[10]

The MTI was ground-breaking in terms of the level of cooperation that the U.S. and Mexican governments achieved. It was part of a larger effort to improve relations with our southern neighbor.

Colombia 1998 – Present

More than 80 percent of the cocaine that is consumed globally comes from the Andean Ridge region of South America, and much of the cocaine from the Andean

Ridge comes from Colombia.[11] Profits from this illicit trade help finance insurgencies that have raged for three decades and have cost thousands of Colombians their lives. The largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, fought the government to a stalemate for years. In 1998, in a dramatic overture to attain a peace agreement with the rebels, Colombian president Andres Pastrana granted the FARC a demilitarized zone.[12] Until 2002, when the government rescinded the demilitarized zone, the FARC used its Switzerland-sized piece of Colombia as a staging base for waging war against the Colombian military and for supporting cocaine production.

President Pastrana, exasperated by the violence stemming from the drug trade and pressured by the U.S. and Europe, developed Plan Colombia with foreign support in 1999. The U.S. government pledged $1.5 billion in aid to the besieged Colombian government. A large portion of the U.S. aid would consist of military training and equipment, especially much-needed helicopters. The provision of military aid held one caveat, however: the military aid could be used only for counterdrug operations, not for combating insurgent forces. With the narcotics trade so entwined with the insurgency and the areas under insurgent control, keeping the two operations separate would prove to be a daunting task.

The Colombian army decided to create a new unit that would be specifically trained for combating narcoterrorist operations. The new unit, the Counter-Narcotics Brigade, or BACNA, would be formed and trained in the area of Colombia known as Tres Esquinas. The 7th Group received the mission to train the new unit one battalion at a time and to have all three of the BACNA battalions operational by December 2000.

Although the 7th SF Group had maintained a presence in Colombia, not until Plan Colombia went into effect did the 7th Group deploy an organic company. In order to train the BACNA, the 7th Group would deploy a reinforced company on a 90-day cycle to train each battalion. At the end of the cycle, a new SF company would rotate in to train the next battalion. The strategy would enable the 7th Group to accomplish its counterdrug mission in Colombia and

Soldiers from the 7th SF Group train Colombian soldiers in airmobile operations in 2000 as part of the Colombian Counternarcotics Initiative.

U.S. Army photo

remain engaged throughout the rest of Central and South America. The operational tempo resulting from the 7th Group's commitments at the end of the 1990s required that every detachment in the group deploy into theater during its battalion-deployment cycle.

The first elements to deploy for the BACNA training mission, which came to be known as the Colombian Counternarcotics Initiative, or C²I, arrived in Tres Esquinas in March of 1999. In a matter of weeks, the first BACNA battalion was receiving multiechelon training. A-detachments worked in the field with squads and platoons, training them in the finer points of patrolling and combat operations. Simultaneously, other SF soldiers worked with the BACNA staff to build their capabilities for planning and operational control. The first iteration of C²I was a resounding success, and immediately after completing its training, the first BACNA battalion deployed to support counterdrug operations.

The two subsequent C²I iterations conducted training at Larandia, which has better facilities for training and logistics than Tres Esquinas does. The second and third iterations were as successful as the first, and the last battalion of BACNA was operational in December 2000, right on schedule. As the war against narcoterrorists continues in Colombia, soldiers from the 7th Group continue to provide additional training to BACNA units as they rotate off the front lines of the drug war.

Conclusion

The 7th SF Group has been and remains heavily engaged in Latin America. The group has played an important role in many of the pivotal events in the countries of Central and South America during the past two decades. The 7th Group's missions have varied from peacetime engagement to advisory operations to combat, and the group's advance notification has varied from a few months to a few minutes. The diverse missions and varied planning times come as little surprise to the 7th Group's soldiers, each of whom carries a unit coin etched with a large, red "7" and the words, *Lo que Sea, Cuando Sea, Donde Sea* (Anything, Anytime, Anywhere). ✂

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Captain Robert Lee Wilson is commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th SF Group. He previously served as an SF detachment commander in the 7th SF Group. Commissioned through ROTC as an Infantry officer, Wilson holds a bachelor's degree in finance from the University of Connecticut.

Notes:

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Operation White Star: Prelude to Vietnam

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

Prior to the Vietnam War, United States Army Special Forces soldiers conducted three years of intensive operations in Laos. From July 1959 to October 1962, SF soldiers rotated through the country as mobile training teams, or MTTs, in support of the Royal Laotian government's operations against the Pathet Lao communist insurgency. The mission, Operation White Star, formally ended with the declaration of Laotian neutrality in July 1962. It proved to be a foreshadowing of the wider use of SF in Vietnam.

USASOC Archive

A soldier from the 7th SF Group assigned to the White Star mission in Laos in 1961.

Operation White Star introduced the SF soldiers to the classic foreign internal defense, or FID, mission. Initially, the MTTs and units of the French army shared the responsibility for improving the combat capabilities of the Laotians, whose army was plagued with dissension and low morale.

The first rotation of Americans arrived in Laos in July 1959. Called "Hotfoot," and led by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons, the contingent consisted of 107 SF soldiers from the 77th SF Group.[1] Wearing civilian dress and theoretically operating in a clandestine fashion, Simons' men trained members of the Royal Laotian army in counterinsurgency tactics. Hotfoot was subsequently renamed White Star; the SF soldiers began wearing military garb; and the number of SF soldiers gradually increased to a peak of 433 by July 1962.[2]

Simons based his training teams in the military districts established by the Royal Laotian army. The northern district was headquartered in Luang Prabang; the central district operated around the capital of Vientiane; the lower central district centered on Savannakhet; and the southern district was headquartered near Pahkse.[3] Simons later increased the number of training teams to accommodate a fifth district that was located in the Plain of Jars area, west of Ban Man.[4]

Simons' men began training the Laotians on Sept. 1, 1959, with an initial class of 1,138.[5] Simons later returned with the sixth White Star rotation in November 1961. By that time, the mission had expanded to include training for Laos' Meo and Kha tribes as well.

From the outset, the SF soldiers found themselves trying to overcome two fundamental hurdles: the French and the Laotians. Of the two, the French proved to be a short-term problem, because the French advisory element, *the Mission Militaire Francaise d'Instruction pres le Gouvernement Royal du Laos*, withdrew from the country Dec. 17, 1960.[6]

The French, entrenched in Laos since

the formation of the Royal Laotian army in 1954, grudgingly acceded to the Americans the authority to teach military skills and techniques, but they retained the right to teach the tactical employment of weapons.

Sergeant Roy Mathews worked with the French Royal Marines in the southern Laotian town of Pakse. "At that time we were not allowed to teach any tactics whatsoever," he said. "We were strictly technical advisers. … We could not say 'This is the way it is deployed.' The French Royal Marines stepped in and taught the combat part of it."[7]

The Laotians soon came to prefer the Americans to the French. Simons explained why that occurred: "I think that the French have had beat into their skulls for many, many years the colonial attitude as well as the big-brother attitude and the idea that these people will look up to them because they are French and because they are white. Nothing could be further from the truth." Eventually the Laotians eased the French out and turned all of the tactical training over to the Americans.

