




MILITARY POLICE



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
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By the order of the secretary of the Army

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MILITARY POLICE, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about military police functions in combat, combat support, combat service support, battlefield circulation control, area security, EPW, law and order, and rear operations. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Objectives of MILITARY POLICE are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to MILITARY POLICE and the author. All photographs are official U.S. Army photos unless otherwise accredited.

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CONTENTS

BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONS

- 4 Light Cavalry vs Static Guards BG (Ret) Raymond E. Bell Jr.
- 7 Desert Storm Team EPW MAJ John L. Della Jacono
- 11 Mobilized for Action, (Part I) Michael Griffin
- 14 To Give an Offensive Capability MP Soldiers
- 20 A Civil Affairs Mission in Desert Storm CPT Scott A. Halasz
- 22 Synchronization LTC Ron Travers
- 25 The National Prisoner-of-War Information Center . . . MAJ Robert G. Koval

EDITORIALS

- 17 Corrections as a Battlefield Resource, (Part I) . . . SFC Michael A. Shipley
- 29 Wheels Up in Ten Hours CPT Jerry D. Stevenson

ARTICLES


- 28 A CID Wartime Mission SPC Linda L. Sluder
- 30 A Military Community, the Gulf War, and Force Protection
. LTC David Lon Walker
- 31 Meeting Global Commitments CPT Brian Tenney
- 33 The Challenge of Keeping the Peace 1LT Clayton Cobb
- 34 New Counterdrug Training CW4 (Ret) Richard D. Hinson
- 35 AIDS and Law Enforcement CW2 David G. Ownby, Jr.
- 37 Operation Quicksilver SSG Frank L. Luhn
- 39 Anonymity in a Crime Stoppers Program MAJ J. C. Northcutt
- 40 In Both Jungle and Urban Operations 1LT Kenneth C. Garrett
- 44 Reading List
- 45 Preparing for NCO Selection Boards COL Jay Martin
- 46 Leading by Example SGM Ireland D. Pulley
- 48 Leader Development for Company-Grade Officers
. 1LT John J. Camps III
- 49 CGSOC Nonresidency As a Viable Option
. MAJ Rick Roberts and CPT Jim Lowerre
- 51 POLICE Index of Articles for 1991

DEPARTMENTS

- 2 Commandant's Notes
- 3 Regimental Command Sergeant Major
- 45 NCO Corner
- 49 Officer Corner
- 52 MILITARY POLICE Subscription Form
- RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL
COMMAND LIST (Inside back cover)



SEE PAGE 9




SEE PAGE 39



During Desert Storm a vital role played by MP soldiers was that of enemy-prisoner-of-war operations. Large numbers of prisoners were processed in a very short period of time, and in careful compliance with international law. The cover photo shows EPW lined up near an MP combat team's HMMWV, all under our nation's flag.

Commandant's Notes

Major General Charles A. Hines



These are exciting times for military police as new programs offer fascinating challenges and opportunities for our Regiment.

Even as the Army reshapes for the future, we continue to identify additional avenues of service for the Military Police School. I am particularly proud of two new missions. We have established a DOD-wide child and spouse abuse program, and are doing great things for our country in specialized counterdrug training for civilian law enforcement agencies.

The Department of Defense Family Advocacy Program mandates the services provide a comprehensive child and spouse abuse program and promote early identification and intervention. The U.S. Army Military Police School, USAMPS, is on the ground floor of the identification and intervention effort. Our mission is to develop a comprehensive training program in prevention, investigation, and intervention in child abuse and spouse abuse, family violence and juvenile delinquency.

The School has received additional funds to develop the family advocacy training program. This program includes creation of specialized training courses addressing child and spouse abuse investigative techniques and leader training in the prevention and intervention of family violence. The first iteration of the Child Abuse Prevention and Investigative Technique Course is projected to begin in June of this year.

Also planned are training support packages to assist provost marshals with unit training and developing community awareness programs. We

are excited about the possibilities for expanding family advocacy training and addressing the needs of law enforcement personnel throughout the military.

Just as significant are our dedicated efforts in developing and successfully executing counterdrug training to civilian law enforcement agencies. Drugs continue to claim our children, our treasure, and our safety, and the Military Police Corps will do everything legally possible to help win this gigantic struggle that exacts such a tragic toll on our country.

Congressionally mandated counterdrug funds made available through the Department of Defense allowed us to design a solid, robust training program for civilian police at minimal cost. Through mobile teams we transport our program nationally.

Using qualified, experienced military police and CID agents who are master instructors, our program has drawn rave reviews across the country. Covert police actions, technical and tactical skills with special weapons, effective means of apprehending marijuana growers in a woodland environment, and protection of prominent authorities from terrorist activities are but a few of the training modules offered by USAMPS.

We want to form more training teams and resources, expand our curriculum and have a dynamic and far-reaching impact on the defense capabilities of the country to combat drug trafficking.


The Military Police Corps proudly continues to take on the hard battles...the ones that mean so much to the human condition and the human spirit

Charles A. Hines
Major General, USA
Commandant

BG Chidichimo →

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

CSM David W. Stalter



The sergeant first class selection list was recently released, and although our numbers selected appear low (especially to soldiers not selected), we did great in my opinion. Many MOSs received zero promotions. In the *right sizing* of our force, future promotion numbers will be low. Only the very best will know the joy of seeing their name on a DA selection list.

This will affect officers as well as noncommissioned officers. Every soldier must understand that as units are inactivated, we lose *X* number of positions. At the same time fewer seats will be available for the Military Police Advanced NCO and Basic NCO Courses. Right sizing means there will be fewer faces to look at.

How do you make sure your face will still be around? How do you get to feel that joyful feeling when a selection list is released and your name is on that list? How can you improve your chances of being a real success in our Regiment?

I urge each of you to read the profile provided on the SFC selectees. Ask questions of your first sergeant, sergeant major, and command sergeant major. Ask them to take a look at your records and assignment patterns. Let them review your microfiche. Ask them to be very critical in their judgment and let you know where you really stand. Just remember--don't ask the question if you are afraid to hear the answer.

I remember something my old granddad used to say, "You can't make a silk purse out of pig's ear." Your records must indicate that you are indeed the quality NCO who deserves promotion. I have provided each command sergeant major with a letter I wrote that covers my observations as I sat on the SFC selection board.

A quick point needs to be made about being competitive--striving for excellence. I recently visited one of our great MP battalions and had the pleasure of presenting an MP coin of excellence to a soldier who won the division soldier of the year honor. This is a significant achievement

and will be of great benefit to the soldier when his records get before a SFC selection panel.

Striving for excellence starts as a young soldier and is carried over as an NCO. *Never*, regardless of grade or position, stop striving for excellence. NCOs who try--even though they may not win the prize--will appear at the top when promotions come. Also think about this--that young soldier became the division soldier of the year because his NCOs provided support and guidance. They gave back to a soldier what they once received themselves.

It would be great to report that our soldiers and NCOs win honors at all our installations. Our Regiment's great reputation is always enhanced when our NCOs win NCO of the year or induction into the Morales Club or Audie Murphy Club. No one expects that our soldiers and NCOs win all the time--just that all are *trying* to be recognized as the best.

Successful NCOs are those who set goals and really work hard to reach those goals. Your goals have to be obtainable, so be realistic when setting them. Discuss the matter with your spouse or loved ones and make sure your family can support you. Sacrifices will be made by our loved ones, and this is a reality you must face. Improving your civilian and military education, and working in tough and demanding assignments means extended times of absence from your family. The happy balance of military obligations and family is never a one-sided position.

A wealth of knowledge is available to you each day on duty. Discuss your goals with your fellow NCOs, first sergeant, and command sergeant major. They are successful and have already traveled the path you are embarking on. There are no real shortcuts they can tell you about, but there are some things to avoid that they may be able to talk about. Our senior NCOs in our Regiment are in the business of giving back for what they have received. At some time in all our careers there was an Old Soldier who got us on the right path to success.

(continued on page 7)

Light Cavalry vs Static Guards

Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr.

Military police combat support companies are equipped and trained as highly mobile, lightly armed fighting units. Their roots are that of the light cavalry or dragoons, and current rear-area and low-intensity doctrine dictates employment in those historical roles.

Military police have long suffered from the perception that they are the enemies of the rest of the Army. Part of the problem was expressed well by the late Ernie Pyle, World War II war correspondent, who once had a soldier tell him, "I've been in the Army three years, and you're the first guy I ever heard of who knew an MP personally. Nobody knows MPs."

If what that soldier said is true, then there is good reason today to know military police better--low-intensity conflict and, of more immediacy, air base ground defense as part of the MP area security mission and the protection of ports and such critical installations as oil fields, all of which doctrinally could be termed rear-area operations.

A cursory look at the U.S. military police reveals that the protection of rear-area operations is an important function of the corps, and although it has only recently come to the forefront, it is really a continuation of the light cavalry tradition. Because there has been a corps of military police in the U.S. Army only for the last fifty years, the MP association with the tradition has not been well-known.

Military police were organized as a corps in 1941. Before World War I and in the period between world wars soldiers were detailed to work for the chief of military law enforcement, the provost marshal. Only in



the time of the world wars were there military police units.

Organized police forces throughout the world are a relatively recent phenomena, most having their genesis in the nineteenth century. The famous London metropolitan police--the "bobbies"--for example, were only organized in 1829; yet personnel performing military law-and-order functions have been around as long as armies have been in existence. They were just not called military police. There was, instead, in many armies, the provost marshal to whom soldiers were temporarily assigned for duties such as holding prisoners or conducting executions.

Discipline was so barbaric in many armed services up to and well into the nineteenth century that what today are considered mere slips of etiquette were routinely corrected in the harshest manner. Lashings were

common and unquestioningly accepted. Provost marshal tasks were not popular.

There were, nonetheless, certain types of troops more suited to provost marshal duties than others; thus, General George Washington used his light dragoons--cavalry--to perform many duties accruing to modern military police. Armed both with sabers and carbines, his dragoons conducted military order enforcement activities in addition to performing escort and reconnaissance duties. On occasion--as at the Battle of Brandywine, south of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania--they operated straggler lines. They also guarded General George Washington's headquarters, and they executed condemned prisoners.

In the nineteenth century the U.S. cavalry continued to perform police-type duties, although

they were not necessarily recognized as such. Before the Civil War, protection of pioneers and wagon trains moving west was the responsibility of the entire Army; but the cavalry's mobility made it especially suited to the task. Even well into the Civil War the cavalry performed more police functions than traditional cavalry roles. The Confederate cavalry, on the other hand, unencumbered as it was by past experience, performed much more effectively in the way that many consider most appropriate for cavalry.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, with the Indian wars coming to an end, much of the policing of the West fell naturally to the cavalry. Small cavalry detachments were spread throughout the western United States at numerous small Army posts. Only when the Army went off to fight the Spanish-American War was it really possible to bring the cavalry regiments together and organize them into large cohesive organizations. In Cuba, however, the cavalry fought largely dismounted.

The cavalry progressed from horses to jeeps and armored cars. These, in turn, gave way to tanks and tracked fighting vehicles. However, the light vehicles returned, but in military police units in the form of the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Then recently, in a new twist, it was announced that the HMMWV was to be placed in some armored cavalry units as a substitute for the cavalry fighting vehicle.

Today military police are carrying on a legacy established by the light cavalry on the plains in the nineteenth century when it protected critical installations like homesteads and farms against marauders. They even carry the colors of mounted troops--yellow for cavalry and green for mounted riflemen. They can perform this role best where the threat of heavy enemy armor is not great,

as in a low-intensity conflict environment.

On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, behind a shield of heavier armor, their potential for air base ground defense and protection of ports and oil fields against special operations type attacks was easily exploited. Unfortunately, however, there has not been wide recognition of this role.

The potential for exploiting the combat capabilities of MPs is yet to be fully realized, although operations in Panama in 1989 really placed them in the limelight. The potential has lain fallow because of the ignorance of commanders about how to get the most out of a relatively small but highly competent combat support force.

Most commanders understand how the different combat arms, support and service support elements function and how they are correctly employed. Military police in a combat mode, however, still need to be better understood. Military police are too often underutilized, overutilized or misutilized. In many cases the commander is not even aware he is not taking full advantage of MP capabilities.

Several years ago, for example, a task force was deployed to a Central American country to perform a road construction mission. The commander of the force was an engineer who clearly knew what had to be done and so organized the task force accordingly. When it came to engineering tasks, this commander assembled the required units and set out to accomplish the mission. Also included in the task organization were military police to perform security duties. The MPs were to guard the engineers and their work sites so that the engineers could do their jobs.

Security tasks included duty in guard towers, checking gate passes, patrolling the base perimeter and serving as site-ready reaction teams. Military police from the reserve components performed their annual

training, accomplishing the above tasks. The force encountered no problems in securing itself. The force was not attacked, and the mission was accomplished.

Not quite. True, the construction progressed satisfactorily, but the military police were grossly misutilized. Those familiar with measures that a unit must take to secure itself will immediately recognize that the MPs were improperly employed because they were required to perform the most fundamental security tasks that all troops, regardless of branch, must be able to perform and which should have been practiced by everyone in this operation.

To better understand why the MPs were misutilized, one needs to look briefly at an important element of U.S. battle doctrine that today translates well into low-intensity conflict operations--that of fighting rear operations.

The lessons of Vietnam emphasize all too well how vulnerable rear-area installations can be in such an operational environment. Vietnam was a dichotomy for many (MPs included) who were responsible for an area of operations that gave them duties akin to line units, but who also guarded bachelor officers' quarters and clubs. More important, though, Vietnam had all the characteristics of what the future low-intensity conflict battlefield will probably look like.

In South Vietnam there was no front line. The enemy moved relatively freely about the country and was able to do so because it blended in with the rest of the native population. Friendly logistical installations were fortified bases containing combat as well as combat support and service support elements. There were also fire bases manned primarily by artillery units and secured by infantry elements. There were air bases that required joint and combined-service coordination.

All the units, however, looked to themselves for protection. Combat

units moved to contact in every direction as well, since the Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldiers and sympathizers were everywhere on the battlefield. There was no western front or eastern front. There was no front, period.

Today it is expected that future war of high or low intensity will be fought everywhere, with those places of high value, the capture of which will produce quick results, being most vulnerable.

The seizure of Kuwait was a prime example. In many cases the primary combat troops will be the military police, especially if U.S. combat formations are engaged with enemy forces and there is some base area that requires protection.

Such battle in base areas can be expected to occupy fully the MPs, and every soldier who is not a medic will have to assist them. Only if the base area is under direct attack by major enemy forces can significant major U.S. combat forces expect to be deployed, and even then it is best not to count on them. So what does this really mean?

As in Vietnam, every troop installation will have to defend itself until such time as the military police can come to assist. High-priority targets such as airfields and harbors may have MPs working closely with static troops deployed there, but often there are too many potential friendly targets for all to have the highest priority.

While waiting for the MPs to arrive, every soldier on the perimeter must know how to do their part in a fight.

At the same time routine security duties will have to be performed by troops in the base area. Transportation soldiers must defend their motor parks; quartermaster troops, their laundry points; and maintenance units, their repair facilities. Engineers will have to stand guard at their work sites, react to low-level



An MP team leader explains the patrol pattern as his team prepares to scout and cut off infiltration routes during an exercise.

threats on their perimeter and man their fighting positions.

United States forces will not have the luxury of having MPs do what they did for them in Central America, for example. Unfortunately, it seems much of the U.S. Army has gotten away from basics like walking guard posts and executing the eleven general guard orders. Now commanders look to the MPs to perform what all soldiers in the Army should be able to do for themselves. On tomorrow's battlefield, however, the paucity of military police means the commander cannot waste a potent combat force.

Although there are a plethora of different types of military police units, the combat force meant here is the MP combat support company. It operates everywhere, even within the boundaries of the combat division when so required. In the absence of mechanized infantry, armor or armored cavalry units, this company is the primary *vehicle-mobile*, low-intensity conflict combat formation. It must be able to fight everyone from individual saboteurs to small light infantry and motorized units.

The basic fighting element of this company is the three-man MP team. It, like a tank or mechanized infantry squad, constitutes what might be termed a fighting system. It is a self-contained entity that when properly manned can move, shoot or fight, and communicate. For conducting rear operations, the HMMWV mounted with a radio and a machine gun or automatic grenade launcher is the MP's fighting system. Such a combat support company has some forty-four of these systems.

A commander would not put an MP fighting system up against something like a Soviet airborne battalion equipped with BMD fighting vehicles, but would use it to detect, locate, fix in place and destroy small groups of special operations soldiers or motorized infantry employing its organic weapons and indirect fire against enemy targets expected to be encountered in rear operations. The MP fighting system can ferret out, distract and delay larger combat operations. It is a potent mobile force with communications capability.

To dismount MPs and put them on gate guard or in watch towers on

exercises or in war is a blatant abuse of their capabilities. It destroys their teamwork, dulls their reconnaissance skills, denigrates their forward observer abilities and underutilizes their flexibility. Military police must be constantly moving and exploiting their mobility, communications and firepower. Like a major city police department, they must be able to out-think and outmaneuver their adversaries.

The characteristics of light cavalry are embodied in rapid reaction, speed of movement, quick and calculating eyes, keen judgment in the face of a variety of situations and ability to use resources at hand--radios, chemical alarms or weapons.

Other branches of the Army possess cavalry capabilities. Armored cavalry, particularly, can and will take exception to the usurpation of what it considers its own heritage. The military police in its combat support company, however, has to be given the nod when it comes to conducting rear operations in low-intensity conflict environments.

Starting primarily with Vietnam and with greater emphasis in

Grenada and Panama, military police have performed with great effectiveness in rear operations. Although many commanders from other branches have yet to appreciate the full potential of the military police, soldiers today know better than ever before what MPs can do.

If the U.S. Army military police is mistaken for light cavalry as it maneuvers successfully to save some beleaguered logistical installation, it is doubtful that there will be many detractors among those who welcome the relieving force. Surely among those soldiers will be at least one who will want to be able to say he "knows MPs."

Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr., AUS retired, commanded a Reserve military police brigade. He holds a doctorate in history from New York University and is a graduate of the Army War College and the National War College. His article also appeared in the September 1991 issue of Army magazine.

(CSM continued from page 3)

Another thing--don't get hard-headed and not ask some of your commanders for help and guidance. Our officers have a wealth of knowledge and experience to pass on to NCOs. Remember this--there is an officer who sits on every promotion board that selects SFC, MSG, and SGM. Leave no source of knowledge untouched.

As I write these articles I hope I can be articulate enough to express the real emotion I feel in wanting you all to be successful. You will need to take my word for it until I get around to visiting you all and have a chance to talk to you. However, what's great is that I sincerely believe our Regiment senior NCOs all feel the same. From units I have already visited I know that your officer and NCO leaders really work to take care of soldiers.

I look forward to visiting you all in the months ahead. For those of you I have already visited--thanks for treating me as one of the family. I will never forget that I am *of the troops, for the troops.*

Keep 'em high and tight.

Desert Storm Team EPW

Major John L. Della Jacono


During planning for Desert Storm the 82d Airborne Division Provost Marshal Office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina identified a need to create a team capable of handling enemy prisoners of war (EPW) captured by lead brigades during the move to their respective sectors. A plan and a team--a mobile EPW processing package--was developed to process and evacuate EPW captured on the move.