The second hurdle confronting the Americans lay with the Laotian people themselves. In the late 1950s, Laos had only recently become a sovereign nation, and the new state presented a cultural and political conundrum for the White Star personnel. The majority of the Laotian trainees were recruited from small villages and hamlets around the country. In most instances, the only requirement for military service was that the trainee be tall enough to reach a certain mark on a bamboo stalk.[8] Most of the trainees were illiterate, and many did not know that Laos was an independent nation or that it possessed a standing army. Their allegiance remained in their village or their tribe, and they were not particularly motivated to fight or even to learn to fight. Compounding these problems was the general cultural make-up of the Laotian people:

> *They are dreamy, gentle, bucolic, nonaggressive people … who live in bamboo-and-thatch houses on stilts, wading tranquilly in their marshy paddies, fishing in the lazy rivers, and worshipping in the curly-roofed pagoda. They are content. They live in a subsistence economy, and generally there is enough rice to go around. The Lao gentleness traditionally has enchanted the foreign visitor, particularly the one not trying to go anywhere or do anything in a hurry.*[9]

The White Star advisers faced an almost insurmountable task in trying to instill a sense of urgency and purpose in the Laotian soldiers, to implement rigid training schedules and to inculcate an aggressive attitude toward the Pathet Lao, who were attempting to take over the country. All the while, the SF soldiers had to communicate through interpreters and share training time with the French army. With the physical and cultural difficulties inherent in the mission, the Americans often fell victim to unrealistic expectations and the ensuing frustration at their inability to achieve progress in the training of their Laotian counterparts. As one member recounted in an interview in 1962:

> *We weren't ready for [the situation that] we walked into. We weren't mentally prepared, and all the new teams were given the same idea. The team that replaced me came in there so full of go, go, go that they couldn't hold it. … That was the biggest problem we had — no true picture of what the situation was. I went over there with such an … illusion.*[10]

The White Star teams generally operated in a decentralized manner, often as half-teams of six or seven men. The prevailing philosophy — that the team on the ground could best assess the requirements of the units being trained — gave the teams considerable freedom to conduct the training as they saw fit. The higher echelons provided supplies for the teams and took care of personnel and administration problems, but they rarely conveyed to the teams any guidance on training or advising.

As one veteran of White Star described the situation: "We were teaching too many subordinates over there when we should have been teaching the superiors. Why teach the lower-grade people when higher-

ups don't know how to utilize [the skills taught]? It's a waste of time."[11]

The Laotian culture figured prominently in the effectiveness of the Americans' style of teaching. Laotian officers and NCOs were reticent about risking any loss of prestige by placing themselves in positions where they might be seen as deficient in a particular skill. Providing the Laotians with face-saving alternatives, such as working after hours with the officers, proved difficult and doubled the workload of the SF team. In addition, the status-conscious Laotian officers, particularly those of field-grade rank, made the advisory role frustrating for the American officers. In attempting to advise a Laotian battalion commander, an American captain or lieutenant often found it necessary to tender his advice in such a manner as to allow the commander to arrive at the appropriate decision on his own, and at his own pace. As one adviser remarked:

> *He was a colonel and I was a captain. And he didn't expect me to tell him anything, but I [learned] to make suggestions or comments, [then] not to say a thing about it for 24 or even maybe 48 hours. Then he would come up with the same thing as his own idea and [he] would be just as happy as a little child would. … So I would say, "Fine Colonel, wonderful idea, that is really thinking," and everybody was happy.*[12]

The presence of the Americans did bring enhanced prestige, along with the added bonus of improved equipment and an occasional helicopter flight, to the Laotian units and their commanders. In this sense, the Americans were welcome. However, in a larger context, a profound sensitivity to their recent past precluded many Laotians from wholeheartedly embracing the American advisers. One veteran of White Star felt that the Laotians were reluctant to take advice from the Americans because of their recent experience with the French:

"They said, well, if we do what they suggest or tell us, [Laos] will eventually end up like it was before '54, except the U.S. will be running [the country] instead of the French. So actually I think we were more or less liaison personnel rather than advisers."[13]

Working with the Royal Laotian army posed a complex set of problems for the White Star teams. Following the initial rotation, the mission expanded to incorporate the Kau and Meo hill tribes. The expansion introduced further complexity.

The training of the hill tribes most closely mirrored the pure SF unconventional-warfare mission. The SF teams trained companies of 100 men for a counterinsurgency mission. In January 1960, SF began

Virtually identical to the OSS mission of training Kachin hill tribes during World War II, White Star also proved to be a training ground for SF missions in Vietnam.

USASOC Archive

training the Kau, who were previously known as the *Maquis* companies, after the French resistance movement of World War II. The Kau proved to be adept fighters, and they quickly drew the admiration of the American advisers. Captain Newlin Harpersett noted, "The leaders are intelligent, hard-working and quick to learn. They are a terrific guerrilla potential in the mountains of this particular region. They respect us and thank us for all we have taught them."[14]

The Meo tribesmen proved to be equally keen pupils, and under the American tutelage, both tribes developed into effective counterinsurgency forces. The American relationship with the tribes continued throughout the war in Indochina, as SF MTTs visited Laos after the close of the White Star mission.[15] If anything, the SF advisers proved to be more successful at working with the hill tribes than they were at working with the Royal Laotian army.

In many ways, the White Star operation represents the quintessential SF mission. Virtually identical to the World War II mission in which the Office of Strategic Services' Detachment 101 trained the Kachin hill tribes in Burma, White Star proved to be a training ground for the SF soldiers, and the experience paid many dividends during the Vietnam War.

On many levels — technical, tactical, cultural and political — an analysis of the White Star operation reveals the requirements and the pitfalls inherent in both FID and counterinsurgency missions. In having to deal with a culture radically different from that of the U.S., the White Star soldiers learned valuable lessons. Close association with the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of State were also hallmarks of the White Star mission. The mission underwent various permutations, going from a supposedly clandestine operation conducted by military personnel in civilian clothes to a major commitment for SF in the years leading up to the Vietnam War.

The list of White Star veterans contains many of the most notable figures in the history of SF, including Bull Simons, Dick Meadows, Charlie Beckwith and Elliot Sydnor. Many of those who served with the White Star teams went on to play prominent roles in the SF operations in Vietnam and in various operations years afterward. The lessons gained from White Star are valid in today's SF environment, and they reinforce Brigadier General William B. Rosson's observation:

"An individual or a unit may be extremely well-trained for counterinsurgency in terms of tactical and technical proficiency, yet be of little value for want of ability to communicate with the friendly forces we seek to assist and for want of understanding of the problems and attitudes of the country concerned."[16]

Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the command historian for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

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The 10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable

by Captains Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis

Since the conclusion of the NATO air war in the summer of 1999, the men of the 10th Special Forces Group have maintained a presence in the Serbian province of Kosovo in support of NATO's Kosovo Forces, or KFOR.

With the introduction of ground forces that summer, the KFOR commander divided Kosovo into five sectors, known as Multinational Brigades North, East, South, West and Central. Each sector was placed under the subordinate command of one of the NATO countries. The U.S. military contingent, Task Force Falcon, is responsible for Multinational Brigade-East, or MNB-E.

MNB-E borders Serbia and the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, or FYROM. The commander of MNB-E/Task Force Falcon is usually a brigadier general from a U.S. maneuver division. He commands two U.S. brigades; a Russian brigade, or RUSBDE; a Greek battalion, or GRKBAT; and a combined battalion of Polish and Ukrainian forces, or POLUKRBAT. In support of Task Force Falcon, the personnel of the 10th SF Group operate a spe-

10th SF Group soldiers of A-detachment 092 with their Russian counterparts near Kamenica, Kosovo, in January 2002.