The team consisted of military police to search, process, guard, and evacuate EPW to the corps cage; a MP security element to provide local security during halts on the main supply route (MSR) while processing; a civil affairs (CA) team with linguists to handle civilians, refugees and displaced persons who might have been er-

roneously captured as EPW; a field ambulance with medical specialists to treat injured EPW; a division counterintelligence and military intelligence (CI/MI) team with linguists to exploit EPW for immediate intelligence value; and a command-and-control element to coordinate with the division for external evacuation assets for EPW and with the maneuver brigades to coordinate link-up and hand-over of EPW to the EPW team.

Supplies were provided for to meet the sustainment needs of the team and the EPW captured. Bottled water and a 600-gallon water buffalo, a thousand blankets, capture tags, MREs (meals ready to eat), surgical gloves, flex-cuffs, and concertina wire were acquired and deployed for self-sustainment on the move.

Team EPW Composition



UNITES INVOLVED:

82D MP COMPANY	4TH PSYOP GP
82D BAND	313TH MI BN
810TH MP COMPANY	307TH MED BN
108TH MP COMPANY	450TH CA BN

Team EPW Supplies

Class I

Water
MRE
Saudi Rations

Class II

Plastic Bags
Blankets
Capture Tags
Flex-cuffs

Class IV

Concertina Wire
Pickets
Sandbags

Class VIII

Surgical Gloves
Medical Supplies
Field Sanitation
Supplies
Casualty Blankets

platoon would assume control of EPW at the phase line and await Team EPW's movement up the MSR for the transfer of EPW to division control for follow-on evacuation of EPW to the corps cage.

The team was designed to handle EPW at two successive phase lines, if warranted. However, because of the tempo of the offensive, Team EPW assumed responsibility of all EPW directly from the lead brigade at points of capture rather than at phase lines as previously planned.

Team EPW Concept

Prevent Loss of Tactical Momentum

CAPTURE

Forward EPW Support
Rapid Evacuation from Maneuver Brigades

PROCESSING

Self-sufficient
Life Support (500 EPW Planning Figure)
Medical
Transportation
INTEL Exploitation (IPW Prisoner-of-War Interrogation Team)
Security
CA Support to Handle Refugees and Displaced Persons (Linguist Using Loudspeaker)

EVACUATION

Built-in Evacuation Capability
Maximize Use of Airevac

Additionally, coordination was made with the 503d MP Battalion for buses to evacuate EPW to the corps cage. At one point about twenty buses were included in the Team EPW convoy and were well employed shuttling EPW from the processing site to the corps cage.

A few weeks prior to G-Day, with its beginning of the ground war against Iraq, the team assembled in the tactical assembly area (TAA) and conducted intensive training and rehearsals to prepare itself for the mission. This train-up period was extremely beneficial in solidifying the team concept and enabled Team EPW members to efficiently and effectively search, process and evacuate large numbers of EPW in relatively short periods of time. The training culminated with the actual processing of several Iraqi EPW captured during a division deep attack prior to G-Day.

The initial plan called for the lead brigade to evacuate all EPW captured on the move to predesignated phase lines along the MSRs. The brigade's direct support MP

On G-Day Team EPW received orders to deploy with the lead battalion of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to relieve the 6th Light French and 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division responsibility for guarding EPW captured



A hasty collecting point established along MSR Texas.

during the initial assault up MSR Texas. At the first halt up MSR Texas Team EPW relieved 2d Brigade of 135 EPW at the escarpment.

In a matter of hours EPW at this site were searched, segregated, tagged and evacuated back to the corps cage in Rafah. At the second site on MSR Texas the 2d Brigade was relieved of 557 EPW. These EPW were processed and evacuated in a record time of three hours during the middle of the night, enabling combat forces to resume the offensive.

On G + 1 Team EPW established a central collecting point *vic* Objective Rochambeau and processed and evacuated an additional 584 EPW from elements of the 6th Light French and 1st Brigade. Team EPW resumed movement up MSR Texas with the 1st Brigade and closed on the preselected site for the division EPW collecting point in assembly area Carey alongside MSR Virginia.

At approximately 1800 hours on G + 2 team EPW was ordered to link up with 2d Brigade for movement north



Search teams begin initial processing of EPW. Various items of contraband including knives and matches were routinely confiscated.



CH-47s expedited the evacuation of EPW from forward collecting points.



Buses with armed MP escorts continually shuttled EPW from Team EPW's collecting points to the corps cage in Rafha during the first two days of the ground war.

toward Tallil Airbase to relieve the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) of approximately two thousand EPW. The move took two days, and a link-up was made with the 24th at their division collecting point at a Polish work camp *vic* Tall al Lahm.

At approximately 0800 hours the next day Team EPW assumed control of over fourteen hundred EPW. Within thirty hours all EPW were searched, processed, and evacuated by CH-47s and buses to the corps facility in Rafha. Concern was growing about the number of displaced persons (DPs) moving to the division EPW collecting point from An Nasriyah, the scene of recent fighting between Saddam's forces and Shiite fundamentalists.

Knowing food, water, and safety were available, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqi men, women, and children began congregating outside the site. A decision was made to split the site and establish a joint DP and refugee and EPW collecting point. The CA element attached with Team EPW, CA elements from 3d Brigade and medical specialists worked jointly with MPs to handle the influx of DPs from outlying areas. Food, water, blankets and medical care were provided to the DPs and refugees.

As Team EPW left the compound, after all the EPW were evacuated, over a thousand Iraqi refugees moved into the Polish labor camp; this was the only "hard" shelter available to them.

The creation of a mobile and self-sufficient EPW team paid big dividends for the 82d. This mobile and well-

tailored team consisting of CA, MI and CI, field medical specialists and military police--augmented with 82d Airborne Division band personnel and linguists--was able to concurrently handle EPW, DPs and refugees on the move. This relieved combat forces of their responsibility to guard EPW and handle DPs and refugees, thus enabling them to resume offensive operations without any loss in tempo.

Team EPW did not drain combat power from the combat commander on the move. With the built-in security force, Team EPW handled well in excess of over fourteen hundred EPW at any one time, alleviating the need for combat forces to guard EPW. The mobility and self-sufficiency of the team enabled it to process 2,730 EPW over a 350-mile route without incident or problems. Going to where EPW were collected by combat forces saved time and precious transportation resources to haul them back to a fixed site.

Team EPW was disbanded once all EPW were evacuated. It was later learned that Team EPW, consisting of around seventy-five personnel, processed and evacuated over half the EPW captured by the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Major John L. Della Jacono was the Deputy Provost Marshal, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC at the time this article was written. He led Team EPW into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm.

Mobilized for Action

Part I

Michael Griffin



The 143d Military Police Battalion, 49th MP Brigade, Alameda, California received its alert on January 13, 1991 during Operation Desert Shield. Ten percent of its personnel was brought on duty, primarily to focus on administration, logistics and training requirements.

After mobilization on January 17 the unit was activated at the San Mateo Armory. Mobilization books and FORMDEPS instructions guided the unit through the requirements to mobilize. Administrative, logistical, and training requirements were identified and addressed with the assistance of the Sixth Army Mobilization Team, State MP-3, and

Sixth Army MP Brigade advisor. The initial mobilization site was Fort Irwin, changed on January 19 to Fort Ord. The battalion was assigned to the 7th Infantry Division Bayonet Support Brigade.

The battalion moved to the mob site on January 20, 1991 and was assigned a two-week validation process that included threat briefings, medical and dental checks, finance and legal processing, MOS (military occupational specialty) and security-clearance review, personnel and equipment fill, weapons qualification, physical training, NBC (nuclear, chemical, biological) equipment requirements, and NBC training, con-

sisting of ten tasks that were top priority. Additional training was received emphasizing radio procedures. The unit completed validation on February 2, 1991.

Initially the unit was assigned to FORSCOM (United States Forces Command). On February 6, 1991 the unit flew from Travis Air Force Base in two chinks with all MTO&E equipment; the two C-141s stopped at Langley Air Force Base and Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, then on to Damman, near Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia. The battalion initially staged at Al Khobar, which was the rear assembly area. This is approximately two hundred miles south



of Kuwait along the Arabian Sea. The unit was then reassigned to the 800th MP Brigade.

On February 12, 1991 the unit received its primary mission from the 800th--Mission Statement: the 143d MP Battalion will provide guard and escort-guard support to the 402d EPW (enemy prisoner of war) camp in support of Operation Desert Storm.

On February 12 the air war had been ongoing since January 17 in preparation for the ground war. Anticipating approximately a hundred thousand EPW, the 800th established two major EPW sites, dividing the theater into east and west with two EPW camps at each site. The 800th remained at Al Khobar, with a forward CP (command post) at King Khalid military city (KKMC). These sites were given New York names; the 800th is a reserve unit from New York.

Of note, the entire EPW operation was performed by National Guard and Army Reserve units; no Regular Army units were assigned to the 800th. The east site was called Bronx and the west Brooklyn. The



east supported Marcent, south of Kuwait.

The west supported the VIIth U.S. Corps, 18th Corps, French and British forces south of Iraq in the

TRI-zone. Brooklyn had the 301st and 402d EPW camps located approximately thirty miles south of the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) along the Iraq-Kuwait border, just outside Hafar al-Batin. The east site had the 401st and 403d EPW camps approximately seventy-five miles south of Kuwait.

Each camp was tasked with building and operating a facility to process and sustain twelve thousand EPWs on a temporary 72-hour basis. The 402d EPW camp, which the 143d was assigned to, consisted of a C-2 staff, three enclosure units, and a repair-and-utility section, totalling about 250 troops, along with approximately 200 personnel attached to support medical operations, host-nation liaison and processing.

The battalion had eight MP companies: six guard and two escort guard assigned initially to support all guard and escort-guard operations anywhere in the Saudi area. It additionally had two MP companies opcon (operational control) from the 185th MP Battalion, which made the 143d the largest MP battalion in the theater of operations, with over thirteen thousand military police under its command and control. This mission was consistent with the battalion motto, *Twice the work with half the people.*

On February 12 the battalion received its mission per frag order to the 800th MP Brigade's Op Plan 1-91,



Members of the 185th MP Battalion prepare to set up a GP tent during Operation Desert Storm.

which directed the 143d to be assigned to the 402d EPW camp and to immediately assume command and control of all MP companies assigned to the camp for guard and escort-guard operations.

The 402d EPW camp site consisted of a six-foot dirt berm, approximately one square mile with one single strand concertina marking the three enclosures, processing, and supply areas. The area was extremely flat, consisting of sand and large gravel base, void of any vegetation.

The 143d was close enough to the FEBA (the border of Iraq) that they could feel the ground shake during the B-52 carpet bombing, and artillery fire was a constant background to all other activities in the air and on the ground.

The unit was located southeast of a major MSR (main supply route) intersection (MSR Dodge and MSR Sultan) located at the city of Hafar al-Batin. This area was historically of significant strategic value as a natural high-speed avenue of approach from Iraq or Kuwait south into Saudi Arabia.

The area had been a trading crossroad between the bordering countries for centuries. As such, a large cultural mix existed in the area, which increased the threat level to the camp significantly. Hafar al-Batin had been evacuated by the Saudis and was off limits to U.S. personnel until after the ground war.

Because of the potential for all levels of threat existing in the area, the first priority mission was to develop a base defense plan with emphasis on NBC monitoring and defense. This was accomplished for the 402d W camp by the battalion, and its commander became the base defense commander for the camp. Additionally, the 143d coordinated its plan with the neighboring 301st EPW camp and the 35th RAOC, located approximately thirty-five miles south of its position. Local air defense artillery support was evident at nearby Quaysima Airport, located

approximately three kilometers northeast of the camp.

On February 13 three SCUD missiles were destroyed in-flight approximately one-half mile north of the camp. A fourth SCUD landed in Hafar al-Batin, destroying an auto repair shop. No artillery support was designated to the 143d area; however, attack-helicopter support was designated for the area.

As the various allied units moved throughout the area there was a wide variety of both traditional allied and

controlling access into the camp were manned. Evacuation and rally points were identified along with a marked helicopter pad.

A company-size reaction force was always on alert for perimeter defense or internal disturbances. All communications, land line and FM were controlled by the battalion operation center for internal and external defense.

Once the unit secured its positions, the MP companies primary



The EPW camp run by the 143d MP Battalion.

threat equipment, mostly armor and helicopters. Egyptian and Syrian equipment in the area was all Soviet-made, such as T-62/72 tanks, BDRMs, HIP and HIND helicopters. The latter, usually flying nap of the earth, occasionally would cause some concern on the perimeter.

As part of an EPW camp, the unit was instructed not to man its fighting positions because the camp was supposed to be a neutral target. However, the MP companies were placed around the perimeter. Fighting positions were identified, with interlocking fires coordinated between all units.

Roving patrols using traveling overwatch constantly patrolled the outer perimeter. All companies had foot patrols in their company areas. Two TCPs (traffic control posts)

missions were identified: EPW enclosure security for three enclosures, reaction force, TCPs and roving patrols, and EPW escort security. Additionally, military police were tasked with providing security of all wounded EPWs in the evacuation hospitals channels.

The 143d also provided physical security at major POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) sites and later at major ASP (ammunition supply point) sites in the area. It assisted in the building of the EPW enclosures. Unit MPs processed the EPWs and conducted tribunals to determine the status of the CIs (civilian internees).

A matrix was developed identifying which companies were assigned which missions. The assignments were initially rotated every four days. While the units rotated through the various missions,

they were instructed that their status was to always be in a combination of training, work details, or operational. This gave a depth of operational knowledge throughout the battalion and reduced possible detractors such as complacency and boredom at static assignments.

The battalion TAC SOP (tactical standing operating procedure) was utilized and found to be a most helpful tool in maintaining efficiency and increasing management control. The 33-person headquarters had command and control of over thirteen hundred military police.

Constant staff coordination and update briefings were critical to the success of missions; the unit quickly learned and stressed to all subordinate units you can't over-communicate. A normal schedule of meetings and briefings was as follows:

- 0730--Staff meeting
- 0800--Commander brief

- (all subordinate CDRs)
- 0900--Section meeting
- 1600--Camp staff meeting and commander brief
- 1900--Section meeting
- 2000--Operations brief.

Although the camp was not completely finished, it began accepting EPWs almost immediately after the ground war began. They arrived at the camp mostly at night, the numbers ranging from forty or fifty by air to several thousand by truck or bus. The first few thousand EPWs were received directly from combat units, such as the British Colstream Guard or the U.S. 1st CAV. They were received at night with no prior warning and with no manifests or tags on the EPWs.

The EPWs were virtually dropped in an open field outside the enclosure, their weapons and belongings dumped in a pile and left, leaving the 143d to sort them out. Many were wounded, sick, or

weak from hunger. Initially they would eat almost anything given to them. The brigade quickly developed a response to this type of *drop-and-run*, as it was called. Various units would respond as security, others to illuminate the area with vehicle lighting, and still others to search and segregate EPWs. Brigade MPs also had to assist in triage of the injured and converted 998s and pickups as ambulances for the first few days.

There were times in the middle of the night when several thousand EPWs would arrive by bus or truck, and several minutes later a flight of four or five CH-47 helicopters would land and drop-and-run several hundred more EPWs in a tremendous cloud of dust, noise and confusion. Again the MPs had to handle these circumstances rapidly and effectively with professionalism, teamwork and common sense.

(To be continued)

To Give an Offensive Capability

MP Soldiers



On November 8, 1990 the president announced that he was sending European and stateside-based troops to Saudi Arabia to give coalition forces an offensive capability. The VII Corps in Desert Shield would be made up of active and reserve component soldiers and units based in Europe and the United States.

The 14th Military Police Brigade began deploying to Southwest Asia from Europe in early December 1990.

Seventh Corps units of the deployed brigade consisted of HHC, 14th Military Police Brigade and the 793d MP Battalion with the 212th and 218th MP Companies. The 93d MP Battalion from V Corps came with the 92d and 109th MP Companies, while



Maintaining a vigilant watch over Tapline Road in eastern Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm. (U.S. Army photo by SPC K. Benjamin Quigley, VII Corps PAO)



Maintaining a vigilant watch over Tapline Road in eastern Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm. (U.S. Army photo by SPC K. Benjamin Quigley, VII Corps PAO)

the 59th and 66th MP Companies represented 21st TAACOM.

In January the 118th MP Battalion (National Guard) from Rhode Island arrived and joined the brigade in deploying to its tactical assembly area (TAA), where units concentrated on training and weapons maintenance. The 372d MP Battalion from Washington, D.C. came into country in February.

On their arrival in Saudi Arabia 14th MP Brigade soldiers began providing port security by patrolling and manning checkpoints in the vicinity of troop and equipment staging areas.



Guarding his post, a member of the 204th MP Company, 14th MP Brigade mans his .50-caliber at the gate of VII Corps main command post. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Barry Platt, VII Corps PAO)



Patrolling the perimeter, ready for whatever might lie ahead a soldier from the 204th MP Company, 14th MP Brigade out of Stuttgart, Germany, protected the VII Corps main command post. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Barry Platt, VII Corps PAO)

When VII Corps began its deployment from the port to assembly areas several hundred kilometers away, brigade MPs took up positions along the MSRs (main supply routes). They provided assistance to convoys and provided area security to deploying forces along the entire route. They also joined with Saudi military police and established joint checkpoints.

As VII Corps soldiers and equipment arrived in their TAAs,

brigade military police concentrated their efforts on area security. They conducted area recons to identify units and their locations as well as integrating them into a corps rear area security plan.

As the number of VII Corps forces flowing from the port to the TAA increased, the brigade soldiers continued with the area security mission and assisted in guiding units to their TAA positions. Logistical base area security became an integral part of MP operations in this phase and lasted far beyond the cease-fire. The brigade also assumed security of logistical bases and Hawk and Patriot missile sites.

Military police patrols acted as a mobile screening force outside sites



During the 1st Infantry Division MP operation EPW line up while awaiting transport to the VII Corps enemy-prisoner-of-war camp. They were captured in the 1ID (Mech) area in southeastern Iraq. (U.S. Army photo by SPC K. Benjamin Quigley, VII Corps PAO)



Captured weapons.

and bases beyond enemy weapon stand-off range. The MPs also evacuated nomadic Bedouin tribesmen with their sheep, camels and goats from the VII Corps TAA; armored forces maneuvering through the desert made the region unsafe.

Before the ground war started, the brigade sent a corps MP company to each division and to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. These five MP companies assisted with controlling and evacuating enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).

At one point the brigade operated two corps EPW sites and three forward holding areas in Iraq

and Kuwait. Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm the brigade processed more than twenty-two thousand EPWs, including more than three thousand taken by the 1st (UK) Armored Division.

During the war VII Corps soldiers destroyed thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery tubes. As the lightning battle swept over the Iraqi defenders, many



Alley of Death.

of the enemy simply abandoned their positions, leaving behind vast stocks of weapons and ammunition.

Corps MPs placed direction signs on the MSR with the help of corps engineers. They also played an important role in the peace process. At the site of the cease-fire talks, the 66th MP Company secured the route to the talks and searched Iraqi representatives.