U.S. Army photo

LCE Helps Storm Terrorist Camp

In late spring 2001, members of the RUSBDE, together with their LCE, captured a suspicious Kosovar at a traffic-control point near the northern Kosovo border with Serbia. The Kosovar was carrying a pistol and a notebook that contained grid coordinates, weapons serial numbers and ammunition counts. Because the man possessed an illegal weapon and because there was incriminating evidence, the KFOR soldiers detained him and transported him to the Russian compound for interrogation.

From the interrogation, the RUSBDE and the LCE learned that a terrorist training camp was operating in the Vela Glava Valley, along the Serbian border. The camp was said to have 30 members, entrenched weapons systems and mortar pits. On the basis of that information, the RUSBDE began preparing a mission to eliminate the training installation. The LCE aided the Russians with the orders and rehearsals, and it escorted the Russian element to the alleged training camp's location.

As the KFOR soldiers arrived at the camp, they observed members of the insurgency patrolling at a small roadblock. The KFOR soldiers dismounted from their armored vehicles and were immediately met with gunfire from the woodline. Members of both the RUSBAT and the LCE returned fire and began maneuvering for an assault on the enemy positions. With the support of an MK-19 grenade launcher and an M-2 .50-caliber machine gun, the composite U.S./Russian patrol secured the training camp without sustaining casualties.

As the patrol consolidated on the objective and began to reorganize, it processed and treated nine prisoners (two wounded and seven unscathed); captured enemy uniforms, weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns; and obtained valuable information about the insurgency.

cial-operations command-and-control element, or SOCCE.

The SOCCE commands all special-operations forces in MNB-E; a reconnaissance and surveillance, or R&S, section; four liaison teams, or LTs; and three liaison-coordination elements, or LCEs. The SOCCE has proven to be an invaluable source of situational awareness and real-time information for the commander of Task Force Falcon.

Working with other NATO units often presents conventional commanders with unique challenges. An LCE is assigned to the RUSBDE, the GRKBAT and the POLUKRBAT to help solve any problems that might arise. The LCE lives on its host unit's compound and conducts all its operations in conjunction with the supported unit. In addition to building rapport, the LCE ensures interoperability and a real-time, redundant communications link between the host nation and Task Force Falcon.

In the early days of the Kosovo mission, LCEs called in artillery support for the Russian Airborne Brigade (the first instance of such interaction since World War II). The LCEs also commanded Russian and Polish soldiers during complex tactical operations against armed insurgents. The SF soldiers' skills in languages and cross-cultural communication allow them to assist the host-nation commanders, staff and leaders of small units with mission planning, actions on the objective, and medical support.

The SF soldiers in Kosovo often draw on their skills in unconventional warfare, or UW. Nowhere are those skills used and adapted more than on the LTs. LTs live and work with Kosovars in the different municipalities, or opstinas. The LTs' mission is to provide "ground truth" to the task force. In order to do that, LTs divide their sectors into smaller sectors, based on the size and the ethnic origin of the sector's population. Each LT uses two-man teams to patrol its sector daily.

Liaison Team Aids Local Election

In September 2001, Tefik Agushi, leader of the largest group of minority Romas (gypsies) in the U.S. sector of Kosovo, died. During the previous year, when Kosovo had elected municipal leaders in the first nationwide democratic election in the history of the region, the U.N. municipal administrator had appointed Agushi the official representative for the Roma community. Agushi's death left the Roma community with no formally recognized leader. The situation gave rise to a conflict: The U.N., the KFOR and the ethnic Albanian municipal leadership wanted the Romas to conduct a democratic and U.N.-sanctioned general election, but the Romas were adamant about choosing their new leader in accordance with their traditional methods.

Because the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, would be conducting nationwide parliamentary elections in another month, OSCE was originally asked to provide assistance with the Roma election; however, because the election of a municipal assemblyman was not required by the U.S. Department of State, the assistance would not have been part of the OSCE's charter, and the organization could not help. The U.N. and KFOR threatened to simply appoint a leader from the Roma community, and the Romas threatened to boycott any further political cooperation with the new government — thereby thwarting the international community's goals for Kosovo.

At that point, the liaison team, or LT, responsible for the Roma community intervened. Unfettered by bureaucracy and familiar with the strange and sometimes eccentric (by Western standards) traditions of the Romas, the LT met with the U.N. municipal administrator and made recommendations for solving the problem. The local U.N. staff was not trained in conducting elections, and their minority-affairs officer was inexperienced, so the U.N. administrator accepted the recommended course of action and asked the LT to assume responsibility for the project. He knew that the Romas would adopt a course of action proposed by the SF soldiers, whom they had come to accept as members of their community.

By building a consensus among all interested organizations before implementing a plan, and by consulting with OSCE on internationally recognized election procedures, the LT was able to tailor an electoral process that satisfied the requirements of the international organizations and that respected the traditions of the Roma community. Because the LT worked outside regular Army KFOR procedures, and because it had a reputation for getting things done, all the parties were more willing to compromise and work toward a common goal. As a result, two SF soldiers were able to accomplish what hundreds of high-level international representatives could not. The resulting election was the first democratic election in Kosovo for a minority group. The election, under the eyes of international observers, became a watershed event for the community, which now felt that the international organizations had finally come to recognize the Romas and their way of life.

Each team's goal is to know and "live" its sector. The two SF warriors make themselves approachable in order to follow the special-operations imperative, "Know your operational environment." Patrol members wear uniforms that have no identifying patches or badges, and unlike other NATO soldiers, the SF soldiers wear no ballistic helmets, load-bearing equipment, or body armor. Although NATO forces routinely use such equipment as a means of force protection, the LT patrols rely on their extensive training and situational awareness to remain alert and out of danger. Their approachability allows them to gain valuable information, but it also adds to their warrior ethos and mystique. The Kosovars use the LTs to relay information to the task force because they know that when they inform the LT patrols first, their problems

are often quickly alleviated. This value to the populace, the rapport that the patrols have with the locals, and the mystique surrounding the soldiers from an "unknown" but obviously "special" unit help deter any threat.

The patrols work with municipal leaders; citizens; business owners; government organizations; nongovernment organizations, or NGOs; and local KFOR commanders and their staffs to solve local issues and to learn how the population will react to various task-force initiatives. The "ground truth" that the LTs are able to provide becomes an indispensable tool for daily operations of the task force.

Often, the LTs are the only conduit of information available to the task force concerning the current situation in Kosovo, including incipient insurgencies, smuggling and other illegal activities. Such information is vital in determining potential flashpoints, identifying persons who are to be detained, and defining daily operational needs.

U.S. army photo

Captain Don Redd, commander of A-detachment 093, discusses current affairs with a Serbian businessman in Strpce, Kosovo.

Some of the missions that the task force deems necessary are beyond the scope of its organic assets. Those missions require the use of the SOCCE's R&S section, which has a more robust capability for conducting special reconnaissance than the task force's organic scouts or long-range surveillance forces. The R&S section encompasses a variety of special-operations specialties. The R&S section provides the task-force commander with mature operators who can operate in extreme conditions and who can send near-real-time imagery to the SOCCE, from which it is relayed to the TF Falcon tactical-operations center. R&S missions can be nominated by the SOCCE elements, by the TF Falcon G2, or through the SOCCE internal targeting process. The interoperability of Army SOF and other services' SOF in the SOCCE is a true success story.

Because of the 10th SF Group's UW roots, skills in the languages of the Balkans and proficiency in special reconnaissance and direct action, the soldiers of the 10th SF Group are ideally suited for aiding TF Falcon and KFOR in the mission of maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.

Captain Robert W. Schaefer is the S5 for the 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group. Captain Schaefer was commander of the first RUS LCE in Kosovo in 1999 and subsequently received the 1999 OSS/SOCOM Award of Excellence for his actions with the Russian Airborne Brigade. During 2001, he served as commander of the liaison team in Gnjilane, Kosovo. He is a distinguished military graduate of the University of Louisville.

Captain M. Davis is commander of SF A-detachment 051. During the fall of 2001, he served as the SOCCE/company executive officer for Company B, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, during the unit's rotation to Kosovo. He is a distinguished military graduate of James Madison University.

The 281st Aviation Company: The Roots of Army Special Operations Aviation

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

Dedicating Army helicopter units to the support of special-operations ground forces — a concept that seems basic today — was, in fact, a by-product of the Vietnam War.

In April 1964, the United States initiated efforts to upgrade the quality and the timeliness of U.S. strategic intelligence. To bring the collection of strategic intelligence more under American control, the U.S. created Project Leaping Lena, which would penetrate the Ho Chi Minh trail. That project led to the creation of Special Forces Detachment B-52 (later called Project Delta).[1]

USASOC Archive

The "Wolf Pack" patch of the 281st Aviation Company.

The success of B-52 led to increased operational demands that resulted in the formation of Projects Omega (B-50) and Sigma (B-56), both of which ran from May 1966 to May 1967. As special operations expanded across the borders of Cambodia and Laos, the Omega and Sigma projects led to the creation of Command and Control North, South and Central under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group, or MACV-SOG. Project Delta remained the only special-operations force under the command of the 5th SF Group.[2]

The increased operational demands also left less time available for B-52 to train replacements, prompting the establishment of the MACV Recondo School to train new personnel for the teams. The training at the MACV Recondo School was later expanded to include long-range reconnaissance teams that were assigned to U.S. and allied forces.[3]

At the urging of Majors Arthur Strange and Charlie Beckwith, the 145th Aviation Platoon (lift) was placed under the operational control of the 5th SF Group on Dec. 25, 1965, to provide dedicated helicopters and crews for Project Delta's training and operational missions. One month later, the 6th Aviation Platoon (attack) joined the 145th to form the 2/171st Aviation Company.

On July 14, 1966, the 281st Aviation Company (assault helicopter) assumed the mission of supporting the 5th SF Group, and it retained that mission until Feb. 23, 1970. According to Clyde J. Sincere Jr., once the 281st was assigned to support the 5th Group, "U.S. Special Forces became more responsive in fielding mobile-reaction forces to deal with crisis situations."[4]

With the exception of operational security, deception was the most important factor during helicopter infiltrations of teams.[5] Experience had proved that infiltration was best accomplished at last light —

USASOC Archive

A crew chief from the 281st stands beside a UH-1C "Hog Frog" that is equipped with 2.75-inch rocket pods and a "chin-mounted" 40 mm grenade launcher.

pilots could still see well enough to insert the force and slip away from the landing zone, but in a few minutes, air and ground elements would be covered by darkness. Because the enemy soon became familiar with that tactic, U.S. forces had to devise methods of confusing him as to the exact point of debarkation. Helicopters often set down briefly at three or more points in the vicinity of the primary landing zone to create uncertainty, and teams rappelled into very small clearings or climbed down rope ladders into old bomb craters.[6] Another trick was to fly three helicopters in single file. The lead helicopter would touch down momentarily to discharge its reconnaissance team as the other two aircraft passed overhead. The lead helicopter would then rejoin the flight as the last one in the file.[7]

Rapid extraction of a compromised team was extremely important, and command-and-control elements had to be prepared to extract teams at a moment's notice. Captain Bill Larrabee, who was a Project Delta operations officer, explained, "We have our own choppers assigned to us. We have three choppers — two gunships and a slick — manned at all times. The crews sleep on them. If one of our patrols gets into trouble, [they] only [have] to whisper one word into a radio, and the choppers are in the air to get [them] out, day or night."[8]

During the Vietnam War, night helicopter flying was risky business, because night-vision goggles were not available. Limited time for remaining on the objective (about 20 minutes) also made night operations more difficult.[9] Aircrews had to rely on strobe lights and pen flares to guide them to the teams that were waiting to be extracted. But once the members of the aircrew established visual contact with the team on the ground and made verbal identification, the team could no longer use strobes and flares. Their use was forbidden in order to protect the pilot's night vision. To further protect the pilot's night vision, the co-pilot focused his attention on the instruments inside the cockpit while the pilot focused his attention outside the helicopter.

The probability that a force would have to be recovered before the completion of its mission was inversely proportional to the size of the force. Road-runner teams (composed of four Vietnamese) and long-range reconnaissance teams (composed of two SF soldiers and four Vietnamese) were the most vulnerable to enemy forces. Ordinarily, helicopters lifted small patrols from landing zones. But if a team had to be recovered from a position that was unsuitable for the aircraft to touch down, rescuers would lift team members using a rope ladder or a block-and-tackle rig. Team members could snap-link onto the ropes or hold on to the ropes and lock arms.[10]

Use of the folding ladder to facilitate helicopter extractions dates back to the

World War II helicopter demonstrations of Otto Sikorsky.[11] But it was not until Sergeant Major Charles T. McGuire designed the first-generation individual extraction harness — initially a snap-link and rope sling that fit under the armpits, and later a web harness — that soldiers could escape in seconds, ascending with the aircraft.[12] Holding on with their arms, however, denied rescued soldiers the ability to return fire during lift-out.

The second-generation harness, the STABO system, corrected the problem and allowed the soldiers to keep their hands free. The STABO rig proved to be one of the most innovative reconnaissance hardware items produced during the Vietnam War. Another insertion/extraction system was the metal-rung and cable-ladder system that was created for the U.S. Navy CH-46 helicopter. Master Sergeant Norman Doney adapted that system for use with UH-1 helicopters.[13]

USASOC Archive

A warrant-officer pilot and crew chief of the 281st's 22nd Assault Platoon stand in front of their "slick" command-and-control helicopter.

Excerpts from the mission reports of several Project Sigma road-runner and recon teams in the vicinity of Phouc Vinh and near the Long Nguyen Secret Zone in the III Corps Tactical Zone highlight the danger of helicopter extractions under fire:

RT Msn 1 extracted by sling under fire vic XT988682 at 011810 May 1967.

RT Msn 4 extracted by sling under fire vic YT008813 at 030850 May 1967.

RT Msn 13 infiltrated vic XT981651 at 151245 May 1967. Team encountered VC force of seven men at 151500 May and opened fire, killing 2 VC.

RR Msn 1 was fired on vic XT678527 during movement to LZ. One man wounded in action, left arm (died of wounds) and team extracted under fire at 281710 April 1967 vic XT665509.

RR Msn 22 infiltrated vic XT938346 at 140807 May 1967, and was extracted by rope ladder vic XT973389 at 151000 May 1967.