Military police from the 14th helped confine all traffic to main supply routes in Iraq and Kuwait to protect the force from unexploded ordnance. Throughout the corps area of operations, MPs manned corps MSR and established safety checkpoints along them to ensure soldier safety was first in all vehicular movements.



Alley of Death.



Pressing the press, military police from the 1st Infantry Division form a line to keep members of the press from storming military officials at the cease-fire talks held in southern Iraq. More than sixty press from several countries came to cover the talks between coalition forces and Iraq. (U.S. Army photo by SSG C. Randy Piland)

Military police also provided refugee and humanitarian assistance

to refugees by providing food, water and medical assistance.

The brigade handled customs inspections for all deploying VII Corps forces, inspecting the corps' equipment and containers being sent home.

The brigade was first activated in Mannheim, Germany on June 25, 1965 as the 14th Military Police Group. Seven years later it was inactivated until November 16, 1981, when it reactivated as part of the VII Corps family. The 14th MP Group was redesignated the 14th MP Brigade on July 24, 1985.

Authors for this article were members of the MP units involved serving in Operation Desert Storm at the time this article was written. Their articles also appeared in the VII Corps magazine Desert Jayhawk, 1991

Corrections as a Battlefield Resource

Part I

Sergeant First Class Michael A. Shipley



The corrections noncommissioned officer (CNCO) is perhaps the only soldier in the Army who performs their primary wartime mission daily under peacetime conditions. This mission consists of providing for the confinement and correctional treatment of U.S. military prisoners and assisting the commander in maintaining unit discipline and law and order as an integral part of the military justice system.

Before August 1990 almost twenty years had elapsed since the CNCO operated in a combat environment. With the onset of war in the gulf the CNCO was thrust into a new dimension of confinement never before encountered.

During times of conflict the CNCO role expands to include detaining, sustaining, protecting and evacuating U.S. military prisoners on the battlefield. Basically the only difference between the two operations is the physical location of the facilities. In addition, previously implied prisoner-oriented missions may take on new dimensions and increase the CNCO's versatility as a combat resource.

Vietnam brought the confinement system into a period of turmoil never before experienced. The peak population

year was 1969, when 10,450 prisoners were confined at one time or another. Most prisoners were confined at the United States Army Installation Stockade located at Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam. The largest stockade in Vietnam, it was the scene of one of the worst riots in Army history.

During World II over eighty-four thousand military prisoners were processed through the Army confinement system. By the end of 1946 approximately three complete divisions were restored to duty. Prisoner population during the Korean conflict reached its peak at 18,653.

On May 16, 1988 at 0330 hours Operation Sundown commenced with the 249th Military Police Detachment, 8th U.S. Army, Republic of Korea. This was the first fully functional and operational Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for a confinement unit.

The exercise evaluated the unit's ability to (1) deploy quickly from a garrison location to a tactical environment, (2) construct and establish a field confinement facility, (3) provide external and internal security, and (4) handle ad-

ministrative and logistical, custody and control, and operational field problems simultaneously.

The unit was faced with intense simulated combat action and fast-moving situations that demanded multiple, complex and prioritized decisions from the chain of command throughout the entire operation. The CNCOs performed under a variety of conditions in conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare environments.

Tasks included deployment to division forward locations for prisoner pickups (air-mobile, mounted and dismounted), in-processing and out-processing prisoners, several minor disorders, and a major disorder with a hostage situation. Military police tasks such as a battlefield circulation control, area security, enemy-prisoner-of-war (EPW) missions and the law-and-order mission were included to test the unit's ability to handle its secondary wartime mission.

By the time the exercise ended on day 5, evaluators determined that the unit was fully capable of performing its wartime mission under almost any circumstance.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

During the early stages of Operation Desert Shield military police units prepared for deployment. Many units tried to reach ramp strength, and commanders foresaw the potentially immense EPW mission and decided to augment their units with CNCOs. The inclusion of the CNCO gave the commander the latitude of utilizing these 95C soldiers as 95B military police or using their skills and experience to assist with the EPW mission.

As Operation Desert Shield yielded to Operation Desert Storm, it became apparent that the ability of the CNCO to assist in the accomplishment of the EPW mission was of paramount importance. The CNCO was able to aid in the EPW decision-making process, thus freeing commanders to make critical decisions affecting battle. In many cases the CNCO supervised the construction of holding areas, assisted in the administration of those holding areas, and evaluated their physical-security posture.

The establishment of shower points was a critical issue and a comprehensive part of the in-processing procedures. The shower point greatly reduced the possible introduction of poor sanitary conditions and acted as a proactive lice infestation countermeasure against the poor hygiene and occurrence of disease among captured enemy soldiers.



Shower point and latrine

In one holding area the elimination of the strip search from the in-processing phase was contemplated because it was time-intensive. The strip search is considered one of the most thorough searches and is conducted to eliminate the introduction of weapons into the holding area, to record identifying marks of the prisoner, and to detect the presence of disease. If this search was eliminated it would have greatly reduced security conditions at the compound and endangered the safety of guard personnel and the EPWs.

Billeting considerations concentrated on the safety and protection of the EPW from direct and indirect fire. As a minimum, the placement of sandbags around each EPW billeting tent or the construction of earthen berms outside the holding area was accomplished. Sandbagging of tents added an additional security burden for the guard force because it would have caused an increase in guard force composition and strength requirements. Segregation areas were constructed to accommodate disorderly prisoners or prisoners suffering from disease or illness not requiring medical evacuation.

Creativity was the byword for those responsible for tower construction. Most towers were of the wooden type constructed by combat engineers. However, several were hastily built by mounting HMMWVs on mounds of dirt just outside the perimeter fences.

Care was taken in the placement of the towers to ensure that tower guards were responsible only for approximately eighty yards of observation in any direction along the perimeter fence. This became an important objective because prisoner billeting was accomplished with the use of either general-purpose medium and small tents or bedouin-type tents, which created a large amount of dead space.



Berms to protect against indirect fire.



Portable light set, tents in background.



Guard tower with earth berms to protect against indirect fire.

Intelligence reported that most Iraqi soldiers had protective masks but few had protective clothing in their possession. Because of the legal obligations of ensuring the safety and security of the prisoners, planning considerations had to be made to include the issuance of protective clothing as needed. Protective masks needed to be issued to prisoners who were captured without a mask or had masks that would be unserviceable in the event of chemical or biological attack.

A more intense and critical mission of the senior CNCO participating in Operation Desert Storm was the training of the 95B military police soldiers to accomplish the EPW mission safely. In other words, the 95Bs had to shift gears from moving, shooting and communicating to providing custody and control at EPW holding areas.

- Training was required in the following areas:
- (1) basic and advanced concepts of custody and control,
 - (2) techniques for escorting prisoners by all modes of transportation,
 - (3) holding-area administration, and
 - (4) the physical security of the EPW holding area.

This training became crucially important at the corps level where the 95B came into direct contact with EPWs for longer periods of time. Under normal conditions this contact would have been only for short durations; however, because of the sheer number of EPWs, their stay at the corps level became longer than anticipated.

The language barrier forced the military police to utilize every interpersonal communication skill while interacting with prisoners. A firm-but-fair approach was the safest and most sound technique to use when interacting with the EPW. One safety barrier to overcome, especially with the young and inexperienced guard, was falling prey to the "John Wayne syndrome." This situation could have produced conditions favorable for misuse of power by guard personnel that could result in verbal and physical abuse of the prisoners.

The CNCO gave additional guidance in the development of holding-area standing operating procedures, guard position duties and responsibilities, and the expedient administrative processing of prisoners. With the assistance of the CNCO, the 95B soldier was able to assume this massive mission swiftly and safely. The potential for disaster was ever present; however, the utilization of the CNCO contributed to the success of the military police during Operation Desert Storm.

(To be Continued)

A Civil Affairs Mission



Captain Scott A. Halasz

During the second year as a captain, military police officers make their choice of a functional area. The choices available allow for a wide variety of personal and professional options.

A possibility is functional area 39 in the psychological operations (PSYOPS) and the civil affairs arenas. Especially civil affairs closely parallels what MPs do on a daily basis. This was clearly demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This article discusses the civil affairs field and operations carried out by the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Military police not only have the four wartime missions of battlefield circulation control, area security, enemy prisoner of war, and law enfor-

building when there often is a critical need to establish law enforcement and security. This capability has been invaluable in assisting Panama in its efforts to put into operation a civilian police system to replace the Noriega Panama Defense Force. Military police training and experience has developed soldiers with a tendency to be appropriately sensitive to cultural issues, political factors, and psychological realities.

The MP role in rear operations has provided many MP officers with experience appropriate to 39 functional area nation-building activities. The 39 experience, in turn, better prepares MP officers to handle the intricacies of low-intensity conflict and contingency operations.

all-encompassing missions are similar to the civil affairs missions.

In As-Salman, Iraq a civil affairs team along with military police processed displaced persons. Food rations, medical services and personnel control were the key efforts.

Civil affairs officers provide support to the theater or maneuver commander in matters concerning the civilian impact on military operations. In Central Saudi Arabia during the defensive portion of Operation Desert Shield many area assessments allowed for the discovery of archeological sites, mosques, and hospitals to be protected from friendly-fire target lists.

Two categories of support that civil affairs officers provide are civil affairs and civil-military relations.

Civil affairs deals with the study and preparation of historical data and assessments of a local area. During an assessment of the town of Rafha (on the Saudi-Iraqi border) discussion with a French NCO on local commerce, trade, and overall acceptance of foreign forces allowed for a good assessment to be completed. The French even utilized the local economy to supplement their rations.

Coordination of civil affairs functions for the command is determined by the civil affairs officer and the host nation. These functions may be the use of government offices and public facilities and other special functions. For example, a civil affairs team coordinated the presentation of a gift for the incoming commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery in central Saudi Arabia. With M-60 machine guns in place for securing the force, the change-of-command ceremony included the presentation of a symbolic gift from a bedouin tribesman.



(Central Saudi Arabia) A civil affairs team meets with the emir (mayor) of Quillyyib to discuss maneuver damage to a bedouin gravesite and desert roads. The discussion included a brief of the M16-A2 rifle.

ment, they also have the viable peacetime missions of law enforcement, physical security and crime prevention. Civil affairs closely parallels these MP missions during war and peace.

Military police and civil affairs officers play a significant role in nation

Military police support humanitarian assistance efforts, an excellent example being support given St. Croix in the Virgin Islands after Hurricane Hugo hit the island. Military police helped restore public order, report area damage, and assist the disaster-stricken populace. These

Damage or disruption of a government causes economic hardship during any level of conflict. Civil affairs personnel advise and assist the area commander or state department about the extent of damage or disruption and the local assets available for the commander's use. In Central Iraq civil affairs officers performed area damage assessments of a water plant that was destroyed by friendly aircraft in the town of As-Salman, Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. Because the water wells in the area were needed to support the town, temporary generators were set up to pump water for the townspeople.

In addition to gathering information civil affairs officers maintain close and continuing relations with other U.S. agencies that have civil affairs responsibilities, e.g., the International Red Cross, state departments, and government law enforcement agencies. This maintains a good flow of communication for any assistance or support that the host nation may request.

Once the studies and assessments are completed on an area, *civil-military relations* can develop. For example, the civil affairs officer serves as the principle adviser to the command on matters about civil population, government, public institutions, and local economy.

Civil affairs officers determine availability of local resources to support the military commander without damaging local commerce. Many times coordination between a civil affairs team and local business in As-Sarrar, central Saudi Arabia concerning support for laundry and briefings for U.S. soldiers on local customs and courtesy information was developed.

One of the many missions of the civil affairs teams during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was to locate water resources. Once in northern Saudi Arabia a developed

natural well site was located in the middle of the desert. It could pump two thousand gallons of nonpotable water a minute used mostly by the engineers to build MSRs (main supply routes). The site was also excellent for NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) decontamination.

Civil affairs officers advise and assist local civilian officials in creating and maintaining public order and safety. This could be in the form of training police forces, making disaster relief plans or forming evacuation plans based on route or area reconnaissance.

Civil affairs officers also advise and make recommendations with the

finement of U.S. military prisoners. This occurred only after considerable deliberation with local authorities and explanation of the U.S. common-law system.

The military police background proved ideal for the functional area 39 civil affairs officer during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Any differences were in the command relationships based on the types of units worked for and support received for logistics, management, personnel and equipment. For example, military police control and conduct law-and-order operations and traffic management control. Civil affairs officers coordinate that support.



(Dammam, Saudi Arabia) A civil affairs team coordinates civil military relations between the eastern province commander of the Saudi national guard and the commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, for the corps artillery rear command post.

staff judge advocate on the handling of certain legal and moral issues regarding differences in the host nation's religious or moral beliefs. During Operation Desert Shield there were no provisions for U.S. military prisoner confinement other than moving them out of the theater. In the Arab culture there is no need for prisons; their culture uses an eye-for-eye type of justice for criminals. For example, if you catch someone stealing, you simply cut off their hand.

However, coordination with local authorities by military police and civil affairs officers, however, enabled con-

In Dammam, Saudi Arabia a civil affairs team coordinated with the Saudi military police on black marketing activities of *sidik*, a locally brewed alcohol. The meeting led to the apprehension of a baharian black marketer. Dammam is a port on the Persian Gulf through which all troops and supplies entered; Daharan airport is also located near there.

Another example, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm driver safety became an issue because of the high rate of vehicle accidents within theater. Both military police and civil affairs officers worked and coordinated



(Northern Saudi Arabia) Conducting area assessments for possible future use for hard-structure command posts, civilian evacuation, and water resources.

educating soldiers on driving techniques and cultural differences, thus increasing driving safety.

Military police and civil affairs officers serve as primary advisors to theater and maneuver commanders on many similar issues such as civilian population, government, and public institutions. Military police and civil affairs officers support the commander in determining local resource availability and its whereabouts. Both advise and assist local civilian officials in creating and maintaining public order and safety.

Military police and civil affairs officers often find themselves working

closely together in designing disaster relief and evacuation plans based on hasty route and area reconnaissance.

With only one civil affairs battalion and four psyops battalions in the Active Army, a real problem exists with assignment of qualified 39 personnel, both enlisted and officer. Officers must have a master's degree in any discipline, although international studies is favored. They must speak a foreign language and attend a civil affairs and regional studies course.

The 39 functional area is actively recruiting people and offering degree completion and language courses to interested personnel. Thus junior

captains could be out of their branch for up to two years for schooling and for an additional three to four years for the tour in the functional area. All schooling and requirements need to be completed before processing into the unit. Once in the civil affairs unit there will be difficulty attending the courses required to become a fully qualified civil affairs officer because of the mission workload.

With world conflicts increasing, military police and functional area 39 officers will be all over the world for force protection and peacekeeping missions. Combat and MP training enables flexibility in all types of situations from St. Croix to Panama to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. When the rubber meets the road, good military police in functional area 39 will be instrumental to the Army in any area of conflict.

Captain Scott Halasz was a Small Group Leader for the MP Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written. He served as a civil affairs officer with the XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.



Synchronization

Lieutenant Colonel Ron Travers

Now those skilled in war must know where and when a battle will be fought. They measure the roads and fix the date. They divide the army and march in separate columns. Those who are distant start first, those who are near by, later. Thus the meeting of troops from distances of a thousand li takes place at the same time. It is like people coming to a city market. Tu Yu, One of Sun Tzu's Battle Captains China, Around 500 B.C.

Synchronization is not unique to AirLand Battle. It has been around for as long as there has been war. The ancient Chinese may not have called it synchronization, but they knew it led to successful prosecution of campaigns and battles.

The need for synchronization and its principles have been applied since the inception of warfare. Yet problems exist in applying it on the modern battlefield. Few units go through combat training centers without some problem in their synchronization of combat power.

What is synchronization? How do you know if you have it? What does it do for you? Is there a doctrinal basis for it? If your only answer to these questions is that synchronization is one of the tenets of AirLand Battle, you are going to have problems using and applying synchronization in battle.

All leaders must understand the concept of synchronization, know the difference between synchronization and coordination, know that different battles and different missions will require different synchronization. All leaders must be able to apply tactics, techniques and procedures in a manner that achieves synchronization in the battle at hand.

Some soldiers will say they have achieved synchronization if they have coordinated everything they should have coordinated. *Not quite.* Coordination is a key process of synchronization, but coordination alone will not produce synchronization. You must coordinate the proper actions with a clear understanding of the commander's intent if coordination is to help achieve synchronization.

When the enemy moves south instead of north, the person you have coordinated with must understand the impact of this move, its relationship to the rest of the operation, and how to adjust the response to the changed situation. If all players in an operation can do this, and their response is correct and timely, you have achieved synchronization. This may be considered a pure synchronization.

Of course, it will not be this easy in the fog of war. However, the closer you come to this pure synchronization, the fewer orders you will need to produce and transmit during a given operation.

There is considerable doctrinal literature that includes a discussion of synchronization. At the lowest level FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team* defines synchronization as the arrangement of actions in time and space to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.

Field Manual 71-2, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, states that synchronization is the process of integrating the activities on the battlefield to produce the desired result. It then lists eight requirements that must be accomplished to synchronize operations.

For the brigade fight as contained in FM 71-3, *Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, synchronization is not defined. However, it addresses two more requirements for synchronization: (1) using the logistics estimate to insure adequate resources are available and allocated, and (2) using smoke to conceal maneuver and allow massing of combat power. The brigade manual drops coordination during the battle as an element required for synchronization.

By the time you find synchronization in FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, you have gone through the close fight and the deep fight, and find synchronization discussed in rear operations. The manuals associated with heavy forces are used here as examples; to a large degree soldiers think of synchronization mainly in terms of heavy forces. Synchronization is just as important to light forces, as indicated in Tu Yu's quote; and synchronization is essential when employing light and heavy forces in concert.

In FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, you would find the first synchronization matrix and synchronization discussed for the first time in both offensive and defensive frameworks. This does not mean that synchronization is more important in offensive operations or in defensive operations at lower echelons. In MP doctrinal publications, overview chapters of synchronization publications are discussed with the intent that it will be remembered and carried through all operations as discussed in subsequent chapters. Military police are included in the synchronization matrix in FM 100-15.

Lack of discussion of synchronization in FM 100-16, *Echelons Above Corps* does not mean that synchronization is not taking place or is not needed at this level. It may simply be transparent to all but those making decisions at the highest level, or possibly the bulk of it is occurring at support elements (support brigades, area support groups) assigned to the echelon.

So there is a substantial base in doctrine for addressing synchronization. It can be defined. From the definition you can determine what it can do for you.