RR Msn 23 infiltrated vic XT941622 at 150837 May 1967. Team observed 30 man VC platoon vic XT956637. At 151430 May, team spotted by estimated two VC platoons vic XT963363. VC fired a rifle grenade near the team and began advancing. A team member threw an M-26 grenade when the VC were about 15 meters away, killing five VC. Team took cover in two old foxholes and killed four additional VC. Gunships suppressed fire and team was extracted under fire vic XT963636 at 151525 May 1967.[14]

The pilots who flew those dangerous missions were young men, 19 and 20 years old, who were attracted by the adventure of the Army's helicopter pilot program. Possessing superb hand-and-eye coordination, courage and a youthful sense of invincibility, the pilots of the 281st regularly flew their birds into hot LZs with little or no thought for their own safety, and they forced their aircraft do things that they were not designed to do. The Hog Frog pilots loaded their gunships with so many rockets and with so much ammo that they routinely had to perform a "lift and bounce, lift and bounce" maneuver on their skids in order to get their birds airborne.[15]

Directed by their crew chiefs, the pilots eased their aircraft down through triple-canopy jungle, with limbs and branches only inches from the rotors. When the aircraft were low enough, the aircrew would drop a jungle penetrator or a STABO kit to pick up the ground forces; then they would reverse the process to escape. These acts required superb coordination and complete trust among the aircrew.

The lines below are taken from the poem "Fire in the Hole," written by James R. Jarrett, who served in Project Delta. They reveal the strong bond that formed between the special-operations ground and aviation forces in Vietnam:

Darkened jungle holds the fate,
Comrades trapped beyond the gate.
Aircraft screaming fast and low,
Death pursues the team below.
Courage their shield from loss of hope,
Hope as frail as STABO rope.
Rotors whine, gunners in the door,
Swiftly go these dogs of war.

A creed unknown to most mankind,
Never leave a man behind.

The effects of the Vietnam War were numerous, and many are still with us today. The STABO rig of the Vietnam era has evolved into the single-point individual extraction system. While helicopter rappelling continues to be the staple of the Air Assault School, the fast-rope insertion-extraction system offers more advantages to the ground forces and reduces helicopter hover time.

But one of the most significant effects is the hereditary connection of the 281st Aviation Company to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Often the importance of training special-operations ground forces and air elements together is overlooked, but operations in Panama, Southwest Asia and Afghanistan have revalidated the need for that training. The strong camaraderie, created in training and reinforced in combat, between the Army SOF ground forces and their organic air assets during Vietnam not only continues, but promises to pay dividends in future operations.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Notes:

1 Project Leaping Lena required a large amount of specialized equipment. Because Captain Larry O'Neill, the supply officer, habitually marked the shipments for Detachment B-52 with a chalk triangle, the unit became referred to as Project Delta. Colonel Robert Mitchell and Fred Funk, interview by Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Dr. Kenn Finlayson, 4 September 2001, transcript, hereafter Mitchell & Funk interview, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

2 Colonel Francis J. Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: Special Forces 1961-1971* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), 107-08; Mitchell & Funk interview.

3 Kelly, 107-08; Mitchell & Funk interview.

4 Shelby Stanton, *Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia 1957-1975* (Charlottesville, Va.: Howell Press, 1990), 153.

5 Kelly, 143; Mitchell & Funk interview.

6 Mitchell & Funk interview.

7 Kelly, 143.

8 Jim Morris, *War Story* (New York: Dell, 1979), 278-79; Mitchell & Funk interview.

9 Kelly, 143; Mitchell & Funk interview.

10 Kelly, 146-47.

11 Ralph Alex, "How Are You Fixed for Blades? The Saga of the Helicopter, Circa 1940-60," in Walter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, eds., *Vertical Flight: The Age of the Helicopter* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1984), 21-22.

12 Kelly, 146-47.

13 The STABO rig, which freed the individual's hands to fire his weapon during ascent, was developed by Major Robert L. Stevens (the ST of STABO), Captain John C. Knabb (the AB of STABO), and Sergeant First Class Clifford Roberts (the O part of STABO). Shelby L. Stanton, *Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam* (New York: Orion Books, 1992), 303; Mitchell & Funk interview.

14 Kelly, 205-10.

15 Mitchell & Funk interview.

The 20th SF Group in Flintlock 2001

During Flintlock 2001, a Special Forces A-detachment from the 20th SF Group, Detachment 2031, together with active-component A-detachments from the 3rd SF Group, deployed as part of Advanced Operational Base, or AOB, 390. The 35-day deployment was preceded by a five-month train-up. The exercise encompassed excellent team training, an austere environment and interaction with the local military and host-country civilians.

A National Guard SF team that is attached to an active-component forward operational base, or FOB, finds itself in a unique situation. Detachment 2031 had to analyze the mission requirements and the intent of the mission from the perspective of both the 20th SF Group and the 3rd SF Group. This was a somewhat challenging task, because the requirements of the two groups did not necessarily coincide. The 20th SF Group placed its emphasis on unilateral training, and the 3rd SF Group placed its emphasis on foreign internal defense, or FID. After conducting a detailed mission analysis, Detachment 2031 arrived at a reworked mission statement that was approved by the commander of the 20th Group:

U.S. Army photo

Soldiers from the 20th SF Group build rapport with Malian airborne soldiers during a wing-exchange ceremony.

> *ODA 2031 conducts unilateral tactical training and trains 120 Malian personnel in light-infantry skills as part of Flintlock - 01 from 09 June 2001 to 12 July 2001 in the vicinity of Sikasso, Mali in order to increase the FID skills of the detachment, the organic capability and efficiency of the Malian Army, and promote stability in the region. Be prepared to conduct real-world unilateral operations in theater immediately upon notification by FOB.*

The mission statement addressed all of the issues raised for Detachment 2031 by both groups, and the statement served the detachment well throughout Flintlock 2001.

In accordance with the first clause of the mission statement, Detachment 2031 initially focused on internal training. The commander of the 20th Group, however, advised the detachment to make the most of the opportunity afforded by the 3rd Group and by the environment in Mali. The detachment conducted training based on its mission-essential task list: FID; direct action, or DA; and unconventional warfare, or UW. The training was especially effective, as the austere environment added a level of realism and stress that cannot be replicated in the armory in Springfield, Mass., where the 20th SF Group has its headquarters.

Detachment 2031 was also able to focus on cross-training and SF common-task training. Again, the real-world environment and the excellent support from AOB 390 contributed to an outstanding training situation. The deployment allowed all members to have an unmatched training experience.

Even if no other training had been conducted, the exercise would have been a successful one for Detachment 2031. But the detachment's role during the Flintlock 2001 exercise was to train 120 Malian soldiers in checkpoint operations and light-infantry skills. The detachment spent months developing the program of instruction, or POI, which was based largely on similar FID missions performed in Latin America by the U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM.

Prior to deploying to Fort Bragg, Detachment 2031 had rehearsed all classes at the Springfield armory. This preparation allowed the detachment to provide the AOB with a meaningful plan immediately upon its arrival at Fort Bragg. Once on the ground in Mali, Detachment 2031 ran three iterations of its three-day POI. As a result, the detachment was able to train three 40-man platoons through the "crawl" and "walk" phases of light-infantry tactics. During the last iteration of training, the teams from the 3rd SF Group attached personnel to observe the Malians and ultimately to take control of the host-nation troops in order to continue training and finish the exercise once Detachment 2031 had re-deployed.