Now for a look at MP involvement in synchronization. At echelons of corps and higher you may be able to get by with the MP portion of the synchronization matrix. However, you would need to specify which LOC (lines of communication) get priority,

Requirements to Synchronize Operations

- Use clear concise orders that describe the mission, commander's intent and assign critical tasks to subordinates.
- Use IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) to determine enemy time-lines, named areas of interest, target areas of interest and task force decision points.
- Coordinate in detail before and during the battle.
- Designate and resource the main effort.
- Coordinate and integrate CS (combat support) and CSS (combat service support) assets.
- Rapidly mass combat power to achieve local surprise, mass, and shock effect without lengthy explanation or orders.
- Plan in advance to identify and exploit the opportunities that tactical success will create.
- Allow decentralized execution of operations.

which MP elements augment which committed units and how EPW (enemy prisoners of war) are to be evacuated.

mitted maneuver units. As a battle unfolds and reserve or counterattack forces are committed or repositioned,

Military Police Synchronization Matrix				
MISSION		OPERATION		MILITARY POLICE
OFFENSE	Break the enemy plan	DEEP	Find enemy 2d echelon and reserves	Conduct BCC of LOC for deep maneuver forces Augment MPs of committed units. Provide BCC along critical corps LOC. Conduct EPW/CI operations Provide BCC/AS/EPW/CI ops. Conduct recon and surveillance to secure MSRs (main supply routes) and area recon of other key facilities. Response force for level II threat.
			Position to support EAC plan	
	Fix an enemy force		Maneuver to achieve objectives	
	Defeat or destroy an enemy force through offensive action	CLOSE	Defeat or destroy enemy engaged division	
			Facilitate passage of reserves	
	Pursue or support EAC objectives	REAR	Retain freedom of action	
Prepare for commitment of reserves				
DEFENSE	Gain time	DEEP	Find enemy 2d echelon forces	Conduct BCC of LOC for deep maneuver forces Augment MPs of committed maneuver units. Provide BCC along critical corps LOC. Conduct EPW/CI ops Provide BCC/AS/EPW/CI operations. Conduct recon and surveillance to secure MSRs and area recon of other key facilities. Response force for level II threats
			Reduce enemy attack tempo	
	Create opportunity to shift to offensive	CLOSE	Deny the enemy the ability to concentrate combat power to interfere	
			Control close ops	
	Seize the initiative	REAR	Facilitate passage of reserves	
			Retain freedom of action	
Cause the enemy to alter his plan for commitment of field of fire		Position reserves		

Without these parameters you have nothing to synchronize. As you go down the organizational chart, military police must be more specific in their input to the echelon's synchronization matrix. At division level the provost marshal (PM) or the PM staff must be involved in building the matrix.

Considerations at this level include traffic rerouting impact on synchronization, EPW collection and evacuation, named areas of interest in the division rear, route priority changes as the rest of the synchronized battle unfolds, and any other function or mission that supports or is supported by any of the four MP battlefield missions.

There are things that military police may do to assist the synchronization process. The first and most obvious is probably traffic circulation and control behind the com-

priority of traffic on routes may need to be adjusted. This is part of synchronization.

If a route is obstructed for any reason, it may impact on synchronization by throwing off unit movement times. This has to be relayed to the headquarters controlling the battle. They may need to adjust efforts depending on the expected length of time added to a unit's movement. The MP synchronization efforts may need to be relayed down to the team on the ground at a traffic control post (TCP). At this level the MP will need to know if a unit is to go right, left, straight, or hold depending on the battle. You will not have time to run a set of orders to each and every TCP.

You may not even have adequate time to pass lengthy electronic traffic to make changes in routes or priority. You may have to use a prearranged code. This must all be

worked prior to a TCP being established or be relayed to each affected TCP before the battle begins.

Other operations that MP may want to consider as part of synchronization are EPW control and evacuation. Where can EPW be expected to be captured? When is the best time for MP to accept custody from maneuver forces? How and where do MP marry up assets for evacuation with EPW? How and where do MP transfer EPW to the next echelon? Recent events in Southwest Asia should reinforce the fact that EPW control and evacuation has an impact on combat forces and that EPW removal from the battle area must be planned and synchronized.

In most battle scenarios there will be named areas of interest (NAIs) and possibly target areas of interest (TAIs) in the rear area. Military police assets should be tasked and plan to be at least a part of the overwatch of these areas. Military police are uniquely suited to do this as part of their area security (AS) mission, freeing up other assets to watch NAIs and TAIs in the main battle area.

To do this successfully, MP teams will need to be fully cognizant of the importance of these areas and what enemy or friendly action triggers which response. This is a considerable contribution to synchronization.

You will also need to establish a method of controlling your synchronization efforts. This can be a synchronization matrix put together from your controlling headquarters matrix or any other method of your design that gets your mission accomplished. To ensure that you are notified of unfolding events that effect you, parts of your synchronization efforts will need to be placed on the controlling synchronization matrix.

You may want to consider placing parts of your matrix requirements on the controlling headquarters matrix. This

will ensure that the event is controlled even if for some reason the MP comms system fails or cannot react in a timely manner.

So, should we make a special effort to add synchronization discussion to MP doctrinal manuals? Probably not. There is sufficient discussion in manuals that MP have available to them. To add discussion would only cloud the issue.

Military police officers and noncommissioned officers must read the discussions on synchronization in the maneuver manuals, then get out of their CPs (command posts) and make their presence useful in synchronizing combat power. It will take considerably more than saying that military police provide BCC (battlefield circulation control), area security, EPW evacuation and law and order.

It is important to understand the fight, to know when and where MP can really add to combat power. Waiting for a task force S1 to report EPW for evacuation is not the answer. Reactive BCC is not the answer, and totally reactive area security ensures that the enemy can successfully fight on his terms on the ground of his choosing.

It may take a lot of imagination to establish successful synchronization for MP on the battlefield. This article has only scratched the surface. There is no way to cover everything that needs to be considered in synchronizing an operation. Too much of synchronization is dependent on METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). It changes with each mission and possibly with each battle.

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The National Prisoner-of-War Information Center

Major Robert G. Koval



The United States armed forces learned numerous lessons in Vietnam that helped shape the tactics and doctrine that the Total Force concept encompasses and that dictate how soldiers and their weapons systems will be employed on the modern battlefield.

Because of the lethality of modern weapons systems and their technological edge for improved accuracy, there will be

a greater number of casualties, and an increase in the number of enemy soldiers who will become enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). Because of the importance placed on EPW operations, the Military Police Corps has refined EPW mission preparedness.

Paramount among considerations in EPW operations is article 13 of the III Geneva Convention, which re-

quires that all prisoners of war (POWs) be treated humanely. Violation of this provision constitutes a war crime. Article 122 of the III Geneva Convention calls for the establishment of an official information bureau for POWs in the possession of the United States during wartime. The National Prisoner-of-War Information Center (NPWIC) was established to fulfill this

requirement and meet the critical accountability responsibilities defined in the III Geneva Convention.

From a historical perspective, the United States first practiced large-scale internment of EPWs during the American Civil War, 1861-1865. The most basic of the humanitarian principles of the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions may be traced back to documents produced during this war.

During World War I enemy powers were allowed to visit and inspect U.S. POW camps, and visits by accredited agents of relief societies were permitted. A theater POW information bureau, serving essentially the same functions provided for by the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions, was established by the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I.

During World War II the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Convention were promulgated through Army regulations and directives setting forth in great detail the procedures to be followed with regard to the handling of POWs. An EPW information bureau was established in the United States. All information concerning initial captures, places of internment, transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospitals, deaths, courts-martial, and other matters affecting the individual welfare or status of each POW was forwarded by the individual camp to the information bureau for permanent recording and transmittal to the powers served by the prisoners.

During the Korean War the procedure established during World War II were adhered to as closely as possible. Late in the Vietnam War the 22d Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Detachment became operational in May 1969 and performed the information bureau function envisaged by article 122.

During the Vietnam war U.S. forces took more than a hundred thousand persons into custody, including seventeen thousand EPWs. The 22d MP Detachment maintained the information required to meet the

Geneva Convention requirement for EPW accountability. Despite accountability problems the 22d performed well, but the need to establish a national prisoner-of-war information center in Washington was definitely recognized.

Principally because of the accountability problems experienced during the Vietnam conflict, the NPWIC was established in CONUS. In 1977 the Engineer Studies Group published a document concerning U.S. preparedness for future EPW and detainee operations, and it noted and cited that accountability was not maintained at the outset of Vietnam hostilities. As a result, it was impossible to reconcile discrepancies in records on EPWs held by the United States during the war.

Despite problems of accountability, largely due in part to initially inadequate policy guidance from Washington concerning an EPW and detainee program and to insufficient planning, the United States slowly developed a workable EPW and detainee program. It was not until 1971 that a CONUS unit was officially directed to serve as a NPWIC.

The Vietnam experience demonstrated the need for trained, organized, and equipped personnel to meet the international obligations and EPW information requirements contained in the Geneva Conventions. Over the years since the Vietnam War a number of military reviews, studies and policy papers have been written on EPW operations. All advocated the establishment of a NPWIC to handle the ultimate task of EPW accountability. The final outcome was the NPWIC in its current configuration.

The NPWIC is assigned to the Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS). The NPWIC at full mobilization is headed by an Army colonel. The NPWIC is organized in four operational sections, with the chief of the NPWIC having

overall control and responsibility for the operation of the NPWIC during wartime. The NPWIC performs its mission with an operations section, an information section, an accountability and information systems management section, and a public affairs section.

Most members of the NPWIC are U.S. Army military police reservists, as are most U.S. Army assets devoted to handling EPW.

The NPWIC exists in large part to fulfill the requirements of part V, article 122 of the III Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, which discusses information bureau and relief societies for prisoners of war. This article mandates the creation of a national bureau by each signatory to the III Geneva Convention upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation.

The NPWIC has been established as the national bureau for the United States. Article 122 of the III Geneva Convention requires that, at the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the parties to the conflict shall institute an official information bureau for POWs who are in its power.

Article 122 further requires that specific information be collected from an EPW, insofar as it is available. This information allows for complete identification of and accountability for each EPW, in accordance with the Geneva Convention requirements. Information that is required to be obtained from EPWs includes surname and first names; rank; army, regimental, personal or serial number; full date and place of birth; the power on which the EPW depends; first name of the father; maiden name of the mother; and the name and address of the person to be informed and address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.

The NPWIC serves as the data collection point for the items required by the Geneva Convention. After the EPWs are processed in the theater EPW camps, information is sent to the theater PWIC for consolidation. The

theater PWIC forwards the EPW records to the NPWIC. The NPWIC then transmits the information to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), located in Geneva, Switzerland, so that the United States fulfills its reporting requirement as expeditiously as possible.

While the NPWIC is capable of handling numerous functions, its current organizational structure enables it to assist in the development and implementation of policy regarding EPW operations; to coordinate the sharing and exchange of information regarding EPWs with the ICRC and other interested agencies; to manage the prisoner-of-war information system (PWIS-2); and to consolidate, store, and distribute information regarding EPWs.

The NPWIC is also able to coordinate with the theater PWIC to ensure information is timely and accurate and meets the requirements established by the Geneva Convention and by the Department of Defense (DOD); and to act as an information transfer agent between DOD and the ICRC for information about, and confirmation of, United States POWs and MIAs (missing in action).

The transfer of information concerning United States POWs and MIAs enables the ICRC to contact the enemy power with the names of possible POWs. The desired outcome of this action is verification and status of possible POWs. Once positive information or verification is obtained by the ICRC, it is transmitted to the NPWIC, which forwards the information as expeditiously as possible to the appropriate U.S. military service contact team. This procedure ensures that the positive identification and status of suspected POWs and MIAs can be obtained as quickly as possible so that the appropriate DOD agency can notify the next of kin, if necessary.

The NPWIC performs its required accountability and reporting missions with the use of the PWIS-2. The PWIS-2 system is a computer

program that supports the MP units conducting EPW operations in the areas of EPW admission, administration during the individuals stay in a U.S. camp, and release.

The PWIS-2 produces twenty-four reports required by the Army and by the Geneva Convention and has the capability to conduct *ad hoc* inquiries designed to respond to one-time questions or unusual circumstances. For investigations the NPWIC can provide aggregate and individual EPW data. All of this data is consolidated and stored at the NPWIC, where it is available for inquiry. The PWIS-2 system was deployed to Operation Desert Shield November 27, 1990 and would be in operation until the last EPW was repatriated.

At the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf the Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division planned, organized, and prepared for the operation of the NPWIC. This action included extensive coordination and lengthy meetings with the ICRC, Office of the Judge Advocate General Corps, and other DOD agencies to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Also inherent in this extensive planning was the establishment, installation, and preparation for the operation of the PWIS-2 system.

Throughout the months of August 1990 to January 1991 individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) reserve officers assigned to the NPWIC during wartime performed two-week active-duty training assignments in anticipated preparation for the operation of the NPWIC during Operation Desert Storm. As tensions in the Persian Gulf intensified, so, too, did the planning and coordination for the anticipated activation of the NPWIC.

During the end of December 1990 and early January 1991 NPWIC reserve officers were alerted to the anticipated mobilization of the NPWIC (before the January 15, 1991 presidential deadline). Coincidentally, two reserve officers serving IMA

active-duty training tours during the second and third weeks of January were already in place and preparing for the operation of the NPWIC, which occurred during their tour.

The NPWIC was activated on January 16, 1991—the outbreak of Operation Desert Storm. By January 21, 1991 the NPWIC was fully operational through activation of five reserve officers, three reserve noncommissioned officers, and one noncommissioned officer recalled from retirement, all assigned to operate the NPWIC.

United States forces captured the first EPWs on January 19, 1991. Their names and other information required by the Geneva Convention were immediately reported to the ICRC upon receipt by the NPWIC. However, the NPWIC went into action on January 17, when the first United States POWs and MIAs were reported to the ICRC, prior to the display of U.S. and allied POWs on Iraqi television, which occurred several days later.

Prior to the February 23, 1991 noontime deadline for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait, Iraqi EPWs who were captured by U.S. forces came at a sporadic rate. As they were processed, they were reported to the ICRC at a pace commensurate with the rate the data was received. Also throughout this period, EPWs were reported as they were transferred to Saudi forces' control. During the initial weeks of sporadic EPW captures the NPWIC was able to refine its operation in anticipation of the large, and in some cases even mass, capture rates of EPWs predicted to occur during an intensive land battle between coalition and Iraqi forces.

As anticipated, these mass captures began on February 25, 1991. With a steady stream of literally thousands of EPWs arriving at the theater camps, processing and accounting became an even greater task. However, because of the preparation, planning, and readiness of the NPWIC, the EPW accounting and in-

formation process flowed continuously between the NPWIC and ICRC.

Because the responsibility for EPW accountability rests with the NPWIC, the NPWIC operates until the last EPW is repatriated.

The NPWIC was also involved in the repatriation of American POWs. The NPWIC, which is the central point of contact between the United States and the ICRC, was the first to be informed of the identities of those POWs to be released to the custody of the ICRC authorities in Baghdad. The first notification of the pending releases came from the NPWIC to the respective services, which then notified the families. The NPWIC serves as a vital information channel to ensure all parties with an interest in POWs are kept informed.

With minor refinements, the NPWIC was able to organize and become operational and mission-capable within a short period of time after partial mobilization. The rapid activation of the NPWIC, coupled with successful fulfillment of its mission, ensures that the United States has complied with the Geneva Convention requirements since the outset of Operation Desert Storm. Equally significant is the fact that this is the first activation of the NPWIC since the Vietnam War.

An effective Department of Defense EPW program is essential for humanitarian reasons, to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and to increase the likelihood of the well-being of United States POWs. There is a symbiotic relationship between EPW and

POW treatment. The United States must maintain an effective system of accounting for EPWs and other detainees. The rapid activation and mission-capable operation of the NPWIC demonstrates the improved readiness of the reserve forces and their increased value as part of the U.S. Army Total Force. For the Military Police Corps this is another example of wartime mission accomplishment.

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A CID Wartime Mission



Specialist Linda L. Sluder

Tankers and mechanics weren't the only soldiers clamoring around the equipment at the German port city of Bremerhaven military terminal's staging area in support of Operation Desert Shield. Criminal Investigation Division special agents were also there wearing bright plastic hardhats, black CID arm bands, and battle-dress uniforms.

Peering in vehicle windows, down track hatches, and into open tanks, the agents checked locks on deploying equipment to ensure that valuable items were not left open to thieves or vandals. Not their everyday job, four special agents were on temporary duty in Bremerhaven from their unit near Bamberg. The four agents came from CID's Second Region headquarters, which covers the European theater.

The wartime mission of the Bremerhaven CID Port Area Support Element was to conduct logistical security at the port. They looked at physical security as well as the vulnerabilities of internal systems such as the convoy operations to ensure the materiel being shipped arrived at where it was supposed to go.

When the agents first arrived in Bremerhaven in November 1990, they noticed that an insufficient number of civilian German guards were posted to watch over the large number of Army trucks and tanks parked in the port's staging area. They coordinated with the Norddeustchland community and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to have military police augmented by German army military police stand guard in the port.

Another CID achievement involved supercargos--the escort soldiers assigned berths on the ships carrying their

units' equipment to Saudi Arabia. Once on board, they fell under the vessel's master or captain, who would determine what they did on the ship. Before CID intervention the value of the supercargo was lost--the supercargo's mission, as spelled out under regulatory guidance, is to keep an eye on vehicles assigned to their unit. They keep all keys to the vehicles and have to ensure the equipment is ready to roll off the ship and go to war, if need be, when they dock in Saudi.

The agents suggested to MTMC that the soldiers be employed for the purposes intended. The supercargos were then all briefed as to their responsibilities before they shipped out.

The CID agents took a hard look at the deployment system to determine if there was a breakdown and if so, where, and how it could be fixed. The agents checked security at the port during the night. If anything was wrong it was reported, with recommendations, to the safety office. Because it wouldn't do much good to point out discrepancies if they didn't have a good solution to offer, they instituted steps to fix everything they observed.

Like the other soldiers at the Bremerhaven dock, the agents worked seven days a week doing a job they found challenging. Being soldiers first and foremost, they were trained for the mission just like everyone else at the port--to do a soldier's job.

Specialist Linda L. Sluder was a journalist assigned to the Air Defender; Darmstadt, Germany at the time this article was written.

Wheels Up in Ten Hours



Captain Jerry D. Stevenson

More and more the Army recognizes military police units as the force of choice. They can be sent anywhere in the world to restore law and order, provide humanitarian relief, evacuate enemy prisoners of war and fight level II threats in the rear area. Because of this versatility and adaptability today's MP companies must be ready to deploy at any time.

During the past few years this was demonstrated when MP units deployed to the Republic of Panama twice, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and to Saudi Arabia. All were no-notice, real-world emergency deployments, and the military police successfully accomplished their missions each time. Because the units have been so successful, this trend is likely to continue in the future.

Combat support and divisional MP companies must be ready to deploy rapidly anywhere, anytime. There are a few things for commanders and leaders at all levels in these units to keep in mind when preparing for the inevitable: an emergency deployment.

For the deploying units emergency deployments will be troublesome. Despite careful prior planning, you will never be able to think of everything. Every time military police get sent on an emergency deployment, the situation will be different. The number of air frames dedicated to the deploying units, the equipment they can take, the force composition and the mission will never be the same.

Possibly the most important factor that will never be the same is the amount of time that you have from when your unit receives the alert notification to when you have to be aboard that high-performance

aircraft, waiting to take off. You may have only six hours, as was the case when the 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) deployed to the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1989; or you may have over two weeks, as was the case for most units that deployed to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Crises management are the two words that best describe the activities that occur once a unit gets alerted for an emergency deployment. Units must remain flexible and be able to respond rapidly to changes. For example, the show times at the airfield may change, or the number of vehicles and personnel that you can take may change. They may change not only once, they may change several times. Remember: *be flexible*. Do not get frustrated when changes occur; just react to them.

Once alerted, leaders must quickly plan how to use the precious time they have to prepare for deployment. Some units have developed time sequences to pace their predeployment activities. These are good for planned deployments and emergency deployment readiness exercises. However, they are not as useful during emergency deployments because the amount of time you have to prepare for deployment will never be the same.

There are a few things to keep in mind while you are in the planning and loading phase of the emergency deployment.

You must carefully consider what mixture of vehicles you will deploy with. The M-998 model of the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) is worth its weight in gold on a

deployment. It has a much greater cargo capacity than the M-1025/1026 models.

Commanders must take the right number of vehicles to accomplish the mission, but should also keep in mind that the mission they have been sent to do will last only so long. It will eventually end, and the military police will likely be one of the last forces to redeploy. The M-998s come in very handy at this stage of the deployment because legally they can haul twice as many soldiers at one time as the M-1025/1026.

Another thing to keep in mind is that you do not want to exhaust your soldiers before they get on the aircraft. One way to avoid this is not to start loading equipment into vehicles immediately after you receive the alert notification. The number of vehicles that your unit can take will probably change. Waiting until closer to your departure time for the airfield to load your vehicles will save your soldiers from having to move equipment from one vehicle to another. This is the type of activity that you must be aware of and try to avoid.

Waiting to load your vehicles also facilitates property accountability. It minimizes the amount of equipment that your soldiers load, unload, and then load again. Loading the equipment only once greatly reduces the chances of misplacing something.

One of the organizations that you must work closely with when preparing for an emergency deployment is the arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG). The A/DACG is at the airfield and is a key link between your unit and the Air Force. They will provide invaluable assistance in loading vehicles onto the aircraft. The A/DACG will weigh and mark your vehicles and will help with the preparation of the final load plans and the joint inspection.

invaluable assistance in loading vehicles onto the aircraft. The A/DACG will weigh and mark your vehicles and will help with the preparation of the final load plans and the joint inspection.

If you work with the people at A/DACG, things will go much smoother for your unit. You must be responsive to their requests. It is a good idea to position one of your unit's air movements personnel at the A/DACG. This person can resolve crises as they arise, can control the order of vehicles being weighed and marked, and can assist in preparing the final load plans and certifying any hazardous cargo in the vehicles.

The Air Force and A/DAGC perform a joint inspection of all vehicles moved by air. They inspect for cleanliness of the vehicle, any class III leaks, correct fuel levels, and hazardous materials and ensure that all loads are properly secured, etc. This inspection can quickly become a nightmare. A unit representative must be present to work with the inspectors in getting the unit's vehicles through the inspection. If you are responsive

and helpful, things will go much smoother for your unit.

There are other things to remember that will make your activities at the airfield easier.

- Identify load teams before you reach the airfield so that you can organize them quickly.
- Check and double check your vehicles' fuel levels to ensure that they are correct. Try to avoid taking vehicles with broken fuel gauges. Fuel cans must have rubber gaskets to pass the joint inspection.
- Ensure that the cargo in each vehicle is correctly tied down, and that you have all the necessary shoring for your trailers. Know what hazardous cargo is in each vehicle. This expedites the certifying of hazardous cargo and helps to avoid little surprises during the joint inspection. During the joint inspection you would hate to find a case of fragmentation grenades in a vehicle that you just told the inspector had no hazardous cargo in it.
- Keep vehicle drivers with their vehicle from the time they arrive at the airfield until they are loaded onto the aircraft. Put a

noncommissioned officer in charge of them to maintain accountability.

- Be absolutely sure you know who is driving each vehicle. This will save time when doing personnel manifest calls. Also, if a vehicle gets switched from one chalk to another at the last minute, you can easily change the personnel manifest.

Emergency deployments are a reality that the Military Police Corps must live with. They are not going to go away. If units remain flexible when the call comes and remember lessons learned from previous deployments, emergency deployments will be much less troublesome.

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A Military Community, the Gulf War, and Force Protection

Lieutenant Colonel David Lon Walker

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq changed preconceived thoughts on deployment and the way community law enforcement was done in Europe. The November announcement that the U.S. VII Corps would deploy from a forward deployed area was unexpected by military police of the greater Stuttgart Military Community, Germany.

While the members of the 14th MP Brigade prepared to deploy, many hours of dedicated effort were expended by the community and those MP units chosen to remain behind. Community efforts were directed at processing deploying units for movement and developing plans for the

care of family members left in theater. All the while the thought of terrorism prevailed.

As units loaded equipment and family support centers were created, community military police increased antiterrorism and force protection measures ensuring the safety of deploying troops and their families.

Once the units had departed for Southwest Asia, the MP mission expanded with fewer MPs on hand to accomplish the job. The work load did not decrease; but the type of cases changed with increases in juvenile misconduct, reports of suspicious activity, and proactive antiterrorism patrolling.

Reserve military police began to arrive but required some train-up time in community law enforcement procedures. When the war actually started, the threat of terrorism caused the community MPs to redouble their efforts in keeping the community a safe and secure place to live while working under an increased THREATCON. The results speak for themselves--no terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities in Europe.

The German police deserve a great deal of credit for their antiterrorism efforts. In the Greater Stuttgart area alone, hundreds of extra German police were dedicated to the proactive patrolling of U.S. areas. Additionally, the *feldjaegers* (German army military police) routinely patrolled many U.S. facilities assisting the MPs in the visible antiterrorism effort.

Local community residents responded to ongoing radio spots by reporting suspicious activity, allowing MPs and German police to investigate. Various infantry units from USAREUR infantry divisions deployed companies to assist in the protection efforts of Stuttgart. These soldiers performed admirably during some adverse weather conditions. All in all, it was probably the joint efforts of all concerned in Stuttgart that prevented the terrorist attacks.

The lessons learned must be applied to future training and planning. Provost marshals must have well-thought-out antiterrorism plans that include an intelligence preparation

of the battlefield. The plans should provide graduated levels of increased security with enough detail to allow the supporting tactical commander to plan for personnel requirements and the PM operations NCO to plan for extra vehicles, radios and other necessary equipment.

While we did not have any mass casualty problems in Europe, the possibility existed; and the plan must provide for immediate response. A close integration of MP antiterrorism efforts and those of local units and augmenting forces, plus the host-nation effort, is critical.

Local residents were kept informed through radio announcements, community newspaper articles, and frequent town hall meetings. The community provost marshal is a key player in developing and implementing the community force protection plan and must be proactive in antiterrorism efforts.

The fact that there were no terrorist attacks in Stuttgart is a credit to the hard work of the German police, *feldjaegers*, reserve military police from CONUS, tactical unit military police from the 385th MP Battalion and the community provost marshal office staff.

Lieutenant Colonel David L. Walker was the Provost Marshal, Greater Stuttgart Military Community, Germany at the time this article was written.

Meeting Global Commitments

Captain Brian Tenney

The 49th Military Police Brigade, Alameda, California again demonstrated Military Police capabilities to the Army as subordinate units of the brigade participated in Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia.

In the past the 49th has sent troops to areas all over the world. During both World War I and World War II the unit responded as required for victory. In the last five years, responding to world missions, the brigade was in Alaska, Hawaii, Honduras, the Philippines, Japan, Germany and Korea.

Although it is based in Alameda, the brigade has units stretching over most of the state. It is comprised of the 143d Military Police Battalion of San Mateo and the 185th Military Police Battalion in Pittsburg, with five companies and four detachments. This translates into twelve cities throughout

California where the brigade's presence is felt.

Deployment to Saudi Arabia

Both battalions and four of the five companies deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm.



Members of the 870th Military Police Company prepare for mobilization.



The first unit to enter federal service and deploy was the 870th Military Police Company. Based in Pittsburg with a detachment in Placerville, the company entered federal service in early December 1990 and deployed to Germany before Christmas.

All additional units activated were sent to Saudi Arabia. The next unit to deploy was the 970th Military Police Company, which was in the theater the second week of January. Quickly following the 970th was the 270th Military Police Company based in Sacramento. The final company to deploy was the 649th Military Police Company, based in San Luis Obispo with a detachment in Alameda.



The 970th Military Police Company departs from station for the mobilization site.

The pace of activations continued with the 143d Military Police Battalion and 185th Military Police Battalion mobilized on January 18. After two intensive weeks of training at Fort Ord the battalions deployed to Saudi Arabia during the first week of February.

The mobilization of these units caused hurried weddings, tearful farewells, and anxious soldiers. However, the mobilization also showed the preparedness of the brigade. The first unit mobilized and deployed in less than two weeks. Remaining units were ready to go well within three weeks.

With the majority of the brigade deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm, several remaining missions felt the impact. Normally twenty individuals participate in a two-week exercise conducted in Chitose or Sendai, Japan during the month of January. In addition, the brigade

headquarters and headquarters company and one company normally deploy to Korea each March in support of Team Spirit.

From Infantry to Military Police Brigade

The brigade has a long and interesting history. Organized and federally recognized on July 1, 1924 as Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 159th In-

fantry, the unit entered federal service in 1941. It participated in World War II in the Aleutian Islands and in the European, African, and Middle Eastern (EAME) theater campaigns.

The unit continued with an infantry mission for the next several decades until on February 1, 1976 it took on its current mission as the 49th Military Police Brigade.

From Coast Artillery to Military Police Company

Units in the brigade have interesting highlights, especially the oldest unit in the brigade, the 970th Military Police Company. Based in San Mateo, it was originally organized July 28, 1909 as 7th Company, 1st Coast Defense Command, Coast Artillery Corps in San Francisco. The 970th entered into federal service on August 5, 1917 with a mission to protect San Francisco Bay during World War I.

The unit was again activated for federal service on September 16, 1940 in San Francisco. The 970th was recognized as Battery B, 527th Field Artillery Battalion in 1944. Campaigns during World War II included the Aleutian Islands and the EAME theater at North Apennines and Po Valley. The battery was inactivated on September 24, 1945 in Italy.

Reorganized and federally recognized on April 5, 1948, the unit became Battery C, 271st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion. The artillery mission continued until March 1, 1963 when the unit designation became Company A, 1st Battalion, 159th Infantry.

Final conversion to military police occurred on January 13, 1974 with home station in San Mateo. The company established a detachment in San Rafael on August 1, 1986.

Support to the State of California

The brigade also provides support to the state. When the state required help to fight fires, the brigade was there. On October 17, 1989 when the Loma Prieta earthquake struck, the brigade was there. When local communities asked for help collecting, storing, and transporting food for the needy, the 49th was there. When the homeless problem became so large that armories were required, the 49th was there.

The 49th has supported the state of California at home by coordinating help during the Loma Prieta earthquake and supplying troops to fight fires, by assisting the needy through food drive assistance, and allowing the homeless to utilize armories throughout the state.

At home in the United States or in meeting commitments worldwide, the 49th Military Police Brigade serves our Army and our nation.

Captain Brian Tenney was assigned to the 49th Military Police Brigade, Alameda, CA at the time this article was written.

The Challenge of Keeping the Peace

First Lieutenant Clayton Cobb

Low-intensity conflict operations offer unique challenges to today's Army leaders. Peacekeeping operations offer great challenge because they are far removed from the conventional military mindset of "close with and destroy the enemy." In peacekeeping operations the mission is to remain removed from and prevent destruction between belligerent parties.

Junior leaders in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps have the opportunity to experience these challenges if they serve with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The MFO, an ongoing peacekeeping operation on the Sinai peninsula, Egypt, was formed in 1979 as a result of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The force consists of military contingents from eleven nations under a centralized command. Participating nations include the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Columbia, Fiji, Uruguay, France, Italy and the Netherlands.

The mission of the MFO is to observe, report, and verify Israeli and Egyptian compliance with the provisions of the peace treaty. To accomplish its mission the MFO mans a series of observation posts throughout the border area and conducts aggressive patrolling on foot and by aircraft and ship. All observed violations are reported to MFO headquarters, which then notifies representatives of both Egypt and Israel.

Two base camps, one in the north where the headquarters is located and one in the south, coordinate and support the force.

Military police serve with the MFO as part of the U.S. Infantry Bat-

alion Task Force (USBATT). These task forces, which serve 6-month rotations, are drawn from the rapid deployment force divisions. The USBATT is headquartered and operates out of the base camp in the south. The battalion is responsible for the fourteen checkpoints in the southern half of the peninsula with an area of operations approximately 220 kilometers by 15 kilometers.

An MP platoon that varies in strength from seventeen to twenty-five personnel (based on task organization) supports the USBATT. The challenges for the platoon begin even before deployment.

In addition to training and maintaining their basic soldier skills and MP combat-support skills, the platoon must train in those tasks required to run a provost marshal office. Additionally, the platoon must find time to conduct mission-specific training such as customs procedures, country training, language classes, desert operations, and survival skills training.

Mission execution begins for the MPs prior to deployment, with customs screening and preclearance of task force baggage and equipment. Upon arrival in country the platoon immediately begins its law-and-order and area-security missions because soldiers of the departing task force leave on the same aircraft on which soldiers arrive.

The platoon gradually, over the course of three weeks, assumes the entire mission, and the challenges truly begin. The platoon is responsible for the standard MP missions such as battlefield circulation control, area security, and law-and-order operations, and also conducts several

missions outside the norm. The platoon supports customs checkpoints on the international border, conducts host-nation law-enforcement liaison, and provides protective-service details for United States and foreign officials.

On the surface the challenges may not be apparent. However, the challenges become evident when you consider that these missions are accomplished within a multinational command structure, follow a restrictive status-of-forces agreement, cover a vast area, and involve a very small force.

To lessen the impact of these challenges the platoon leader and subordinate leaders must coordinate closely with both the task force chain of command and their own company chain of command. The most important factors are thorough planning and an early start.

Peacekeeping offers military police soldiers many challenges and many rewards. In addition to providing an excellent forum for junior leader development the lessons learned, personal growth, and new friendships will last a lifetime.

First Lieutenant Clayton Cobb was a student in the MP Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL when this article was written. He served as Platoon Leader, 101st MP Company, 101st Abn Division (AASLT), Fort Campbell, KY, and Provost Marshal, Task Force 1-187th Infantry, MFO, Sinai, Egypt.

New Counterdrug Training

CW4 (Retired) Richard D. Hinson

The rendezvous was set. The poolside deck at a large local motel selected, considered safe and neutral ground for both negotiators. An undercover police officer and a cocaine trafficker, connecting through a police informant, will soon meet.

The counterdrug unit chief prepares the operational plan while the team members stand by nervously awaiting assignment to specific duties. Although this is only an introduction, extraordinary precautions will be taken—the targets of this investigation include members of the "Dogs" street gang, noted for their violence.

The backup personnel form three teams: the cover team, assigned to maintain constant surveillance of the undercover officer and rescue him if necessary; the target team, assigned to maintain discreet surveillance of the suspect and any of his associates; and the tech team, detailed to monitor and record the operation using the latest police electronic technology.

The planning session is complete. In less than an hour the undercover officer will enter the dangerous and unpredictable drug underworld.

At police departments throughout America similar scenes are taking place as a result of drug training developed and provided by instructors from the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The Military Police Corps and the School seized the initiative when the president mandated that the Department of Defense actively join in the national antidrug effort.

A slice of that mission involves police training, and highly qualified to provide counterdrug training to drug law-enforcement agencies are the soldiers from the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

Subjects and courses were designed based upon an analysis of training needs for civilian police; the analysis was conducted by military police researchers in early 1991. The data revealed that drug instruction was most needed at the local police level, such as small police departments and sheriff's offices with little or no training budget.

A mobile-team concept minimizes costs by presenting training on a regional basis. The majority of students commute daily to the classroom, thereby providing education virtually without cost. Expenses for instructor travel, lodging, and training equipment are borne by the Department of Defense, using congressionally mandated counterdrug funds.

The research also identified the training topics needed. Amazingly, of the 365 critical training tasks identified during the needs analysis, 362 tasks were already being taught in residence to soldiers at the Military Police School. Lesson plans only needed to be modified for the civilian police student. To ensure quality instruction, military police and CID special agent instructors having the most drug experience were selected for this highly visible mission.

The program currently offers four diverse training courses.

The Counterdrug Investigations Course. Covert police operations provide the best evidence to arrest and convict drug traffickers. Undercover techniques, surveillance

methods, technical equipment, and operational planning constitute the bulk of the instruction in this course. Each class focuses on risk management to reduce the potential for violence in this highly dangerous police operation. Videotapes of lessons learned from the various federal and state police agencies provide case studies. Highlights include the undercover drug-purchase practical exercise and the follow-up raid in this scenario-driven, five-day course.

The Counterdrug Special Weapons and Tactics Course. Drug raids, potentially the most hazardous police action, require a high degree of technical and tactical skills. This course provides hands-on practice in raid planning, entry techniques, arrest methods, and fire control. Proper use of diversion devices and chemical agents for high-risk entries are also taught. Pistol and shotgun stress courses test the fitness of the students to withstand the rigors of the tactical police actions. The final examination, a raid of a crack house using two-way paint-ball weapons, furnishes the student with the most realistic training available anywhere.

The Counterdrug Field Tactical Police Operations Course. Domestically grown marihuana is a major cash crop throughout the United States. Many states have eradication programs that successfully locate marihuana plots, but rarely result in the arrest of a marihuana grower. Few officers have the field tactical skills to maneuver effectively in a woodland environment. This course provides those skills, enhancing the student's ability to apprehend growers while they cultivate their crops. Besides map reading, patrol planning, cover and concealment, students train in a live-fire paint-ball exercise by planning and executing a drug raid on a woodland marihuana plot.

The Counterdrug Personal Protection Course. Narcotics traffickers today use terrorist tactics not only to intimidate witnesses but also to threaten judges, mayors, prosecutors, and police. This course stresses personal protection methods for the public official or witness threatened in a narcoterrorism environment. A recent case in northern

Alabama demonstrated the need for this training when the mayor, chief of police, and town officials were threatened by an organized ring of marihuana growers. Motorcade operations and evasive driving segments provide the student with an exciting and realistic practical exercise.

Additional training modules, such as the Counterdrug Criminal Intelligence Systems Course and the Drug Unit Commander's Course, are under development and scheduled for deployment in late 1992. For 1993 an advanced police marksman and observer course is also planned.

To date twenty mobile training teams have provided one-week training courses to police officers having drug enforcement responsibilities. Classes have been conducted in Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Massachusetts, Maryland, Iowa, and New Mexico. The training schedule for 1992 includes travel to New York, Mississippi, Texas, South Carolina, and many other states.

Civilian students initially expressed skepticism that soldiers could provide practical civilian police training. They soon realized that the instructors from the Military Police School have the experience, expertise, and assets to provide high-quality counterdrug training.

Little marketing of the counterdrug training program was required as word rapidly spread throughout the law-enforcement community. Requests for training this year have

exceeded available resources. A priority system based upon threat and need ensures effective and fair selection for the training.

Expansion of the USAMPS counterdrug training program is planned. Department of the Army recently authorized twelve instructor spaces to support the program and funding levels have doubled for 1992.