The success of Detachment 2031 was due in large part to the skill, professionalism and preparation of its soldiers and their ability to work together. In this regard, Detachment 2031 was greater than the sum of its parts, as are all successful A-detachments. Detachment 2031 has supported operations in the U.S. European Command and SOUTHCOM, and it has worked with the 10th, 7th and 3rd SF groups. The institutional memory of the team stretches back to 1973, but no one remembers a true integration of National Guard and active-component units prior to Flintlock 2001.

During the exercise, the ODA was integrated into both FOB 33 and AOB 390. The rapport that developed among all personnel was critical to Detachment 2031's accomplishments. Upon its arrival at Fort Bragg, the detachment was incorporated into Company C, 1/3rd SF Group. Throughout the deployment, National Guard teams and active-component teams were treated alike. In fact, the mix of National Guard and active-component teams was critical to the operations in Sikasso. Because of problems with air transportation, many of the mechanics and support personnel were late in arriving at Sikasso. But electrical power to the AOB was not delayed, because Detachment 2031's personnel included two licensed electricians who installed all required wiring and generator hookups. Detachment 2031 personnel also included an emergency-room nurse, who provided a capability that is not normally available in the AOB during an active-component deployment.

U.S. Army photo

A soldier from the 20th SF Group instructs Malian soldiers on small-unit tactics.

Similarly, the active-component personnel at the AOB and ODA levels were an invaluable asset to the National Guard soldiers. They provided subject-matter expertise on new equipment that would otherwise have been unavailable to the National Guard personnel. On average, the soldiers of Detachment 2031 had graduated from the SF Qualification Course at Fort Bragg 15 years earlier.

The Flintlock 2001 deployment/exercise was an unqualified success. The commander's intent, as briefed to the group commander, was accomplished, and Detachment 2031 built an excellent rapport with FOB 33, AOB 390 and the two active-component A-detachments. To a man, the detachment felt that Flintlock 2001 was worthwhile and that integrating National Guard and active-component units is an excellent way of operating.

This article was written by members of the 20th Special Forces Group.

Enlisted Career Notes

Former SF soldiers may be accessed on active duty

The Special Forces Prior Service Accessions Program has established procedures for evaluating and accessing CMF-18-qualified NCOs who had previously served on active duty or in the reserve component and who are interested in re-applying for SF service in the active component. Those who are eligible include prior-service personnel, SF reserve-component personnel, and active-duty soldiers who are SF-qualified but are not serving in a CMF-18 skill.

Applicants will be accessed on active duty under a conditional contract. The contract specifies that if soldiers are selected by the assessment-and-review board, they will serve on active duty in CMF 18. Soldiers who do not meet the assessment prerequisites or the board criteria will be reclassified into another MOS as directed by the Total Army Personnel Command, or TAPC, consistent with the needs of the Army.

The Special Warfare Center and School will evaluate an applicant's physical ability, duty performance, psychological stability and security clearance prior to the applicant's appearance before the assessment-and-review board. Evaluation criteria include a complete physical examination, the Army Physical Fitness Test, psychological testing, and a 12-mile road march. The assessment-and-review board will convene at Fort Bragg once the candidates have completed their assessment-and-evaluation criteria. Applicants who are selected by the review board will be accessed into active-duty SF in accordance with the guidelines of both TAPC and the Army Recruiting Command. Applicants who are not selected will not be re-evaluated for at least 12 months.

For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf at DSN 239-8423/9002 or commercial (910) 432-8423/9002.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Competition keen for SF battalion command

The SF Officer Branch at PERSCOM provides the following data from the fiscal year 2003 battalion-command selection board:

- All officers selected in the tactical and TSS categories performed exceptionally well in branch-qualifying, or BQ, major positions. Those in the institutional category performed nearly as well.
- BQ time as a major ranged from 22 to 45 months, with 29 months the average.
- Four of those selected (two TSS and two institutional) were non-resident MEL 4 graduates. Thus, resident MEL 4 is not a discriminator.

The battalion-command cut is extremely tough for SF because of the small number of SF battalion commands and the exceptional quality of the SF Branch. Anything less than exceptional BQ performance as a major is a discriminator. SF officers who are not selected for battalion command but perform well as lieutenant colonels still have a chance of being selected for colonel — an opportunity not available in the other combat-arms branches. Of the 17 SF lieutenant colonels who were selected for colonel on the last board, four had not commanded as lieutenant colonels.

PERSCOM points of contact

SF Branch chief	LTC Chris Allen DSN 221-3173 christopher.allen@hoffman.army.mil
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MAJ assignments	MAJ Ron Tuczak DSN 221-5739 ronald.tuczak@hoffman.army.mil
CPT assignments	MAJ Roy Douglas DSN 221-3175 roy.douglas@hoffman.army.mil
Future readiness	CPT Steve Johnson DSN 221-3178 steven.johnson@hoffman.army.mil
Field-grade tech	Ms. Sandra Bryant DSN 221-7915 sandra.bryant@hoffman.army.mil

The commercial telephone prefix for the numbers listed above is (703) 325-. Address correspondence to Department of the Army; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414.

Foreign SOF

Chinese Army trains special-operations force

In the Chengdu military region of southwest China, the Chinese army is training a special-operations force. According to Chinese reports, the force is making "extensive use of high-technology and new-generation equipment" and is training to perform a range of "reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering, secret infiltration, raiding and sabotage, joint operations, hostage rescue," and other missions. The unit benefits from a training environment that ranges from tropic-like jungle areas, to plains, and to mountains that are more than 4,300 meters above sea level. The training environment also includes large cities and extensive rural areas. Substantial training — including a two-month exercise — has been conducted in snow-covered mountainous areas of the region in winter, with the goal of improving the unit's capabilities to operate in a "high-altitude frigid zone."

German special-ops in public eye

The *Bundeswehr's* still-developing Special Operations Division, or DSO, and one of its subordinate elements, the Special Forces Command, or KSK, have received increased media coverage since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The DSO, which includes two airborne brigades trained for traditional air assault missions as well as the KSK and other elements, was established several years ago and is expected to reach a full strength of 8,000 personnel by the end of 2003. Despite austere German military budgets, DSO elements are reportedly receiving new equipment, including communications means, light armor and specialized weapons. DSO still lacks long-range air transport and modernized combat helicopters. It has been a stated German goal in on-going transformation and military-reform efforts to create mobile forces capable of dealing with the new challenges in the contemporary operational environment. The war on terrorism quickly highlighted the DSO as the German force best-suited for missions beyond traditional central European and regional requirements. KSK soldiers, whose past overseas missions have reportedly included deployments to the Balkans and to the Middle East, are widely reported to be engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan together with special units from the U.S., Britain and other allies, but the German government has been largely silent on specifics.

Shining Path may target U.S. interests in Peru

Over the last few months, a number of regional specialists have reported new activity by Sendero Luminoso — the Maoist Shining Path terrorist group that was largely dismantled in the 1990s. Shining Path members are reportedly reorganizing politically in Peruvian universities and in poverty-stricken settlements around Lima, as well as preparing for bombings and other direct terrorist acts in urban and rural settings. The growing danger of renewed activity was particularly underscored by a bomb detonation shortly before the arrival of President Bush in Lima in March 2002. In addition, some regional specialists believe the Shining Path may be allied with external terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Force of

Colombia and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Long involved in the drug trade with Peruvian coca cultivators and Colombian traffickers, Sendero is also reportedly linked to opium-poppy cultivation and heroin-trafficking to fund its reorganization and sustainment efforts. Peruvian Interior Minister Fernando Rospigliosi recently acknowledged that Shining Path reorganization attempts are under way, and while stipulating that a return to the widespread terrorism of the early 1990s is unlikely, he did note the potential for attacks on U.S. interests in Peru.