The Department of Defense, called to action by congress and the president, accepted the challenge to support this nation's drug law-enforcement agencies in this most difficult battle. Highly trained and effective drug enforcement officers are a necessary prerequisite to success. The U.S. Army Military Police School plays a key role in this effort.

Chief Warrant Officer (Retired) Richard D. Hinson, a CID Special Agent, has held a wide variety of criminal investigative positions culminating in his final assignment as Program Manager, Counterdrugs Division, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL. Other key assignments included duty as Chief, Drug Suppression Team, Fort Campbell District, CID, Fort Campbell, KY; Drug Suppression Coordinator, Camp Howze Branch Office, CID, South Korea; and Special Agent assigned to undercover duties, Drug-Suppression Team, Fort Benning District, CID, Fort Benning, GA.

AIDS and Law Enforcement

CW2 David G. Ownby, Sr.

AIDS (*acquired immunodeficiency syndrome*) is an increasingly serious public health problem worldwide. An extremely emotional issue, it has heightened concern among law enforcement personnel, evidence technicians, laboratory staff, and criminal investigators.

The jobs of military police, military police investigators, and CID agents are inherently dangerous occupations because of high-risk duties and procedures required of them--performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), making arrests, conducting searches, processing crime scenes, etc. These actions expose military law-enforcement personnel to individuals who are HIV-positive or to potential sources of contagion (e.g. syringes, blood).

Military law-enforcement personnel must be able to employ defensive measures against exposure to the HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) while still successfully performing their missions.

Surprisingly, HIV is difficult to transmit, and the virus is quite fragile when outside the human body. The virus is susceptible to heat, to many common household disinfectants and detergents, and to washing with soap and water. It is primarily transmitted by exposure to contaminated blood and other body fluids, primarily during sexual activities and intravenous drug use.

Although the risk of getting the HIV from needle sticks and puncture wounds is low, the risk associated with open-wound and mucous-membrane (e.g., eyes, nose, mouth) exposure is even lower. A CDC (Center for Disease Control) study of 172 health-care

workers who had open wounds or exposed mucous membranes, and who were exposed to the blood of HIV-infected patients, reflected that none of them became infected.

There are, however, two recorded incidents where two health-care workers became infected following extensive blood contact while providing care to AIDS patients. Both had failed to follow CDC-recommended infection control procedures.

Primarily HIV is transmitted through exposure to contaminated blood, semen, and vaginal secretions. The HIV has been found isolated in only very small concentrations in saliva, tears, and urine, but not in feces. Military police should wear latex or vinyl gloves when touching saliva, and open wounds or sores should be covered by a waterproof dressing.

Military police personnel may worry about being bitten while apprehending a subject. According to the CDC, no cases of HIV infection or AIDS have been traced to human bites or exchange of saliva.

Use disposable plastic cuffs in making arrests and dispose of them as contaminated waste. Disinfect steel handcuffs used on suspected AIDS carriers by dropping them into an EPA-approved germicide or ten-to-one solution of water and bleach, using gloves. Vehicles that have been stained by human body fluids from AIDS suspects should be decontaminated with bleach or an EPA-approved germicide solution (using gloves) or be commercially cleaned.

While the risk of infection through human bites is already low, there are precautions that will minimize the risk of HIV and other infections as well as promote basic hygiene. Backbleeding should be encouraged when receiving a bite wound. This is done by applying pressure and "milking" the wound. Wash the wound thoroughly with soap and hot water and seek medical attention as soon as possible. Testing the victim and perpetrator for HIV should also be considered.

Although the risk of HIV infection from being cut or punctured by contaminated needles or other sharp objects appears to be low, many law-enforcement personnel worry about exposure to HIV during searches incident to the apprehension of a subject. There are precautionary measures that can be taken to minimize exposure to HIV.

Ask subjects to empty their own pockets. When doing strip searches of subjects, wear latex or vinyl gloves when handling the subject's clothing. To avoid sustaining a puncture wound from a hypodermic needle or other sharp object, carefully empty the contents of a female suspect's purse by turning it upside down over a table.

When possible, use long-handled mirrors and a flashlight to search hidden areas at crime scenes. Wear

protective gloves and conduct the search slowly and carefully. Use puncture-proof containers to store sharp instruments and place a warning label on plastic bags used to store possibly contaminated items. Use tape, never metal staples, when packaging evidence.

The plastic tubes that some cigars come in make excellent evidence containers for hypodermic needles. Investigators at crime scenes where body fluids such as blood are present should brief unit personnel on the use of disinfectants prior to the release of the crime scene.

Investigators should take certain universal precautions before, during, and after processing a crime scene where suspected body fluids are present. Under emergency conditions when differentiation between body-fluid types is difficult if not impossible, personnel should treat all body fluids as potentially hazardous. They should wear coveralls, protective eyeglasses or a face shield, a disposable face mask, footwear covers, and latex gloves. Take precautionary measures when helping to remove a body, accompanying a body to the hospital, or attending an autopsy.

Investigative personnel should take care not to smoke, eat or drink while processing the crime scene and should keep their fingers, pencils, pens, or other objects out of their mouths. Evidence should be properly packaged and labeled.

Used face masks, latex gloves and foot covers should be considered contaminated waste and disposed by burning. Use containers or trash bags marked "bio-hazardous" for disposal. Most hospitals on military installations have an incinerator for this purpose. Coveralls should be washed or laundered in hot water. Hands should be washed after processing the crime scene and the evidence. Liquid or granular soap is preferred over bar soap.

Often law-enforcement personnel are the first professionals to arrive at

the scene of an accident or crime. Frequently they are presented with emergency situations that involve contact with blood or other body fluids. When they are required to perform CPR on a victim, a one-way airway should be used.

Provost marshals, military police and CID supervisors should get the equipment that will provide their personnel a defensive posture against the HIV. The following equipment, available through any local military hospital logistics office, should be made available to all law-enforcement personnel:

ITEM	NSN
Mask, disposable	6515-00-982-7493
Footwear Covers, disposable	6532-00-397-2883
Gloves, Exam, medium/ large	6515-00-462-0832
Gloves, Exam, small	6515-01-210-5886
Airway, Pharyngeal, infant	6515-00-687-8052

A pocket mask with a one-way valve is to be used with the pharyngeal airway. It can be obtained from the supporting hospital, which can acquire it through a local purchase.

Items that can be local purchase include infection control goggles, disposable gowns, pocket masks, one-way valves for pocket masks, and dual-channel airway kits. The airways should be used only by trained personnel and only on an unconscious patient. In measuring the correct size of airway tube to use, measure from the tip of the ear lobe to the corner of the mouth.

For any exposure to a source individual who has AIDS, who is found to be positive for HIV infection, or who refuses testing, the investigator should be counseled regarding the risk of infection and evaluated clinically and serologically (blood testing) for evidence of HIV infection as soon as possible after the exposure. The investigator should be advised to report and seek medical evaluation for any

febrile illness that occurs within twelve weeks after the exposure.

Following the initial test at the time of exposure seronegative investigators should be retested six weeks, twelve weeks, and six months after exposure to determine whether transmission has occurred. During this follow-up period (especially the first six to twelve weeks after exposure, when most infected persons are expected to seroconvert) the investigator should refrain from donating blood and should use appropriate protection during sexual intercourse.

If the source individual was tested and found to be seronegative, baseline testing of the exposed person with

follow-up testing twelve weeks later may be performed if desired or recommended by the health-care provider.

Conclusion

Training and education should be the cornerstone of the military police and CID supervisor's response to law-enforcement issues related to exposures to the HIV and other blood-borne diseases. Such training should reduce concerns their personnel have about their coming into contact with HIV. Training assistance is available to military police and CID supervisors through their supporting hospital's plans, training, mobilization, and security office.

Military law-enforcement personnel should consider every suspect a potential HIV carrier. Precautions should be employed when engaging in high-risk police duties. Military law-enforcement personnel can successfully and safely perform their missions if properly educated and trained in the employment of universal precautions against HIV exposure.

CW2 David G. Ownby, Sr., was Chief, Warrant Officer and Investigations Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written.

Operation Quicksilver

Staff Sergeant Frank L. Luhn

The 194th Separate Armored Brigade from Fort Knox, Kentucky was selected for downsizing and reorganization by the Department of the Army in January 1990. This restructuring resulted in several battalion-sized units within the brigade disbanding while others were reorganized into smaller, more compact units. Overall reduction resulted in a loss of 51 percent of authorized personnel and equipment.

Discussed here are major issues encountered during this transitional period. Most units can expect to experience such issues in similar downsizing operations if they are selected for reorganization or deactivation.

For military police perhaps the most important aspect of reorganization or downsizing operations is the security of arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E) during movement. Whole or parts of unit arms rooms will be deactivated, and their contents will be transported to other locations on or off the installation. This movement presents an enticing target for criminal or terrorist groups.

Security of these shipments must be a primary concern to all who are involved in the planning and execution of downsizing operations. Proactive planning is the key to this mission. Escorts of AA&E during this brigade's operations went very smoothly.

The ease of these operations was facilitated by proactive coordination between post and brigade provost marshal offices (PMOs) early in the operation and the effective support received from the post PMO operations section. Movement schedules and telephonic coordination were all that were necessary to arrange security escorts for AA&E shipments by surface.

Normally these escorts consisted of a unit NCO, a vehicle driver and one MP patrol car selected from the law enforcement commitment. The weapons themselves were secured in arms racks and placed in the rear of a covered vehicle. No additional resources were required. No breaches of security or loss of weapon accountability were encountered. Flexibility on the part of all participants was necessary as escorts were often rescheduled, sometimes with less than twenty-four hours notice when there were sudden changes in mission resources.

Physical Security and Crime Prevention

A second challenging aspect to any downsizing operation involves physical security and crime prevention. If internal military police assets are available (as in division or separate brigades), command emphasis, careful internal planning, and constant review of policies are necessary for a successful program of these two vital areas. Unit commanders at all levels must be, and were in the 194th's case, committed to crime prevention and physical security necessities.

During downsizing operations units will work long hours and have tunnel vision, seeking to complete the mission with little overt planning or emphasis on crime prevention and physical security issues. Personnel are often working beyond normal duty hours, and large quantities of equipment of all types are often spread throughout unit areas or motor pools. This enhances the opportunity for larcenies of government or private property.

Command support and countermeasures must be implemented early and increased or decreased as activity within the unit area fluctuates. Internal MP and security assets can be expected to bear the majority of crime prevention and security initiatives outside of unit areas. No major losses or larcenies of government or private property occurred during the 194th's entire reorganizing and downsizing phase.

All planning and execution was done with commanders, internal brigade MP assets with assistance from the post PMO, particularly in the later stages of reorganization as brigade MP assets diminished. This included crime-prevention patrols and the deactivating and reactivating of JSIIDS (joint services interior intrusion detection system) in unit arms rooms. Information exchange between reorganizing unit PMO and security personnel and the installation PMO physical security section is critical, particularly in the areas of deactivation and reactivation of JSIIDS systems.

Because of increased external commitments of post PMO assets and availability of brigade MPs, minimal support was necessary from the installation PMO in respect to crime-prevention patrols in the early stages. However, in the latter stages as the brigade MP assets diminished because of reassignments or other losses, post MP assets were required to devote more resources to protecting brigade facilities.

During the final stages of downsizing operations physical-security and crime-prevention requirements often exceeded both brigade and post MP assets. Downsizing units were compelled to do much of their own daily crime-prevention and physical-security inspections. This becomes a real challenge as whole units are deactivated or reorganized and personnel losses occur in great numbers. Positive command support was necessary, and it was overwhelmingly provided during this reorganization and greatly enhanced MP physical-security and crime-prevention efforts.

The prevention of waste, fraud and abuse must be immediately emphasized upon notification that downsizing or deactivation will occur. The potential for waste, fraud and abuse is extremely high during downsizing and reorganization operations. Subsequently unit leaders and military police must set the standards by instituting proactive measures to discourage personnel from participating in improper actions.

Installation representatives from the USACIDC (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command) were a good source of support. They provided an information briefing to brigade and battalion commanders and staffs prior to the commencing of the 194th's downsizing operations. This provided important information down to the unit level, detailing proactive actions that should be accomplished by unit personnel and actions that needed to be accomplished by law enforcement agencies on the installation. This set the

tone for a team approach to preventing waste, fraud and abuse.

As units began to clear facilities at all levels, especially platoon and squad echelons, large quantities of government equipment were required to be turned in, transferred or otherwise legally disposed of. Despite command, MP and CID efforts during the brigade's downsizing, some individuals were still found improperly disposing of government equipment by dropping it into dumpsters.

Overt and covert surveillance of the brigade's motor parks, storage areas, post range roads and the land fill during the early and middle stages of downsizing operations quickly identified and reduced this activity. Some incidents of individuals pawning military equipment were also discovered and should be expected. This was quickly and easily countered after MP investigators and CID personnel obtained the records of all the pawn shops in the area from civilian police authorities.

Those military subjects who were identified wrongfully disposing of government equipment were quickly processed and strongly disciplined by the chain of command. Pawn shops were also put on notice that continued purchase of military equipment could lead to actions by the Armed Forces Disciplinary Board.

Commanders should be further cautioned and alerted to the possibility of fraud through hand-receipt turn-ins and transfer of equipment during these turbulent times. During the later stages of operations and as suspense dates became closer, "alternative" methods of equipment disposal again resurfaced. Dumpsters were once again being used for disposing of serviceable military equipment.

Much of the equipment being disposed of in these dumpsters was excess (found on post) repair parts and components that were dumped out of frustration with the complex and bureaucratic system employed to turn in excess property legally. A centralized, user-friendly turn-in point would have greatly reduced soldier frustrations and the subsequent incidents of wrongful disposition of property.

Lessons Learned

Command involvement and commitment to physical security; crime prevention; waste, fraud and abuse prevention; and prior planning were the keys to this brigade's reorganization.

Close coordination between post PMO and the unit PMO (if available) or security/S-2 section is paramount to successful movement of small arms on or off the installation. Having PMO operations direct and task MP patrols is clearly the optimum choice for coordination activities. Use of the installation physical security branch was utilized early on and found to be redundant. For units without internal military police or internal physical security experts the installation PMO must provide positive guidance and control as well as actual support.

Unit commanders must establish and support proactive physical security efforts. This was key to the brigade's success during downsizing. Be proactive, establish a deterrence plan early (overt surveillance, CID briefings, etc). Involve leaders at all levels, particularly at platoon and squad levels.

Special emphasis should be placed with the leadership in the unit's motor pools and supply areas. Prosecute violators; don't look the other way at violations.

Lastly, the installation must insist on the establishment of a simple, centrally located operation to classify, process and accept excess and found-on-post property from reorganizing units. Perhaps even a no-questions-asked policy

would encourage turn-in of equipment. This is paramount in preventing waste of government resources, particularly in these resource-intensive times.

Being proactive and maintaining open lines of communication throughout the entire chain of command will also ensure that any reorganizing or downsizing operation will be as successful as the one experienced by the 194th Separate Armored Brigade.

Staff Sergeant Frank L. Luhn was the Operations Sergeant, Provost Marshal Office, 194th Armored Bde, Fort Knox, KY at the time this article was written.

Anonymity in a Crime Stoppers Program

Major J. C. Northcutt

The well-worn cliché crime doesn't pay may apply to criminals, but not to Crime Stoppers. Crime Stoppers is a successful anticrime program that utilizes anonymous tips to apprehend criminals and pays a reward for the information.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma was the first Department of Defense installation to incorporate Crime Stoppers into its law enforcement program. Since its organization in 1986 thirty-one cases were solved, thirty-one subjects apprehended, and over \$230,000 worth of property recovered or restitution made to the government. A total of \$2,950 in rewards was paid to individuals for this information. For each dollar expended for rewards, over \$75 was recovered.

The Crime Stoppers program is relatively simple. A highly advertised phone line is maintained at the military police desk—for example, Fort Sill's is (405) 351-COPS. An individual, without revealing their identity, may call in with information on criminal activity. The desk sergeant or clerk will log the information in the record book and then assign a code number, *i.e.* 3-92 (third entry for 1992), to the caller. The anonymous informer will use this number in future telephone conversations with the MPs.

The information that the caller provided is then passed on to the ap-


propriate military or civilian agencies. If an apprehension results from the information, the caller can receive up to \$1,000, depending upon the crime. Arrangements are then made to pay the informant.

Fort Sill's Crime Stoppers organization is unique in the overall Crime Stoppers program because it is organized under the regulations of the post nonappropriated fund (NAF). It cannot solicit contributions as civilian programs can. Fort Sill provides approximately \$2,500 in rewards to the program each fiscal year.

A board of directors from various post activities approves all expenditures and activities. The board of directors meets once a month to review the program and receive information from the post Crime Stoppers coordinator, the military police operations officer. A monthly report is submitted to Crime Stoppers International, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The post newspaper, the *Cannoner*, publishes a weekly column on crime and crime-prevention tips. Posters are posted in all troop and installation activity areas. The public affairs office produces a bimonthly Crime Stoppers video, which is shown on a daily basis on the installation cable TV channel.

If Fort Sill's program receives information of crimes committed in the



CRIME STOPPERS

Crime stoppers pays cash rewards for information on crimes and guarantees anonymity to callers. If you have information on the crime listed below or on any crime, call:

**CRIME STOPPERS at 351-6654,
Military Police Investigations
at 351-5822, or
MPs at 351-2101 or 351-COPS.**

LARCENY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. July 12, between 8:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., an Audiovox car phone, serial number 44295, and a Whistle radar detector were removed from a 1985 Honda Accord while it was parked in the lot adjacent to building 3424 (troop billets).

CRIME TIP. Crime stoppers will pay a reward for information concerning fugitives from the law. If you have any such information, call Crime stoppers at 351-COPS.

civilian community, it forwards the information to the appropriate civilian agency (many civilian police departments also have Crime Stoppers).

The nearby Lawton Police Department and Fort Sill work closely together to produce results and trade tips. The chief of law enforcement, security, and administration was the former deputy chief of police for Lawton and currently serves on both boards.

Crime Stoppers is an effective program. The Fort Sill command structure has been highly supportive of Crime Stoppers, and results justify this support. In July 1991 an escapee from a civilian prison was apprehended by Fort Sill military police acting upon a Crime Stoppers tip. In February 1991 five subjects were apprehended, breaking up a group that was stealing government property from the post hospital. This kind of success encourages support.

Information on the Fort Sill Crime Stoppers program can be obtained by calling Fort Sill at AUTOVON 639-6802/2800/5066 or commercial (405) 351-6802/2800/5066. Address correspondence to Provost Marshal Office, ATTN: ATZR-FO, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503-5100.

CRIME STOPPERS
(405) 355-INFO
Standard Descriptions of Persons
Always state in this order, omit any item you do not have.

Name

Race

Sex

Age/DOB

Height

Weight

Hair Color

Style of Hair

Eyes Color

Complexion

Distinguishing Characteristics (including facial hair and glasses)

Clothing (Head to foot)

Hat

Shirt-tie (Blouse, etc.)

Coat

Pants, jeans

Socks

Shoes

Other pertinent identification or markings

Major J. C. Northcutt was the Operations Officer for the Law Enforcement Command and the Police Coordinator for the Fort Sill Crime Stoppers Program, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, OK at the time this article was written.

In Both Jungle and Urban Operations

First Lieutenant Kenneth C. Garrett

The 534th Military Police Company, 92d MP Battalion, Fort Clayton, Panama has covered the full spectrum of MP combat support missions in Panama. Highlights revolved around three key events: Operation Just Cause, Operation Promote Liberty, and combined patrols with Panamanian national police in Panama City, when the company became a major force in the establishment of democracy in a highly volatile and uncertain environment.

During Operation Just Cause the 534th was attached to a U.S. Marine Corps unit and provided desperately needed service. Articles about the mission and the use of combat support military police appeared in the June 1991 issue of **MILITARY POLICE** and in the September 1990 issue of *Marine Corps Gazette* magazine.

The marines understood how to use combat support military police as an effective and devastating combat

multiplier. The 534th successfully conducted convoy escorts, enemy-prisoner-of-war operations, route recons, and numerous area security missions in a combat environment.

The unit conducted raids that resulted in the capture of many wanted individuals, large sums of money, and caches of weapons and ammunition. The company also provided law and order to many towns in the Republic of Panama until a Panamanian police force could be established.

For Operation Promote Liberty, which began immediately after Operation Just Cause concluded, the company was called upon to perform many varied missions. The unit was tasked with security missions for the inauguration of the Panamanian President and for the vice-president of the United States during his Panama visit. The 534th also provided security at the Panamanian presidential palace, which is located in the heart of Panama City's most dangerous area.

After a young soldier lost his life in a terrorist bombing, the 534th became the primary quick-reaction force on the Pacific end of the Panama Canal. The company also performed garrison law enforcement duties on seven U.S. military installations.

One platoon received a special security mission around the island of Contradora. It performed perimeter security around the island during a series of meetings between high-level officers and diplomats. The mission required the soldiers to dress in civilian clothes and blend with tourists on the crowded beaches.

Challenges of Jungle Operations

Most unit training was conducted during Operation Promote Liberty. Soldiers were introduced to the training challenges of jungle operations, in addition to the special missions in an urban environment. They learned the advantages that the jungle offers to trained individuals and the hazards that befall the untrained.

The company developed a special squad reaction course to test the proficiency of the jungle training. Each member of the squad was placed in the position of squad leader for a jungle scenario. The new squad leader would have no prior knowledge of the scenario and could not receive guidance from the other squad members; the entire course was timed. The squads performed exceptionally well, based upon the difficulty of the course.

The company's main focus on training was geared to the persistent real-world threat of civil disturbance. The unit developed an intense and challenging training plan that

would prepare the company for the dangers that military police face in civil disturbance operations in Panama.

A mock riot became the highlight of the civil disturbance training period. The MP platoon, with full riot gear, would face an angry mob comprised of other unit soldiers. Motivation and intensity was at its highest, and soldiers regarded it as some of the most realistic training they ever performed.

Role in New Panama Police Force

In June 1990 the 534th undertook an important mission—assisting Panama in its establishment of an effective civilian police force. Operations included soldiers performing combined military police and Panamanian national police patrols in some of the most dangerous areas of Panama city.

The entire company was committed to the mission, which operated twenty-four hours a day in the city of 1.5 million people. As the soldiers learned valuable skills, they also learned about problems involved with maintaining law and order in a large foreign city. During a routine patrol one of the 534th soldiers was shot in the shoulder by a group of Panamanians with handguns.

There were numerous times when the company impressed the citizens of Panama. For example, their training in first aid enabled them to save the lives of many Panamanian citizens. Although the 534th did not actually train the Panamanian police, they set an example for the Panamanian police to follow. The 534th Military Police Company was released from the combined military police and Panamanian national police patrols after the government of Panama determined that it no longer needed U.S. assistance.

In December the 534th was called to stop a coup attempt and hostage situation at the Panamanian national police station. The unit, the first to respond at the scene, contained the entire area.

The 534th captured the escaped Panamanian Defense Force colonel responsible for the coup attempt. At the successful completion of this mission the company was tasked to perform security at two prisons that contained many dangerous criminals, former Panamanian Defense Force officers and the leader of the coup attempt.

First Lieutenant Kenneth C. Garrett was the 4th Platoon Leader, Company XO, 92d MP Battalion, Fort Clayton, Panama, at the time this article was written. He holds a bachelor's degree in public administration from the University of Mississippi.

I hear and I forget; I see and I remember; I do and I understand

CONFUCIUS

C. 500 BC

Fighting the Dragon

Second Lieutenant Melissa House

Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders clustered around a circle drawn in the dirt. As a lieutenant drew on the ground with a stick, an energetic discussion broke out. The group was preparing to brief the company commander on the defense plan for Holland drop zone (DZ) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The group of leaders from the 65th MP Company, 503d MP Battalion (Abn), 16th MP Brigade (Abn) at Fort Bragg was participating in Dragon Team 1-92. This XVIII Airborne Corps emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) involved all the major corps units including the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the 24th Infantry Division (M), Fort Stewart, Georgia; and the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg.

In the scenario XVIII Airborne Corps was required to conduct a forced entry to secure forward staging bases at North Airfield and McEntyre Air National Guard Base, South Carolina. The six-day exercise allowed for a diversity of training on wartime and contingency missions and also on force protection and community assistance missions. Members of the 16th MP Brigade (Abn) played both the "good guy" and the "bad guy."

Defense of a landing strip and DZ is not usually encompassed in area security (AS), battlefield circulation control (BCC), enemy-prisoner-of-war (EPW) operations, or law and order (L&O). The company, along with the 21st MP Company (Abn), a sister 503d MP Battalion unit, was involved in innovative realistic, combined-arms training by piggy-backing

brigade staff. All the units participated in the personnel overseas readiness process and in preparing the units to deploy with MILES gear and other logistical items.

While the role of the OPFOR called mainly for a return to the basic infantry tactics and skills, it left time for training on three MP missions (AS, BCC, and L&O) as the units moved to their defensive positions and awaited the arrival of the 82d, 101st, and the 24th divisions.

The brigade operations order gave the battalion an area of operation (AO) with critical sites. The units would perform AS and BCC, and, on order, would defend critical facilities. An engineer platoon and an armor platoon were attached to the 65th for the duration of the exercise, as well as a communications package from the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade (Abn). Spanish-speaking soldiers were identified in each company to add to the role of the OPFOR. All orders and message traffic over the FM were transmitted in Spanish.

During phase I missions ranged from conducting an airborne operation into North Airfield at McEntire and conducting AS at those locations, to defending Holland DZ at Fort Bragg as the OPFOR.

Included were the more routine "good guy" missions of providing force protection and community assistance to Fort Bragg and securing the airfield, limiting the press, and securing the personnel and equipment staging areas at Pope Air Force Base and the corps marshaling area for the departure of the 82d and the arrival of the 24th and 101st.

Since the 65th was the current mission company, it had to hand over the force protection mission in order



The exercise revalidated the ability of the units to operate as a corps. Fourteen of the major subordinate commands participated, with over five thousand soldiers deployed to the field and more involved at their home stations in emergency operation centers (EOCs) and other support functions.

on the corps mission. Both the 65th and the 21st served as aggressive opposing forces (OPFOR) for elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Participation in Dragon Team 1-92 allowed exercising the entire 503d and also the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), the U.S. Army garrison MP company and the

to depart for the field. To keep things running smoothly on Fort Bragg, the 108th MP Company took over the mission from the 65th. This transition was accomplished with no disruption in the service provided to the Fort Bragg community.

In phase II the 21st, augmented by a platoon of the 118th MP Company (Abn), donned parachutes and rigged its equipment in the pack shed in preparation for the flight to Elizabeth DZ. After a successful drop into

and special forces reconnaissance teams conducted probing exercises against the 21st and later the 65th. The military police were able to capture a member of one of the teams.

Combat operations of phase III began first in South Carolina as the 82d conducted an airfield seizure of North and McEntire Airfields. Although word to the corps EOC was that the 82d had met with light resistance, the MPs were able to damage the battalion task force.

The battalion expanded its AO after identifying the roads, critical facilities, and terrain in its new sector. An aviation task force of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters arrived and attacked the 65th positions as the 21st was again attacked by the 82d, this time at Normandy DZ. After the units were pushed off of their objectives by the 82d and the 101st and conducted a few probing attacks, the 65th, 21st, and the HHD used escape-and-evasion tactics to get out of the area and return to garrison.



South Carolina the unit had two days to prepare to defend North and McEntire Airfields against the 82d.

The 65th and the 503d MP Battalion HHD (headquarters and headquarters detachment) deployed to their positions at Holland and All-American DZs. Soldiers at both sites erected tents and fighting positions while the battalion staff monitored the developing situation in the south. At the same time the unit validated its load plans for rail and air movements. A convoy of flatbed trailers loaded with 21st MP Company vehicles was taken to South Carolina for the unit to use after it hit the ground.


During the wait for the division, long-range surveillance unit teams

After briefing the company commander and first sergeant on the plan to defend Holland and All-American DZs, the platoon sergeants rallied up their teams for a quick rehearsal of movement between initial and final positions. Placards with red stars were taped down on HMMWV doors and MILES gear adjusted; cross-leveling of blank ammunition rounded out the preparations.

Five CH-47 Chinook helicopters carrying the 21st landed at Simmons Army Airfield as the 65th was returning to its defensive perimeter. The unit picked up its vehicles and joined the battalion in the field to secure Normandy DZ and the surrounding areas.

The 16th MP Brigade's participation in Dragon Team 1-92, afforded units the opportunity to train with divisional units in scenarios that were different and challenging. The EDRE involved the leaders at all levels in the planning for operations in an exercise at the corps level and displayed the brigade's ability to prepare and move units within the 18-hour deployment requirement.

Second Lieutenant Melissa House was the Brigade Chemical Officer and Assistant Training Officer for the 16th MP Brigade, Fort Bragg, NC at the time this article was written.



MILITARY POLICE occasionally prints synopses of books that may be of interest to the military police community.

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Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict

From Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 to the coalition military victory over Iraq seven months later, the attention of the world focused on the Persian Gulf crisis. The armed forces of the United States, along with the forces of the coalition of nations that opposed Iraq's wrongful aggression, played a decisive role in the liberation of Kuwait and the defeat of Iraq. SN: 008-000-00589-3; 272 pp; \$14.00

Fundamentals of Force Planning

This book treats force planning as the conceptual background to combat. From Korea through Iraq, no American commander has had the luxury of first building a force and then taking it to war, as we did against the Axis in World War II. Rather, theater commanders fought with inherited forces. Some were blessed, and some were cursed; but no matter what their operational brilliance, tenacity, and luck, all were influenced by decisions made in peacetime decades earlier. SN: 008-046-00143-0; 680 pp; \$24.00.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

The Army's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was to deploy rapidly to defend Saudi Arabia and deter Iraq from further aggression. Within days of President Bush's deployment order, thousands of soldiers and tons of equipment began moving to the Middle East in Operation Desert Shield. SN: 008-029-00223-0; poster; \$5.00.

Arabism and Islam:

Stateless Nations and Nationless States

During the 1980s Islamic activists in the Arab Middle East challenged the definition of legitimate authority and provided the means and rationale for revolutionary change, hoping to pressure established governments to alter domestic and foreign policies. No nation-state has been immune. Fearful Arab nationalist leaders, unwilling or unable to abandon decades of ideological baggage, began a gradual, if erratic, process of melding the spirit and letter of Islamic precepts into existing national laws and political rhetoric. SN: 008-020-01214-9; 52 pp; \$1.75.

Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East

The authors of this report look at the last campaign of the Iran-Iraq War and show how the Iraqis were able to turn that war around, inflicting a crushing defeat on the Iranians. As a result of their victory the Iraqis were able to set themselves up as the preeminent Arab military power in the Middle East. The authors go on to explain how the emergence of Iraq as a formidable power affected the balance of power in the region, particularly addressing the tense relations between the newly powerful Iraq and Israel. They conclude

with recommendations for U.S. policy makers and military commanders for dealing with Iraq. SN: 008-020-01231-9; 112 pp; \$3.25.

Iraq--A Country Study

This study is an attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, and military aspects of contemporary Iraqi society. SN: 008-020-01206-8; 336 pp; \$16.00.

Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War

Iraq emerged from its war with Iran as a superpower in the Persian Gulf. This had not been its original intent; it did not deliberately use the war to transform its strategic position or to impose its domination over the region. Iraq achieved regional superpower status through a series of escalatory steps that were required to repel Iran's Islamic fundamentalist crusade. Iraqi leaders mobilized a diverse population, strengthened Iraq's armed forces, and transformed its society to take the offensive and terminate the war with Iran. SN: 008-020-01238-6; 136 pp; \$4.00.

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Last year was an encouraging year for international narcotics control efforts. While still a long way from ending the illegal drug trade, important developments highlight the balance sheet: for the first time in a decade--and for the first time since the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report was instituted--there was a halt in the rise of coca cultivation and opium production. Total coca cultivation, which had been increasing annually by as much as 10 to 20 percent, levelled off; in Bolivia and Colombia it declined. Opium production, which had also been growing at an alarming rate, dropped by 10 percent. While weather played a part in this decline, law enforcement and crop control programs were the determining factors in all countries except Burma. SN: 044-000-02305-9; 400 pp; \$19.00.

America Living With AIDS

The people of the United States arrived at a crossroads in the history of the HIV epidemic. In the months to come they must either engage seriously the issues and needs posed by this deadly disease or face relentless, expanding tragedy in the decades ahead. In just ten years the human immunodeficiency virus "HIV," the causative agent of AIDS, claimed more American lives than did the Korean and Vietnam wars combined. If, from this day forward, there were never another instance of new infection, the upcoming decade would still certainly be much worse. The amount of human suffering and number of deaths will be much greater. SN: 022-003-01169-2; 172 pp; \$9.00.

Preparing for NCO Selection Boards

Colonel Jay Martin

The Department of the Army promotion system is supported by hundreds of dedicated civilians and military personnel at the U.S. Army Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The DA selection boards consist of senior officers and NCOs with considerable command and staff experience selected from commands around the world.

A board is broken down into panels (usually around ten panels) with each panel reviewing one or more career management fields (CMFs). For example, one panel might look at recruiting and retention, band and public affairs CMF files. The full selection board receives detailed briefings from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Total Army Personnel Command and CMF proponents. Its job is to recommend the best qualified in each military occupational specialty for promotion to meet the needs of the Army.

Before a NCO becomes best qualified they must become fully qualified. Each panel has to determine whether an NCO being considered for promotion is fully qualified. That means qualified professionally and morally, has demonstrated integrity, is physically fit and capable of performing duties expected of an NCO in the next higher grade.

The process

There are five parts to an individual board record: official military personnel file (OMPF-fiche) that includes the performance and restricted fiches; hard-copy photograph; personnel qualification sheet; personnel data sheet; and other, such as correspondence to the board president and hard-copy documents.

Fiche. Every NCO should review a recent copy of their fiche to ensure data is correct, clear and readable, and up-to-date. Board members carefully read reports, giving particular attention to narrative comments. Here patterns of strengths and weaknesses over time emerge. Learn to read your reports the same way, together with a senior NCO whose judgment and counsel you value.

After reading the evaluation reports, board members spend time reviewing awards, decorations, letters, and military and civilian education documents.

They are careful not to unduly penalize NCOs who have had early exposure to heavy responsibilities and the inherent opportunity to make mistakes through misguided effort. However, derogatory information in the present rank and within the past year was appropriate for consideration.

Hard copy photograph. This is one of the most influential items in a package because it visually says so much.

A board member can see whether the NCO is interested in presenting the best image (uniform pressed and properly fitted to height and weight), whether attention was paid to detail (decorations, stripes and patches), and if the photo is up-to-date. A board sees more poor photos than good ones. Have someone in your rating chain review your photo before you send it in.

Personnel qualification record. This is where a board member can rapidly find verification for decorations, skills testing results, military and civilian schooling and physical profiles. These items are checked against detailed information on the performance fiche and, in some cases, the photo. Too many of these records are not kept up to date.

Personnel data sheet. This is an internal document used by the Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center to centralize key items of information for board members.

Correspondence to the board president. If you have a strong urge to write the president of the board, here are some do's and don'ts. *Do* be brief, concise and factual; use the correct memorandum format; provide information not on your OMPF; address it to the board president; use your social security account number; and sign the memorandum.

Don't use the correspondence to express grievances, to justify past conduct or to boast about yourself; enclose extraneous documents; or forget to sign the memorandum. Usually the don'ts are what appears most often in files. The NCOs tried to explain why they had trouble under a certain rater or what a great job they did for a community.

If you receive an award, letter of commendation or NCO evaluation report just before the board convenes, there may not be sufficient time to place the document on the fiche. A hard copy should be included in your file. In the case of the NCO-ER, it pays to include the hard copy in your file, particularly if it covers the past year of performance.

The NCO Evaluation Report

Board members placed the highest priority on NCO-ER narratives. Although all parts of the report are significant, particular attention goes to the following:

- *Scope and degree of responsibility* in terms of resources, people, facilities and dollars managed as outlined in the duty description,
- *Trends in professional ability and performance* with special emphasis on the specifics of performance as they relate to the soldier's MOS and duty description, and
- *Specific potential recommendations* by the rating officials.

When you are trying to objectively review your overall performance, there are specific areas you should carefully consider (again, with a trusted senior NCO or officer):

- Levels of responsibility--tough jobs,
- Trends in efficiency--upward or downward,
- Military education--meets or exceeds standards,
- Professional values--Army ethics such as loyalty, duty, selfless service, and integrity and Army values such as courage, candor, competence and commitment
- Range and variety of assignments,
- Physical fitness and weight control, and
- Medical profile.

Obviously no one will exceed standards in all the above areas. Use them as a guide along with counselling sessions with your rater.

When you sit down and discuss your present or future evaluation with your rating officials, get used to the concept of excellence. Excellence is special. Only a few will achieve it. A report with all excellence ratings will be unusual; however, the bullet examples will tell if it is really excellence.

Ensure your files are accurate, complete and readable. Have someone check your photograph before you send it in. Ensure your uniform has been pressed, fits according to standards and properly displays all your awards, decorations and insignia.

One important link in this process is you and your rating officials. With all participants properly completing evaluation report requirements and records review, your chances of promotion are improved considerably.

Evaluate with your rater where you are, where you are going and what you need to do to improve your performance. If you have weight and physical fitness problems, you have no choice--get with the program! The downsizing of the Army will place you in harm's way if you are borderline on weight control or physical fitness.

The bottom line is to remember that selection is not intended as a reward for past performance, but for performance and potential for future service.

Colonel Jay Martin was the Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army Pacific at the time this article was written.

Leading by Example

Sergeant Major Ireland D. Pulley

Noncommissioned officers uphold the proud heritage of the NCO corps by teaching, training and caring for their soldiers. However, that teaching, training and caring does not always extend into the most fundamental and perhaps most important arena--the physical fitness of soldiers.

Without question, the physical fitness of the Army has improved tremendously in the past several years. Yet there remains much work to be done.

Disturbing statistics from Army physical fitness studies showed that 17 or more percent of soldiers could not pass the Army physical fitness test (APFT). A closer look at the data shows that in the youngest age groups (17-21, 22-26) fully 25 percent fail the test.