The Ukraine to create special-operations forces

The Ukrainian General Staff has announced its intention to create special units capable of conducting reconnaissance-sabotage missions and other operations on enemy territory. The new units will also perform counterterrorist duties and operate together with other rapid-reaction and so-called "front line" forces that collectively may total 50,000 personnel by 2005. The formation and equipping of these new units is termed part of a larger Ukrainian military reform and restructuring effort.

Guerrilla group condemns Mexican president Fox for supporting U.S.

The Mexican Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR, guerrilla group continues to project a political presence and a public face through its internet publication, *El Insurgente*, as well as through it armed actions and surprise appearances. The EPR — engaged earlier this year in a recruiting effort in the Costa Grande mountains of Guerrero state — issued a statement in May condemning Mexican President Vicente Fox as a supporter of Yankee imperialism. The EPR singled out the Fox administration's support of counterterrorist cooperation and activities with the U.S. and others. In particular, the EPR charged that Fox "allowed Argentine, Spanish, and, of course, Yankee police to act inside Mexican territory to apprehend and [to] send back home those who were fighting for social causes and who still had faith in Mexican solidarity … the Fox administration is acting in complicity with the imperialists' fight against alleged terrorists." Also noted was support of "the creation of the Northern Command and the participation of the Mexican Navy in joint military maneuvers with the United States, even though the SDN [National Defense Secretariat] denies this." In recent months, armed EPR members have shown up in a number of villages where they distributed propaganda leaflets, painted slogans on local structures, and encouraged residents to join them in their efforts against the government. The propaganda leaflets emphasized the enduring links that the EPR members have to past guerrilla movements. Some of the leaflets celebrated the memory of the Mexican guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas Barrientos, who was killed in the Guerrero mountains by the Mexican Army and police in 1974. While the EPR appearances have not involved observed acts of violence, the late-January killing of a leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, by armed men wearing military-like gear and carrying assault rifles, was suspected by some to have links to EPR. The PRI official was killed by AK-47 and shotgun rounds. Regrettably for the violent area, guerrillas, drug traffickers, paramilitaries and other criminal or political groups can be numbered among the suspects.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Army SF Command's Burford receives first star

Brigadier General David P. Burford was promoted in a ceremony April 26, 2002, at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Dick Meadows Field.

Burford, deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, received his stars from his wife, Susan, and from Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, commander of the Army SF Command. Burford is a National Guardsman from the 20th Special Forces Group, Fort McClellan, Ala.

Photo by Kyle Cosner

BG David P. Burford's wife, Susan, pins a star on his shoulder during the ceremony at Fort Bragg April 26.

European detachment assigned to 112th SOSB

Thirty-two soldiers formerly assigned to the 52nd Signal Battalion in Stuttgart, Germany, officially became members of U.S. special-operations forces April 2, 2002. The soldiers are now designated as a detachment of the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion, but are forward-deployed to the Special Operations Command-Europe.

The 52nd Signal Battalion has been responsible for providing communication to the special-operations community in the European theater since 1985.

The unit is responsible for operations from the southernmost tip of Africa to Finland in the north, said Army Lieutenant Colonel John Forsyth, director of SOCEUR's communications and electronics division.

"What is special about the soldiers," Forsyth said, "is they are able to operate in small units of just one or two men, making them highly mobile. The soldiers also must have the ability to solve problems quickly."

The split in the unit will leave a void within the 52nd Signal Battalion, according to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cyrus E. Gwyn Jr. "It's a bittersweet moment," he said. "They brought a warrior attitude to the battalion … especially in physical fitness and soldier skills."

About 100 people attended a 45-minute ceremony in Washington Square at Patch Barracks, during which the special-operations soldiers changed their guidon and berets for new ones that bore the symbol of the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion. — *David Josar, European Stars & Stripes*

SF manuals cover survival, resistance, pack animals

When soldiers are working within a non-permissive environment, the necessity to evade capture is paramount, especially during conflict with nations that do not abide by the Geneva Conventions. FM 3-05.70, *Survival* (formerly FM 21-76), has been submitted to the Army Training Support Center for printing and for distribution to the force. The manual provides in-depth information about the terrain, vegetation, weather and other conditions that are critical to SF soldiers' ability to survive in various environments.

Chapters 20, 21 and 22 of FM 3-05.70 address survival movement in hostile areas; camouflage and stalking methods; contact with the local populace; survivor's behavior; and changes in political allegiance. The other chapters have been updated from earlier versions of the manual.

Closely allied to survival are resistance and escape. The Center and School has completed the publication and distribution of FM 3-05.71, *Resistance and Escape*, dated August 2001, to aid soldiers in surviving captivity and to provide instruction on various techniques of escape. The manual is classified confidential.

During recent operations in Afghanistan, U.S. Army Special Forces once again found themselves accomplishing the mission by using pack animals. Pack animals were used extensively during the Korean War, were important during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and are used throughout the U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility.

FM 31-27, *Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations*, published in February 2000, helps to prepare soldiers for the chal-

lenges of moving personnel and equipment in denied areas. Redesignated FM 3-05.213, it is undergoing revision.

Measures of effectiveness important in PSYOP

Discerning the measures of effectiveness, or MOE, to determine campaign success may be one of the most difficult steps in the execution of psychological operations, or PSYOP. Taking into consideration the myriad processes and functions that contribute to the success or failure of a PSYOP program presents even further challenges. As the target audience's attitudes, beliefs and behaviors are examined, can the supported commander accurately surmise the degree to which PSYOP contributed to the success of his mission? After any operation, PSYOP commanders and planners are often called upon to explain the outcome of PSYOP campaigns.

The Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School, is soliciting suggestions from the PSYOP community to help clarify which MOE methodologies may be feasible for evaluation and modification of PSYOP programs. Examples of successful MOE would also be useful.

The PSYOP Division will use the feedback to provide assistance to Major Russell Hampsey, a PSYOP analyst at the Special Operations Center for Force Structure, Resources, and Strategic Assessments, Wargaming Simulations and Analysis Division, U.S. Special Operations Command. Hampsey leads a team of experts who are developing a methodology that will ascertain not only the degree of PSYOP success, but also the factors contributing to an effective program. The PSYOP Division is providing PSYOP doctrinal expertise to Hampsey's project.

Together with Major Todd Gesling, an operations-research-system-analysis officer; and David R. Holdsworth, a senior military analyst with the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute's Modeling and Simulation Information Analysis Center, Hampsey has devised a prototypical model to assist PSYOP personnel in accurately determining the effectiveness of their programs.

The model examines PSYOP task execution and the target-audience behavioral responses to determine campaign success. Task execution identifies whether or not the development, production, distribution, and dissemination tasks are completed to standard. The model also examines the magnitude and the direction of any change in the target audience's behavior.