Because each of these young soldiers had to meet minimum Army standards to graduate from initial entrance training, it's obvious their fitness declined once they reached their units. The conclusion can only be that

there is a leadership failure as well as a training failure.

The most important part of leading is setting the example. Unfortunately, there is still a significant number of NCOs who cannot pass the APFT when they report to the Basic NCO Course, the Advanced NCO Course, and the Sergeants Major Academy. This is not only an outrage to the NCO corps but a slap in the face to those NCOs who do lead by example and maintain a high state of personal fitness.

Noncommissioned officers, who profess to be the Army's trainers, must not continue to send individuals to the NCO education system who can't meet minimum standards of fitness and personal appearance. To do so sends the wrong message to soldiers and condones unsatisfactory performance.

Those who fail the APFT are usually the same ones who accept or perpetuate substandard physical training. Their excuses? "Ability-

group runs break up unit cohesion by taking soldiers away from their NCOs." "The only way to run soldiers is behind a guidon." "Timed sets of exercises don't look military."

The answer to such unfounded excuses is that if unit cohesion is destroyed by separating squad leaders from their soldiers for one hour a day, those units have bigger problems than ability-group running. Exercises in cadence will not make teams of such units.

For this alarming trend to change, the NCO must start doing a better job in physical training. First, NCOs must lead by example and conduct smart training. Simply put, this means all must participate in physical training and insure that challenging training takes place. The best way to do this is to learn from and use the thousands of master fitness trainers out in the field.

It is also necessary to be familiar with FM 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training*. The old way of leading and training soldiers just doesn't cut it.

Not long ago DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) sent a message urging units to buy into the newer fitness doctrine and to conduct physical fitness training as it relates to how soldiers will fight on the battlefield. Unfortunately, some units cling to the old way of doing physical training, and the culprits appear to be senior NCOs and commanders.

Physical training must be intense and challenging to improve physical abilities. Training leaders must capture, understand and use the best available methods to improve the capabilities of soldiers.

The newer physical training techniques are designed to maximize the benefits for all soldiers by training them at

the proper level and incorporating physically demanding tasks from the mission-essential task list. Do not worry about how it looks--worry about how it works. An NCO's job is to ensure the training is effective and to lead by example; NCOs make things happen.

The NCO education system and officer professional development schools are incorporating physical fitness education at each level of training. Physical training time will be devoted to teaching leaders the how-to of physical fitness training. Staying in shape and being able to demonstrate it on the APFT remain an individual responsibility. This in itself will help correct many problems.

Trainers need to accept responsibility and do it right. The reduction


in forces means a much smaller force--a force that will need to train even smarter, insuring that every soldier is in the best possible physical condition. The primary emphasis of conditioning must be to prepare soldiers to meet the physical demands of war.

Every NCO's primary job is to lead, train and care for soldiers--to care enough in physical training to condition themselves to set the example and enforce the standards by training soldiers to do as they do. This is the mission of the NCO corps.

Sergeant Major Ireland D. Pulley was the Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN at the time this article was written.

Unit Inactivation or Relocation?

Commanders of units scheduled for inactivation or relocation are requested to notify the Editor, MILITARY POLICE Magazine, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030. This will enable us to update our distribution lists. Telephone numbers are AUTOVON 865-4326 or commercial (205) 848-4326.--editor.



Correction

On page 23 of the last issue of MILITARY POLICE (PB 19-91-2, December 1991), "Defending Enemy-Prisoner-of-War Camps, Part II" by MAJ Harry F. Noyes III, an error was made in the second paragraph. The Los Banos POW camp, whose occupants were liberated by U.S. airborne raiders in World War II, was located in the Philippines--not Italy as the article indicated.

In the Battalion-Level Command Designated Units listings in the December 1992 issue of MILITARY POLICE, the 705th Military Police Battalion was incorrectly referred to as the MP BN, USDB. The United States Disciplinary Barracks Military Police Battalion was readjusted as the 705th Military Police Battalion effective April 15, 1991.

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace

George Washington



Leader Development for Company-Grade Officers

First Lieutenant John J. Camps III

Officer professional development (OPD) generally means that a group of officers will be participating in a series of briefings either by attending them or by giving them. This form of professional development, the focus of this article, is aimed at commanders charged with developing unit OPD programs. It describes what an OPD program should be like from the point of view of those officers for whom it is most important: *lieutenants*.

Leader development, as defined in *Military Qualification Standards II, Manual of Common Tasks for Lieutenants and Captains* (STP 21-II-MQS), is the process through which individuals develop the skills, knowledge, and attitudes needed to lead, train, and employ Army units and organizations at increasing levels of responsibility. The significance of professional development becomes apparent when one reads *Battle-Focused Training* (FM 25-101): "...battalion commanders train company commanders...and company commanders train platoon leaders..." (page 1).

Officer professional development rests on three pillars that work simultaneously to ensure the proper development of a leader: institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development.

Operational assignments make up the majority of an officer's development. These assignments assist the officer in gaining expertise in their branch. Duties such as leading a platoon and commanding a company serve to develop each officer operationally.

Institutional training, such as the officer basic and advanced courses and Combined Arms and Service Staff School, make up the majority of an

officer's institutional training. Each course is programmed to take place prior to an officer's assuming a key operational assignment within their specialty branch. Completion of the above courses is a prerequisite for advancement within each branch.

Self-development, the third pillar, begins when an officer enters a precommissioning program, continues through commissioning, branch education, and operational assignments. It stops only when military service is completed. Self-development becomes the cement that bonds the leader development process together. The remainder of this article will discuss this third pillar of leader development.

In order to facilitate self-development and OPD programs, the Army has developed the military qualifications standard (MQS) system. All recently commissioned officers are issued the MQS II manual, which is tailored specifically toward company-grade officers. Each officer should also have received a branch-specific MQS II manual that further focuses self-development toward one's branch--STP 19-31, *All MQS* is the manual for the MP specialty. Commanders should use both of these references when developing a unit OPD program.

The major distractor for commanders in developing a meaningful OPD program instead of one that is based solely on training documents is the day-to-day mission. The rigors of daily operations can stifle an OPD program at unit level. This is where the MQS system can fail without commitment to a program.

The basis of self-development rests on the implication that officers will want to develop themselves, if not

for purely personal reasons, then for professional ones. Ponder the following question: Would you put as much effort into your self-development if you knew that no one was going to check your progress or monitor your efforts? In most cases you would not.

Even the most dedicated and selfless officers find themselves forced to choose between their own development and mission accomplishment. This is where the commander comes into the OPD self-development picture.

Commanders at all levels must stress OPD programs, especially at company level, and must participate in their program; battalion and brigade commanders must further emphasize it. A way to ensure that this occurs is by conducting evaluations and active participation. As training, OPD must be put on the training schedule. Once scheduled, a commander is responsible for ensuring that all such scheduled training occurs.

A key to success is to ensure that every OPD program has a reading program. At a minimum every program should follow the standards outlined in the MQS II manual. All company-grade officers must choose ten books from the foundation reading list. Officers are required to complete 50 percent of the foundation reading prior to beginning the advanced course and to complete all of it prior to selection for promotion to major.

Commanders can ensure that required reading is completed by requiring reports or briefings on the books. This would further develop two key job skills for officers: effective writing and briefing skills. The MQS manual lists many other titles that

could be used to develop specific unit reading lists.

Another key to success is to provide variety. Briefing and listening to lectures or participating in discussion all play a part in OPD, but if standing alone become boring. Once individuals become bored with instruction, any possible value that may have been gained disappears.

The goal should be to foster outright enthusiasm in the OPD program. Enthusiasm will then breed active participation and may lead to further self-development. Making use of the following whenever possible will ensure that those concerned actively participate.

Company level

- Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs)
- Guest lecturers
- Professional reading
- Battalion level
- Computer-assisted simulations
- Terrain rides
- Battle analysis seminars
- Leader certification programs
- Others
- History classes; civilian education

- Unit and branch professional associations
- Correspondence courses
- Shared experiences, periodic change-of-duty assignments, and additional duties

Another key to success is that commanders must participate at all levels. Participation means not only conducting OPD sessions, but actively participating in scheduled events whenever possible. Senior NCOs should also be involved whenever possible, both as instructors and participants. Their perspective, views, and experiences will be of great value to the development of junior officers.

Spouses and family members can be included when possible. Throughout the year events should be planned that include them. Terrain rides provide such an opportunity.

Professional development should be included on commanders' and officers' OER support forms and on OERs. This will further show that professional development is a concern of each officer's rating chain.

Homework, reports, tests, or briefings ensure those participating are learning. Assigning such activities

outside of OPD sessions will allow you to judge if subordinates are actively participating, and will force all involved to look into the topics more thoroughly. It will also force those individuals preparing development sessions to learn the topic.

For any professional development program to have sustenance, it must be more than a quarterly gathering of officers at battalion and more than Friday evening company sessions of the officers' club.

Your professional development program will be whatever you make it--a waste of time or one that builds the skills and knowledge of all participants. It may also develop a sense of pride and comradery.

First Lieutenant John J. Camps III was a student in the MP Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written. He holds a bachelor's degree from Kent State University (OH). He served as Rear Battle Plans Officer, HHC, 14th MP Brigade during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

CGSOC Nonresidency as a Viable Option

Major Rick Roberts and Captain Jim Lowerre

Junior officers frequently ask the School of Corresponding Studies (SOCS) if taking the nonresident Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) will help their careers if they are not selected to attend the resident course. The answer is that if you want promotion to lieutenant colonel take nonresident CGSOC.

Both the resident and nonresident courses are challenging. Taking the nonresident course requires the officer to perform a full-time job while completing the course at the same time. The nonresident version partially compensates for this additional burden by allowing a maximum of forty-eight months to complete the course. The nonresident CGSOC parallels the core curriculum of the 41-week resident course. The resident CGSOC instructors prepare and update the instruction presented in the nonresident CGSOC.

Enrollment and completion of nonresident CGSOC does not preclude an officer from being selected for the resident course. Officers are eligible for the resident course until they are either selected or are no longer eligible. Many officers believe that completing the nonresident version of CGSOC makes them more competitive for selection to attend the resident course.

Completion of CGSOC by either the resident or nonresident program results in a designation of military education level 4 (MEL-4).

Nonresident CGSOC is a six-phase sequential course. Each subcourse is a self-contained block of instruction with one or more examinations. Five subcourses require submission of subjectively-graded written requirements, and one subcourse requires an oral briefing. As mentioned earlier,

all requirements must be completed within forty-eight months of enrollment.

The nonresident CGSOC is offered in two options.

The *SC* option is the pure correspondence version. The individual student does all the work without classroom instruction. The SOCS mails instructional materials to the student by phase, examinations, and other graded requirements. Students return examinations and writing requirements to SOCS for grading.

The *M* option is under the auspices of the ninety-one U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools. There are over 350 teaching locations throughout the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, Germany, Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. Reserve Component (RC) officers serve as instructors at the USARF schools. Phases 1, 3, and 5 are from October through May during inactive duty training assemblies. Phases 2, 4, and 6 are from June to August during periods of active duty for training. Administration of examinations and written requirements are administered in the classroom.

Students may complete the nonresident CGSOC by correspondence (*SC* option), by attending the USARF schools (*M* option), or by participating in a combination of both options.

The eligibility criteria for nonresident CGSOC are as follows:

- All component officers in the rank of major or above who have completed an officer advanced course (OAC);
- Active Component captains who have completed both OAC and Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), phases 1 and 2;
- As of October 1, 1993 RC officers who have completed CAS3 (concurrent enrollment in CAS3 and the CGSOC is not authorized);
- Up to October 1, 1993 RC and non-OPMD captains who have not completed CAS3 but have seven years of commissioned service are eligible for enrollment. The seven years of commissioned service may be reduced to six with a waiver approved by SOCS. The officer's waiver request must have a cover letter or memorandum endorsed by their rater requesting the action. Reserve Component officers in a status without an assigned rater or commanding officer must submit their waiver requests through their control headquarters.

Education Technician Team Responsibility

Team	Responsibility	Telephone
1	Students A-E First U.S. Army Schools OAC Schools: OD, MI, MP, QM	AV 552-5615 Comm (913) 684-5584
2	Students F-K Second U.S. Army Schools OAC Schools: ADA, AR, AV, FA	AV 552-5615 Comm (913) 684-5615
3	Students L-R Fourth and Fifth U.S. Armies Schools OAC Schools: CM, TC, SC, IN	AV 552-5618 Comm (913) 684-5618
4	Students S-Z Sixth U.S. Army and Overseas Schools OAC Schools: AG, FN, CH, EN, AHS, JAG	AV 552-5407 Comm (913) 684-5407

Officers should not wait to complete CGSC. In this era of Army officer reductions being MEL-4 can only make an individual more competitive. Completion of the CGSOC may be the difference in retention and promotion. Prospective students should contact the team corresponding to the first letter of their last name with any questions they might have concerning enrollment.

Major Rick Roberts was serving as the Executive Officer of the School of Corresponding Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS at the time this article was written. He holds a master's degree in education administration from the University of Louisville (KY) and a bachelor's degree in education from the University of Southern Mississippi. He is a Command and General Staff College nonresident graduate.

Captain Jim Lowerre was serving as the School of Corresponding Studies Operations Officer at the time this article was written. He holds a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from Norwich University, CT.

**If love of money were the mainspring of all American action,
the officer corps long since would have disintegrated**

-anonymous

MILITARY POLICE Index of Articles for 1991

TRAINING

- Air Movement Operations for Desert Shield-- CPT Raymond J. Bernier, June 1991, page 14
- Law Enforcement Activity Days--LTC Dennis J. Foster, December 1991, page 5
- Combined Arms Training Strategy--MAJ Ralph K. Ellison and CPT John M. Huey, December 1991 page 7
- Reserve Support and Planning for a Crisis Plan Test Exercise--MAJ Douglas M. Brown, December 1991, page 13
- Centurion Shield: Military Police Participation in REFORGER 90--MAJ Charles J. Dietrick, December 1991, page 19
- Training with *Feldjaegers* in Centurion Shield--PFC Gregory C. Davis, December 1991, page 20
- Stubby Pencil Approach to Terrain Management--SSG Sandra Farley, December 1991, page 29
- Project Partnership--SSG Carrie Gobeli and Ms. Karen H. Gambone, December 1991, page 33
- Security Forces Training and Evaluation System--1LT Melinda C. King, December 1991, page 34
- Train Smart, Evaluate Smart--MAJ Gary W. Kosinuk, December 1991, page 37
- The DOD Police Program--CPT David W. Haywood, December 1991, page 38
- Prepping for the Point--COL James A. Orahoad, December 1991, 45
- Career Opportunities in the Army Acquisition Corps--LTC Daniel D. Ziomek, December 1991, page 48
- Training with Industry--CPT Michael S. Galloucis, December 1991, page 49

EDITORIALS

- A Sister Service Perspective on Military Police Operations--CPT R. Barry Cronin, USMC, June 1991, page 22

- The Times, They are A'Changing--LTC Herbert R. Tillery, June 1991, page 24
- Enforcing the Law--Ms. Karen H. Gambone, June 1991, page 32
- A Soldier's Request--SGM Frank M. McMahon, June 1991, page 40

HISTORY

- Lineage and Honors: The 159th Military Police Battalion--COL Earl O. Cullum, Dec. 1991, page 5
- The MP Role in the Opening of the Berlin Wall--1LT Robin Fontes, December 1991, page 24
- Closure of Allied Checkpoint Alpha--SSG Tony W. Howard, December 1991, page 28
- Before the Fall--SSG Richard C. Miller, December 1991, page 31

ARTICLES

- Readiness and Deployability to Desert Shield--COL Douglas H. Cobb, June 1991, page 4
- Contemporary Challenge of Port Security--COL Arnold Daxe, Jr. and CPT Laura G. Chawell, June 1991, page 6
- The Gulf Classic: When Military Police Tee-Up for the Real Thing--CPT Virginia A. Todd, June 1991, page 9
- Military Police Support to REFORGER 90--MAJ Donald J. Reed, June 1991, page 12
- CID Role as Desert Cops--Ms. Donna Miles, June 1991, page 12
- Defending Enemy-Prisoner-of-War Camps, Part I--MAJ Harry F. Noyes III, June 1991, page 16
- Evolution of Rear Operations Doctrine--LTC Ronald G. Rada, June 1991, page 17
- Supporting the Three--SGT Allan L. Perkins, June 1991, page 20
- 3ID Military Police Combat Role in Divisional Rear Operations--LTC Jack Silva, June 1991, page 21
- Automation and Military Police Missions--Mr. Edwin O. DeJesus, June 1991, page 32

- History of Automation Training in Law Enforcement--CW4 Dennis Scott, June 1991, page 32
- Computer Crime and the Army--CPT Randal L. Sullivan, June 1991, page 33
- Computer Literacy for the MP Soldier--CPT Thomas Z. Napier, June 1991, page 35
- Electronic Information Delivery System--Mr. Tim Oman and Mr. Patrick M. Kelly, June 1991, page 36
- Offense Reporting System--Mr. Tim Oman, June 1991, page 37
- Local Area Networks--Mr. Tim Oman, June 1991, page 39
- Computer-Related Crime: A Primer for Leaders, Part II--CPT Michael R. French, June 1991, page 41
- MILITARY POLICE* Index of Articles in 1990, June 1991, page 51
- Reserve Component Military Police Brigade-Level Command List, June 1991, inside back cover
- Living on the Edge in Korea--2LT Stephen A. Laurance, December 1991, page 4
- 3ID Military Police Role in Division Rear Operations, Part II--LTC Jack Silva, December 1991, page 16
- New MP Corps Regimental Command Sergeant Major, December 1991, page 22
- Defending Enemy-Prisoner-of-War Camps, Part II--MAJ Harry F. Noyes III, December 1991,, page 23
- Regimental Crest, December 1991, page 25
- The Army Goes Rolling Along, December 1991, page 28
- Providing Security for an International March--Mr. Brian Pigott, December 1991, page 33
- Communicative Skills, A Must for NCOs--SGM Jack L. Hooper, December 1991, page 44
- Importance of Effective Communication--LTC Richard St. Denis, December 1991, page 46
- Military Police Brigade and Battalion Level Command List, December 1991, inside back cover

**RESERVE COMPONENT
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS
AS OF 1 MAY 1992**

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
BG Richard J. Valente	CSM Frank V. Gallo	43d MP Bde	Warick, RI
COL Jerry Fields	CSM Bernis E. McGill	49th MP Bde	Alameda, CA
BG Gary J. Tellier	CSM Eugene R. Bowman	177th MP Bde	Detroit, MI
BG George G. Kundahl	CSM Calvin A. Lightfoot	220th MP Bde	Gaithersburg, MD
COL Craig Bambrough	CSM Joseph R. Sweeny	221st MP Bde	San Jose, CA
BG Stanley J. Haransky, Jr.	CSM Bryant J. Pegram	260th MP Bde	Washington, D.C.
BG Bruce G. MacDonald	CSM Carol R. Booth	300th MP Cmd	Inkster, MI
COL Evo Riguzzi, Jr.	CSM Patrick F. O'Connor	800th MP Bde	Hempstead, NY
COL Mark R. Bailey	CSM Curtis Reed	8830th MP Bde	Ft. Mead, MD



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