Finally, the model assesses success in terms of the degree that the target audience's behavior change is sustained over time and how the change aligns with campaign objectives. The model therefore evaluates the completed tasks from planning to execution; most notably, the PSYOP products, the media selection, and the objective in relation to the target audience's actions.

The progress of the proposed MOE model will be discussed in an article in a future issue of *Special Warfare*. Interested persons may provide input to Hampsey at DSN 299-6950, commercial (813) 828-6950; or e-mail hampser@socom.mil. They may also contact Lynn Gilfus, PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division, at DSN 239-1318, commercial (910) 432-1318; or e-mail gilfusl@soc.mil.

DoD reinstates National Defense Service Medal

The Department of Defense has reinstated the National Defense Service Medal for members of the U.S. armed forces serving on active duty on or after Sept. 11, 2001.

The authorization to reinstate the NDSM is contained in MILPER message number 02-150. The NDSM is now awarded for honorable active service during the following inclusive periods: June 27, 1950, to July 27, 1954; Jan. 1, 1961, to Aug. 14, 1974; Aug. 2, 1990, to Nov. 30, 1995; and Sept. 11, 2001, to a date to be determined.

For the award of the NDSM after Sept. 11, 2001, the following persons will not be considered as performing active service:

- Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve personnel on short tours of duty to fulfill training obligations under an inactive duty training program.
- Any service member on temporary duty or temporary active duty to serve on boards, courts, commissions and like organizations.
- Any service member on active duty for the sole purpose of undergoing a physical examination.

Executive Order 12778, dated Oct. 18, 1991, has authorized a one-time-only exception for members of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve who were part of the selected reserve in good standing during the period Aug. 2, 1990, to Nov. 30, 1995.

For more information, telephone Arlette King at DSN 221-9171, or commercial (703) 325-9171; e-mail: arlette.king@hoffman.army.mil; or visit the home page of the Army Awards Branch at http://www.perscom.army.mil/tagd/awards.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Green Berets in the Vanguard: Inside Special Forces 1953-1963. *By Chalmers Archer Jr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001. ISBN: 1-55750-023-1 (hardback). 168 pages. $28.95*.

Chalmers Archer Jr. offers a unique historical perspective on U.S. Army Special Forces during its formative years. An African-American who served as a medical sergeant during the early days of U.S. Army Special Forces, Archer provides an engaging story for those who are interested both in special operations and in the initial stages of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. In the book, Archer skillfully blends his capabilities as an award-winning writer and as an educator with his military experience to produce a thoughtful and captivating story on his rich experience in Special Forces.

Archer weaves an intriguing story about his life in Special Forces with the values he grew up with and the importance of teamwork and communities. He has an uncanny knack of offering macro and micro perspectives of situations on the ground. At the same time he offers strategic suggestions of the employment of SF, he also speaks authoritatively on the local norms and customs of the host-nation people with whom he served. Archer pays close attention to what is happening at the grass-roots level and ties it clearly into a strategic framework.

Archer views SF soldiers as field diplomats, trainers, leaders and fighters. He bases his account



on a variety of missions and operations that took him to Hawaii, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Okinawa and Laos.

Trained as a medical NCO, Archer brings a values-based and dignified appreciation for the support that he and his teammates provided to host-nation communities. A former college professor, Archer reflects authoritatively on past SF operations and operators, and he expresses a kinship with those who went before him. Throughout the book, he stresses the values of teamwork, commitment, courage and community. The values-based, multifaceted roles and the human dimensions of SF form a theme that he superbly carries throughout the book.

Interspersed throughout the book are a variety of colorful vignettes that help explain the legacy of Army SF. Archer tells of the origins of the green beret and shoulder-sleeve insignia, of early relations with OGAs, of training host-nation soldiers, and of the gap between policy-makers and the troops on the ground who had to execute the policy. Archer finishes the book with some insightful lessons learned and a wise look toward the future.

Archer writes a thoughtful account of his service in Special Forces. His commendable history of the training, missions and types of soldiers during the early days of SF helps to fill a gap in the rich lineage of Army Special Forces. Archer's book is relevant to those who are interested in the early years of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, as well as to those who enjoy a well-written and authoritative account of SF history. *Green Berets in the Vanguard* is highly readable, relevant and recommended.

MAJ Fred T. Krawchuk
1st Battalion, 10th SF Group
Stuttgart, Germany

U. S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Revised Edition). *Alfred H. Paddock Jr. (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2002). ISBN 0-7006-1177-0. 280 pages. $35*.

U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, by Alfred H. Paddock Jr., was published in 1982 in a very limited paperback edition by the National Defense University, or NDU. Possession of the book was pretty much limited to those fortunate enough to know the author or

to have access to NDU's generous shelves. To those few fortunate enough to acquire a copy, the book was a treasure. It was lent only to the most trustworthy, and with maledictions should it not be returned promptly.

In the years since its publication, the book has become a collector's prize. One bookstore in Washington, D.C., asked almost $200 for a well-used copy, a fact that gave the book's author, who received nothing from its publication, near cardiac arrest.

In addition to being rare, the book was unique. It was one of the few books extant that described the creation of Special Forces in precise detail and without mythical attachments to earlier irregular organizations, such as the New England rangers, "Swamp Fox" Marion's partisans, or various Civil War irregulars. And, unlike many books that address the founding of Special Forces, it was not a memoir but a serious history. That is an important distinction. While the book may not have had the personal experiences and viewpoints that often make memoirs engaging reading, it had the facts, carefully researched and meticulously referenced.

Late last year, the University of Kansas wisely decided that the book deserved to be reprinted. Unfortunately for the author, but fortunately for the reader, reprinting demanded computer-formatted text. The original had been written on a typewriter. The author, Al Paddock, had to retype the entire text.

During the intervening years, he had continued probing into the early days of the Army's Psychological Operations and Special Forces organizations, acquiring additional information and insights. He was particularly fortunate in locating and receiving access to the papers of Major General Robert A. McClure, a central figure in the development of both of these organizations.

As he retyped the book, Paddock integrated the additional facts and references. The result is a book, which while technically a reprint, is largely new, with numerous sections enhanced by extensive additions of information. The revised edition has all the strengths of the original and even greater depth.

As indicated above in the discussion of the earlier work, this is a serious history. There are hundreds of end notes. These are so full of interesting facts, explanations, and references that the reader will find himself flipping back and forth to determine "Who said that?" There are also some 36 pages of notes, 14 pages of sources, a nine-page index, and a highly helpful glossary.

These dry facts concerning the author's historical probity should not intimidate the reader. Despite its meticulous presentation of facts, the book is highly readable. It is not, like much that has been written about Special Forces, a tale of derring-do and door-kicking. It is, once the World War II roots have been explained, a story of organizational struggle. It is a story of how Robert McClure and his three guerrilla-warfare paladins, Colonels Volckmann, Fertig, and Bank, struggled to establish Special Forces in an Army whose attitude varied from antipathy to hostility. This story should be a revelation to those who think there was an element of inevitability about the creation of Special Forces.



This very readable book provides prime professional knowledge not only of the foundation of Psychological Operations and Special Forces but also of the workings of military bureaucracies. I heartily recommend it to every Psychological Operations and Special Forces operator, regardless of grade or assignment. I would like to particularly recommend it to the senior SF NCO who told me with sincerity that SF was created by the CIA and to the SF officer who, with equal sincerity, assured me that President Kennedy created Special Forces.

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Special Warfare

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